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Abstract 
This study examines sustainable development in practice, particularly in the 
context of mining and environmental management in a less developed 
country (LDC). It argues for sustainable and participatory mining in LDCs, 
such as Mongolia, by encouraging democratisation of the environmental 
impact assessment (EIA) process.  
The EIA, a major tool of environmental management, addresses the negative 
environmental and social impacts of development projects, such as mining, 
and has the capacity to mitigate such impacts by incorporating EIA 
recommendations into business practice. To ensure the inclusion of affected 
communities in the EIA process, public participation in EIAs is legislated in 
many countries. This is particularly important for mineral-rich LDCs, as 
they have experienced growing conflict among mining companies, local 
communities, and government authorities, due to a lack of dialogue among 
mining constituents and a lack of effective public policy and public 
engagement in the promotion of socially and environmentally accountable 
mining.  
This study applies Brown‘s (2009) dialogic accounting framework in the 
exploration and evaluation of current EIA practices. By using Mongolian 
EIA practices for illustrative purposes, this study seeks to contribute to 
debate in EIA and SEA literature, and to support calls for more participatory 
EIAs that can embed sustainable development into business practice. 
Furthermore, the current and potential engagement of NGOs in the EIAs of 
Mongolia is examined in order to explore their potential to foster dialogic 
accounting.  
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Chapter 1: INTRODUCTION 
This multi-disciplinary study examines environmental management, social and 
environmental accounting (SEA), mining, and non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs). It argues for sustainable and participatory mining in less developed 
countries (LDCs), such as Mongolia, by encouraging democratisation of the 
environmental impact assessment process. Dialogic accounting is explored as a 
potential accounting project for facilitating this process, given its critical pluralist 
roots and capacity to foster participatory democracy in relation to sustainable 
development (Bebbington, Brown, Frame, & Thomson, 2007; Brown, 2009; 
Dillard & Roslender, 2011).  
This chapter explains my motivations for undertaking the study, briefly discusses 
the scope of the study, identifies the research aims and objectives, and outlines the 
organisation of the thesis. 
1.1 Research motivations  
I had several motivations for undertaking this study. Personally, I support 
initiatives that apply sustainable development in practice, believing that this can 
lead to changes in both social and business values. Being a Mongolian, I wish to 
make a contribution to my country, and I regard this PhD research as an 
opportunity to make such a contribution. Accordingly, I have explored ways of 
promoting sustainable development in the Mongolian mining sector. I also wished 
to combine the study of mining and sustainability issues with accounting, as I see 
accounting as an important tool in the endeavour to operationalise sustainability-
oriented changes in business.   
Sustainable development – the idea of balancing economic and social 
development along with consideration for the state of the natural environment for 
future generations (UNWCED, 1987) – has been widely encouraged around the 
world. However, it is important to emphasise that this is not a totally new idea. In 
Mongolia, ideas of social equity, future generations, and the need to respect nature 
have influenced the social values and norms of Mongolians for centuries, as 
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Mongolian nomadic culture is closely interrelated with the natural environment. 
By defining and conceptualising sustainable development, the United Nations has 
reintroduced or reminded countries about their traditional goals and values in this 
‗money-oriented‘ era that overemphasises economic growth. Thus, I welcomed 
sustainable development, and wished to conduct research that would help apply it 
to Mongolian business practice. The mining sector was chosen for this reason.  
The study focuses on the environmental impact assessment (EIA) as an 
environmental management tool which aims to mitigate the negative 
environmental and social impacts of mining. In spite of enthusiasm by economists 
for mining as an income generator, mining-related social and environmental 
impacts have been increasingly questioned by communities around the world as 
well as in Mongolia.  
Since Mongolia‘s democratic revolution of 1990, Mongolia has been in transition 
from an authoritarian communist regime, with a centrally-planned economy, to a 
democracy with an open-market economy. Political and institutional changes, and 
economic liberalisation have created a boom in mining. Mining has dramatically 
increased because of the introduction of mining legislation, intended to attract 
foreign investors by promising favourable mining conditions, such as a ‗first come, 
first served‘ approach and tax-holiday incentives. As mineral deposits are 
distributed throughout Mongolia, many regions are affected by mining operations.  
With the increase of mining activities, the negative impacts on society and the 
natural environment have become more evident. Traditionally, Mongolia‘s unique 
nomadic culture has been found throughout the vast steppes and has emphasised 
living in harmony with nature.  Not surprisingly, poor mining practice and 
environmental degradation have antagonised local communities. In response, 
these communities have formed environmental and social NGOs to challenge the 
irresponsible behaviour of mining companies, and to seek better management of 
mining and greater accountability from government (Snow, 2010).  
Globally, mining companies are also under increasing social pressure to consider 
their impacts and to operate in a socially responsible manner. There are various 
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voluntary initiatives in the mining sector aimed at preserving their ―social licence 
to operate‖. For LDCs with rich mineral resources it is particularly important to 
have rigorous planning and management of mining development.  The mining 
practices of many LDCs show that poorly managed mining can result in serious 
environmental, social, and economic problems (MMSD, 2001). Once 
environmental degradation and other problems occur, it will be too late to reverse 
them. As the Mongolian proverb states, there is ―no need to put on a raincoat after 
the rain‖. Therefore, I decided to pursue mining issues from the environmental 
management perspective in the hope it may have the potential to counter the 
adverse effects of mining.  
Another reason for undertaking this study relates to the accounting discipline. As 
accounting is regarded as the language of business, it can both reflect and 
influence business values and ways of doing business. Arguably, accounting can 
and does play an important role in the ‗greening‘ of business and in developing 
various applications that could promote sustainable development. 
SEA researchers have actively initiated and engaged in discussions surrounding 
accountability, sustainability, and corporate social responsibility related initiatives 
and reporting practice. Dialogic accounting, an emerging SEA project, attracted 
my attention because of its promotion of multi-stakeholder dialogic engagement 
that could foster both accountability and sustainability. Thus I sought to conduct 
this study, which bridges SEA, mining, and the EIA, to address sustainability 
challenges.   
All these personal values, love of my country, and research curiosity have 
motivated this study. 
1.2 Scope of the research  
This is a multi-disciplinary study relating to SEA, mining, environmental 
management, and civil society. The primary focus is on exploring potential ways 
of improving the accountability of mining practices in LDCs, such as Mongolia.  
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Concepts of sustainable development have provided a major impetus for reflecting 
on and seeking to change organisational and societal values through various 
disciplines, such as accounting and environmental management.  This is often 
referred to as a paradigm shift from economic-oriented development towards 
sustainable development
1
 (Thomas & Mohan, 2007). Sustainable development has 
been enthusiastically supported in local and international circles in various 
disciplines and among many actors, such as practitioners, academics, politicians, 
international development agencies, and civil society organisations (Gray, 2006a; 
Nooteboom, 2007; Toth, 2010).  
As sustainability concepts have evolved, the mining sector has come under 
increasing scrutiny, and is now expected to behave in a socially and 
environmentally accountable way to ‗legitimate‘ its operations (CSP2 and WRI, 
2005; MMSD, 2002). It is argued that companies have moral obligations to take 
into account the social and environmental impacts of their activities (Millon, 1993; 
Molisa, Vandangombo, & Brown, forthcoming). There are ongoing debates 
among researchers about how to internalise social and environmental impacts, 
previously regarded as ‗externalities‘, so that sustainability can be taken seriously.  
SEA and environmental management are promising tools with which to respond 
to this challenge. SEA is defined as an organisational communication process that 
accounts to stakeholders for the social and environmental effects of business 
(Gray, Owen, & Mauders, 1987). The formation of sustainable development 
challenges the traditional instrumental approach, and requires a systematic rethink 
of accounting so that development can be studied in all its social complexity 
(Gray, Owen, & Adams, 1996; Morgan, 1988; Unerman, Bebbington, & O'Dwyer, 
2007).  
Unlike mainstream accounting, SEA explicitly acknowledges the importance of 
stakeholders, their engagement in accountability issues, and the urgency of social 
and environmental considerations in economic processes. It argues for public-
                                               
1  However, sustainable development is a ‗contested‘ concept that is interpreted differently by 
various actors (Söderbaum, 2011).    
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interest oriented accounting as a potential proposal to address sustainability (Gray, 
2006a; Lehman, 2005; Unerman, et al., 2007). Research is needed to explore 
possible ways to pursue SEA engagement, especially for LDCs that have not yet 
been closely investigated in SEA literature (Molisa, et al., forthcoming).  
Dialogic accounting, an emerging SEA project, argues for dialogic engagement of 
different actors to open up discussion on contested issues, such as mining and its 
impacts (Bebbington, Brown, Frame, et al., 2007; Brown, 2009; Dillard & 
Roslender, 2011). Dialogic accounting calls for more pluralistic and democratic 
accounting so as to humanise accounting and business with insights from 
sustainable development (Bebbington, Brown, Frame, et al., 2007). It argues the 
need for dialogic engagement of all actors in contested issues. Through dialogue, 
areas of agreement and disagreement and power dynamics among participants 
may be revealed (Brown, 2009).  Dialogic accounting seeks to open up an arena 
for participation and debate on how to regard accountability from the perspectives 
of different actors, including what and how issues need to be addressed. This 
thesis explores its potential for enabling engagement among mining constituents 
to discuss social and environmental issues.  
Another potential arena for addressing the sustainability challenges of mining is 
the EIA. This is an environmental management tool that addresses the negative 
environmental and social impacts of development projects such as mining, and 
attempts to mitigate such impacts by incorporating EIA recommendations into 
business practice. To ensure the inclusion of affected communities, public 
participation in EIAs is legislated in many countries (Glasson, Therivel, & 
Chadwick, 2005).  
In spite of its potential to promote sustainable development (Doberstein, 2003; 
Söderbaum, 2004; Wilkins, 2003), the EIA has been criticised for its technocracy 
and symbolic participation practice in developed countries and LDCs (Jay, Jones, 
Slinn, & Wood, 2007; Morgan, 1998; Rockloff & Lockie, 2006). At the same time, 
there are proposals in the EIA literature for meaningful public participation that 
can challenge existing technocratic EIAs and provide greater social learning for 
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EIA constituents (Diduck, Sinclair, Pratar, & Hostetler, 2007; Sinclair, Diduck, & 
Fitzpatrick, 2008; Webler & Tuler, 2006).  
This is particularly important for mineral-rich LDCs as they have experienced 
growing conflicts (Szablowski, 2007) among mining companies, local 
communities and government authorities, due to a lack of dialogue among mining 
constituents and a lack of effective public policy and public engagement in the 
promotion of socially and environmentally accountable mining (CSP
2 
and WRI, 
2005). There is a need for research to investigate EIA mining practices, and to 
examine its potential for, and the challenges of, fostering responsible mining. 
Civil society actors, namely non-governmental organisations (NGOs), have 
performed crucial roles in promoting sustainability and accountability initiatives, 
by challenging mining, particularly in LDCs, and advocating for participatory 
environmental decision-making. NGOs are studied in literature concerning both 
the SEA and EIA. Especially in LDCs, local, national and international NGOs 
have actively raised public awareness of social and environmental issues, 
undertaken collective actions against local and multinational corporations, and 
challenged their socially and environmentally unfriendly business behaviours 
(Betsill & Corell, 2008; Howell & Pearce, 2001; Schlosberg, 2007). Thus, NGOs 
have been regarded as a leading actor, encouraging participation in contested 
issues surrounding mining and environmental management (Li, 2009; Schlosberg, 
2007; Szablowski, 2007). 
NGOs have also been criticised in many disciplines. In SEA, researchers have 
begun to address accounting and accountability issues relating to NGOs, 
particularly international advocacy NGOs (Gray, Bebbington, & Collison, 2006; 
Lehman, 2007; O'Dwyer, 2007; O'Dwyer & Unerman, 2008; Unerman & 
O'Dwyer, 2006). In development studies and civil society literature, the 
accountability of NGOs is questioned, along with their representative powers, 
outreach to LDC beneficiaries, their over-reliance on donors, and opportunistic 
behaviours (Bano, 2008; Bebbington, 2005; Howell & Pearce, 2001; Munck, 
2006). However, the NGO sector is also seen as an under-researched area, and the 
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potential of NGOs for promoting accountability, sustainability and participatory 
mining and environmental management has been recognised (Betsill & Corell, 
2008; Edwards & Sen, 2000; Feher, Krikorian, & McKee, 2007; Gray, et al., 
2006).  
This study explores the potential of dialogic accounting to address sustainability 
challenges that arise in LDCs. To this end, the EIA for mining projects can be 
regarded as a tool and a process, where environmental and social issues of mining 
projects are discussed and assessed, and alternatives for mitigation methods of 
these impacts are developed. Furthermore, the current and potential engagement 
of NGOs in the EIAs of an LDC is examined to explore their potential for 
fostering dialogic accounting.  
1.3 Research aims and objectives 
The principal goal of this study is to examine the use of the EIA in Mongolian 
mining and its potential as a dialogic accounting tool. The specific objectives are 
threefold:  
1. to address global and local calls for sustainable and participatory mining. 
2. to problematise symbolic participation practices evident in current EIA 
practice and to investigate ways of fostering more inclusive and meaningful 
EIA practices.  To this end, the study focuses on the EIA as a potential 
dialogic tool for promoting sustainable and participatory mining, drawing on 
Brown‘s (2009) critical dialogic accounting framework to evaluate existing 
EIA practices and to suggest new ones.  
3. to examine environmental and mining-related NGOs in Mongolia and to 
explore their potential for promoting dialogic EIAs that could ‗democratise‘ 
environmental management and improve the performance of mining 
companies in relation to sustainable development.  
Research questions are developed to understand the status quo of mining and 
EIAs, and to explore the potential for applying dialogic accounting to the EIA. If 
dialogic accounting has the potential to open up contestation of controversial 
issues and areas, such as mining and environmental decision-making, then it is 
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important, first, to understand the complexity of these fields and their main actors. 
Issues, such as how the mining sector and the EIA framework have developed, 
what participants have been involved, and what challenges mining and EIAs 
encounter, need to be investigated. Further, theoretical questions are designed to 
examine whether existing EIA practice is monologic or dialogic, and to explore 
the potential application of dialogic accounting.     
The key research question and sub-questions are as follows: Can the EIA provide 
a dialogic accounting tool to promote sustainable and participatory mining.  This 
leads to four sub-questions:  
1. Why do we need sustainable and participatory mining? 
2. Are existing EIA practices primarily monologic or dialogic?  
3. Can the EIA be a dialogic accounting tool to promote sustainable and 
participatory mining? 
4. What role(s) might NGOs play in promoting dialogic EIA practices? 
This study seeks to make theoretical and practical contributions and, to these ends, 
spans a number of fields of study.   
This thesis seeks to contribute to literature on SEA, particularly dialogic 
accounting, and EIA. Dialogic accounting proposes dialogic engagement and 
pluralism to foster sustainability and accountability issues. This study applies the 
dialogic accounting framework to the EIA, endeavouring to link SEA with other 
disciplines so as to stimulate discussion of social and environmental mining 
concerns.   
This study also draws NGOs into the application of dialogic accounting. The 
accountability of business can be addressed in a number of ways; stakeholders, 
including local communities and NGOs, have the potential to promote dialogic 
EIAs in different ways, depending on their perspectives and chosen strategies. 
This study proposes that a transformation towards dialogic EIAs may come from 
and be facilitated by a combination of insider and outsider NGO engagements.  
By using Mongolian EIA practice for illustrative purposes, this study seeks to 
contribute to the ongoing debate in EIA literature. It supports calls within EIA 
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research communities that seek more participatory approaches to EIA to apply 
notions of sustainable development in practice, and to enable social learning 
among EIA constituents.   
The study aims to foster mining related debate, and proposes that sustainability 
challenges can be addressed through EIA and dialogic accounting. It suggests that 
sustainable and participatory mining may be encouraged through greater 
participation and dialogic engagement in EIAs that are conducted before mining 
projects begin. In this way the EIA – a well institutionalised environmental 
management tool around the world – has the potential to include sustainability and 
participatory aspects into the life cycle of mining projects.  
This study also aims to provide practical benefits for the Mongolian EIA 
framework. There is a lack of research in Mongolia examining the EIA framework 
and public participation in the mining context, because both EIA and mining are 
relatively new to Mongolia. The emergence of environmental and mining NGOs 
is another new phenomenon in Mongolian society, which requires attention from 
research communities.    
In short, the aim is to contribute to the development of SEA and related fields by 
exploring the potential application of the dialogic accounting framework to EIA 
mining practices in an LDC, and by exploring the potential role(s) of NGOs in 
promoting this practice. I hope this study can help foster debate on sustainability 
applications, and provide new avenues of thought and discussion for SEA and 
EIA researchers and mining constituents.  
1.4 Thesis organisation 
The nine chapters of this thesis are organised as follows: 
Chapter 2 discusses the principal challenges of addressing sustainable 
development in the mining sector. It introduces the nature of mining and its 
impacts, and reviews mining issues raised by global and national communities. 
The historical context of Mongolia‘s mining sector is examined in terms of 
economic, social and political factors, providing an overview of the industry.  
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Chapter 3 describes SEA in relation to dialogic accounting. It investigates the 
debates and calls for SEA, and explores dialogic accounting as a potential SEA 
project for promoting pluralistic and public-interest oriented accounting to foster 
sustainability. The chapter also introduces EIA, its application and ongoing debate 
among EIA research communities regarding the potential of EIA to address 
sustainability issues and for promoting participatory environmental decision-
making.  
Chapter 4 discusses NGOs and their roles in promoting participatory decision-
making, sustainable development, and environmentally and socially accountable 
mining, globally and nationally. It also provides an overview of the Mongolian 
NGO sector and its development.    
Chapter 5 briefly summarises the literature reviews on mining, SEA, EIA and 
NGO for the purposes of locating the study. It also introduces dialogic accounting 
in more detail, focusing on discussion of technocracy, monologism and 
participatory democracies. The chapter also proposes an analytical framework for 
this study, based on the dialogic accounting framework developed by Brown 
(2009). 
Chapter 6 justifies the use of qualitative case-study methods to conduct this 
exploratory and multi-disciplinary study. It outlines the research process and 
explains the research methods used, and what and how data were collected, 
validated, and analysed.  
Chapter 7 explores Mongolian EIA practice and public participation in EIAs. 
Development of the EIA, public participation, and contestation and power issues 
among EIA constituents are investigated, employing the analytical framework 
developed in Chapter 5. The chapter also discusses findings and possible ways to 
improve the existing EIA framework.  
Chapter 8 examines the development of Mongolian NGOs with a particular focus 
on environmental and mining NGOs. The roles of NGOs are discussed and case-
studies of two environmental and mining related NGOs are presented. The chapter 
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discusses the potential of, and challenges facing, environmental NGOs for 
promoting sustainable and participatory mining, and discusses ways to foster 
dialogic EIAs.  
Chapter 9 presents my conclusions, discusses the contributions and limitations of 
my study, and provides suggestions for future research.  
  
12 
 
Chapter 2: A CALL FOR ECONOMICALLY SUSTAINABLE 
AND PARTICIPATORY MINING 
2.1 Role of mining in the world 
A growing world population creates an ever increasing demand for consumer 
products and thus demand for the mineral resources from which such products are 
made. Base metal minerals, such as copper, coal, gold, and iron ore are 
extensively used in energy, manufacturing, construction and heavy industries. 
Moreover, some emerging economies such as China and India are becoming 
rapidly industrialised, which increases even further global mineral demand 
(Australian Government: Corporate and Markets Advisory Committee, 2006, 
Article 5).  
Mining has developed unevenly throughout the world. By 2004, the mining 
exports of 78 countries accounted for 2.6 percent of the world‘s annual GDP 
(Crowson, 2009). Fifty-three less developed countries (LDCs) are mineral 
dependent  (Ross, 2008). Mining in these countries accounts for more than five 
percent of their annual GDP and plays a significant role in earning their export 
revenue. In 2000, 27 mineral dependent countries had mineral exports that 
accounted for more than 20 percent of GDP (Ross, 2008).   
Compared with other economic sectors, mining is capital intensive, with high 
risks due to the inaccessibility and scarcity of mineral resources. The most easily 
accessible minerals have been extracted over the last few centuries, so today, 
companies must spend much time and money to extract minerals from deeper 
underground or from seashores (MMSD, 2001). Most mineral resources are 
spread unevenly throughout different regions and are becoming scarcer, as they 
are non-renewable and have been formed over millions of years in specific 
geological contexts. This quest to extract remaining deposits has resulted in more 
investment in many geographical regions, with no guarantee of finding 
economically viable mineral deposits.  
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Even discoveries of large mineral deposits do not necessarily lead to extraction 
and processing as they require huge capital investment in extraction equipment, 
mining-site development, processing factories, technologies and more (MMSD, 
2001, 2002). Therefore, risk sharing is common in mining, as a sole company 
often has insufficient capital and capacity to mine large deposits. Globalisation 
has allowed companies to operate anywhere in the world, so many smaller mining 
companies conduct exploration and then sell mining licences to larger mining 
companies once they have found economically viable mineral deposits and 
obtained mining licences (Ross, 2008). Large companies or consortiums can mine 
large deposits, given their capital and technical capacities. Consequently, the 
mining sector has seen considerable mergers and acquisitions (Humphreys, 2006). 
Today, only a few large mining conglomerates hold mining rights to the biggest 
deposits in the world, and their power and influence would exceed that of many 
nation-states (Global Witness, 2005).      
Mining has increasingly spread to previously inaccessible regions or once 
economically unviable deposits, due to the economic liberalisation in many 
countries after the ‗cold war era‘, technological advancements in mining and 
geology, globalisation, and the rapid development of information and 
communication systems (CSP
2 
and WRI, 2005; Humphreys, 2005).  
With the end of communist authoritarian regimes and colonialism, countries in 
Eastern Europe, Asia and elsewhere have opened their economies to foreign trade 
and investment, and have undertaken rapid liberalisation involving privatisation of 
state-owned mining companies, lower rates of tax and royalties, and restructured 
mining laws to attract greater foreign direct investment (Bury, 2005; Szablowski, 
2007). This neo-liberal development agenda, often supported by international 
donor organisations, has brought mining sector prosperity to many LDCs over the 
last few decades (Slack, 2009) as well as increasing concern about the benefits 
and costs.  
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2.1.1 Mining impacts 
Mining has both positive and negative economic, social, and environmental 
impacts.  
2.1.1.1 Economic impacts 
Mining has been received with hope and enthusiasm in many LDCs as it is 
perceived as a key determinant of development and economic growth. 
Economists, policy-makers and international policy advisors, influenced by neo-
classical economics, have enthusiastically supported mining development, 
particularly in LDCs, in the belief that it will increase production, export income, 
tax revenue and reduce unemployment (Slack, 2009). The increased economic 
growth is claimed to reduce the inequalities of income distribution (Ross, 1997, 
2004, 2008; Stevens, 2003).  
However, in many LDCs mining has not led to economic prosperity. In spite of 
having rich mineral resources and high economic growth, poverty and inequality 
in such countries are worsening (Crowson, 2009; Ross, 2008). Terms such as 
‗Dutch disease‘, ‗resource curse‘ or ‗inequality trap‘, have been used to describe 
such results.  
 ‗Dutch disease‘ was termed after mineral-sector led economic development 
biased the Dutch economy during the 1970s. This relates to mineral-rich countries 
having a higher risk of becoming dependent on their mining sector, which is 
vulnerable to global price fluctuations of minerals. Excess concentration on 
mining can result in labour moving from other sectors to mining due to higher 
wages (Crowson, 2009). Consequently, sectors which cannot compete with 
mining wages, reduce their production or become bankrupt (Lahiridutt, 2006). 
Although mining may generate economic growth, the economy can become less 
diversified and more dependent on mining exports and volatile global mineral 
prices (Ross, 2008).  
Some LDCs have experienced the so-called ‗resource curse‘ or ‗inequality trap‘. 
Countries, such as Algeria, Angola, Colombia, the Democratic Republic of 
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Congo, the Republic of Congo, and Nigeria show results that are contrary to neo-
classical economic theory (Ross, 2008, p. 189). Instead of increased prosperity, 
mineral wealth has increased inequality, given rise to violent conflicts and 
corruption, increased country risk and decreased foreign investment, and limited 
diversification of the economy (Ross, 2004). Poor governance and control of 
politics and economies by elites has often resulted in mismanagement of mining 
sectors, and caused an increase in rent-seeking ‗predatory state‘ behaviours 
(Stevens, 2003). Governments are encouraged to control mineral mining 
(Szablowski, 2007; World Bank & International Finance Corporation, 2002), but 
some can become more bureaucratic and corrupt, which creates a mining 
inequality trap. It becomes difficult to break out of the trap, as considerable 
political will and effort are required to overcome entrenched economic, social and 
political practices (p. 193). Some countries, such as Bolivia and Chile, have used 
their resources well and enjoy economic prosperity (Ross, 2008), but most 
resource-rich LDCs are vulnerable to or suffer from the ‗resource curse‘ 
(Crowson, 2009; Stevens, 2003).  
In spite of increases in mining-led investment and economic growth, mining has 
often not brought benefits to LDCs, in terms of social well-being and the 
environment. Therefore, the economic contribution of mining must be treated 
cautiously because of its social and environmental impacts before, during, and 
after mining development.  
2.1.1.2 Environmental impacts 
Mining is ‗digging, removing soil, and separating out ores and non-metal 
minerals‘ (World Bank & International Finance Corporation, 2002, p. 1), hence it 
has negative impacts on the natural environment. Compared with other extractive 
resources such as oil and gas, hard-rock and coal mining have greater 
environmental impacts (Diamond, 2005), causing water and air pollution, land 
disturbance, tailings, and acid drainage.  
Mining activities include digging the land‘s surface, using water sources, and 
piling waste rocks and ores in tailings, and dumps that carry the danger of acid 
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drainage. Mining can cause water, soil, and air pollution that lasts for substantial 
periods (CSP
2 
and WRI, 2005; Diamond, 2005). If mining operates in a fragile 
and relatively closed ecosystem, such environmental disturbances affect the 
biodiversity and ecological systems of a region (Warner & Sullivan, 2004, p. 9). 
Technological advancements have allowed mining to operate almost anywhere 
and it occurs more frequently in geographically isolated areas of LDCs, making 
biodiversity and ecosystems vulnerable to external or human activities (CSP
2 
and 
WRI, 2005).  
Land disturbance from mining without proper controls can be disastrous both 
during mining operations and after their closure. As mining commences with 
digging and removing top soil, the most fertile land and all vegetation with its 
biodiversity disappear (MMSD, 2001). Where there is low metal concentration in 
metal-bearing ores
2
, huge amounts of soil become waste. Therefore, mining needs 
careful planning and implementation of waste solutions and rehabilitation after 
mining closure (MMSD, 2002).  
Mining generates various types of waste, including overburden, waste rock, 
tailings and heaps of leach-spent ore (MMSD, 2002, p. 234). Mounting tailings 
are created after separating the ore. Unfortunately, there is a worldwide lack of 
comprehensive legal requirements for the disposal of mining waste (Otto, 2009). 
Common solutions are dumping tailings into a river or ocean, piling them up on 
land, or (mostly) behind a dam (Diamond, 2005, p. 453). All cause water pollution 
and acid drainage problems (MMSD, 2002; Otto, 2009).   
Disposal of mining waste into a river or ocean also causes water pollution. 
Chemicals, such as mercury and cyanide from gold or silver mining, and sulphuric 
acid from copper and uranium mining (MMSD, 2002, p. 235), are commonly used 
in ore separation processes. Mining companies should use chemicals to neutralise 
waste tailings, but they are often allowed to reach poisonous chemical 
                                               
2 The ratio of the earth to metal is 1:400 for a copper mine and 1:5,000,000 for a gold mine 
(Diamond, 2005, p. 460). 
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concentrations
3
 (MMSD, 2002, p. 235). Disposal of waste into water results in 
higher chemical concentrations of metals in water (UNEP GEMS/Water 
Programmes, 2006, p. 26). For instance, hard-rock mining is blamed for half of 
the reported industrial pollution in the USA, and nearly half of Western USA river 
headwaters are polluted by mining (Diamond, 2005, p. 452). Water pollution in 
LDCs threatens the life of local communities as it causes the loss of fish – the 
main food and source of living for locals. For example, the failure of the poorly 
constructed dam by BHP in the Ok Tedi copper mine of Papua New Guinea 
discharged 200,000 tonnes of mining tailings and waste into the Ok Tedi River in 
the late 1990s and destroyed its fishery, a source of living for 50,000 people 
(Diamond, 2005, p. 454).  
Dumping mining waste as tailings has another serious negative impact on the 
natural environment – acid drainage (MMSD, 2002). Tailings and dams often 
hold high concentrations of metals and poisonous chemicals, even after 
neutralisation, so piled tailings have a high risk of causing acid drainage (CSP
2 
and WRI, 2005). This is ―characterized by depressed pH values and elevated 
concentrations of dissolved heavy metals; the sulphuric acid easily dissolves 
metals such as iron, copper, aluminium, and lead‖ (MMSD, 2002, p. 238). Such 
drainage can have a devastating impact on ecosystems and usually lasts a long 
time (Tarras-Wahlberg & Nguyen, 2008).  
Without proper regulation of accurate measurements, the clean-up costs
4
 of water, 
air and land pollution are often underestimated or avoided
5
 by mining companies 
(Diamond, 2005, p. 455). Consequently, the main victims of negative impacts of 
mining are ordinary people and governments due to the high cost of rehabilitation 
projects, using taxpayers‘ money. For instance, from 1980 the USA Superfund 
                                               
3 Neutralisation practices, in particular, in LDCs are poor as it is costly (Diamond, 2005; MMSD, 
2002)    
4 Although there some initiatives, such as Integrated Environmental and Economic Accounting 
(UNEP, 2003) and Global Reporting Initiative (GRI, 2006), practical implications are critically 
weak.     
5  Becoming bankrupt is one way to avoid clean-up responsibilities. In the 1990s, after the 
bankruptcy of Pegasus Gold Inc., in Montana, and Galactic Resources‘ Summitville Mine in 
Colorado in USA, taxpayers paid US$169,500 million to clean polluted rivers (Diamond, 2005, pp. 
456-457).  
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required companies to remedy environmental problems they created, but in 1990 
Congress authorised US$15.2 billion expenditure for clean-up operations when 
many companies responsible for the pollution had become bankrupt (Milne & 
Patten, 2002). By 1990 there were 1,200 sites on the National Priorities List of the 
USA, and  the average clean-up costs were US$30 million (Milne & Patten, 2002, 
p. 379).       
Mining accidents often occur because of improper management and control of 
tailings and dumps. Anecdotal evidence suggests that every year there is one large 
accident from a tailing dam (Diamond, 2005; MMSD, 2002). The UNEP (2000) 
reports that failure of tailings storage facilities accounted for three-quarters of 
major mining-related environmental incidents since 1975 (MMSD, 2002, p. 240). 
LDCs and their natural environments often become victims of poor mining 
practices. They often lack financial, professional and technical capacities to 
mitigate mining-related problems (Reed, 2002) and are often unaware of negative 
environmental consequences (MMSD, 2002; Tarras-Wahlberg, 2002; Tarras-
Wahlberg & Nguyen, 2008).  
2.1.1.3 Social, cultural and political impacts 
Researchers and practitioners have begun to address the negative social impacts of 
mining since the 1970s. However, these are controversial issues; given the 
complexity of social life and the effect of economics on the natural environment, 
the negative social impacts are difficult to measure (Mitchell, 2001). As most 
impacts occur gradually over a long period, they are often less noticeable. Social 
impacts can be classified as social, cultural, and political (MMSD, 2002). Mining 
development in LDCs needs careful consideration as it can have more serious 
direct and indirect social consequences than in developed countries where there is 
better governance, rule of law, and well-sustained social development.       
2.1.1.3.1 Social impacts 
In LDCs, the arrival of mining can result in the immigration of non-local people, 
as local people are often not employed due to their lack of training and 
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professional skills in mining. Immigration creates social issues such as 
overpopulation, gender imbalance, and increased crime-rates near mining areas 
(MMSD, 2002). With the increased population, the local capacity and resources of 
social services, such as health, education, police, beverage and water, become 
inadequate for meeting the population‘s needs (Ross, 2004, 2008). Consequently, 
accessing facilities becomes challenging for local people, as they usually have 
lower incomes and less ability to access such facilities and services compared to 
miners (CSP
2 
and WRI, 2005).  
Moreover, increases in gender imbalance, alcoholism, crime and prostitution are 
often associated with a growing number of male workers in mining areas 
(MMSD, 2001). Local women become more marginalised than before mining 
(CSP
2 
and WRI, 2005; ICMM, 2005). Immigration can also raise health issues for 
local people (World Bank, 1992). Previously uncommon diseases, such as 
HIV/AIDS, can occur as a result of overpopulation and prostitution (MMSD, 
2001). Essential human rights of local people, such as the rights
6
 of women, 
children, and indigenous people, and rights to live in a safe and healthy 
environment and to be informed, are often violated in LDCs (CSP
2 
and WRI, 
2005; Martin, 2006; MMSD, 2002). In addition, poorly managed mining 
companies, which infringe employees‘ rights and neglect health and safety issues, 
precipitate conflicts with their employees and accidents  (Martin, 2006). 
As mining companies receive formal consent from central government for their 
mining licensed areas, local communities are forced to move to other areas, which 
transfers migration and social problems elsewhere (CSP
2 
and WRI, 2005). Hence, 
local and indigenous people are often disadvantaged and marginalised following 
mining development in their areas (Haselip & Hilson, 2005; Rockloff & Lockie, 
2006).  
Additionally, mining-related water pollution can bring serious health problems for 
local people. One highly publicised environmental accident that occurred in the 
                                               
6 Human rights declared by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; the UN Declaration on the 
Right to Development; the International Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; and 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (CSP2 and WRI, 2005, p. 7)  
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Philippines in 1996 caused serious health and survival issues for local people. 
Following a burst concrete plug, which sealed a drainage tunnel, at the Marcopper 
mine, four million tonnes of mine tailings poured into the Boac River. After the 
accident, a UN assessment team declared the river to be biologically dead. The 
spill not only destroyed all aquatic life in the river but also affected more than 
20,000 people living along the river (MMSD, 2002, p. 204). 
2.1.1.3.2 Cultural impacts 
Some researchers argue that the cultural impacts of mining should be considered 
alongside other social and environmental impacts (Söderbaum, 2007, p. 614). 
Mining has increasingly operated in isolated areas, where local and indigenous 
people have unique cultures, and traditions are often vulnerable to the imported 
ways of outsiders and other cultures.  
Growing natural resource exploitation in LDCs cause, increasingly, local cultures 
to ―resemble dominant modern cultures, with their individualistic and productive 
ethos and market orientation‖ (Escobar, 2006, p. 7). For example, Potosi, in 
Bolivia, has experienced great human, cultural and environmental damage after 
five centuries of mining (MMSD, 2002). Such cultural disturbances may replace 
local culture with cultural monologism, marginalise local people, and precipitate 
conflict between local communities and mining companies.    
2.1.1.3.3 Political impacts 
Consistent with the concept of ‗resource curse‘, a growing number of studies 
argue that mining has direct and indirect impacts on the politics of LDCs. Due to 
poor governance and weak institutional capacities, a mining boom often creates a 
rent-seeking, predatory behaviour by government, as well as increased corruption, 
conflict and civil war (Ross, 2004, 2008; Stevens, 2003). Negative political 
impacts of mining are dangerous as they can weaken governance and 
accountability, and worsen injustice and inequality. This has attracted the 
attention of international donor and civil society organisations, researchers and 
practitioners (CSP
2 
and WRI, 2005; MMSD, 2002; Ross, 2004; World Bank & 
International Finance Corporation, 2002).  
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In many mineral-rich countries with poor governance and economic conditions, 
growing mining interests and foreign direct investment bring greater rent-seeking 
behaviours. Their governments become vulnerable to ―predatory‖ behaviours, as 
mining can generate enormous revenues compared with other sectors. Common 
rent-seeking behaviour include creating or increasing windfall tax rates, 
demanding mandatory state shares, royalties, bribes, and lobbying (World Bank, 
2007b). Furthermore, the strategic importance and income generated in individual 
countries makes mining a politicised sector: ―large-scale resource revenues create 
a pot that is worth fighting for since whoever is in power is better able to plunder 
that pot‖ (Stevens, 2003, p. 8). Therefore, mining development in LDCs can 
increase political instability and country risk, which in turn negatively affects 
further mining investment and development (Auty, 2007). 
Research in development studies and public policy suggests that mining 
contributes to corruption in many LDCs. Some mining companies bribe 
politicians, senior public officials, and public servants to facilitate access to 
licences for mining projects, or to obtain ‗soft‘ contracts that provide favourable 
conditions for projects, or to avoid revenue sharing, and environmental and social 
obligations (Stevens, 2003; Szablowski, 2007). Some mining companies lobby 
and bribe public officials because it is a less costly way of doing business (World 
Bank & International Finance Corporation, 2002) rather than adhering to very 
bureaucratic procedures in countries with high levels of corruption and nepotism 
(Stevens, 2003). In both cases, companies promote more corruption, including 
grand corruption
7
, in host countries (Hilson & Maconachie, 2009).  
Corruption affects every aspect of society, politics, and economics of countries, 
and threatens human rights, accountability and democracy. It results in unjust 
income distribution, increased inequality, improper use of investment, 
unproductive public and private sectors, and can lead to a ‗shadow‘ economy and 
tax cheating (Lambsdorff, 2006). Combating corruption in countries with endemic 
                                               
7  There are two types of corruption: petty corruption and grand corruption. Grand corruption 
involves a large sum of money that is paid to political elites and higher-level public officials 
(World Bank, 1997, p. 34). 
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corruption becomes a major challenge as it requires a greater political will and 
radical changes in the political and social environments of public institutions 
(Smith, 2010).   
Many conflicts in LDCs have arisen due to the unfair distribution of wealth and 
ecological resources created by their mining sectors (Urkidi, 2010). Mineral-based 
conflicts can instigate serious conflicts among mining constituents, human-rights 
violations, and even civil wars in LDCs (Humphreys, 2005; Martin, 2006; Ross, 
2008). 
Unfair wealth distribution can cause conflicts between the government, the public 
and mining companies. Many LDCs cannot benefit from mining revenues due to 
their poor legislative frameworks, governance, and their limited human and 
institutional capacities (MMSD, 2001, 2002; Ross, 2008; World Bank & 
International Finance Corporation, 2003). They receive an insufficient share of 
mining revenues and fail to distribute such income to promote development, 
alleviate poverty, and improve the well-being of locals (Martin, 2006). 
Mining companies often fail significantly to share their revenues with 
governments of their host countries and especially with local people (Diamond, 
2005). They favour tax holidays, a favourable investment environment, and the 
easy granting of mining licences in countries with weak governance, poor rule of 
law, and endemic corruption. Occasionally they provide ad hoc donations for local 
development which do not address local issues or improve living standards (CSP
2 
and WRI, 2005; MMSD, 2002). Moreover, the local population often have 
insufficient power and knowledge to influence mining decisions, to demand 
improved revenue sharing, or to protect their human rights (CSP
2 
and WRI, 2005; 
Martin, 2006).            
Given their lack of expertise and capacity to address mining issues and their high 
levels of politicisation, governments in many LDCs are incapable of making 
strong contracts with multinational mining companies to gain a better share of 
mining revenues (Mbaku, 1992). Even if they receive a proper share of mining 
revenues, many LCDs fail to provide effective and fair income distribution for 
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their people (Martin, 2006). Predatory states often attempt to receive more income 
but not for the ‗public interest‘. Moreover, greater mineral resource income can 
increase social conflict. Poor governance and accountability, and politicisation 
lead bureaucrats to act in their political and individual interests as the ―... bulk of 
rents created in these economies are channelled by bureaucrats, the majority of 
whom are members of the politically dominant group...‖ (Mbaku, 1992, p. 250). 
Instead of fulfilling their responsibility to act in the public interest, a few senior 
officials use mining-generated income illegally for personal or political interests 
or to fund political activities, civil war, and even for abuses of human rights, as in 
Sudan and Nigeria (Martin, 2006).        
A growing number of conflicts among mining constituents are caused by negative 
environmental impacts of mining in LDCs. Local and indigenous people often 
become the most marginalised, as their lives depend on the natural environment. 
Polluted water sources, degraded land, and reduced animals and fish threaten the 
sustainable survival of their land. Mining companies often do not provide 
adequate compensation for their losses (CSP
2 
and WRI, 2005). Dissatisfaction 
with mining by locals can lead to conflicts with mining companies (Martin, 2006; 
Szablowski, 2007). 
In summary, the principal social and environmental impacts are closely 
interrelated with the economic, political and social life of LDCs. Mining affects 
local regions and ecosystems, but also seriously affects other regions and their 
public and private sectors. Therefore, it is simplistic to encourage mining only 
because of the assumed economic benefits (Slack, 2009; Szablowski, 2007). 
Rather, mining development should be seen as a complex development project 
with potentially negative impacts on the natural environment and society, politics 
and economy (MMSD, 2002). In this respect, the mining sector is increasingly 
under pressure from international and national states, donor organisations, civil 
society organisations, and the public.  
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2.1.2 A call for economically sustainable mining 
Global warming and more frequent, devastating environmental disasters have 
increased the urgency of paying greater attention to industries that impact directly 
on the natural environment. In particular, LDCs are vulnerable to economic and 
environmental shocks (Ingelson, Holden, & Bravante, 2009), as their people 
become marginalised due to unequal income distribution, environmental damage, 
and the loss of biodiversity necessary to supply food and resources to local 
communities (CSP
2 
and WRI, 2005; Diamond, 2005). 
In a rapidly globalising world, the social, political and economic problems of 
individual countries have become part of regional and transnational issues. There 
is unprecedented close integration among countries, and even within a country, 
economic, social and environmental issues are often deeply interrelated. As 
mining uses non-renewable resources, sustainability issues must be properly 
addressed to ensure that mining does not jeopardise the lives of current and future 
generations of a country but, rather, benefits societies where it operates 
(Fitzpatricka, Fonsecab, & McAllisterb, 2011; Waye, Young, Richards, & Doucet, 
2009). Therefore, mining impacts should be considered holistically without 
overlooking the particular benefits of specific mining projects (MMSD, 2002).  
There are well-known initiatives among multilateral donor organisations, mining 
conglomerates, international and national NGOs and governments that encourage 
corporate social responsibility and sustainable development (CSP
2 
and WRI, 
2005; Fitzpatricka, et al., 2011; MMSD, 2002). 
With growing concerns for sustainable development, international development 
agendas, public policies and public opinion on business have gradually changed 
over the last two decades. Sustainable development is a balanced way of 
development that considers economic, social, environmental and intergenerational 
equity issues (World Commission on Environment and Development, 1987). In 
spite of various interpretations, it proposes a new framework for development and 
calls for fundamental changes in ideologies, perspectives and values in 
development agendas, public policies, business goals and various disciplines in 
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academia (Gray, 2006a; MMSD, 2002; Richards, 2009; Söderbaum, 2006; 
Wilkins, 2003).  
Growing numbers of development agencies and practitioners have gradually 
revisited their development agenda for LDCs. The failure of widely advocated 
economic growth-oriented development (Stiglitz, 2006); destructive 
environmental and social practices of mining (Ross, 2008); growing conflicts 
among mining constituents (Barton, 2005; Ross, 2004); and worsening global and 
local environmental issues has brought reconsideration of fundamental 
developmental concepts (Richards, 2009; Söderbaum, 2006, 2007; Wilkins, 
2003).  
Corporate social responsibility (CSR) has been incorporated in the goals, policies 
and actions of numerous companies (Fitzpatricka, et al., 2011). With CSR, 
business entities must acknowledge they are a citizen of society and thereby 
recognise their social and environmental obligations to society (Gray, et al., 1996; 
Gray, et al., 1987). However, CSR is a controversial term, subject to on-going 
debate, reflecting ideological differences, which include the benefits of judicial 
versus voluntary CSR, its applications in developed and developing countries, the 
effectiveness and usefulness of its applications, and ways of further improvement 
(Australian Government: Corporate and Markets Advisory Committee, 2006; 
Collins, 2009; Fitzpatricka, et al., 2011; Imbun, 2007). In spite of initiatives to 
make CSR judicially binding, businesses are eager to keep it voluntary (Australian 
Government: Corporate and Markets Advisory Committee, 2006; Fitzpatricka, et 
al., 2011).  
Today, sustainable development and CSR are extensively used in mining as it is a 
widely recognised polluter. Mining conglomerates have started to play a leading 
role to address this and to maintain their ―social licence to operate‖ (BHP Billiton, 
2007; Martin, 2006; MMSD, 2002). They have invested in local development 
programmes (Garvin, McGee, Smoyer-Tomic, & Aubynn, 2009), cooperated with 
government agencies, research institutions and civil society organisations (Martin, 
2006; Reed, 2002), produced sustainability reports (BHP Billiton, 2007; Shell, 
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2007), and raised public awareness on sustainability (Hilson, 2000). However, 
some researchers and civil society organisations are sceptical about the motivation 
and effectiveness of voluntarism (Sethi, 2005) and criticise  the lack of 
meaningful commitment by firms to sustainability (Imbun, 2007; Richards, 2009). 
Sustainable development and corporate social responsibility have similar 
repercussions for business, in particular mining. Both involve complex issues and 
challenges that companies and managers cannot fully address on their own. 
Consequently, researchers and practitioners argue that multi-stakeholder 
participation can bring meaningful changes in practice. 
2.1.3 A call for participatory mining 
Multi-stakeholder engagement in mining is more inclusive and democratic as it 
enables participation of all organisations and communities affected by mining. 
More inclusive engagement of previously marginalised communities affected by 
social and environmental issues is crucial to ensure local societies benefit from 
mining and that their views on mining development are considered. Development 
practitioners and researchers suggest that participatory mining can promote CSR 
and sustainable development practices in the mining sector. 
Agenda 21, developed during the United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development, provides a solid foundation for public participation. It suggests that 
sustainable development requires new forms of participation. Its agenda 
encourages individuals, groups and organisations to participate in decisions, 
particularly those that ―potentially affect communities in which they live and 
work‖, and to have ―access to information relevant to environment and 
development … [and] environmental protection matters‖ (United Nations, 1992, 
Chapter 23:2). After Agenda 21, many international donor organisations such as 
the UN, the World Bank, mining conglomerates, international NGOs, 
governments, and large mining consumers, established voluntary initiatives. 
Sustainable and participatory mining is crucial in LDCs as they tend to be mineral 
dependent and vulnerable to the ‗resource curse‘ and other negative effects 
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(Crowson, 2009; Ross, 2008). Due to poor capacity and governance, governments 
often formulate inadequate mining policies that could otherwise favour 
development and the well-being of the populace (Diamond, 2005; Kapoor, 2008). 
This contributes to growing conflict in these countries (Lahiridutt, 2006; Stevens, 
2003). The hope is that sustainable and participatory mining initiatives can 
promote sustainable development and democratic mindset in LDCs.    
2.1.3.1 ‘Best practices’  
Several initiatives and frameworks for proposed mining development have been 
developed by international developmental organisations. Depending on the 
interpretation of sustainable development, views on ‗best practices‘ in mining can 
be situated between two extremes: sustainable economic growth in mining 
(Hilson, 2003) and ‗deep green‘ opposition view of mining expansion (UNEP, 
2000; Wackernagel & Rees, 1996; WWF, 2002). However, the most influential 
recommendations lie between these two extremes.  
The World Bank, a leading multilateral donor agency in LDCs, has published a 
series of papers with the International Finance Corporation on mining and 
development (Slack, 2009). The study, ‗An Asset for Competitiveness: Sound 
Environmental Management in Mining Countries‘ (2002), examines 
environmental practices of mining and environmental regulatory frameworks of 
LDCs. The World Bank advocates vibrant mining in countries that can attract 
responsible private investment and create a foundation for economic and social 
well-being (World Bank & International Finance Corporation, 2002). It 
acknowledges destructive mining practices in LDCs and considers environmental 
challenges of the mining sector, using economic cost-benefit and risk management 
analyses. It claims that irresponsible mining incurs substantial environmental and 
social costs, and thereby erodes the reputation of industry and social trust, which 
leads to social conflicts and political instability in countries where a mining 
company operates. Consequently, it becomes costly for the company to operate in 
countries with increased risk (World Bank & International Finance Corporation, 
2002, p. iv). The report suggests that governments should establish clear 
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environmental frameworks, systems, and competent institutions to attract foreign 
direct investment which can promote sustainable economic growth (World Bank 
& International Finance Corporation, 2002, pp. 4-5). The report shows that the 
World Bank recognises the responsibilities of the mining sector and encourages 
environmentally sound mining for sustainable growth that considers 
environmental issues. It calls on individual governments to create effective 
legislative frameworks and regulatory practices for environmental management. 
Studies by the Mining, Minerals and Sustainable Development (MMSD) project 
of the International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED) are widely 
commended for their innovatory and comprehensive recommendations for mining 
best practice (Slack, 2009, p. 76). The first study, ‗Mining and Economic 
Sustainability: National Economies and Local Communities‘ (2001), critically 
evaluates the lack of mining benefits to LDCs, and mining companies‘ approaches 
towards national and local community development. The study attempts to change 
the short-term interests of mining companies towards long-term sustained benefits 
of mining.  
The report of the MMSD called ‗Breaking New Ground‘ (2002) develops a 
comprehensive framework to extend sustainable development and CSR notions 
into practice. The report acknowledges the need for changes in mining 
perspectives, views and values to develop economically sustainable mining. It 
provides the first comprehensive framework for the mining sector that considers 
sustainable development (Danielson, 2006). The report examines the mining 
sector, its main actors, stakeholders and sectoral trends, its impact on economics, 
society and the natural environment, and governance of mining companies and 
national governments. The integrated approach has defined the meaning of 
sustainable development for the mining sector, defined necessary changes in 
values, visions, and approaches, determined key areas of actions and challenges, 
and addressed challenges of enforcing the framework. To make change 
meaningful, the report clarifies governance, and the roles and responsibilities of 
mining constituents, including mining companies, international donor 
organisations, national governments, financial stakeholders, customers, 
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communities, and civil society organisations. It encourages effective stakeholder 
engagement and capacity building to promote economically sustainable mining.  
Last but not least, the report, developed by an independent research team of the 
Centre for Science in Public Participation and the World Resource Institute, is 
another important publication that proposes a responsible mining framework 
consistent with sustainable development. The ‗Framework for Responsible 
Mining: A Guide to Evolving Standards‘ (2005), outlines the need to recognise 
‗no-go‘ zones for mining; its environmental social impacts; and the importance of 
good governance. Building on existing norms and standards of responsible mining 
practice, the framework develops ‗leading edge‘ or future standards for mining 
development. Furthermore, the framework highlights community participation at 
all stages of mining projects and emphasises the need for careful consideration of 
marginalised community groups, such as indigenous people and women (p. xiii). 
The framework encourages dialogue among mining constituents on social and 
environmental issues arising from mining projects. 
In many mineral-rich countries, responsible or economically sustainable mining, 
which considers negative environmental and social issues as well as its economic 
benefits, has begun to be enthusiastically supported by international organisations, 
governments, mining conglomerates, and civil society organisations. The 
importance of the multi-stakeholder approach for promoting economically 
sustainable mining has also been acknowledged by international and local mining 
constituents (CSP
2 
and WRI, 2005; Guerin, 2009; MMSD, 2002; World Bank & 
International Finance Corporation, 2002).  
The next section will discuss mining practice in Mongolia – a newly democratic 
developing country in Asia, to illustrate the complexity and impact of mining in 
LDCs.  
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2.2 Mining in Mongolia 
2.2.1 Mongolia in brief 
Mongolia is a large land-locked country, covering approximately 1.5 million 
square kilometres of land and bordering two of the world‘s largest nations, Russia 
and China. It has a diverse range of geological areas, found in high mountains in 
the west, wide steppes in the east, and the Gobi desert in the south. Mongolia has 
a dry continental climate, experiencing up to +40
o
C in summer and down to -40
o
C 
during winter in the hottest and coldest areas.     
In spite of Mongolia‘s large land area, it has a relatively small population of 2.8 
million people (Mongolian National Statistical Office, 2010). Of twenty ethnic 
groups, 82.4 percent of the population are Khalkhs (or Mongols), followed by 3.9 
percent Kazaks, and 3.5 percent of other 20 ethnic groups and nationalities 
(Mongolian National Statistical Office, 2010). Mongolia has had a unique 
nomadic culture and shaman religion for many centuries. Such traditions have 
encouraged people to live in harmony with nature and to respect its biodiversity.  
Mongolia is a relatively new democratic country. After 70 years of socialism 
under the former USSR, Mongolia had a peaceful democratic revolution in the 
spring of 1990. For the last two decades, Mongolia has undergone radical changes 
in its political, economic, and social arenas during the transition from rule under 
an authoritarian communist regime, with a centrally-planned economy, to a 
democracy with an open market economy.  
2.2.2 Economic, social, and political contexts 
2.2.2.1 Economy  
In spite of a rapid increase in the tertiary sector over the last decade, the 
Mongolian economy is still based on the primary and secondary economic sectors 
of agriculture and industry. Full and semi-nomadic herding and mining accounted 
for 38 percent of GDP in 2010, of which mining and quarrying comprised 22 
percent (Mongolian National Statistical Office, 2011). The main exports are 
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cashmere products, meat, and minerals such as copper, molybdenum, gold and 
fluorite. As Mongolia has two giant economic neighbours, the majority of its 
exports (84 percent) go to China, while 31 percent and 33 percent of total imports 
come from China and Russia respectively (Mongolian National Statistical Office, 
2011). 
As a result of opening up the economy and creating a friendly legal environment, 
as advocated in a neo-liberal structural adjustment programme, foreign direct 
investment (FDI) has increased dramatically. Mining, construction, infrastructure, 
and communication have attracted the greatest FDI.  
GDP, in terms of purchasing power parity per capita, has increased from 
US$1,970 in 1996 (CIA, 1997) to US$3,300 in 2010 (CIA, 2010). In terms of 
income distribution, Mongolia ranks 142nd out of 182 countries (International 
Monetary Fund, 2011). Although GDP per capita has almost doubled in the last 
14 years, wealth distribution is uneven. There is an increasing gap between rich 
and poor; one-third of Mongolians live in poverty (UNDP, 2007). 
2.2.2.2 Social and political contexts 
In spite of its historic nomadic culture, Mongolia has experienced a mix of 
traditional and Western cultures after 70 years of the communist era in the 
twentieth century and globalisation since the 1990s. Today, more than half the 
population lives in the capital and two other large cities (World Bank, 2007b).  
The communist period introduced industrialisation, agriculture, modern health and 
education systems, and Western or Russian style urbanisation. The influence of 
the USSR-educated, middle-class Mongolians and Russian supervisors has 
permeated almost every sector. Moreover, the change from a nomadic to a settled 
culture was accelerated by a political agenda which promoted a secular, Marxist 
country. In spite of many positive changes during the authoritarian political 
regime with its centrally-planned economy, political, economic, religious rights, 
and freedoms to express the voice of the people were limited (Cleary, 1995). A 
monopoly single party ruled the country and planned every aspect of political, 
economic, and social life.            
32 
 
As in other former communist countries in Eastern Europe and the former USSR, 
Mongolia experienced conflict and protest against the authoritarian regime in the 
late 1980s. ―Perestroika‖ (or ‗reform‘ in English) in the USSR in 1989 contributed 
to this by giving hope to those who favoured the introduction of democracy. At 
the beginning of 1990, a few hundred mostly young people organised a protest 
march, requesting democratic changes, and declared a hunger strike in front of the 
parliament building (David, 2010). After several months of activism, the protest, 
which was supported by thousands, was successful. The ruling government 
officials resigned and agreed to stage the first election of a new multi-party 
parliament. It was a peaceful revolution for democracy without bloodshed, and it 
was a turning point for the country (Fritz, 2008).  
Since 1990, Mongolia has experienced a rapid economic and political transition to 
a democracy with an open market economy. Many overnight radical changes were 
made to new political and economic systems. At the political level, the Mongolian 
Constitution created a semi-parliamentary system with a unicameral parliament 
and a prime minister-led government cabinet. The president has a symbolic status 
and plays an advisory role over legislation. The old tradition of one-party 
dominance was replaced by an elected parliament of multiple parties - the ‗State 
Great Khural‘ (1992). To provide basic conditions for market-based economic 
development, the whole economic structure - strictly state regulated with fixed 
pricing systems, state-owned economic sectors and institutions - was changed 
under the supervision and support of international donor and developmental 
organisations, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank 
and the UNDP. Following a neo-liberal structural adjustment programme, 
supervised mainly by the IMF and the World Bank, the government undertook 
fundamental economic reforms relating to pricing and trade liberalisation, and 
privatisation of state-owned entities and animal husbandry (Snow, 2010). 
Previously non-existent economic institutions, such as a stock market, commercial 
banks and commercial insurance, have been developed over the last two decades 
(Griffin, 1995). During this period, the State Great Khural has passed laws, 
regulations, acts and codes, influenced principally by the Romano-Germanic legal 
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system (Odgerel & Battsetseg, 2006), that have been crucial for the development 
of new political, social, and economic systems. 
Seventeen political parties were registered on the Supreme Court registration list 
by 2010 (Supreme Court). However, only two major parties, the Mongolian 
People‘s Revolutionary Party (MPRP) 8  and the Democratic Party have 
interchangeably ruled the country since 1996. In spite of obstacles, people are 
gradually learning to exercise their rights to freedom of speech and to vote. 
Today, demonstrations, hunger strikes, and other social and political activities are 
common phenomena, which were prohibited and unimaginable during the 
communist period.  
Although democracy is welcomed by most Mongolians, its meaning and values 
are still not well understood. According to a survey on democratic governance 
indicators, only eight percent of respondents perceived ―civil society, public 
participation‖, responsiveness, responsibility and consensus as major features of 
democracy, while ―freedom, freedom of speech and expression‖ (34.3 percent), 
justice (19.5 percent), ―open society, healthy political leaders‖ (13.1 percent), 
―private property, privatization‖ (10 percent), ―respect of law, implementation of 
rights‖ (7.2 percent) and transparency (6.6 percent) were seen as crucial 
characteristics of democracy
9
 (UNDP, 2006, p. 99). The survey found that half of 
respondents (52.9 percent) were ―neither satisfied nor dissatisfied‖ with the 
development of democracy in Mongolia, while 14.3 percent of respondents were 
not satisfied (UNDP & Government of Mongolia, 2006, p. 100). Given their 
partial understanding and appreciation of democracy, people are often unaware of 
their rights to express their voice, to be heard, and to actively engage in issues 
which affect them most.      
In terms of human development, some social aspects of the country have been 
positive. Following a relatively well-developed education system during the 
                                               
8 It is the former communist party and was founded in 1921 and ruled Mongolia for over 70 years. 
The MPRP is still very powerful. It has won two parliamentary elections. Two presidents serving 
between 1996 and 2009 were elected from the MPRP.    
9   12.7 percent of respondents said they did not know what democracy meant (UNDP & 
Government of Mongolia, 2006).  
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communist era, Mongolia today has a well-educated populace, reflected in a 98 
percent literacy rate and the near absence of ethnic conflict, resulting in well-
developed social capital (World Bank, 2007b). By 2006, the National Human 
Development Index attained its highest level at 0.718, making Mongolia a 
medium Human Development nation, with social indicators considerably more 
advanced than the average country with similar levels of GDP per capita (UNDP, 
2007). In spite of these positive aspects of Mongolian society, the country faces 
many challenges, including the existence of an old communist mentality, 
nepotism, corruption, and power imbalances. 
2.2.2.3 Social and political issues 
Unlike the speed with which technical and institutional changes can be made, 
human mentality requires a longer period over which to change. Overnight 
reforms and radical institutional changes were made within a few years, and today 
the social and political institutions of Mongolia appear appropriate for the new 
democratic society. With its small population and adaptive nomadic 
characteristics, Mongolia has made a fast transition (World Bank, 2007b), but the 
most challenging task has been to change people‘s mentality and habits. The 
traditional mentality, a legacy of the communist past, including worship of the 
state, thereby being a ‗passive recipient‘, still exists (UNDP & Government of 
Mongolia, 2006, p. 10). Even after two decades of being a democratic country, 
fear of expressing opinions publically and the lack of trust between one person 
and the next are widespread social phenomena (USAID, 2005).  
However, people are gradually learning new values and changing their attitudes. 
Time is necessary to learn new values, as people can become confused following 
massive changes in social ideologies and their associated values. Once prohibited 
items, such as freedom and money, now ―represent‖ the principal aspirations of 
life. Once valued things, such as the communist ideology and its goals are no 
longer valued. Therefore, people and their mindsets during the transition between 
two very different social systems must be considered, in order to understand 
Mongolian society and its challenges (Griffin, 1995). 
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Similar to other LDCs, nepotism and bureaucracy causes problems in society. As 
Mongolia has a family and locally oriented, small population, nepotism is 
common at social and political levels, and in business (USAID, 2005). People will 
often favour relatives or local tribal ties when voting in elections, making 
promotions and appointments in the public service, and providing public services 
(World Bank, 2004). Moreover, bureaucracy from the former regime still exists in 
the public service, due to the old mentality and a lack of understanding of the 
state‘s role in a democratic society with a liberal economy. Nepotism and 
bureaucracy contribute to the ineffectiveness of the public service and to increases 
in corruption (USAID, 2005).  
Corruption
10
 has become one of the biggest social problems in Mongolia. 
According to Transparency International‘s Corruption Perceptions Rating, 
Mongolia moved from 43 in 1999 to rank 85 in 2004, and 116 in 2010, with a 2.7 
score out of 10 (Transparency International, 2010). A survey conducted by a joint 
project of UNDP and the Mongolian Government reported that most respondents 
(88.9 percent) agreed that corruption had become widespread in the country 
(UNDP & Government of Mongolia, 2006). The ―ariin khaalga‖11 or ―backdoor‖ 
mentality from the previous period has also contributed to the endemic corruption 
(USAID, 2005). The danger of corruption is that it promotes more corruption at 
every level of society, sustains the ―ill-belief‖ of people in giving bribes to 
succeed, causing deterioration of social trust, fairness and accountability.  
Mongolia endeavours to combat corruption by the declaration of zero-tolerance in 
its National Millennium Development Goal 9 (UNDP, 2005). The main anti-
corruption policy documents are the National Program to Combat Corruption and 
the Anti-corruption Law (The State Great Khural of Mongolia, 2006a) among 
                                               
10 Corruption is regarded as the use of public office for illicit private gain (could involve bribe or 
self-interest). LaFree and Morris (2004) define it as ―an abuse of public office that violates formal 
and informal norms, that brings direct or indirect gain to a public official and provides a third party 
with services or resources that would otherwise be more difficult or impossible to obtain‖ (cited in 
Fritz, 2007, p. 191). 
11 ―Ariin khaalga allowed Mongolians to cope under the Communist rule. It remains an efficient 
way to get things done in government-to-business and government-to-citizen interaction in 
Mongolia‖ … ―many Mongolians simply look for a friend, family member to circumnavigate the 
formal system of rules‖ (USAID, 2005, p. 19) 
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others. To address corruption more effectively, the law was passed in 2006, 
establishing an authority to combat corruption that is independent of government. 
The authority aims to ―educate and raise public awareness and prevent corruption‖ 
(The State Great Khural of Mongolia, 2006a, Provision 18.1).  
Another social and political issue is the worsening of power imbalances. The 
democratic revolution decentralised political power and ended one-party 
domination. Liberal economic programmes enabled the establishment of private 
properties through privatisation in almost every economic sector. However, 
political and economic power gradually became concentrated in certain parties, 
groups, and people (UNDP, 2006). As noted above, political power and decision-
making are mainly exercised by two dominant political parties in spite of the 
existence of seventeen other political parties.  
The linkage between politics and business has gradually tightened (UNDP, 2006; 
UNDP & Government of Mongolia, 2006, p. 30), which has resulted in political 
oligarchy and economic oligopoly, evidenced by the increased number of 
businessmen who are members of parliament; donations from businesses to 
political parties during elections; and political appointments for businessmen, who 
are large donors, to high ranking positions within ministries. This has resulted in a 
weak, corrupt public sector which is prone to political influence and favouritism. 
There is a lack of merit-based appointments, and increased instances of conflict of 
interest in the public service (Radnaasumberel, Baatartogtokh, Purev, & Namkhai, 
2006).   
These issues have been detrimental to public confidence in democracy and 
democratic processes. According to the survey, following the Fifth International 
Conference of New or Restored Democracies, respondents ranked corruption 
(36.2 percent); ―bureaucracy and red tape‖ (15.9 percent); ―poverty, differences 
between rich and poor people‖ (11.5 percent); injustice (7 percent); and ―old 
communist ideology, one party domination‖ (6.8 percent) as the main obstacles to 
Mongolian democracy (UNDP & Government of Mongolia, 2006, pp. 100-101).  
The more recent threat was the riot of 1 July 2008 in the capital city. The riot 
began with hundreds of people demonstrating in front of the MPRP headquarters, 
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as they were annoyed with the alleged parliamentary election result. There were 
regrettable consequences, including deaths, arrests, and social chaos: five civilians 
were killed, 220 civilians and 108 service members were injured, and 731
12
 
people were arrested, of whom 140, including 13 minors and 3 women, and 
sentenced from 2 to 7 years in prison as of 31 October 2008  (Wikipedia, 2008). 
The MPRP headquarters and the Cultural Palace were set on fire. Following the 
riot, the President declared the first state of emergency for four days. The country 
was in a state of shock. The riot ―left a legacy of ill-treatment, impunity and 
injustice‖, and was ―in sad contrast to progress that Mongolia has made in recent 
years in improving human rights‖ (Amnesty International, 2009, p. 23).  
After the riot, the public, especially civil society organisations, feared that state 
suppression from the previous communist regime might re-occur. Therefore, 
people became silent and hopes for a stronger democracy were weakened. 
Perhaps, the public began ―to worry that a self-interested elite is monopolising 
both political and economic power‖ (David, 2010, p. 255). However, a year after 
the riot the presidential election result revitalised hopes for democracy. The 
candidate of the Democratic Party, supported by other opposition parties, was 
elected in spite of a powerful competitor, the incumbent president from the MPRP 
who had held the position for 8 years. The new democratic president, 
campaigning on a theme of anti-corruption, was supported by 51.21 percent of 
voters (Mongolia-Web, 2009). He became the first president of the opposition 
Democratic Party (Bulag, 2010).  
Given its economic, social and political background, Mongolia has experienced 
various challenges in its transition period. One emerging issue is the booming 
mining sector. Debate is growing in public arenas around the development of the 
mining sector, especially regarding its social and environmental impacts on local 
regions and the country as a whole.  
  
                                               
12 Most arrested people were freed after the new presidential pardon   
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2.2.3 Mining sector 
2.2.3.1 Overview of the mining sector 
Mongolia‘s complex geology, which underlies diverse landforms of mountains, 
steppes and the Gobi desert, provides extensive mineral resources of about 800 
deposits and 8,000 findings, comprising 80 different minerals identified to date, 
which cover 28 percent of the territory (Myagmarsuren, 2006; Unen sonin, 
24.12.2007). The most economically significant minerals are base metals, most 
notably, copper, gold, zinc, silver, coal, fluorspar and uranium
13
. 
In 2008, the mining sector accounted for 28.2 percent of the GDP, 64.3 percent of 
total industrial products and 80.7 percent of total exports (Mongolian National 
Statistical Office, 2009). The mineral dependency of Mongolia was 24th highest 
in the world in 2000
14
 and its mineral exports accounted for 25.45 percent of GDP 
(Ross, 2008, p. 195). This is due to its sizable deposits of copper, gold, coal and 
other minerals, and its relatively narrow economic base.  
Since the mid 1990s, mineral exploration and mining has rapidly increased, 
following new laws and mineral discoveries. The cornerstones of mining 
regulations are the Constitution Law (1992), Law on Mineral Resources (1997), 
Foreign Investment Law (1993), Taxation Laws (1993 and 1998), Law of 
Environmental Protection (1995), Law of Environmental Impact Assessment 
(1998), Land Law (2002) and Law on Special Protected Area (1994). Consistent 
with the neo-liberal structural adjustment programme, these laws, particularly, 
concerning minerals, taxation, and foreign investment were intended to attract 
foreign investors by promising favourable mining conditions, such as a ‗first 
come, first served‘ approach and tax holiday incentives.  
                                               
13 With growing international interests in uranium and an abundance of resources in Mongolia, 
uranium is likely to become a significant mineral in the near future.  
14 As the percentage of mineral exports to the GDP increased to 29 percent in 2008 (Mongolian 
National Statistical Office, 2011), mineral dependency can be higher than in 2000.   
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Other important factors underpinning the mining boom are the increased world 
mineral demand
15
 and widely publicised discoveries of the Oyu Tolgoi 
copper/gold and Tavan Tolgoi coal deposits at the beginning of the new 
millennium
16
. After these discoveries, exploration licences and land held by 
licence-holders increased five-fold. By 2008, there were 4644 exploration licences 
and 1115 mining licences covering 44.4 percent of its territory (Shiirevdamba, 
2009). Today, 500 mining companies operate, of which 127 are gold mining 
companies (Tsogtbaatar, 2009).  
International mining companies and donor organisations have enthusiastically 
supported mining development as a source of Mongolian economic growth 
(World Bank, 2004, 2007b; World Growth, 2008). Today, the mining sector 
attracts considerable domestic and international interest and it plays an important 
role in the Mongolian economy. However, this sector has to be examined in terms 
of the complex economic, social, and environmental contexts in order to 
understand the impact of existing mining practices and to formulate appropriate 
action to ensure that mining can benefit the country.    
2.2.3.2 Mining impacts 
2.2.3.2.1 Economic impacts 
With new mineral resource discoveries, favourable international market demand, 
and increased prices for minerals, the mining sector has developed rapidly over 
the last two decades. The sector has attracted increased domestic and international 
attention and investment because of supportive legislative and regulatory 
frameworks
17
, based on the neo-liberal economic view, which claims that 
increased foreign direct investment will result in GDP growth, and in turn will 
                                               
15 A big portion of this demand relates to China, due to its rapidly growing industries. Being a 
neighbour of China, Mongolia faces both international and domestic pressures to have more 
exploration and mining.   
16 These deposits are considered to be world-class deposits. According to information published by 
Ivanhoe Mines Limited, the mineral explorer and investor of Oyu Tolgoi copper and gold deposits, 
two mines are expected to produce an annual output of 500,000 tons of copper and 330,000 ounces 
of gold for at least 35 years (Ivanhoe Mines Mongolia Inc, 2005). 
17  Mongolia is ranked 15th out of 64 countries for its favourable legal framework for mining 
(Fraser Insititute, 2007).  
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help alleviate poverty and improve social well-being (World Bank, 2004; World 
Growth, 2008). Foreign direct investment increased five-fold
18
 between 2002 and 
2006 (World Growth, 2008, p. 3), and GDP growth reached its highest points
19
 of 
8.4 percent in 2006 and 10.2 percent in 2007 (Mongolian National Statistical 
Office, 2009).  
However, mining-led economic growth does not necessarily reduce 
unemployment or alleviate poverty. Compared with other sectors, mining does not 
provide much employment. By 2009, it employed 49,000 people in Mongolia - 
only 4.7 percent of the labour market (Tsogtbaatar, 2009). Moreover, GDP 
growth, created principally by development of the mining sector, has not had a 
positive effect on income inequality, a major problem in Mongolia, where 32.2 
percent
20
 of the total population live in poverty (UNDP, 2007, p. 11). The widely 
advocated economic benefits of the mining sector are questionable. 
2.2.3.2.2 Social impacts 
Mongolia has a relatively short mining history that can be traced back to the 
communist era
21
. State-owned companies had principally mined copper, 
molybdenum, and coal. Since the mid 1990s, mining has increased dramatically as 
a result of supportive policies, such as a government programme called ‗Gold 
Programme‘ 22  and the investor friendly legislative framework. With growing 
economic interests and mining activities, people have expected much from the 
development of mining in their areas. However, mining has failed to meet public 
                                               
18 Mining sector received about $200 million FDI in 2006, compared with $40 million in 2002 
(World Growth, 2008).   
19  Especially, after the Boroo Gold mining started its operation in 2004, the total mining 
production has nearly doubled (MRPAM, 2008).  
20 However various civil society organisations argue that the poverty rate in practice can be higher 
than 36 percent, as official statistics are often ‗underestimates‘ of the status quo (UNDP, 2006).   
21 In the late 1970s, a joint venture of Mongolian and former USSR governments - called Erdenet 
was built. It is the only copper and molybdenum mining and processing company. Since then, the 
company has been the most significant income producer for the country. Erdenet city, the second 
biggest city of Mongolia, has established alongside the company development.    
22 In 1993, the government initiated the ‗Gold Programme‘ to increase gold mining and thereby 
promote budget income and economic growth. However, economic benefits of mining outweighed 
proper consideration of environmental and social issues that might arise from mining (IUCN & 
URM NGO, 2010). The programme is still in force.  
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expectations of the benefits of development to local society and the lives of local 
people.  
Mining legislation requires that mining companies hire 90 percent
23
 of their total 
employees from the Mongolian population (The State Great Khural of Mongolia, 
1997, Article 43). However, anecdotal evidence suggests that companies often 
breach this requirement and employ foreign mining engineers and workers
24
. This 
is related to the lack of trained, skilled, appropriately qualified local people 
(World Bank, 2006). Therefore, local areas often do not benefit from mining 
through employment.  
As mining companies often do not hire local people, foreign and domestic 
migrants bring social problems to local areas. Social services and resources, such 
as education, health, and water sources, have become scarcer as the number of 
users has increased (World Bank, 2006). Migrants have also brought increased 
alcoholism, crime, prostitution and diseases in local areas, as miners are often 
male workers, away from their families (World Bank, 2006, 2007b).    
Mining-related conflicts between local communities and mining companies are 
increasing as mining often occurs on state-owned pastoral land. According to the 
Constitution (1992), land is state property and can be used by local people for 
pasture. As in other LDCs, mineral rights belong to the state, while local 
communities can use only the land‘s surface (Szablowski, 2007, p. 34). 
Mongolian land has not been privatised because of the tradition of nomadic 
culture. Unlike farming, nomadic husbandry requires movement several times a 
year depending on the season. Therefore, herders live on relatively large areas all 
year round. Although local authorities register some pastoral areas for local use
25
, 
                                               
23  The Mineral Law allows mining companies to employ foreign employees but they must 
comprise no more than 10 percent of their total employees. Otherwise, companies must pay a 
penalty to the local administrative body that is ten times the minimum wage (The State Great 
Khural of Mongolia, 1997, Provision 43.2)  
24 Particularly, for Chinese invested or owned companies that are most likely to hire Chinese 
workers from China. This migration causes conflict as most Mongolians are not friendly to 
Chinese people.   
25 By law, mining licences should not be issued for areas registered as in local use. However, due 
to weak coordination and information sharing there are some cases in which licences are locally 
registered, but not registered in the Cadastral Agency information system.   
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there are no other protection mechanisms for locals to save their pastoral land 
from mining (Suzuki, 2008). Therefore mining, which covers extensive land-
areas, forces herders to move without proper compensation (Snow, 2010). The 
migration of herders who have lost their pasture results in further conflict with 
herders in other local areas when they try to share pasture. Moreover, conflicts 
arise due to lands not being rehabilitated after mining and becoming infertile, 
thereby being unavailable for pasture and grazing.       
Even if there are few conflicts over pastoral land, local people are often unhappy 
with mining in their regions because of its poor contribution to local development. 
Most taxes from mining go to the central government budget and only a few 
minor fees and payments are allocated to local budgets. However, mining 
companies usually provide ad hoc donations to local administrative bodies, 
particularly to governors on their request, but mining companies often do not 
widely inform the public about such donations (Crane White & Accosiates, 2007). 
Most donations are either in cash for financing local anniversaries and festivals, or 
in-kind donations, such as vehicles, computers and renovations of local buildings 
and hospitals. However, there is no sustained comprehensive development 
programme for local areas (World Bank, 2006), which compounds the 
dissatisfaction of locals with mining. Moreover, the non-transparent contributions 
of mining companies promote corruption in the local public sector.      
A serious issue for many regions during the last decade is artisanal mining, which 
began in Mongolia due to increased poverty
26
 and unemployment in the late 1990s 
(UNDP, 2007). This illegal mining appeared increasingly where gold/mineral-
bearing tailings were left from abandoned commercial mining (Dierkes & 
Khushrushahi, 2006). Due to the ‗cost-efficient‘ approach of businesses and lack 
of financial capacity, most small and medium mining companies use out-dated, 
cheap technologies and equipment that are incapable of efficiently processing 
extracted ore-bearing soils (World Bank, 2007a). Therefore, mining companies 
                                               
26 Particularly in the countryside, where the loss of livestock during ‗dzud‘ disasters (extreme cold 
and excess snowing) that occurred in the late 1990s and early 2000s made many herders poor and 
desperate to find other sources of income. 
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often focus on ores with a high concentration of gold, and leave tailings and dams 
containing minor parts of gold that are uneconomic to process (World Bank, 2006, 
2007a). 
This practice resulted in increased artisanal mining of abandoned tailings that 
remained from legal mining. It became the source of living for 30,000 to 
100,000
27
 people, including men, women, children and older people (MRPAM, 
2008). Today, ninja
28
 or artisanal miners work in 112 places of 83 soums of 16 
aimags
29
 (Tsogtbaatar, 2009). Places with artisanal miners are often riddled with 
crime, prostitution, disease and loss of life (World Bank, 2006). In the absence of 
regulations concerning work safety, there are many accidents resulting in many 
deaths (World Bank, 2006). Currently, no effective legislation regulates artisanal 
mining
30
, and artisanal miners are excluded from mainstream society, with no 
access to health, education, and other public services.  
2.2.3.2.3 Cultural impacts 
Cultural impacts of mining should be taken into account, as the traditional 
Mongolian way of living is closely related to the natural environment. Mongolia 
has had a unique nomadic culture and shaman religion for centuries, which 
encouraged people to live in harmony with nature and to respect its biodiversity. 
Land was regarded as sacred and excavating it would have been taboo. As Jachid 
and Hyer (1979) illustrate, ―Mongolian nomads have been psychologically 
conditioned for centuries to feel that toiling in the soil is not a proper way for 
humans to make a living‖ (p. 297 cited in Quah, 2003).  Given this cultural 
background, mining, particularly large-scale mining, did not occur in Mongolia 
until the 1970s
31
.  
                                               
27 Year round artisanal miners are about 30,000-40,000. This number increases during summer and 
reaches about 100,000 people or more (MRPAM, 2008). 
28 Another name for artisanal miners 
29  ‗Aimag‘ is the biggest administrative unit in Mongolia. There are 21 aimags (Mongolian 
National Statistical Office, 2011). 
30 Bill for artisanal mining is on the Parliamentary discussion for recent years. The temporary 
regulation on artisanal mining came to force in 2007, but it is not having impacts on the issue 
(World Bank, 2006).   
31  The Mongolian biggest mining company, Erdenet, was established in 1976. Erdenet is the 
biggest producer and exporter of copper and molybdenum.    
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Since the mid 1990s, nomadic culture has been threatened by mining development 
in many aimags. Both legal and illegal mining have negatively affected nomadic 
culture. Large-scale migration of mining workers to local areas has caused rapid 
changes in culture (World Bank, 2007b). In artisanal mining, in particular, 
traditions and morality have been heavily violated (World Bank, 2006). For 
instance, the nomadic culture of respecting the land and water resources, and the 
tradition of respecting children and elders, are seriously ignored in localities with 
artisanal miners and foreigners. 
Some heritage and culturally important places have been threatened by mining, as 
legislation and its enforcement have neglected the cultural impacts. Mining 
companies have failed to carefully respect heritage sites, sacred mountains, and 
water resources in their licensed areas. This has annoyed local people and created 
conflict with mining companies, giving rise to social movements and NGOs to 
address mining-related issues so as to protect the cultural heritage.  
2.2.3.2.4 Political impacts 
Another problem of mining in LDCs such as Mongolia is the political impact. In 
spite of an absence of in-depth studies, the current state of mining and politics in 
Mongolia demonstrates how mining can affect the politics of a country. As in 
other LDCs with rich mineral resources but poor economic conditions, Mongolia 
has a corrupt and politicised public sector which is vulnerable to rent-seeking 
activities, particularly in relation to extractive industry matters.  
Typical rent-seeking behaviours in Mongolia include a windfall tax
32
, royalties, 
bribes, lobbying, and mandatory state shares
33
 in mining (World Bank, 2007b). 
The parliament passed the Windfall Tax Law in the spring of 2006, which caused 
                                               
32 Windfall tax on gold and copper mining was passed in 2006. By the law, during the favourable 
world mineral price situation, 68% of excess gold sale income (for gold, above US$500 per ounce 
and for copper, above US$2800 per tonne) is paid as windfall profit tax (The State Great Khural of 
Mongolia, 2006b). The law was disregarded in 2009.   
33  The Mineral Law amendment in 2009 states the Mongolian state should hold shares in a 
strategic mineral deposit: 34 percent if it is explored by private companies and 50 percent if the 
deposit is explored by state investment (The State Great Khural of Mongolia, 1997).   
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a significant decrease in gold mining production
34
 (Portfolio Media Inc., 2007). 
Mining companies, investors and international donor agencies strongly criticised 
legislation on the windfall tax and the minerals law amendments in 2006, which 
require a mandatory state share in large deposits and identify 15 large deposits as 
strategic state deposits (World Bank, 2007b; World Growth, 2008). According to 
the Fraser Institute survey, Mongolia‘s mining legislation was an ―unfortunate 
development‖ and the overnight legal changes resulted in the ―collapse‖ of the 
favourable Mongolian legal environment for mining investors, evidenced by its 
reduced rank on the policy potential index, moving from 33 out of 64 in 
2005/2006 to 62 out of 65 in 2006/2007 (Fraser Insititute, 2007).  
Within Mongolia, these legislative changes caused enormous debate and conflict 
among political parties, NGOs, and the public. Anecdotal evidence suggests that 
mining becomes excessively politicised during elections. The most recent debate 
was on the government stability agreement with Ivanhoe Mining for its Oyu 
Tolgoi copper/gold mining project in the Southern Gobi. Several stability 
agreement proposals were discussed by governments and parliaments since 2004 
and it was finally signed in September 2009. The process created huge social and 
political debate, protest, and conflict among politicians, governments, mining 
companies, international organisations, NGOs, academics, and the public in 
Mongolia. 
Moreover, growing interests in mining have promoted corruption and red-tape in 
the country. Licence issuing and other mandatory legislative requirements are 
prone to corruption, as mining companies bribe public officials and servants ―to 
obtain mining licences and avoid tax and customs payment‖ (USAID, 2005, p. 4). 
In general, the economic, social and political impacts of mining are deeply 
interrelated but are not easily observable.  
                                               
34 Anecdotal evidence suggests that although some small and medium mining companies stopped 
their operations, the law resulted in shadow exports of extracted gold without an intervention of 
the central bank which is in charge of buying all extracted gold and thereby monitors gold mining 
production. 
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2.2.3.2.5 Environmental impacts 
The impacts on the natural environment of increased mining activities have 
become more evident. Consequently, environmental concerns about mining 
development have increased significantly since the mid 2000s.  
As suggested in the World Bank report (2006), Mongolia - A Review of 
Environmental and Social Impacts in the Mining Sector, the environmental record 
of the Mongolian mining sector is, at best, mixed. Its key environmental impacts 
are changes in hydrological regimes, deterioration of water and soil qualities, 
increases of mercury and cyanide pollution, and waste-rock piles and tailing 
repositories (World Bank, 2006, pp. 1-3). 
Given that Mongolia is a land-locked country with scarce water resources, 
mining-related water pollution and the improper use of water are serious issues. 
Potential water resources of the country are estimated at about 36.4 square 
kilometres (Dorjgotov & Purevsuren, 2006). As Mongolia consists of arid and 
semi-arid regions, there is a great risk of water scarcity (UN, 2007, p. 4).  
By 2007 some 28 rivers
35
 had dried up and 56.2 ha land in 25 soums
36
 of 10 
aimags were poisoned by mercury and cyanide as the direct result of mining 
activities (2008). As gold deposits of open-pit mining often appear along river 
basins, many mining companies operate near rivers. Using their out-dated 
technologies such as dredges and ‗water guns‘37 to separate gold from ores by 
washing ore-bearing soils, some mining companies illegally redirect river flows 
and draw off substantial volumes of water (Grayson & Baatar, 2009). This 
reduces water quantities down-stream in localities where water is a major resource 
for herding animals and for sustaining the biodiversity.  
                                               
35 Due to the lack of professional skills and technical capacities to measure water quality and 
pollution, the actual number of dried-up rivers may be greater. 
36 ‗Soum‘ is an administrative unit after an aimag. Mongolia has 338 soums (Mongolian National 
Statistical Office, 2011).  
37  ‗Water guns‘ are medium and large sized equipment commonly used by open-pit mining 
companies. They use gravitational force to separate gold concentration from ore-bearing material.    
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Water
38
 quality is also affected by mining. Water pollution is caused by 
discharges of mining-processed water into nearby water ways to reduce costs, and 
the number of accidents are increasing due to the collapse of poorly constructed 
dams (World Bank, 2006). Government organisations have ineffectively regulated 
and monitored water quality, due to a lack of human, financial and technical 
capacities (ADB, 2005). The financial capacity of government organisations is 
limited as they must invest much to train specialists and acquire equipment to 
monitor water and soil qualities (MNPC, 2008). Anecdotal evidence suggests that 
more rivers and lakes are in danger of becoming polluted and drying up unless 
improvements are made to current mining practices, the regulatory framework and 
its implementation.  
Another environmental problem caused by mining is cyanide and mercury 
pollution. Mercury and cyanide
39
 are commonly used chemicals in Mongolian 
mining. Since hard-rock mining began in 2000, and especially after a large project, 
Boroo Gold, by a Canadian mining company which began in 2004, cyanide use in 
mining has increased (Myagmarsuren, 2006). However, state controls on cyanide 
imports and usage are weak (MNPC, 2008). Moreover, improper use of mercury 
for gold washing by illegal miners has become a major cause of river and land 
pollution (World Bank, 2006). According to an extensive study by government 
authorities, sodium cyanide and mercury have been released in nine aimags in the 
Central and Gobi regions by 2007 and alleged incidents of mercury poisoning 
have increased (Mongolian River Resources, 2007a). 
The most devastating mining-related scandal happened in Khongor soum near the 
third largest city Darkhan, 240km north of the capital city. There was a spillage of 
waste mercury and cyanide from an illegal gold washing operation in the factory 
owned by the governor of Khongor soum. Mercury and cyanide, which had been 
smuggled into Mongolia from China, were excessively used in the factory. Local 
                                               
38 In terms of annual water consumption, mining is the second largest user of water after the 
energy sector, accounting for 22 percent of total consumption (Batbayar, 2009). 
39
 Gold ore is crushed with mercury first and as a result of amalgamation about 30 percent of the 
gold ore is extracted. The remaining 70 percent of gold ore is taken out from the waste by a 
solution of cyanide (World Bank, 2006).  
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residents only became aware of this after the spillage in February 2007 (The 
HUB, 2007).  
Some water supplies and soil in the area became contaminated by the spillage of 
mercury and cyanide. By the end of 2007, about 700 local people were poisoned 
and had suffered serious health problems; pregnant women suffered miscarriages, 
and animals died unusual deaths (Olloo.mn, 2007). Although environmental 
testing by the World Health Organisation (WHO) revealed that pollution in 
Khongor was at acceptable levels, locals and some NGOs made opposing claims 
(Sumyabazar, 13.03.2008). In November 2007, a public protest organised by 
human rights groups and other NGOs was held in the capital city after 
miscarriages of nine local women. Meanwhile, local people organised a small 
demonstration in Khongor soum on a main highway leading to Darkhan city 
(Batmonkh, 03.01.2008). However, the government and state organisations 
refused to acknowledge that cyanide and mercury poisoning was occurring in 
Khongor soum. In January 2008, the prime minister apologised to local residents 
for the government‘s provision of misleading information (Sumyabazar, 
13.03.2008). The Khongor case demonstrated the potential environmental, health 
and social impacts of mining. In spite of contradictory views among state, public, 
and civil society organisations, the Khongor pollution made Mongolians recognise 
the environmental impacts of mining.          
The lack of proper rehabilitation in affected areas is a serious issue. According to 
the Minerals law (1997) and the Environmental Protection law (1995), all mining 
companies must carry out technical and biological rehabilitations. Although 
mining companies claim they already do this, investigation shows that the amount 
of rehabilitated land, the quality of rehabilitation and the quality assurance of 
mining rehabilitation measures are deficient and poorly managed (Saran, 2009). In 
2005, a ministerial inspection organised by the Ministry of Nature and 
Environment investigated the quality of rehabilitation undertaken by 107 mining 
companies operating in nine aimags. Only 40.24 percent of the total affected area 
of 2454 ha had undergone technical rehabilitation but not biological rehabilitation 
(Ministry of Nature and Environment, 2008).   
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In summary, mining induced environmental impacts affect local people in various 
ways. Some have been affected both directly and indirectly by contaminated water 
and soil, and suffered health problems. Some have lost fertile pasture land and 
hence livestock - the main source of living for herders. This has caused growing 
conflict among local people, mining companies, illegal miners, and the state.  
2.2.4 Challenges of the mining sector 
The principal issues can be summarised as a lack of mining awareness, poor 
governance, non-transparent information, and increasing social conflict.  
As mining in Mongolia has increased, the state and the public have gradually 
begun to understand its potential impact. Due to the relatively recent emergence of 
mining in Mongolia‘s economy, public awareness of mining is almost non-
existent. An informal survey conducted by the Asia Foundation
40
 among herders 
in some regions, revealed that many still have no understanding of mining, how it 
might affect their lives, and how they could engage in mining activities. Public 
officials and public servants at both central and local government levels are also 
unfamiliar with mining practices. Possible economic benefits of mining are 
overemphasized in decision-making without consideration of its other potential 
impacts.  
In spite of legislative requirements, regulation and enforcement of environmental 
protection and rehabilitation was poor until 2006, and it received scant attention 
from government organisations. Due to growing environmental conflicts, protests 
and appeals organised by local environmental NGOs, and recommendations of 
international donors and NGOs, government organisations have begun to give 
more attention to environmental matters and are gradually improving the 
enforcement and monitoring of rehabilitation (ADB, 2005; MNPC, 2008; 
Myagmarsuren, 2006; World Bank, 2006).  
However, more effective regulatory mechanisms, standards, policies and 
institutions are needed to improve the quality and quantity of rehabilitation. As 
                                               
40 A USA donor NGO operating in Mongolia 
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Mongolia did not previously
41
 have the commercial mining sector practices, most 
legislation was merely ‗copies‘ of legislation from developed countries, without 
proper integration between legislative frameworks and institutions, and without 
the appropriate consideration of Mongolian characteristics (ADB, 2005). 
Moreover, human and institutional capacity constraints and the need for effective 
resolution of bureaucracy and conflicts of interest in the public sector must be 
addressed, as weak governance and institutional structure cause weak compliance 
with legislation and poor transparency (UNDP, 2006; World Bank, 2007a, 
2007b).  
Mining-related information is often not transparent to the public or to government 
organisations. Individuals and civil society organisations encounter difficulties in 
obtaining reliable information on the investment and investors of mining 
companies, taxes and other contributions paid by mining companies, numbers and 
areas of issued mining licences, reports of environmental protection, rehabilitation 
and monitoring of mining, and decisions made by the government organisations 
on mining-related issues (Myagmarsuren, 2006; USAID, 2005). Additionally, 
government organisations have produced different statistics and reports about the 
mining sector and its impact due to a lack of coordination and cooperation 
between them as well as poor institutional and human capacities (World Bank, 
2007a). Such secrecy and controversy increases public distrust of the state and 
mining companies, and creates corruption and conflicts of interest in the public 
sector (USAID, 2005). 
These developments benefit no one. The government becomes less stable, more 
prone to corruption and comes under pressure from NGOs and the public. For 
mining companies, it becomes difficult to operate as mining becomes politicised 
and receives greater scrutiny from its stakeholders (World Growth, 2008). Given 
this distrust, it becomes riskier and unsustainable for mining companies to operate 
long-term (World Bank & International Finance Corporation, 2002). The public 
therefore becomes the most disadvantaged party, due to unpaid or unfairly 
                                               
41 The state-owned Erdenet copper mining and some coal mining companies operated during the 
communist period from the 1970s.   
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distributed mining taxes, income and compensation, worsening environmental 
degradation, increasing health issues, endemic corruption, and loss of national 
wealth.  
Thus, there are growing debates and initiatives among mining constituents for the 
promotion of socially and environmentally responsible mining in Mongolia. The 
increased recognition of sustainable and participatory mining is apparent in the 
responsible mining definition formulated by participants of the multi-stakeholder 
forum on mining in 2007. They defined responsible mining as ‗a comprehensive 
and transparent minerals activity respecting the rights of all stakeholders, 
especially of local people; environmentally friendly and free of human health 
impacts; embracing the best international practices and upholding rule of law 
whilst generating a sustainable stream of benefits for Mongolia‘ (Mongolian River 
Resources, 2007b).  
While the mining sector has been enthusiastically supported as the income 
generator for economic development (World Bank, 2004; World Growth, 2008), 
recent public debates and initiatives show an increased acknowledgement of the 
importance of economically sustainable mining that can benefit all Mongolians 
(Ivanhoe Mines Mongolia LLC, 2008; MNPC, 2008). International donor 
organisations and national NGOs have played crucial roles in this process 
(Dierkes & Khushrushahi, 2006; Snow, 2010; World Bank, 2006). Domestic 
environmental and human rights NGOs have increased social awareness of the 
social and environmental impacts of mining, particularly in local regions; and 
international donor organisations and NGOs have introduced international best 
practice frameworks for mining by organising and encouraging multi-stakeholder 
forums, supervising government organisations, producing various reports and 
funding capacity building projects. 
To summarise, there is tension both globally and nationally regarding mining 
development. The tension is between the income generation sector and mining 
which is economically sustainable and participatory. The current trend is shifting 
towards the latter, with varying degrees of voluntarism. Big multinational mining 
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conglomerates and international donor and civil society organisations lead in the 
introduction of benchmarks and appropriate frameworks for mining development. 
Domestic civil society organisations have simultaneously contributed through 
various activities and initiatives. The mining sector has encountered a 
fundamental challenge to its business-as-usual practices, and ‗the train has already 
started to move‘.  
The next chapter will introduce social environmental accounting and an 
environmental management tool known as the environmental impact assessment. 
Both concepts explicitly address environmental and social aspects of business and 
encourage putting sustainability ideas into practice.   
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Chapter 3: AN ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT 
AS A POTENTIAL DIALOGIC ACCOUNTING TOOL 
3.1 Dialogic accounting for sustainability 
3.1.1 Introduction to social and environmental accounting 
The potential of accounting for reshaping society is controversial. A growing 
number of social constructionist researchers argue that accounting is not mere 
calculation and reporting but it (re)constructs social worlds. Through its language 
and methods of calculation, accounting shapes/creates meanings (Tinker & 
Neimark, 1988) and ―inscribe[s] its ... values on the world‖ (Hutchinson, 1989 
cited in Brown, 2009). Accounting, therefore, affects people‘s lives ―through its 
influence on economic and social exchanges and the mediation of conflicts‖ 
(Brown, 2009, p. 314). In this respect, it has the potential to promote sustainable 
development.  
However, mainstream accounting has failed in practice to address sustainable 
development and corporate social responsibility, possibly because of its positivist 
roots and its monologism. Some researchers argue that accounting has become a 
technical authoritative tool which serves capitalism (Cooper & Sherer, 1984; 
Gray, 2006a; Unerman & Bennett, 2004). Its emphasis on profits and business 
interests are related to its positivist epistemology and neo-classical economic roots 
(Bebbington, Brown, Frame, et al., 2007; Brown, 2009). In the name of being 
objective and credible, accountants are expected to be value-neutral and apolitical 
professionals who produce ―fair value‖ and assist users to make economically 
rational decisions (Gray, et al., 1996). However, researchers have increasingly 
argued that accounting is not value-neutral or apolitical (Cooper & Sherer, 1984; 
Lehman, 2005; Lehman, 2001; Spence, 2009; Tinker & Neimark, 1987). Rather, it 
is a subjective process by which means of power are exercised (Brown, 2009) and 
some unwanted issues, such as the environmental and social effects of businesses, 
are excluded by powerful groups under the name of ‗externalities‘ (Gray, 1992), 
and do not recognised as real costs to economic actors (Jacobson, 1990).  
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Since the 1970s, social and environmental accounting (SEA) has attempted to 
address the deficiencies of mainstream accounting, particularly on social and 
environmental matters. SEA is ―the process of communicating the social and 
environmental effects of organisations‘ economic actions‖ to stakeholders (Gray, 
et al., 1987, p. ix). Researchers argue the need for public-interest oriented 
accounting (Cooper, 2005; Lehman, 2005; Sawabe, 2005), which can consider 
broader social influences and can ―internalise‖ externalities into accounting and 
decisions (Gray, 1992; Mathews, 1997). In this respect, SEA is seen as ―a vacant 
space of possibility‖ to reconsider ―the relationship between forms of calculation 
and democracy‖ (Power, 1992, cited in Brown, 2009, 492-494).   
Through applications of various perspectives, theories and approaches, SEA has 
burgeoned and attracted ―almost unprecedented level[s] of interest‖ (Gray, Dey, 
Owen, Evans, & Zadek, 1997). Much research covers a wide range of issues, such 
as social and environmental accounting, accountability, corporate social 
responsibility, sustainable development, accounting education, and accounting 
theories; research uses interdisciplinary approaches, and employs numerous 
theories not only from accounting but also from other disciplines. Today, SEA 
accommodates different perspectives and studies, ranging from the purely critical 
to those offering alternatives to conventional accounting.  
This diversity challenges SEA itself. Some researchers are critical of some 
theories applied in SEA. They criticise their application for being company-
centric, reflecting dominant neo-liberal economic models (Lehman, 1999), and for 
being constrained by instrumental reasoning and technical rationality (Cooper, 
1992; Puxty, 1991; Tinker, Lehman, & Neimark, 1991). They argue that existing 
cost-benefit analysis falls short of addressing sustainability (Bebbington, Brown, 
& Frame, 2007) and that current voluntary social reporting initiatives lack 
commitment in practice (Gray, 2002; Lehman, 1995, 1999, 2001; Mathews, 
1997).  
Following corporate voluntary reporting, mainly in developed countries, studies 
have investigated the motivation, quality, and commitment to sustainable 
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development by comparing reports with claims. In spite of evidence of changing 
business practice that incorporates the notion of being socially responsible, some 
researchers are sceptical of voluntary reporting practices. They criticise its self-
praising nature (Deegan & Rankin, 1996, 1997; Guthrie & Parker, 1990) and the 
tendency to ‗green-wash‘ (using the term sustainable development in their reports 
while practices have actually been ‗business-as-usual‘) (Cooper & Sherer, 1984; 
Gray, 2006a; Gray, Walters, Bebbington, & Thompson, 1995; Milne & Gray, 
2007). Consequently, more researchers have called for research which examines 
accountability not only from a corporate perspective but also from that of other 
stakeholders (Mathews, 1997; Milne & Gray, 2007).  
In this vein, some researchers have advocated pluralistic and democratic 
accounting (Bebbington, Brown, Frame, et al., 2007) that can ‗humanise‘ business 
(Cooper, 1992; Gray, 1992) and promote sustainable development and democracy 
(Adams & McNicholas, 2007; Brown, 2009; Gray, 2006a; Lehman, 2001; 
Saravanamuthu, 2004). This challenge requires a systems approach to accounting 
so issues can be studied in the context of their social complexities (Gray, et al., 
1996; Morgan, 1988; Unerman, et al., 2007) and power relationships (Lehman, 
1999; Spence, 2009; Tinker, et al., 1991). 
A critical interdisciplinary approach is promising, as it embraces wider social, 
economic, and environmental considerations and recognises power inequalities 
(Bebbington, Brown, Frame, et al., 2007; Bebbington, Gray, Hibbit, & Kirk, 
2001; Cooper, 1992; Gray, 2006b; Mathews, 1997; Tinker, et al., 1991). 
Additionally, interdisciplinary research in SEA connects accounting with other 
disciplines, such as sociology, politics, and environmental, pedagogic, and 
development studies (Everett & Neu, 2000; Hines, 1991; Thomson & Bebbington, 
2005; Tinker & Neimark, 1988).  
One emerging SEA area is dialogic accounting. Its pluralistic roots and 
encouragement of democracy provide the potential to address the SEA challenge 
of promoting pluralistic and public-interest oriented accounting. It is increasingly 
advocated for addressing accounting challenges regarding participation and 
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sustainable development (Bebbington, Brown, Frame, et al., 2007; Brown, 2009; 
Gray, et al., 1997; Unerman, 2007). Dialogic accounting may enable SEA to 
contribute to ―emancipatory social transformation‖ (Bebbington, Brown, Frame, 
et al., 2007, p. 357) by promoting participatory accounting which can 
acknowledge different perspectives and values, and challenge existing monologic 
accounting.      
3.1.2 Dialogic accounting 
Dialogic accounting is based on theories developed by Freire, Bakhtin, Habermas, 
Rawls and Mouffe (Bebbington, Brown, Frame, et al., 2007). Its central 
assumption is that ―it is possible to resolve the contradictions in different 
worldviews, not by denying their differences but by denying the invasion of one 
worldview by the other and identifying the support and commonality each 
worldview offers to others‖ (Bebbington, Brown, Frame, et al., 2007, p. 364).  
By ―taking pluralism seriously‖, dialogic accounting challenges the monologic 
and technocratic nature of mainstream accounting (Brown, 2009; Dillard & 
Roslender, 2011). The latter instrumental rationality reproduces a unitary view of 
the world which ignores social diversity and alternative perspectives. Its monetary 
reductionism emphasises economic factors while excluding their social and 
environmental impacts (Söderbaum & Brown, 2010). Dialogic accounting, by 
contrast, rejects monologism and finding ―one right answer‖ through economic 
rationalism and ―value neutral‖ experts (Brown, 2009). Instead it favours a 
systemic approach which recognises different perspectives. The aspiration is to 
create a social reality which is presently excluded by the economic domination of 
monologic accounting (Brown, 2009; Söderbaum & Brown, 2010).  
Dialogic accounting particularly supports participatory projects, especially 
deliberative and agonistic democracies, formulated by Habermas and Mouffe 
(Bebbington, Brown, Frame, et al., 2007; Brown, 2009; Lehman, 1995; Lehman, 
1996; Lehman, 1999; Power & Laughlin, 1996; Unerman & Bennett, 2004). 
Being pluralistic, they do not regard the different perspectives of opponents as 
problematic; rather, they are considered legitimate as long as they can accept valid 
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dissent (Brown, 2009, p. 321). Differences among social actors and hegemonic 
struggles are not perceived as threats, but as ―central to democratisation‖ (Brown, 
2009, p. 320). Hence, the participation of stakeholders with differing views on 
development projects is widely advocated by dialogic accounting. 
Thus, dialogue becomes a platform or space where participants with varying 
perspectives and values can discuss certain issues and ―(re)construct their social 
realities‖ (Brown, 2009, p. 328). As Bebbington et al. (2007) state, dialogic 
accounting encourages ―the heterogeneous interaction of multi-voiced dialogue‖ 
to expand meaning and understanding (Shields, 1996 cited in Bebbington, Brown, 
Frame, et al., 2007). Dialogue is particularly important for socially and 
environmentally sensitive issues that may arise from economic activities. 
However, full participation by stakeholders is problematic due to information 
asymmetries and existing power imbalances (Söderbaum & Brown, 2010).  
Dialogic accounting is critical by nature. It recognises that power inequalities 
among participants constrain effective engagement in dialogue. Power has 
negative repercussions when ―used to exercise domination or oppression directly 
or indirectly‖ and to silence people. However, the exercise of power is always 
incomplete and is ―the basis of all forms of behaviour in which people resist, 
struggle and fight for their image of a better world‖ (Freire, 1985). By its 
acknowledgment of power, critical dialogic accounting promotes the participation 
of marginalised people affected by economic activities although excluded from 
participating in them (Brown, 2009; Molisa, et al., forthcoming).  
In most cases, affected communities or indigenous people do not have rights of 
participation and dialogue about development projects that have potential social 
and environmental impacts on them. However, a critical dialogic approach can 
promote dialogue that would provide ―platforms for normally unheard voices to 
be heard‖ (Bebbington, Brown, Frame, et al., 2007, p. 366). Through fuller 
participation, it is argued that participants can better understand different 
perspectives, learn mutually from each other, and ―create better outcomes‖ and 
accountability (Bebbington, Brown, Frame, et al., 2007). In this respect, social 
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learning exercised through dialogue is ―at the centre of ... the critical project‖ 
(Bebbington, Brown, Frame, et al., 2007; Brown, 2009).   
However, dialogic accounting has attracted criticism, not least for the 
underdevelopment of its theories and practices (Bebbington, Brown, Frame, et al., 
2007; Brown, 2009; Frame & Brown, 2008; Thomson & Bebbington, 2005). Its 
theoretical development is still in its infancy. Although it recognises the 
importance of pluralism and participatory democracy, dialogic accounting 
researchers have advocated different types of participatory democracies and their 
applications, especially in the context of sustainability (Bebbington, Brown, 
Frame, et al., 2007; Brown, 2009; Dillard & Roslender, 2011; Frame & Brown, 
2008).  
Dialogic researchers recognise the barriers and practical difficulties that any 
dialogic process might encounter, but its underdeveloped theory and practical 
application has inhibited its operationalisation. Current institutional arrangements 
lack the room and capacity for democratic participation (Söderbaum, 2007; 
Söderbaum & Brown, 2010). Powerful decision-makers may be unwilling to 
promote effective dialogue among various stakeholders for fear that ―dialogic 
approaches may cause difficulties for power elites and lead to heightened 
stakeholder demands‖ (Brown, 2009, p. 335). Others have criticised participatory 
approaches for being time-consuming and costly (Jones, 1997). Moreover, 
decision-makers trained in technocratic, positivist paradigms tend to resist 
dialogic approaches in the name of finding ―right answers‖ on behalf of others 
(Brown, 2009, p. 336). They are often uncomfortable ―with uncertainty associated 
with the absence of pre-specified foundations‖ and find dialogics too complex to 
operate (Brown, 2009). Moreover, dialogic approaches may be constrained by a 
lack of information access and by the ability of stakeholders to participate 
(Bebbington, Brown, Frame, et al., 2007). 
Dialogic accounting lacks empirical studies of its application in LDCs, as it has 
been developed principally in developed countries. The latter usually have better 
institutional arrangements, more democratic participation, and better public and 
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private sector accountability, due to relatively well-enforced legislative 
frameworks (Molisa, et al., forthcoming).  
Much critical dialogic accounting research focuses on accounting democratisation 
by using a sustainability assessment model developed in the United Kingdom and 
New Zealand (Bebbington, Brown, Frame, et al., 2007; Brown, 2009; Frame & 
Brown, 2008). However, there are not yet empirical studies or critical dialogic 
accounting proposals for LDCs (Molisa, et al., forthcoming). Less developed 
countries vary significantly from developed countries in terms of their social, 
political, economic and cultural contexts. The understanding of democracy and 
participation can differ in LDCs due to their ―legacies of colonialism, the impact 
of socio-economic inequality on democratic politics, the democratic participation 
of the subaltern, and the pivotal role of the (Third World) state‖ in social arenas 
(Kapoor, 2008, p. 98). Therefore, critical dialogic accounting needs to recognise 
the differences between developed and developing countries, and may need to 
modify its proposals according to each LDC‘s context.  
Researchers suggest using dialogue to operationalise critical dialogic accounting 
to resolve controversial issues, such as sustainability, accountability, and 
development projects with social and environmental impacts (Molisa, et al., 
forthcoming). In many LDCs, governments are less capable of handling social and 
environmental harms as they ―often do not possess the material infrastructure or 
the technological resources and funding that enable them to cope with 
environmental crises compared to more materially well-off societies‖ (Molisa, et 
al., forthcoming, p. 2). Moreover, regulatory spaces have been reduced 
internationally by dominant neo-classical developmental agendas, such as 
structural adjustment programmes and decentralisation in the public sector 
(Hopper, Tsamanyi, Uddin, & Wickramasinghe, 2007; Szablowski, 2007).  
However, some argue that legislative frameworks could promote dialogic 
accounting if they were to legitimise and facilitate the institutionalisation of 
participation (Bebbington, Brown, Frame, et al., 2007; Brown, 2009). In this 
respect, the environmental impact assessment (EIA), a tool of environmental 
60 
 
management, might be a tool which could operationalise critical dialogic 
accounting.  
An EIA could provide space for dialogue and subjectivity. Because its 
multifaceted nature embraces a broad range of social, economic, and 
environmental issues and engagement with various stakeholders, the EIA could do 
this for SEA related issues.  
3.2 Environmental impact assessment 
3.2.1 Literature on environmental impact assessment  
3.2.1.1 Development of environmental impact assessment 
With its excessive emphasis on economic benefits, rapid industrialisation has 
caused increasingly negative environmental changes, such as global warming, 
environmental degradation, and more frequent disasters. The Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change Report shows that human activities have increased 
greenhouse gas emissions by 80 percent between 1970 and 2004 and are a major 
contributor to global temperature increases (IPPC, 2007, p. 5).  
Environmental ethics radically challenge the absence of environmental concerns 
in Western ethics. In contrast it acknowledges a human ―duty to nature‖ (Gray, 
1994, p. 57). Moreover, research has supported such ethics. Nature and its 
resources, once considered as ―neutral stuff‖ (Mitchell, 2001, p. 6), are now 
receiving a great deal of attention. The commonly expressed idea that ―natural 
resources are defined as resources if they satisfy human needs‖ (Zimmermann, 
1933) has been criticised for its anthropocentric and utilitarian position (Mitchell, 
2001). Now many researchers and practitioners argue that the economy is closely 
interrelated to society and the environment within a ―closed system‖ (Daly & 
Farley, 2004; Mitchell, 2001), and that there are limits to growth (Meadows, 
Meadows, Randers, & Behrens III, 1972). In this respect, a systems approach 
which encourages careful consideration of economic, social, and environmental 
factors and their interrelations (Meadows, Randers, & Meadows, 2004) is 
increasingly advocated by researchers in various disciplines, including economics, 
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sociology, politics, development studies, accounting and management. Such an 
approach has also influenced environmental management studies.  
Over the last few decades, the importance of environmental management has 
increased dramatically. Environmental management covers decisions and actions 
―concerning policy and practice regarding how resources and the environment are 
appraised, protected, allocated, developed, used, rehabilitated, remediated and 
restored, monitored and evaluated‖ (Mitchell, 2001, p. 6). It deals with an 
important dilemma – finding a balance between the rapid depletion of natural 
resources used to meet the needs of a growing world population and the 
worsening environmental degradation (Kapoor, 2001). Environmental 
management has been widely adopted in the legislative frameworks and public 
policies of most countries (Coenen, 2008; Mitchell, 2001). 
The EIA is a major environmental management tool, which could directly address 
the environmental impacts of development projects that may negatively affect the 
natural environment. The origins of EIA legislation lie in the National 
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) (1970) of the USA (Garb, Manon, & Peters, 
2007; International Association for Impact Assessment, 1999; Jay, et al., 2007; 
Mitchell, 2001). For the first time in environmental public policy, legislation 
proposed a systematic approach to assess and predict environmental impacts 
(Garb, et al., 2007, p. 482). Its drafters aimed to reform decision-making 
processes and mainstream development priorities ―in a way that would be 
enforceable and subject to external review‖ (Caldwell, 1993).  
According to the International Association for Impact Assessment (1999), an EIA 
is ―the process of identifying, predicting, evaluating and mitigating the 
biophysical, social, and other relevant effects of development proposals prior to 
major decisions being taken and commitments made‖ (p. 1). In spite of possible 
variations, the principal stages of an EIA are screening, scoping, assessing 
impacts, reviewing, implementing and monitoring/auditing (Garb, et al., 2007, p. 
483).    
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The content of an EIA, and its institutionalisation, have gradually developed 
throughout the world from being a tool for measuring biophysical environmental 
impacts to being a decision-making tool which considers environmental, 
economic, and social aspects (Jay, et al., 2007). Over the last few decades, 
researchers have proposed various approaches and methods for its betterment, for 
example, adaptive environmental assessment (Holling, 1978), life-cycle 
assessment (Canadian Standards Association, 1994), and strategic impact 
assessment since the late 1990s (Fischer, 2003).   
Since the introduction of the NEPA, EIAs have been incorporated in the 
environmental management frameworks of many countries either through 
legislation or by being integrated into planning procedures (Barrow, 1997). 
Today, more than 100 countries have EIA frameworks (Glasson, et al., 2005). The 
EIA is generally regarded as an anticipatory planning and decision-making tool 
which provides environmental information for decision-makers, thereby ensuring 
they consider environmental issues in decisions (Jay, et al., 2007, p. 288). The 
recognition of global environmental problems and the need to incorporate 
sustainability concerns into developmental agendas has significantly increased 
interest in EIAs among researchers and practitioners.  
Many LDCs formed their EIA frameworks with help from international 
developmental and donor agencies, such as the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP), the World Bank, the European Bank of Reconstruction and 
Development (EBRD) and the Asian Development Bank (ADB) (Cherp, 2001; 
Glasson, et al., 2005; Jay, et al., 2007). To have an EIA framework represents an 
important achievement which can help LDCs to consider sustainability in their 
policies and development projects. Environmental issues are often at stake in 
these countries, where governments give priority to other urgent economic 
development needs, such as financial stability and poverty alleviation (Doberstein, 
2003). Given this, EIAs have become the most common environmental policy 
tools in LDCs (Mitchell, 2001), including those countries in transition (Cherp, 
2001, p. 335). 
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By 2001, transition countries had more than one hundred new legal acts that 
adopted EIAs (Cherp, 2001, p. 336). These legislative measures aimed to improve 
environmental protection, encourage ―more transparency, participatory and 
decentralized decision-making procedures‖ (Ziegler, 1991, cited in Cherp, 2001), 
and to comply with international norms, such as the Environmental Assessment 
Directives of the EU, the Espoo and Aarhus conventions (UNECE, 1991, 1998), 
and the environmental procedures of the World Bank and the EBRD (European 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 1996; World Bank, 1999). However, 
the evolution of EIAs in transition countries is strongly influenced by their 
societal contexts, in particular, the speed of transition processes, including reforms 
of political and economic regimes, consolidation of democracies, and progress 
towards integration into the European Union (Cherp, 2001; Kravchenko, 2002). 
Their EIAs focus mostly on the compliance of ―proposed activities with sector- or 
media-specific technical standards‖ (Cherp, 2001, pp. 346-347). 
Nevertheless, the EIA is a ―fairly institutionalised‖ (Söderbaum, 2004, p. 3) and 
widely-employed environmental management tool, which can show the pros and 
cons of a development project (Mitchell, 2001; Morgan, 1998) and provide more 
comprehensive guidelines for decision-makers, project developers, and interested 
parties for resolving issues surrounding it. As mining proposals have potential 
negative impacts on the natural environment, they require an EIA in most 
countries (Biller, 2003). This not only helps decision-makers to approve or reject 
a project, but also to inform other constituents about possible methods for 
mitigating the potential impacts of a mining project.  
3.2.1.2 Criticism of the EIA as a monologic tool and process 
The EIA is an important managerial tool which can apply sustainability 
considerations at the project level. However, researchers and practitioners have 
increasingly criticised the effectiveness of EIAs, which has resulted in debate 
about the lack of work on the practical applications of EIAs and their theoretical 
bases.  
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The theory and practice of EIA are dominated by positivism and technical 
rationality (Jay, et al., 2007, p. 288). The EIA process has to be based on 
―accepted scientific principles and procedures if it is to be perceived as credible‖ 
(Cashmore, 2004, p. 408). Hence, researchers tend to employ a positivist 
approach, which focuses on making models of an EIA, and predicting 
environmental impacts by pursuing quantified hypotheses that can, and should, be 
subjected to rigorous falsification (Richardson, 2005). They have the privilege of 
quantitative data obtained by ‗objective‘ scientific methods. Environmental and 
social issues are often simplified and quantified where possible in order to 
develop an optimal model for prediction.  
Objectivity and value-neutrality of an EIA are important claims of the dominant 
positivist perspective. Experts play an important role in identifying and measuring 
impacts, proposing mitigation methods, preparing EIA reports and making 
comments (Morgan, 1998). They are expected to be value-neutral and to make 
judgements based on ―scientific rationality‖ and their expert knowledge (Petts & 
Brooks, 2006; Wilkins, 2003). Value-neutrality also applies to EIA decision-
makers; they are regarded as value-neutral and apolitical individuals who make 
decisions rationally.    
However, a growing number of researchers have criticised the techno-rationalist 
and simplistic ethos of EIAs. The multifaceted nature of EIAs and the broad range 
of environmental, social, political, cultural, and economic issues they cover render 
impossible the positivist assumption that they can perform an anticipatory role in 
planning and decision-making (Jay, et al., 2007). Indeed, in spite of their claims 
on ―the likelihood of making an accurate prediction‖, technocratic researchers 
may make prediction less precise through simplification (Buckley, 1989, cited in 
Wilkins, 2003, p. 407). Over-emphasis on quantitative data generated through 
rational simplification
42
 has been questioned for most environmental and social 
impacts, and their boundaries are barely identifiable and quantifiable (Biller, 
2003; Söderbaum & Brown, 2010). 
                                               
42Using models that simplify environmental systems by eliminating ‗unimportant‘ variables leads 
to a structural error (Wilkins, 2003, p. 407). 
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The ‗value-neutrality‘ of the EIA has encountered criticism. Experts are value-
laden individuals (re)shaped by their beliefs and institutional values (Petts & 
Brooks, 2006). Similarly, decision-makers are influenced by their social and 
institutional values (Morgan, 1998; Richardson, 2005; Wilkins, 2003). 
Particularly in LDCs, decision-making often does not accord with a rational 
model. Rather decisions often depend on the interests, norms and values of 
decision-makers operating within a political arena (Jay, et al., 2007, p. 293). To 
acknowledge the politicisation of an EIA is not undesirable, for it may encourage 
recognition of plurality and help improve EIA practice (Cashmore, Richardson, 
Hilding-Ryedvik, & Emmelin, 2010).     
Critics of technocracy question EIA effectiveness. However, they differ on 
defining effectiveness: some look into ―whether or not EIA is being carried out 
according to its own procedural requirements‖, while others suggest evaluating 
EIA ―according to more substantive criteria, … whether EIA is resulting in the 
kind of outcomes that are typically sought to identify the effectiveness‖ 
(Cashmore, 2004; Jay, et al., 2007). However, many agree that EIA effectiveness 
can be judged by evaluating its practical application against its initial objectives.  
The EIA seeks to provide comprehensive environmental and social information 
about a project to decision-makers and other EIA constituents, and to incorporate 
environmental concerns into decisions (Jay, et al., 2007). Therefore, its 
effectiveness can be evaluated by its influence on planning and decision-making 
(Jay, et al., 2007). However, there is evidence that EIAs are not well integrated 
into the structures and procedures of decision-making institutions and their 
resultant decisions (Doberstein, 2003).   
Technocracy often results in an expert-oriented EIA (Petts, 2004; Petts & Brooks, 
2006). The reports of experts use professional and technical language (Morgan, 
1998) that can fail to provide useful and understandable information for decision-
makers and other EIA constituents (Mitchell, 2001). The size of reports is also 
problematic; they tend to have either too many pages or too few (Jay, et al., 2007).  
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In addition, EIA practices in LDCs are ineffective for a number of reasons. The 
lack of rule of law, weak transparency and accountability, and endemic corruption 
leads to weak governance in LDCs (Cherp, 2001; Kakonge, 1998), and hence poor 
enforcement, low institutional and human capacity, and ―overlapping 
jurisdiction‖, which creates conflict between agencies (Doberstein, 2003; 
Mitchell, 2001). Legislation usually requires proposed projects to bear all the EIA 
costs, but often provides ‗flexibility‘ for proponents by allowing them to choose 
the assessor company (Li, 2009). This increases conflict of interest among EIA 
companies and reduces the incentives for them to criticise projects (Biller, 2003; 
Li, 2009). It‘s often assumed these problems can be resolved by developing 
additional laws, regulations, and penalties for any damages, but these often have 
no effect (Biller, 2003, pp. 127-128), which can render the EIA to being a 
‗symbolic‘ reporting process for project approval (Branis & Christopoulos, 2005).  
The EIA will lose credibility among constituents if they believe it is a biased and 
inaccurate process. On the one hand, the public and environmentalists can distrust 
an EIA, as they believe it favours project developers (Essex Planning Officers 
Association, 1995). On the other hand, proponents of projects complain that an 
EIA is a costly and time-consuming ‗bureaucratic hurdle‘ (Biller, 2003); hence 
claims that EIAs have become a tool for ‗decision-aiding‘ rather than decision-
making (Jay, et al., 2007, p. 293). 
Following growing recognition of the importance of sustainable development, 
some researchers define EIA effectiveness by its sustainable development 
methods. However, EIAs are often politicised and decision-makers prioritise 
short-term individual gain over longer-term community goals (Wilkins, 2003, p. 
410). Caldwell (1993) argues that EIAs are effective compared to the ―past 
neglect and failings‖ of environmental management, but not if evaluated 
according to sustainable development criteria (cited in Cashmore, 2004, p. 2). 
However, the meaning of sustainable development and its application needs a 
better definition in EIA theory and practice (Akol, 2001; Cashmore, 2004; 
Nooteboom, 2007).  
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EIAs involve ―contested rationalities‖ and ―inescapable relationships between 
power and value‖ (Richardson, 2005, p. 343). Consequently, researchers 
increasingly argue that the EIA cannot be ―value neutral‖ and ―apolitical‖ (Jay, et 
al., 2007; Richardson, 2005; Wilkins, 2003) and call for approaches that 
acknowledge its complexity and subjectivity (Cashmore, 2004; Cashmore, et al., 
2010; Wilkins, 2003). Given the potential of the EIA to encourage preventive 
rather than corrective action, to gather considerable information about a project 
and its effects within the area where it will operate, and to build mitigation 
measures into contracts between the authority and a project proponent, the EIA 
could help reduce or resolve conflicts between the authority, the project 
proponent, and affected communities, and to increase public awareness of 
sustainability, thereby changing social values (Biller, 2003; Cherp, 2001; Garb, et 
al., 2007; Jay, et al., 2007; Mitchell, 2001; Nooteboom, 2007). Thus, the EIA 
becomes not merely a decision-making tool, but could also promote sustainable 
development (Söderbaum, 2004; Wilkins, 2003) and social learning (Diduck & 
Mitchell, 2003; Diduck, et al., 2007; Sinclair & Diduck, 2001; Wilkins, 2003). 
Thus the practice of the EIA needs guidelines for sustainability (LeBlanc & 
Fisher, 1994), better coordination and commitment (Marsden, 1998) and better 
public participation (Glasson, et al., 2005).    
3.2.1.3 The EIA as a participatory decision-making tool 
Today, legislation in most countries requires public participation (EIA Centre, 
1995a, 1995b), especially following the Aarhus Convention on ―Access to 
Information and Public Participation in Decision-Making in Environmental 
Matters‖ (UNECE, 1998). The importance of public participation stems in part 
from the multidisciplinary nature of EIAs (Morgan, 1998). Stakeholder 
participation in an EIA increases its credibility and quality (Diduck, et al., 2007), 
and benefits participants, ranging from assessment experts to affected 
communities.  
According to Mitchell (2001), participants or stakeholders are ―a person and 
groups that are directly affected by or with an interest in a decision, or with legal 
responsibility and authority relative to a decision‖ (p. 189). Stakeholders can be 
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classified as ―active‖ and ―passive‖ publics. The active public organise interest 
groups and are more committed to participation, where inactive sectors of the 
populace, usually the majority, are silent about environmental issues (Mitchell, 
2001, pp. 189-190).  
The most common methods of public participation are public hearings and 
consultations, usually organised to provide information about a project and to 
obtain comments from the public, once an EIA report has been prepared 
(Mitchell, 2001; Morgan, 1998; Sinclair, Diduck, & Fitzpatrick, 2002). The 
effectiveness of participation in developed and developing countries has 
increasingly been questioned. In developed countries, such as Australia, Canada, 
UK, and USA, collaborative public engagement has largely been successful in 
raising understanding and shared capital, but has proven to be ineffective for 
translating such capital into action (Margerum, 1999). Research in Canada and the 
UK has criticised the trend for participation to become symbolic by relying on 
consultation rather than active public participation (Booth & Skelton, in press; 
Kapoor, 2001; Lockie, Franetovich, Sharma, & Rolfe, 2008; Marsden, 1998; 
Rockloff & Lockie, 2006).  
Such instrumental participation fails to address indigenous people‘s concerns 
about projects operating in their land. They are often incapable of participating in 
public consultation due to their lack of knowledge about an EIA and their inability 
to understand its professional language (Stewart & Sinclair, 2007a). Even when 
they participate, their comments are often not included in final reports and 
decisions (Diduck & Sinclair, 2002; Li, 2009). Thus, indigenous people are often 
excluded from decision-making even if they are involved in public hearings and 
consultations (Booth & Skelton, in press; Hilson, 2003; Rockloff & Lockie, 
2006).  
Often experts and decision-makers lack an appreciation and understanding of 
public participation, as their formal education and training tends to focus on 
environmental and economic issues, and instrumental rationalities (Doberstein, 
2003; Petts, 2004; Petts & Brooks, 2006). As Doberstein (2003) comments:  
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The formal training of most development planning bureaucrats is in economic or 
technical/scientific disciplines, which reinforces the tendency to view impact 
assessment as a technical or scientific input to planning, rather than a participatory 
process of planning (p. 26). 
The local knowledge and the ability of affected communities to participate in 
scientific decision-making tools such as EIAs are often underestimated by 
experts and decision-makers (Kwiatkowski & Ooi, 2003; Mitchell, 2001), who 
can regard public participation as time-consuming and costly, with no direct 
benefits (Biller, 2003; Cherp, 2001).  
It is important to recognise differences in cultural, political, governance and local 
knowledge systems of LDCs compared to Western countries. LDCs often 
uncritically import EIA legislation from Western countries or are recommended to 
do so by international donor organisations (Doberstein, 2003). Research on EIA 
practices in some South-East Asian countries, such as Thailand, Indonesia, and 
Malaysia, reveal that Western style public participation does not work due to the 
markedly different cultural and socio-political practices (Boyle, 1998). In these 
countries, public participation was absent, and decisions were often made without 
regard for public or national interests (Kolhoff, Runhaar, & Driessen, 2009). The 
principal reasons for ineffective public participation include the common 
acceptance of paternalistic authority and social hierarchies, the desire to maintain 
‗face‘ in personal relations, the avoidance of conflict, and the inability of 
individuals, communities and public-interest groups to participate in an EIA 
(Boyle, 1998, p. 114).  
Similarly, post-communist countries have also experienced ineffective public 
participation. In spite of claims to the contrary their democracies are still largely 
―on paper‖ and public participation in EIAs is very limited (Kravchenko, 2002, p. 
502). The low participation rates emanate from poor public awareness of 
environmental matters, lack of a participatory tradition, and distrust of 
governmental bodies and the courts (Kravchenko, 2002, p. 467). This is 
compounded by state deficiencies, including a poor rule of law, weak institutions 
and human capacity, and no detailed regulatory frameworks for public 
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participation (Cherp, 2001; Kravchenko, 2002). Moreover, many LDCs lack the 
political will to promote participatory decision-making as public participation is 
considered ―unnecessary, inefficient, time-consuming or even politically 
dangerous‖ (Doberstein, 2003, p. 26).  
Although researchers have criticised existing participation as being ‗symbolic‘, its 
importance has not been undermined. Indeed, calls have grown for more 
interactive and meaningful public participation that could include affected 
communities and would challenge existing monologic EIA practices (Diduck, et 
al., 2007; Söderbaum, 2004; Stewart & Sinclair, 2007b; Wilkins, 2003). It is 
argued that comprehensive assessment that can include local knowledge, values, 
and concerns of affected communities would be more effective (O'Faircheallaigh, 
2010). Additionally, public engagement in EIA enforcement and monitoring may 
mitigate potentially negative impacts of a project and avoid future conflict among 
constituents (Furia & Wallace-Jones, 2000; Mitchell, 2001; Morgan, 1998; 
Scottish Executive, 2006).  
Importantly, a participatory approach would help to redistribute power from 
environmental assessment managers to the public (Arnstein, 1969), would 
improve accountability (O'Faircheallaigh, 2010), and could help make EIAs more 
plural, democratic, and better at incorporating sustainability considerations 
(Cashmore, et al., 2010; Jay, et al., 2007; Nooteboom, 2007). A participatory 
approach would improve public confidence in the EIA and encourage discourse 
and social learning among constituents (Diduck & Mitchell, 2003; Sinclair & 
Diduck, 2001; Webler, Kastenholz, & Renn, 1995; Webler & Tuler, 2006; 
Wilkins, 2003). In the absence of other forms of participation, the EIA could 
become ―a crucial instrument of local democracy‖ (Cherp, 2001, p. 352). By 
granting space for the public to participate, the EIA could also encourage 
democracy in environmental decision-making (Petts, 2003; Petts & Brooks, 2006; 
Rockloff & Lockie, 2006; Sinclair, et al., 2002; Sinclair & Diduck, 1995; 
Söderbaum, 2004).  
Meaningful public involvement in all EIA stages, beginning with the 
identification of impacts to monitoring and auditing EIA compliance (Diduck, et 
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al., 2007; Mitchell, 2001) would also put pressure on mining companies to 
become more environmentally and socially responsible (Ingelson, et al., 2009; 
Nooteboom, 2007). 
In this regard, NGOs can ―act as very powerful actors of monitoring and enforcing 
E[I]A provisions, provided they have such an opportunity‖ (Cherp, 2001, p. 352). 
National and international civil society organisations have been important for 
initiating participatory environmental management projects and for mobilising the 
involvement of local communities (Szablowski, 2007; Tarras-Wahlberg & 
Nguyen, 2008), and for putting pressure on ―reluctant governments or 
international agencies to at least begin making the necessary institutional 
changes‖ (Kapoor, 2001, p. 273).  
NGOs have begun to engage in and activate public participation in EIAs. There is 
evidence that NGOs in post-communist countries have invoked EIA procedures 
―against legal and institutional odds‖ which have led to counter EIAs that 
demonstrate ―public environmental expertise [in EIAs]‖ (Kravchenko, 2002, p. 
490). Therefore, NGOs have the potential to promote participatory EIAs and to 
facilitate dialogue among EIA constituents, including affected communities 
(Whiteman & Mamen, 2002).  
3.2.2 The EIA in Mongolia 
3.2.2.1 Overview of the environmental legislative framework 
As in other countries that are in transition (Cherp, 2001), social context has 
influenced the Mongolian EIA framework. The transition period required radical 
changes to legislation that had been developed during the communist era. To 
balance environmental protection against dramatically increasing economic 
interests in the use of natural resources, Mongolia needed better legislation, 
stronger governance, and new institutions that could address the growing 
environmental and health concerns about the operations of mining.  
Environmental legislation now consists of 30 laws and 150 associated documents 
that regulate environmental protection and use of natural resources, and define the 
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scope of environmental management (ADB, 2005). The cornerstones of 
environmental legislation for mineral resource uses are: the Constitution Law 
(1992), the Environmental Protection Law (1995), the Law on Environmental 
Impact Assessment (1998), the Land Law (2002a), the Law on Special Protected 
Areas (1994), the Water Law (2004), the Law on Chemical Toxics (2006), the Air 
Law (1995), the Minerals Law (1997) and the Law to Prohibit Mineral 
Exploration and Mining Operation at Headwaters of the Rivers, Protected Zones 
of Water Reservoir and Forested Areas (2009). The Constitution (1992) 
guarantees the right of Mongolians to live in a safe and healthy environment and 
to be protected from adverse impacts. Therefore, the need for environmental 
management is addressed in legislation.     
Environmental management has developed dramatically under the supervision of 
international development and donor organisations and advocacy NGOs. There 
are various inter-governmental projects on environmental governance and 
capacity building. The chief administrative bodies for environmental management 
are the Ministry of Natural Environment and Tourism (MNET), the State 
Specialized Inspection Agency, and local environmental units and inspectors (The 
State Great Khural of Mongolia 1995).  
The EIA
43
 is the major environmental management tool in Mongolia. In 1998, the 
Law on Environmental Impact Assessment
44
 was passed after the introduction of 
the Environmental Protection Law (1995). The law regulates the coordination and 
control of activities relating to environmental protection and use of natural 
resources, and requires an EIA from the beginning of any project that has 
potential environmental impacts (The State Great Khural of Mongolia, 1998, 
Article 1). As mining has potential adverse impacts, the law states explicitly that a 
mining project requires an EIA at the Ministerial level (Annex). 
                                               
43 The EIA was first introduced by the Asian Development Bank in 1994 as an environmental 
management tool. Recognition of the importance of this tool led to the 1998 law (ADB, 2005).    
44 Amendments were made in November 2001 
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3.2.2.2 EIA procedures 
According to the Minerals Law (1997), all mining licence-holders should have an 
EIA, an environmental protection plan, and an environmental monitoring 
programme in order to operate (Article 30). The principal constituents of the EIA 
process are defined as mining companies, impact assessment companies, local 
administrative bodies, the Ministry of the Natural Environment and Tourism 
(MNET), and local people.  
A legal entity with assessment specialists may apply to the MNET for a licence to 
conduct an EIA. The Technical Commission, appointed by the MNET, examines 
each application and provides its comments. If positive, the MNET decides 
whether to issue an EIA licence for two years, subject to renewal every two years. 
The Ministry can issue and revoke the licence of an EIA specialist if he/she were 
proved to have submitted a faulty EIA (Article 9.12). 
Once a mining company is granted a licence for mining, it must then submit a 
project description, a technical and economic feasibility study, working drawings 
and other related documents to the MNET for screening (Article 4.4). Within 12 
working days, a screening expert will make one of the following 
recommendations (Article 4.6): 
 the project may be implemented without conducting a detailed EIA 
 the project may be implemented pursuant to specific conditions 
 a detailed EIA is required 
 the project is rejected on the grounds of non-conformity with the relevant 
legislation, or adverse impacts of equipment and technology on the 
environment, or absence of the project in the land management plan.  
Given their potential social and environmental impacts, all mining projects require 
a detailed EIA
45
 which is subject to screening. To obtain an EIA, a mining 
company must find an authorised EIA company and pay all costs relating to the 
                                               
45 By the law, ―new projects as well as the renovation and expansion of existing industrial, service 
and construction activities and project which use natural resources in different ways shall be 
subject for screening‖ (Article 4.1).   
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EIA. The assessment company will develop a detailed EIA in accordance with set 
requirements by a screening expert in his/her recommendation (Article 5.1). An 
EIA report should include environmental baseline data and indices, appropriate 
project alternatives, recommendations for mitigating measures that can minimise 
or eliminate potential adverse impacts, a risk assessment, an environmental 
protection plan, an environmental monitoring programme, a rehabilitation project, 
and opinions of local residents and the Local Representative Khural (Article 5.4).  
Following amendments in 2001, the opinions of residents from the area where a 
project proposes to operate became a requisite for the approval of an EIA report 
(The State Great Khural of Mongolia, 1998, Provision 5.4 and 7.3). Therefore, 
assessment companies require the comments of local people when conducting an 
EIA. They usually obtain these through a questionnaire and face-to-face meetings 
when preparing environmental baseline data in the local area (Johnova, 2004). 
The law states that the receiver of the EIA report should organise a public meeting 
to introduce the report (Article 7.5). However, a public meeting is not 
compulsory.  
Once the EIA report is prepared, members of the Local Representative Khural or a 
local governor must approve it. Their signature of approval indicates that they 
have seen and commented on it. The report is also submitted to the mining 
company for review and comments (Article 5.5). The report and related 
documents are then sent to the screening organisation.  
An expert (an impact assessor officer of the Ministry) must review the report and 
submit his/her conclusion/recommendation within 18 working days  (Article 7.2). 
The EIA committee of the MNET then makes the final decision whether to 
approve the project (Article 7.3). The Committee consists of EIA specialists, the 
head of the Natural Resource Department of the Ministry, and academics.  
After approval is granted, the EIA company will send two final copies of the EIA 
report, one to the MNET, the other to the mining company, and keep a further 
copy for itself. All copies are equally valid (Article 5.7), and all recipient 
organisations must ensure the public has access to the information when necessary 
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(Article 7.5). The law also requires the Ministry to have an EIA database available 
for interested parties (Article 7.6).    
Once the project is approved, the mining company must develop an environmental 
protection plan and an environmental monitoring programme. These should 
implement EIA recommendations and monitor and control mining performance 
accordingly (Article 6.1). An environmental protection plan includes ―measures to 
minimize, mitigate and eliminate adverse impacts identified during the detailed 
EIA as well as indicates the timeline and estimated budget for implementation of 
these measures‖ (Article 6.1.1). The environmental monitoring programme should 
cover ―the monitoring and study of changes in the environment as a result of 
project activity and reporting requirements, include monitoring schedule and 
methods as well as determine the timeline and estimated budget for 
implementation of those measures‖ (Article 6.1.2). These plans and estimated 
budgets need the approval of the MNET, and the mining company must deposit in 
a special MNET account fifty percent of its annual environmental protection 
budget as a guarantee. This is refunded when the environmental protection plan 
has been fully implemented (The State Great Khural of Mongolia, 1997, Article 
30.11-12). 
Figure 1 illustrates the entire process, beginning from the EIA request by a mining 
company through to developing an environmental protection plan following 
comments in the final EIA report: 
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Figure 1. EIA procedures 
 
According to the EIA law (1998), if a mining company ―caused or has caused 
damage to the health of the local population or the environment‖ the assessment 
should be reviewed (Article 8.1). The MNET would then appoint a review team 
and cover their expenses. Any guilty party must repay these costs. If the EIA was 
incorrectly prepared, the EIA company must conduct a reassessment to meet the 
MNET requirements, and the MNET may suspend the EIA company‘s right to 
conduct further EIAs (Article 8.6). 
The EIA law establishes that violators of the law are subject to criminal or 
administrative liability, depending on the nature of the violation and the size of 
the damages. If the violation is not subject to criminal liability, administrative 
sanctions would be imposed by a judge or an environmental inspector (Article 
12.2). If the project has been implemented without an EIA and an environmental 
plan and programme, or the means of implementation do not meet the 
requirements of the EIA and the environmental plan, the guilty official can be 
fined 25,000-50,000 tughriks
46
, and a guilty legal entity, 250,000 tughriks 
47
. If a 
                                               
46 equals US$18 – 36 at the current exchange rate (US$1 = 1400 tughriks)  
47 equals US$178 at the current exchange rate 
77 
 
licensed EIA company is found guilty for making an incorrect EIA, it will be 
fined 150,000-250,000
48
 tughriks (Article 12.2.2 - 12.2.4).  
By law, the guilty party must eliminate or compensate for damage to human 
health, property, and environment caused by a project which has no EIA or has 
not complied with requirements of an EIA report. If an EIA company has 
prepared an incorrect EIA, it must pay all related costs of the EIA review process 
and compensate for environmental damages caused by the EIA (Article 13.2).           
3.2.2.3 The state of the EIA in the mining sector 
Over the last decade, the number of EIA reports and EIA companies has gradually 
increased, due partially to development of the mining sector. Mining accounted 
for 29 percent of EIA reports from 1998 to 2007 (MNET, 2008). About 70 EIA 
companies conduct EIAs (MNET, 2009a) (MNET, 2009b).  Today, the EIA is a 
‗well-recognised‘ legislative process for mining companies wishing to commence 
operations. Table 1 details EIA reports from 1998 to 2007 by sectors. 
Table 1. Statistics on the Environmental Impact Assessment, 1998-2007 
Resource: MNE (2008) ―Report on the State of the Environment of Mongolia‖, Ulaanbaatar, p.103 
However, EIA practice in Mongolia is still in its infancy and falls short of being 
an effective environmental institutional process that can address and prevent 
environmental and social damage from development projects (Netherlands 
Commission for Environmental Impact Assessment, 2002). Over its relatively 
short development, the EIA has become a technical procedure conducted among 
the authorities, EIA companies, and mining licence holders. As in other LDCs, the 
                                               
48 It equals to US$107 – 178 by the current exchange rate. 
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effectiveness of Mongolian EIAs is questionable (Johnova, 2004) for several 
reasons, including a poor legislative framework, a lack of capacity among the 
Ministry and EIA companies, weak implementation and compliance monitoring, 
and poor quality of the EIAs (ADB, 2005; Myagmarsuren, 2006).    
Regulation to ensure implementation of EIA law remains inadequate. The 
framework is weak with respect to public participation, sanctions, funds for 
rehabilitation, informal mining, protected areas, and compensation for land-use 
(IIED & WBCSD, 2002; World Bank, 2006). Moreover, there is poor 
implementation of EIA law because of a lack of coordination and cooperation 
between government organisations, poor human and institutional capacity, weak 
compliance monitoring, and inadequate penalties (Netherlands Commission for 
Environmental Impact Assessment, 2002; World Bank, 2006). Enforcement 
mechanisms and standards are still lacking in the current regulatory framework 
(World Bank, 2006).   
The EIA may be a new policy tool in Mongolia, but the ministry lacks proper 
knowledge and expertise about it and is understaffed. The government has 
reduced the ministry budget and staff numbers, due to its policies of 
decentralisation, reducing bureaucracy, and for strengthening capacities (Ministry 
of Finance, 2007). Therefore, a few government officers cannot comprehensively 
review and assess EIAs given the limited time-frame and excessive workloads
49
 
(Johnova, 2004). This is compounded by government organisations failing to 
make merit-based appointments due to political interventions, following each 
election (USAID, 2005). Constant changes in the ministerial structure have badly 
affected staff productivity and motivation to improve knowledge and skills 
(Radnaasumberel, et al., 2006), and conflicts of interest among public servants 
have also increased (Research team, 2006).  
The number of EIA companies has grown rapidly in response to the dramatic 
increases in mining, infrastructure, construction and tourism sectors that require 
                                               
49 According to the law, the detailed EIA report should be reviewed within 18 working days. 
However, one officer has to review many EIAs at once as there are about 800 EIA reports 
reviewed annually and the number is expected to increase.    
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EIAs. While EIAs have been a new business area for environmental and technical 
experts by EIA companies, their lack of expert knowledge and skills about EIAs 
has resulted in poor quality EIAs, and conflicts of interest (Netherlands 
Commission for Environmental Impact Assessment, 2002). 
Weak compliance with the law and poorly managed EIAs are also linked to 
monitoring. In 2002, the government took the monitoring role from the MNET so 
as to separate the policy-making and controlling functions (ADB, 2005). Today, 
compliance monitoring of EIAs and associated environmental plans are inspected 
by the State Specialised Inspection Agency (SSIA) (Ministry of Nature and 
Environment, 2008). The intention was to centralise all monitoring functions of 
government organisations into the SSIA to improve coherence and effectiveness 
of state monitoring, but the situation has not improved due to poor coordination 
and cooperation among government organisations (World Bank, 2007a).  
There are many problems with the accessibility of reports and public participation 
in EIAs. The process of preparing an EIA report and the decision-making leading 
to approval of a mining project are often ―in-transparent‖ and not available for 
public review (World Bank, 2006). Public participation is lacking in an EIA and 
in the granting of a permit for a mining project, because legislation ―fails to 
formalise public involvement‖ (World Bank, 2006, p. 3). Therefore, public 
participation is left to the discretion of the proponent and the government 
authority, in spite of the law saying that the ministry should consider public 
opinion when reaching a final decision (The State Great Khural of Mongolia, 
1998, Provision 7.3). However, it does not specify how opinion should be gauged 
and included. Moreover, reports are inaccessible for the public as they are either 
not ―effectively placed in the public domain‖ (World Bank, 2007b, p. 160) or 
―secretised‖ by the bureaucracy in spite of the legal requirement for public access 
to information. 
As in other mineral-rich LDCs, Mongolians are gradually learning about the 
mining sector and its impacts on society and the natural environment. Although 
EIAs should be able to address the environmental impacts of mining, 
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environmental destruction, and rehabilitation practices of mining, evidence 
suggests that EIA practice fails to do so (Saran, 2009). Weak compliance and 
monitoring of rehabilitation also compounds environmental degradation, water 
and soil pollution in local regions. Consequently, local people face more 
frequently serious issues concerning health and safety, dangers to biodiversity, 
and herding of animals, and the drying-up of local river resources (MNPC, 2008).  
Environmentally destructive mining, which fails to contribute to local 
development, results in dissatisfaction, anger, and conflict among local people and 
NGOs. Consequently, they have formed local grass-root NGOs and movements 
(UNDP, 2006). They have begun to recognise the importance of environmental 
management for encouraging better environmental governance, and socially and 
environmentally responsible mining (MNPC, 2008). Participatory environmental 
and mining decision-making has the potential to address poor mining practice, 
which is gradually being acknowledged by government organisations, mining 
companies, environmental experts and international and domestic NGOs (ADB, 
2005; RMI, 2009; World Bank, 2006). More local and international NGOs have 
begun to address environmental management and EIA practices. Some NGOs 
have been involved in preparing a bill that would make public participation in an 
EIA mandatory in law. This suggests there is a need and support for a democratic 
EIA which could allow public participation and consider the concerns and views 
of affected communities.  
Chapter 4 will discuss in more detail the potential involvement of NGOs in 
mining and environmental management.   
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Chapter 4: NGOs AS PROMOTERS AND FACILITATORS OF 
PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY AND DIALOGUE 
4.1 Introduction 
Within civil society, NGOs have been crucial in raising public awareness of 
mining issues and for promoting sustainability. As long-standing advocates for 
democracy and participation, NGOs promote transparent and inclusive public 
policy and decision-making that have a bearing on the lives of ordinary people.  
This chapter will explore how NGOs promote sustainability and participatory 
decision-making in mining. First, notions of civil society are discussed, as NGOs 
are a part of and/or claim to represent civil society. Second, the classification, 
roles and the contested nature of NGOs are discussed, drawing from research in 
development studies, public policy, SEA, and environmental management. Third, 
the engagement of NGOs is examined, especially their promotion of democracy 
and participation, and the raising of environmental and mining issues. Lastly, this 
chapter discusses the development of the Mongolian NGO sector and its 
involvement in mining-related environmental issues.              
4.2 Contested nature of NGOs 
4.2.1 Civil society 
The terms ‗NGOs‘ and ‗civil society‘ have been used interchangeably over the 
last three decades. This acknowledges the centrality and significance of NGOs 
within socio-political spheres compared with other civil society organisations. 
However, to understand NGOs it is important, first, to discuss civil society.  
Since the late twentieth century, the term ‗civil society‘ has been widely used 
across disciplines such as development studies and public policy (Howell & 
Pearce, 2001). However, the concept and its meaning date back to at least Hobbes 
and Locke (Robertson, 1986) and other philosophers who have expressed 
divergent views on civil society and its relations with the state, family, and 
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market. Hegel viewed civil society as ―a social formation [that] intermediate[s] 
between the family and the state‖, whereas Marx and Engels distinguished civil 
society from the state (Gray, et al., 2006). An influential theorist, Antonio 
Gramsci, an Italian Marxist, argued that civil society constituted a separate arena 
from both the state and market (Robertson, 1986) that could disseminate the 
ideology of the dominant group or dispute it, especially through counter-
hegemonic actions, often influenced by organic intellectuals (Howell & Pearce, 
2001, p. 54). Although debate on civil society continues, its importance is now 
recognised both in theory and practice. 
Civil society is defined as all aspects of society that are beyond the public and 
private sectors. It as ―an arena of association and action independent of the state 
and market in which citizens can organise to pursue purposes that are important to 
them, individually and collectively‖ (Brown, Khagram, Moore, & Frumkin, 2000, 
p. 275). Thus, a voluntary association in civil society – based on shared moral and 
intellectual sentiments  – provides an opportunity to take collective action to 
achieve desirable ends that would be difficult to achieve individually (Teegan, 
Doh, & Vachani, 2004). The London School of Economics Centre for Civil 
Society defines civil society as: 
The arena of uncoerced collective action around shared interests, purposes and 
values. In theory, its institutional forms are distinct from those of the state, family 
and market, though in practice, the boundaries between state, civil society, family 
and market are often complex, blurred and negotiated. Civil society commonly 
embraces a diversity of spaces, actors and institutional forms, varying in their 
degree of formality, autonomy and power (Centre for Civil Society, 2004).  
Collective action can originate from broad social concerns or the marginalisation 
or failure of social and political institutions to recognise the social identity of 
some groups of people and to support them appropriately (Putnam, 2002). 
Consequently, some civil society organisations pursue ―political ends‖ outside the 
―state apparatus‖ (Salamon, 1994). ―Shaping the larger political and social reality‖ 
(Schwartz & Pharr, 2003) and ―invoking public debate on common concerns‖ 
both influence and derive from collective actions (Teegan et al., 2004).  
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One type of collective action is a social movement, which according to Teegan et 
al. (2004) occurs ―when the collective action of a group of individuals is sustained 
over time in an identifiable way‖ and it ―reflects an important emerging social 
change‖ (p. 465). When citizens lose trust in institutions that are supposed to 
protect their interests, a new ―outward looking‖ and ―bridging‖ mechanism which 
encourages social capital formation is needed (Putnam, 2002, p. 11). For this 
reason, social movements have become more organised, influential, and integrated 
into global political and economic systems, and have formed NGOs (Gray, et al., 
2006). Although not all social movements become formalised NGOs, doing so 
can legitimate social movements, enable them to be eligible for fundraising, 
provide access to information, and help communities to be represented in 
decision-making, thereby pursuing their objectives in a sustained way (Korten, 
1990; McIlwaine, 2009). 
To define types of civil society organisations is difficult due to their diverse 
formality, size (in terms of membership), geographic scope, rationale (for 
formation/operation), and linkages to the market, state, and family (Gray, et al., 
2006, p. 323). Nevertheless, civil society organisations continue to grow in size, 
vitality, and importance.  
Civil society includes a wide range of organisations, such as registered charities, 
NGOs, community groups, women's and faith-based organisations, professional 
associations, trade unions, self-help groups, social movements, business 
associations, coalitions and advocacy groups (Centre for Civil Society, 2004). 
Given their roles and scope of operations, NGOs are now key elements of civil 
society and have significant influence in national and international social and 
public-policy arenas.  
4.2.2 Definition and classification of NGOs 
Any definition and classification of NGOs must carefully consider their 
multifaceted and diverse activities across sectors, their relationships with the state, 
market, public and international organisations, and their wide range of objectives 
(Gray, et al., 2006; Teegan, et al., 2004). Given this diversity it is unsurprising 
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that there is little consensus on how to define and classify NGOs either 
theoretically or empirically (Vakil, 1997, p. 2057). Korten (1990) defines NGOs 
as being close to social movements, whereas Vakil (1997) identifies them as not-
for-profit organisations for disadvantaged people. For the purposes of this study, 
NGOs are understood as movement-oriented, self-governing, non-profit 
organisations that have tended to focus attention on improving the quality of life 
of disadvantaged people and protecting the natural environment.    
In developmental discourses, the term ‗NGO‘ is used interchangeably with grass-
root organisations. Some have attempted to distinguish NGOs from social 
movements. Mercer (2002) states: 
NGOs are officially established, run by employed staff (often urban 
professionals or expatriates), well supported (by domestic or, as is more often 
the case international funding), and are often relatively large and well-resourced. 
Grass-root organisations are smaller, often membership-based organisations, 
operating without a paid staff but often reliant upon donor or NGO support, 
which tend to be (but are not always) issue-based and therefore ephemeral 
(Mercer, 2002, p. 6).  
However, NGOs and social movements are not mutually exclusive or easily 
distinguished because the former sees ―civil society as a collective of 
organisations, while the latter tends to encompass civil society as an arena for 
action‖ (McIlwaine, 2009, p. 136).  
NGOs are commonly classified by their functions and geographic locations. 
Depending on their major activity, NGOs are classified as advocacy, operational 
or hybrid. Advocacy NGOs work on behalf of others who lack the voice or access 
to promote their interests and/or to exercise their rights. Operational NGOs 
provide critical goods and services to clients with unmet needs. NGOs involved in 
both activities, are called hybrid (Teegan, et al., 2004).  
Thus NGOs play differing roles and adopt different strategies to achieve their 
goals. For instance, advocacy NGOs may be well positioned to give people a 
voice where markets are repressive, or weak, resource-strapped government 
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regimes fail to meet their needs (Korten, 1990). They can advocate in various 
ways: lobby power-holders, serve as representatives and advisory experts in 
decision-making, conduct research, hold conferences, stage citizen tribunals, 
monitor and expose the actions (and inactions) of others, disseminate information 
to key constituencies, set/define agendas, develop and promote codes of conduct, 
and organise boycotts and demonstrations (Gunter, 2004).  
Operational NGOs can also influence important values, but they are primarily 
involved in delivering public services to provide critical ―safety nets‖ (Howell & 
Pearce, 2001). They fill voids generated where markets fail or where politically 
challenged, indebted or corrupt states are unable or unwilling to provide unmet 
needs; and when global problems defy neatly defined nation-state responsibilities 
(Teegan et al., 2004). 
 NGOs can be classified by spheres and geographic locations, that is, local, 
national or international (or large international). As McIlwaine (2009) states, 
NGOs range from ―very small-scale community based organisations at the 
grassroots level to larger regional or nationally based organisations, to umbrella 
groups comprising several organisations, and to international NGOs‖ (p. 140). 
However, boundaries between classifications are becoming increasingly blurred. 
For example, the rapid development of internet use and globalisation enable 
NGOs to act nationally and globally (Feher, Krikorian, & McKee, 2007). 
Attempts to classify and homogenise NGOs into a few categories may be 
detrimental and counter-productive to understanding their roles (Mercer, 2002). 
Rather, recognising NGOs‘ roles in contestation and the plurality within the 
social, political, economic, and cultural environments in which they operate may 
be more important (McIlwaine, 2009).   
4.2.3 Roles of NGOs 
The roles of NGOs in society and their relationship with the state and markets 
have changed in recent decades. Key roles now often include promoting and 
facilitating democracy; acting as a watchdog over states and businesses; 
representing and educating the public; mediating conflicts; advocacy in favour of 
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poor/marginalised groups and environmentalists; providing public services and 
delivering aid; and participating in tri-sector partnerships (Howell & Pearce, 2001; 
Teegan, et al., 2004).  
As NGOs are civic organisations that aim to empower the public and make 
unheard voices heard, they are perceived as promoters of democracy (Howell & 
Pearce, 2001). Their positive contributions in this capacity lie in fostering 
democratic transitions from authoritarian regimes and in consolidating democracy 
in the LDCs of Africa, Latin America, and Asia (Mercer, 2002). When the Cold 
War ended, liberal democracy and open-market economies were increasingly 
advocated by multilateral donor organisations; capitalism with liberal democracy 
became the ―triumphant winner‖ in a long-lasting state/market-oriented 
development debate (Howell & Pearce, 2001, p. 4). Many donor organisations 
turned to NGOs to further ―good governance‖ in LDCs (McIlwaine, 2009; 
Mercer, 2002). 
NGOs have also been public watchdogs over the state and business. Whether from 
a neo-liberal or human rights and justice perspective, local, national, and 
international NGOs have been independent ‗auditors‘ of state and business 
performance. From the neo-liberal democratic perspective, NGOs help maintain 
accountability of the state to the public and help prevent state power from 
becoming too oppressive (McIlwaine, 2009). NGOs have promoted corporate 
social responsibility, human rights and environmental justice when addressing 
problems caused by the private sector (Howell & Pearce, 2001; Schlosberg, 
2007). International NGOs, such as Amnesty International, World Wildlife Fund, 
Greenpeace, Oxfam, and Mining Watch, as well as national NGOs, have 
monitored business activities around the world, particularly in LDCs, through 
their independent research on industries such as mining, and have challenged the 
‗business-as-usual‘ behaviour of multinational corporations and domestic 
businesses (Szablowski, 2007; Teegan, et al., 2004).  
NGOs are commonly perceived as public or community educators, facilitators, 
representatives and mediators of conflicts among the public, state and business 
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sectors (Teegan, et al., 2004). In spite of criticisms of their capacity to represent 
(see section 4.1.4), NGOs usually have closer connections with the public they 
serve because they are created and mobilised by individuals with similar interests 
(Korten, 1990). NGOs often try to increase people‘s awareness of their rights and 
participation in decision-making (Feher, et al., 2007), and they disseminate 
information on pertinent political, social, and environmental issues (Howell & 
Pearce, 2001). NGOs in LDCs have introduced and implemented participatory 
approaches at community and national policy-making levels with the support of 
donor organisations (Jordan & van Tuijl, 2006). Moreover, they have actively 
raised social, environmental, and human-rights issues at domestic and 
international forums and have acted as mediators and public representatives in 
conflict resolutions, not least in regard to social and environmental issues caused 
by mining (see sections 4.2.2 and 4.2.3 for more detail)  (Humphreys, 2005; Li, 
2009; Szablowski, 2007).  
Throughout their history, NGOs have addressed issues that the state or market 
have neglected, often contrary to the expectations of the public. In spite of NGOs 
being present in many countries, it was not until the 1960s that NGOs became 
significant players in political and social arenas. Activists and social movements 
(or NGOs) propounded alternative views to the mainstream on the Vietnam War 
and human rights, such as race and gender inequalities, in the USA and Western 
Europe (Howell & Pearce, 2001).  At the time, NGOs were often regarded as 
critics and antagonists of the state and markets, and as representatives for 
suppressed voices, such as black people, women and environmental justice 
campaigners (Howell & Pearce, 2001; Schlosberg, 2007). Since the 1980s, NGOs 
have frequently been cited as democracy promoters/facilitators in newly 
independent and post-communist countries (Kravchenko, 2002; Mercer, 2002), 
anti-globalisation activists, and campaigners against the environmental and social 
impacts of multinational companies in LDCs (Mittelman, 1998; Parker, 2003; 
Urkidi, 2010). Their mobilisation of local and international communities has 
endeavoured to promote democracy and empower people through greater public 
participation in policy and decision-making in the belief that this would improve 
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public and private sector accountability and promote sustainable development 
(Hickey & Mohan, 2004b; Schlosberg, 2007).  
During the late 1970s, influential Keynesian economic theories were increasingly 
questioned; in many capitalist countries, burgeoning welfare states were deemed 
too expensive to sustain; and in newly independent LDCs the theories were 
perceived as having failed to generate development (Howell & Pearce, 2001). By 
the 1980s, neo-liberal economic development policies, akin to the political 
economics of Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan, spread across the world. 
Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) were introduced in the North
50
 and the 
South.
51
 These incorporated aspects of new public sector management‘ (Kapoor, 
2008), including decentralised government, privatisation of state-owned 
enterprises, and reduced social-welfare programmes (Reed, 2002; Szablowski, 
2007). Multilateral donor organisations, such as the World Bank and the IMF, 
promoted SAPs in many LDCs to minimise state intervention and to promote free-
market economic development (Howell & Pearce, 2001; Szablowski, 2007). Neo-
liberal development policies encouraged the provision of some public services by 
NGOs, and they began to be seen as ‗substitutes‘ for some state agencies, 
particularly in providing social services such as health and education, and as 
social safety nets (Teegan, et al., 2004).  
Hence, in cooperation with donor organisations, NGOs increasingly became aid 
deliverers in LDCs. Until the 1980s, development agencies and donor 
organisations had provided millions of dollars to the governments of newly 
independent countries in Africa, Latin America, and elsewhere. However, the 
failure of economic and social development in sub-Saharan countries, particularly, 
prompted a switch of strategy away from direct monetary aid to governments of 
LDCs (Howell & Pearce, 2001). Often they had insufficient capacity and 
capability to use aid as effectively as expected (Bebbington, 2005). Such 
governments were criticised for their ―militarism and authoritarianism, corruption 
                                               
50 The North is a commonly used expression in political studies to refer to welfare countries in 
North America and in Western Europe (Kapoor, 2008).  
51 The South refers to the remaining countries, mostly LDCs and newly independent countries 
(Kapoor, 2008). 
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and venality, wasteful investment and expenditure, their distortion of market 
forces, protection of uncompetitive national industries, the creation of large-scale 
state monopolies‖ and for their lack of accountability and representation (Howell 
& Pearce, 2001, p. 14). Governments of LDCs could be prone to corruption and 
nepotism, so donors turned increasingly to international and national NGOs to 
deliver development projects. NGOs were also favoured because of their less 
bureaucratic structures, closeness and willingness to help the public, and greater 
local knowledge (Feher, et al., 2007).  
This created unprecedented new relationships between donor organisations, 
particularly regarding humanitarian and developmental agendas (Jordan & Tuijl, 
2006; Howell & Pearce, 2001). Since the 1990s, NGOs have become regarded as 
partners of the state and business, reflecting the growing enthusiasm by 
development theorists and practitioners for ―social capital‖ and tripartite 
partnership approaches (Teegan, et al., 2004). Nevertheless, neo-liberal 
development policies attracted criticism; their application was associated with a 
continuous decline of economic growth-rates in Africa and other regions, and with 
widening socio-economic disparities within LDCs and between LDCs and 
developed countries (Hall & Trentmann, 2005). Some researchers argued that 
neither the state nor markets could fully deliver development policies and there 
was ―a missing link‖ (Howell & Pearce, 2001). In this vein some argued that 
―civil society and civic engagement produce an identifiable stock of norms, trust, 
and networks, an accumulation of social capital that enables development to take 
place‖ (Putnam, 2002). NGOs and other civil society organisations were deemed 
as crucial for building and strengthening ―social capital‖ (Teegan, et al., 2004). 
Donor organisations welcomed this, and policies from international institutions, 
such as the World Bank
52
 and the UN, gradually changed (Howell & Pearce, 
2001). Over the last two decades they have strived to improve the capacity of 
NGOs and other civil society organisations to foster and deliver development 
(Toth, 2010). 
                                               
52 The World Bank changed its orientation in 1997 and encouraged more engagement with NGOs 
(Teegan, et al., 2004).  
90 
 
Moreover, philosophies of sustainable development and building social capital 
encouraged more institutional collaboration to address the apparently complex 
social, economic, and environmental issues (Hall & Trentmann, 2005; Korten, 
1990). Donors introduced tri-sector partnerships, encouraging cooperation 
between the state, business, and civil society (Gunter, 2004). Consequently, 
NGOs became increasingly perceived as partners rather than as ‗enemies‘ of the 
state and business (Teegan, et al., 2004).  
In summary, the roles of NGOs have changed due to new development agendas 
that recognise the importance of civil society and its relationship with the state 
and business. Depending on their values and objectives, NGOs have assumed 
different roles. Thus, to attempt to make distinctions between NGOs according to 
their roles would be an ambitious exercise that could oversimplify their social 
contributions. NGOs are complex in their vitality, views, and objectives.  
4.2.4 Contestation of NGOs 
In spite of being ‗non-governmental‘, ‗non-profit‘ and ‗apolitical‘ organisations, 
the NGO sector has attracted growing criticism from international donor 
organisations, academics and practitioners, particularly after the 1990s (Munck, 
2006, p. 328), concerning its poor accountability, representation, credibility and/or 
co-option to dominant beliefs. 
There are three main reasons for concern about the accountability of NGOs: rapid 
growth in their number and size; their increased funding; and their stronger voice 
in shaping public policy (Jordan & Tuijl, 2006, p. 4). NGOs are accountable to 
fund-providers, members, and beneficiaries, but as the boundaries between each 
set of accountabilities has become blurred in practice, such distinctions are only 
useful for analytical purposes.  
NGOs are non-profit, social organisations. Most depend on the funding of donors 
to provide benefits to the poor, marginalised communities, and beneficiaries. 
However, donors may focus on the efficiency of NGO accountability, rather than 
the effective use of funding (Howell & Pearce, 2001). This has led some NGOs to 
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concentrate on the donors‘ efficiency requirements, to the neglect of serving 
beneficiaries in areas such as participation and public empowerment, which has 
divided NGOs into followers and non-followers of donors‘ guidance (Bebbington, 
2005; McIlwaine, 2009). Dependency on donor funding may divert NGOs from 
their initial objectives, lead to neglect of beneficiaries‘ needs by co-opting donors‘ 
perspectives, and encouraging opportunistic enterprises that seek to ‗make money‘ 
under the name of ‗NGOs‘ (Mercer, 2002). NGOs, particularly in LDCs, must go 
beyond securing aid if they are to attain their social goals and change society 
(Bebbington, 2005).  
Some SEA researchers have examined the accounting and accountability issues of 
NGOs as non-profit organisations, and also in terms of both internal 
accountability and to society. Attention has been drawn to the poor institutional 
accounting and accountability of NGOs, particularly those in LDCs (Goddard & 
Assad, 2006) and for Northern advocacy NGOs, such as Amnesty International 
(Unerman & O'Dwyer, 2006). Others have criticised the unelected and ‗profit-
centred‘ nature of NGOs (Lehman, 2007), the loss of their legitimacy (O'Sullivan 
& O'Dwyer, 2009), and the lack of willingness to apply accountability standards 
to themselves that they demand of others (O'Dwyer, 2007). Given the failure of 
mainstream accounting to provide effective accounting and accountability systems 
that are appropriate for the distinctive features and complexity of NGOs, some 
SEA researchers have called for more appropriate means (Lehman, 2007) and the 
development of new accounting systems for civil society organisations (Gray, et 
al., 2006).  
NGOs have been criticised for being too distant from beneficiaries and for lacking 
accountability and outreach to them (Bebbington, 2005). Donors expect NGOs to 
bring benefits to marginalised communities (Howell & Pearce, 2001) in the belief 
that they have ‗greater capacity to reach the poor and promote local participation‘ 
(McIlwaine, 2009, p. 139). However, some NGOs fail to reach the poor, due to 
their dependence on development-aid, opportunistic, self-interested leaders, and 
an absence of skilled staff (Feher, et al., 2007). Operational NGOs in LDCs are 
mostly located in urban areas and staffed by middle-class professionals or (ex)-
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public servants (Weller, 2005). They are often formal, well-structured and well-
staffed to meet donors‘ requirements, but such NGOs can lack local knowledge 
and become geographically separated from rural areas and the intended 
beneficiaries of donor-funded projects (Jordan & Tuijl, 2006; McIlwaine, 2009). 
Sometimes, especially in authoritarian and post-communist countries, (ex)-
political elites and (ex)-public servants use their contacts and information access 
to establish NGOs and obtain donors‘ funding (Weller, 2005). Low accountability 
to beneficiaries brings into question the power of NGOs to represent them (see 
later) as well as their ability to reach poor, marginalised people in LDCs 
(Bebbington, 2005; Gray, et al., 2006; Howell & Pearce, 2001; McIlwaine, 2009).  
Such criticisms may stem from the close relationships between the state and 
NGOs in LDCs and normative assumptions that NGOs are ‗apolitical‘ and ‗non-
profit‘ (Bebbington, 2005). NGOs are assumed to be separate from the state in 
LDCs, but in practice the boundaries between them can become blurred 
(McIlwaine, 2009; Mercer, 2002). Funding by the state or political entrepreneurs 
has brought unexpected ‗fuzzy‘ relationships, particularly in non-Western 
countries where civil society is new and where no clear division exists between 
the state and civil society (Schwartz & Pharr, 2003). In authoritarian regimes, this 
relationship can become symbiotic rather than antagonistic, as NGOs try to obtain 
better access to the state and to gain political benefits by working for it (Munck, 
2006). Hence, NGOs can become both political and dependent on the state, albeit 
sometimes inadvertently (Feher, et al., 2007; McIlwaine, 2009). 
Increased funding has precipitated a booming NGO sector and an increase in 
opportunistic NGOs. The neo-liberal ideology advocated by multilateral donor 
agencies, such as the World Bank and the IMF, and beliefs that NGOs can 
promote liberal democracy and economic liberalism has penetrated the 
development agendas of donors (McIlwaine, 2009), resulting in dramatic 
increases of donor funding to NGOs over the last three decades and increased 
numbers of NGOs in LDCs (Howell & Pearce, 2001). Most funding has gone to 
the increased number of operational NGOs (Mercer, 2002, p. 14) rather than to 
advocacy NGOs that could contest issues such as human rights and environmental 
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protection (McIlwaine, 2009, p. 139). Some operational NGOs have become 
regarded as money-making enterprises that have been established 
opportunistically, and some advocacy NGOs have changed their function 
accordingly (Howell & Pearce, 2001). Some argue that opportunistic NGOs have 
acted as ―supportive arms‖ of the neo-liberal economic perspective advocated by 
Western donors, and have become ―semi-state entrepreneurs‖ (Feher, et al., 2007).  
Donor funding is essential for the ―survival‖ of many advocacy grass-root NGOs 
in LDCs (Howell & Pearce, 2001). When they become operational, advocacy 
NGOs often lose their ability to provide critical voices against dominant 
hegemonies of the state and global governance (Mercer, 2002). Thus, the 
increased number of operational NGOs has fed criticisms about NGOs‘ 
accountability and claims to represent civil society. Given their dependence on 
donor funding, many operational NGOs are ―too close for comfort‖ to donors and 
their independence has become threatened (McIlwaine, 2009). This calls into 
question whether donors can strengthen civil society through this route 
(Bebbington, 2005; McIlwaine, 2009). Moreover, distance from and a lack of 
transparency to beneficiaries and grass-roots organisations has weakened the 
legitimacy of NGOs in society (Mercer, 2002).  
Some argue that donors‘ use of NGOs as a technocratic tool and service or as aid 
deliverers and facilitators to ―strengthen civil society‖ in non-Western countries 
may undermine their representative abilities and may discourage NGOs from 
developing alternative politics (Bebbington, 2005; Howell & Pearce, 2001; 
Mercer, 2002). Thus, a danger exists of non-Western NGOs co-opting the 
prevailing Western views on ―development‖ (Hickey & Mohan, 2004), and 
become ‗missionaries of Western capitalism‘ (Munck, 2006, p. 329). 
The above has created scepticism about the claims of NGOs as representing poor, 
marginalised people in LDCs (Mohan, 2002) and has served to undermine donors‘ 
neo-Tocquevillian goals for promoting liberal democracy and participation in 
LDCs (McIlwaine, 2009, p. 139). For example, some allege that donors‘ attempts 
to alleviate poverty and promote democracy in LDCs have failed because they 
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have neglected the structural issues of poverty and socio-political inequalities 
(Bebbington, 2005; McIlwaine, 2009; Mohan, 2002).  
In summary, there are criticisms concerning NGOs‘ accountability, the rise of 
opportunistic NGOs, and their ability to represent poor, marginalised people. 
However, the potential remains for NGOs to promote global and national 
democracy, participation, thereby improving the accountability of the state and 
markets to the public (Howell & Pearce, 2001; Lehman, 2007; McIlwaine, 2009). 
Some critics advise paying attention to the complex political natures of NGOs and 
to avoid treating them as a unitary concept (Howell & Pearce, 2001; Mohan, 
2002). As noted, the term ‗NGOs‘ covers a wide range of operational and 
advocacy NGOs, professional organisations, and grass-roots social movements 
and there is always scope for alternative thought and action (Mercer, 2002).  
Conflict and antagonism should be expected in the NGO sector, if it seeks to 
create space for alternative views on issues such as ―development‖, human rights, 
and environmental protection (Howell & Pearce, 2001; McIlwaine, 2009; 
Schlosberg, 2007). In this respect, the neo-Gramscian view of civil society has 
been influential, especially during the democratisation of South America during 
the 1980s and of Eastern Europe during the 1990s (Munck, 2006, p. 330). There, 
civil society was both a supporter and challenger of the dominant hegemony; it 
became an arena where ―people [could] associate in a myriad of forms and for a 
variety of purposes‖ (Howell & Pearce, 2001, p. 34) and where ―flexible, 
heterogeneous, and plural‖ discourses on justice and other issues abounded 
(Schlosberg, 2007, p. viii). In the capitalist era, this alternative space challenges 
―the mainstream‘s homogenisation of civil society‖ and ―reflects a multiplicity of 
diverse and often diverging voices that share a wish to preserve a concern for a 
common humanity, to undo the negative aspects of capitalist development, and to 
promote forms of economic organisation that are environmentally and socially 
just‖ (Howell & Pearce, 2001, pp. 35-37). Thus, it is misleading to treat NGOs as 
homogeneous; for instance, environmental, justice-oriented NGOs ―employ 
multiple conceptions of justice simultaneously‖, ranging from fairer distributions 
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of costs and benefits to ecological justice for animals and biodiversity 
(Schlosberg, 2007, p. 5).  
Nevertheless, NGOs are consistently ranked among the most trusted 
organisations. According to the Edelman‘s Barometer Trust global surveys, 
between 2000 and 2005 they outranked corporations, governments, churches, the 
media, and other authorities (Edelman, 2005). The sixth survey showed that the 
public believed that NGOs most closely reproduced their own personal social 
networks, and offered more reliable information than leaders, experts, the media, 
governments or corporations (Jordan & Tuijl, 2006, p. 13). They are undoubtedly 
powerful actors in national and global discourses on public policy, development, 
and other issues.  
  4.3 NGOs as promoters and facilitators of dialogue  
4.3.1 NGOs as ‘agents’ of democracy and participation 
The importance of NGOs is acknowledged in various fields. In particular, they are 
recognised as influential in fostering democracy and participation in LDCs. 
Democracy – ―government by the people‖ – is argued to be a better social order 
than authoritarian regimes as it is more inclusive and not as oppressive (Lipset, 
1995). It encourages empowerment of people whose voices often go unheard in 
authoritarian regimes (Korten, 1990). Public participation in socio-political and 
economic decisions has been widely commended in development discourses about 
poor and marginalised communities (Coenen, 2008).  
As already noted, the neo-Tocquevillian liberal approach has influenced 
development discourses of donor organisations. Civil society is encouraged by the 
belief that it can provide a check to ―potentially authoritarian elements of the 
state‖, while promoting democratisation through public participation (McIlwaine, 
2009). NGOs have become an ―integral dimension of the good governance agenda 
of donor organisations‖ and have attracted numerous international projects on 
strengthening the capacity building of NGOs, particularly in LDCs (Howell & 
Pearce, 2001; McIlwaine, 2009; Mercer, 2002). 
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Consistent with their claims of acting in the public interest, many NGOs have 
initiated, fostered and helped to maintain democracy – they have acted as a 
‗shepherd‘ for democracy. NGOs have pursued various strategies adapted to 
different stages of democratic evolution. They have organised antagonistic actions 
to raise social awareness of politically sensitive issues and demonstrations against 
oppressive states to foster democracy and social change (Li, 2009, Gunter, 2004). 
In countries undergoing democratic transition, NGOs have actively raised public 
awareness of democracy and citizens‘ rights, represented the voices of people who 
go unheard, and have mobilised public participation in socio-economic and 
political discourses (Howell & Pearce, 2001; Teegan, et al., 2004). Moreover, they 
have checked ―state power by challenging its autonomy at both national and local 
scales, pressing for change and developing an alternative set of perspectives and 
policies‖ (Mercer, 2002, p. 9). Hence, they have been leaders in mobilising 
pressure for political change and democratic transition in authoritarian regimes in 
Latin America, South-East Asia and in former communist countries (Howell & 
Pearce, 2001; Mercer, 2002). However, this has been more difficult in countries 
where civil society is weak or underdeveloped: there, severe socio-economic 
constraints exist; corruption and ineffective legal systems abound, there is a lack 
of a ―democratic culture‖; and socio-economic inequalities among ethnic and 
regional communities exist (Kapoor, 2008; Reed, 2002).  
From the neo-liberal viewpoint, development and democracy are positively 
correlated (Howell & Pearce, 2001). As democracy is widely regarded as 
―humane‖ development, participation can empower citizens and marginalised 
people, and can aid the ―transformation‖ to participatory democracy particularly 
in LDCs (Cooke & Kothari, 2001). Participation – regarded as a prerequisite of 
democracy – has been supported and used ―virtually unchecked from margins to 
the mainstream of development‖ since the mid-1980s (Hickey & Mohan, 2004, p. 
3). There is a normative consensus that civil society and NGOs are inherently 
―good things‖ and constitute ―microcosms‖ of the (liberal) democratic process as 
they are separate and autonomous from the state, while acting as a ―bulwark‖ 
against it (Korten, 1990; Mercer, 2002). International donor organisations have 
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enthusiastically incorporated schemes such as participatory rural appraisal and 
rights-based approaches into funded projects and research executed by 
development practitioners, including NGOs (Cooke & Kothari, 2001).  
However, these participatory approaches are criticised for being technocratic tools 
and processes with little evidence of success. Accusations contend that 
participation represents a ―new tyranny‖ used in the name of vulnerable people 
who are ―coerced into activities‖. Thus, decisions become subject to a series of 
techniques that encourage people to express their experiences and views, but 
which rarely ‗empower‘ them (Hickey & Mohan, 2004); and such technocracy is 
―administered and planned by agents of development rather than negotiated with 
and contested by its subjects‖ (Hickey & Mohan, 2004, p. 10). Arguably, 
technocratic participatory approaches fail to address power and politics and 
depoliticise ―what should be an explicitly political process‖ (Hickey & Mohan, 
2004, p. 3). Decisions, concerning who should participate and how, and which 
issues and objectives should be prioritised, are political. Thus, participation in 
decision-making processes is inherently political and influenced by power 
relations. 
International development NGOs facilitate/deliver development aid and projects 
of international donor organisations to LDCs and cooperate with domestic NGOs 
to implement these projects (Feher, et al., 2007); whereas, domestic NGOs act as 
facilitators and implementers of development projects in their own countries, and 
sometimes become beneficiaries of international NGOs (Howell & Pearce, 2001). 
This relationship is increasingly criticised for being top-down, technocratic, and 
ultimately undemocratic. It is accused of being inattentive to local realities and 
power relations, and of ignoring empowerment goals and possible local inputs, 
such as local knowledge (Cooke & Kothari, 2001).    
However, that participation has entered mainstream views on development is ―a 
sign of success‖ (Hickey & Mohan, 2004, p. 12). It may have stimulated 
consideration of radical alternatives proposed by NGOs in LDCs and development 
study research (Mercer, 2002). Moreover, even critics acknowledge that civil 
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actors can promote participation and strengthen democracy under certain 
conditions in LDCs with appropriate support from NGOs (McIlwaine, 2009; 
Mercer, 2002). Heller (2001) argues that ‗transformatory‘ participation needs 
three enabling conditions: 
 a strong central state capacity 
 a well-developed civil society 
 an organised political force, such as a party, with strong social movement 
characteristics (Heller, 2001, pp. 138-139). 
However, most LDCs lack these conditions. Thus it is important to focus on pre-
conditions of participatory governance, such as awareness building on rights and 
citizenship; building civil associations and social movements engaged in 
governance issues; and strengthening institutions of governance, both at the local 
and central levels (Howell, 2001). NGO assistance in fostering these conditions is 
crucial for many LDCs, where state institutions are often neither responsive nor 
accountable to their people and have a lack of political will to support truly 
participatory governance (Mohan, 2002; Bebbington, 2005)   
4.3.2 NGO engagement in environmental issues 
Local, national and international NGOs, through public participation in decisions 
have raised public awareness of social and environmental issues associated with 
economic development – previously excluded as ‗externalities‘. In addition, they 
have organised collective actions against oppressive states, and they have exerted 
pressure on companies and multinational corporations to change their socially and 
environmentally unfriendly behaviours (Gray, et al., 2006; O'Dwyer & Unerman, 
2008; Schlosberg, 2007). Environmental protection and environmental 
degradation are two areas where NGOs have had a prolonged engagement 
expounding participatory development, with significant effects on global and 
national policies and decisions on environmental matters (Gunter, 2004; Howell 
& Pearce, 2001).  
Rachel Carson‘s book Silent Spring (1962) had a profound influence on Western 
thought. She combined consideration of the natural environment, its habitats and 
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―the concern for human health and industrial impacts on individuals and 
communities‖ which had become disconnected from the dominant perspectives of 
the day (Schlosberg, 2007, p. 7). Inspired by Carson‘s work, numerous 
environmental movements and NGOs emerged in the North during the 1960s that 
were devoted to promoting environmental justice and human rights (Howell & 
Pearce, 2001; Schlosberg, 2007). NGOs have raised social and global awareness 
of environmental issues and put pressure on responsible parties, for example, by 
organising demonstrations and consumer boycotts (Gunter, 2004; Howell & 
Pearce, 2001). Alongside such activism, NGOs have cooperated with government 
organisations, international donors, companies, and research institutions over 
policies and decisions regarding environmental protection and preventing 
environmental destruction (Feher, et al., 2007). Thus, NGOs act as mediators or 
―border-crossers‖ among the state, business, academia and the public (Schlosberg, 
2007; Teegan, et al., 2004). Depending on their ideologies, for example, whether 
they are anthropocentric or deep green, the views of NGOs and environmental 
movements on environmental issues can range from the just distribution of natural 
resources within local communities to complete environmental protection in 
favour of biodiversity (Schlosberg, 2007).  
However, all NGOs recognise the importance of participation, and the inclusion of 
affected communities and ecological concerns in decision-making (Gunter, 2004). 
Given this, and their advocacy of environmental justice, NGOs believe that this 
can improve the credibility of decisions, prevent potential conflicts among 
constituents, and encourage democratisation in environmental management 
(Coenen, 2008; Kapoor, 2001). As discussed in Chapter 3, environmental 
management deals with ―inherently political questions‖ by making decisions 
about ―a shift of resources and opportunities from some groups to others‖ 
(Coenen, 2008, p. 6).  
The importation of participatory approaches that are consistent with sustainable 
development and CSR has accelerated in both national and international policy 
agendas. International conventions, such as Agenda 21 and the Aarhus 
Convention ―Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and 
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Access to Justice in Environmental Matters‖, are outcomes of active collaboration 
with national and international NGOs on global policy-making (Coenen, 2008). 
These conventions provided fundamental international legislative documents for 
NGOs to promote participatory environmental decision-making in LDCs 
(Schlosberg, 2007; Toth, 2010). These documents declared that participation of 
affected communities in environmental and social matters is the pillar for 
achieving sustainable development (United Nations, 1992), which could provide 
the legal space for people and NGOs to participate in forms of environmental 
management that are less technocratic and more participatory (Kapoor, 2001; 
Toth, 2010).  
NGOs, being legal entities with sufficient legitimacy and power to influence the 
state and business, have increased their mediating and facilitating roles among the 
state, business and the public (Feher, et al., 2007). Following greater enthusiasm 
for such tripartite partnerships, NGOs have engaged in national and global 
environmental policy-making and discourses, and capacity building schemes 
(Howell & Pearce, 2001). They have endeavoured to incorporate local knowledge 
into the formal – often Western-style – environmental decision-making, and to 
cooperate with government organisations and academia to conduct research and 
policy analyses (Gunter, 2004). NGOs have also cooperated with the state and 
international organisations to raise public awareness of environmental matters, 
and to build and mobilise the public‘s ability to participate in environmental 
decisions (Li, 2009; Szablowski, 2007). Thus, NGOs have become well-
recognised, civil society organisations that are routinely given seats at major 
international meetings of the United Nations, and are systematically included in 
established networks concerning global and national policy arenas, the World 
Bank, and the decision-making processes of other multilateral donor organisations 
(Toth, 2010).  
In the meantime, NGOs have retained the reputation for being watchdogs over the 
state and business, regarding social and environmental issues. As NGOs are 
heterogeneous, some work outside the state and business networks and act as 
social and ecological ―auditors‖ (Schlosberg, 2007). Together with environmental 
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advocates, national and international NGOs have strongly criticised multinational 
corporations, governments and international organisations by organising citizens‘ 
jury systems, and producing counter-assessments to formal EIAs (Li, 2009; 
Schlosberg, 2007; Szablowski, 2007). This is evidenced by successful 
transnational lawsuits, development of an ombudsman function by 
Oxfam/Community Aid Abroad, changes in World Bank policies following NGO 
criticisms about their negative impacts on LDCs, and creating ―public independent 
expertise‖ in some post-communist countries (Kravchenko, 2002; Szablowski, 
2007).  
Globalisation and rapid technological advances in the Internet have given NGOs 
unprecedented power and influence across the world. Beside their traditional 
modes of operation, NGOs have used internet public domains, such as Facebook, 
Twitter, and their own websites and blogs to initiate public debate, organise 
―virtual‖ boycotts of multinational corporations, and help change social attitudes 
to social and environmental issues (Nelimarkka, 2010). Through a combination of 
their activist and watchdog roles, NGOs have encouraged greater accountability 
and democratisation in many countries (Feher, et al., 2007; Howell & Pearce, 
2001).  
4.3.3 NGOs as promoters and facilitators of dialogue in mining  
As noted in Chapter 2, mining can have severe environmental and social impacts 
in LDCs. This has fostered pursuit of various strategies and forms of activism by 
local, national, and international NGOs (Li, 2009; Szablowski, 2007). It is 
commonplace for local and international NGOs to work alongside affected local 
and indigenous peoples, protesting against poor mining practices and inequitable 
distributions of economic and social benefits, human rights‘ violations, land 
disputes and disastrous effects on the natural environment (Diamond, 2005; 
Martin, 2006; MMSD, 2002; Schlosberg, 2007). The sometimes ―selective 
absence‖ of the state in LDCs in such matters, the power of multinational 
companies relative to individual states, and a lack of transnational legislation on 
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environmental matters (Szablowski, 2007) have heightened the importance of 
NGO engagement in mining issues in LDCs.  
A common tactic of local and international NGOs is to damage the reputations of 
target companies, thereby undermining their legitimacy (Szablowski, 2007). 
Methods to achieve this include ―consumer boycotts, lobbying for legislative 
change, picketing retail outlets or corporate headquarters, lobbying large 
institutional investors, developing public awareness through media campaigns, 
raising issues in shareholder meetings‖, and organising local demonstrations 
(Szablowski, 2007, p. 68). International NGOs and their networks, such as Mining 
Watch, Greenpeace, Oxfam and the WWF, act as umbrella organisations to create 
globally influential media coverage, to support and mobilise national NGOs, and 
to monitor and exert pressure on multinational mining companies (Collins, 2009; 
Diamond, 2005). Sometimes, local NGOs have been involved in violent 
demonstrations and domestic conflicts in LDCs (Li, 2009; Martin, 2006).  
Nevertheless, some NGOs have begun to cooperate and facilitate dialogue among 
mining constituents, with a growing emphasis on tripartite partnership and multi-
stakeholder engagement to address sustainable development within the mining 
sector (MMSD, 2002). This has led some NGOs to initiate collaborations between 
the state and mining companies (Cornejo, Kells, Zuniga, Roen, & Thompson, 
2010). In such instances EIAs have increasingly become conduits for promoting 
democratic, environmental decision-making, deliberative engagement, 
collaborative social learning and for preventing conflict among mining 
constituents (Diduck & Mitchell, 2003; Kakonge, 1998; Petts, 2004; Saarikoski, 
2000). EIA legislation creates a legal public space ―in which government is more 
prominently involved in an administrative capacity‖, and requires EIA companies 
to assess their social and environmental impacts and to ensure public participation 
in EIA decisions (Szablowski, 2007, p. 49).  
NGOs have begun to consider EIAs as potential spheres where affected people 
can actively participate, have a voice, and thereby prevent negative environmental 
impacts. Stronger environmental NGOs have managed to increase their 
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involvement in EIA procedures against legal and institutional odds (Cherp, 2001, 
p. 346). In both developed countries and LDCs, NGOs have begun to play a 
crucial role in improving public participation in EIAs (Diduck & Mitchell, 2003; 
Mitchell, 2001; Richardson, 2005). This, coupled with a dialogic approach, may 
challenge the current technocracy of EIAs and their neglect of sustainable 
development (Kapoor, 2001; Söderbaum, 2004). 
The Peruvian case of the Tintaya copper mine shows how an EIA can promote 
participation and dialogue among all mining constituents, including domestic and 
international NGOs and their coalitions (Barton, 2005). In this space, mining 
constituents not only ―may deliberate the facts and issues‖ regarding mining 
projects, but can also engage in social mediation (Szablowski, 2007, pp. 49-51). 
Previously, paternalistic CSR models used by mining companies were ineffective 
as they ―reinforced a cycle of dependency and rendered the local communities 
unorganised, voiceless and weak‖, thus multi-stakeholder dialogue is ―a 
fundamental element in promoting sustainability‖ (Cornejo et al, 2010, p. 1).  
As noted in Chapter 3, public participation in EIAs is still weak internationally 
(Cherp, 2001; Sinclair, et al., 2008; Jay, et al., 2007; Mitchell, 2001). 
Nevertheless, given their long-standing support for participatory environmental 
decision-making and engagement in EIA practices, NGOs can or do have a role in 
educating, mobilising and organising the public and affected communities, giving 
voices to marginalised people, involving and monitoring EIA processes (Barton, 
2005; CSP
2 
and WRI, 2005; Kapoor, 2001), building alliances nationally and 
internationally, and in identifying partnerships that can move beyond 
―partisanship‖ (Cornejo, et al., 2010, p. 41). 
However, not all NGOs are enthusiastic about contributing to formal EIA 
procedures. Some prefer to produce counter-assessments of EIAs (Kravchenko, 
2002) in the belief that formal EIAs play only a symbolic role in mining practice 
(Szablowski, 2007). For example, when there was an official public hearing on an 
EIA for the Minera Yanacocha project, a foreign mining venture in Peru, some 
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social movements (NGOs) and affected communities refused to participate, 
claiming that:  
Nothing they could say would prevent the EIA from being approved. Not only 
would their intervention in the meeting be futile, but the company would use 
their attendance to legitimate the EIA with the claim that it was democratically 
accepted. They decided that their best course of action was to step outside the 
[EIA] document (Li, 2009, p. 230).  
However, NGOs can use EIAs to construct scientific counter-arguments against 
mining companies, rather than only engaging in activism (Li, 2009, pp. 229-230).  
Thus, NGOs have used collaborative and activist strategies to force the state and 
mining companies to improve their accountability of environmental management 
and mining (Li, 2009). Participatory EIAs could help advance economically 
sustainable mining.  
4.4 The Mongolian NGO sector 
The emergence of NGOs in Mongolia is closely related to growing public demand 
for strengthening democracy, respecting human rights, combating corruption, and 
improving inadequate state management of social and environmental issues. 
NGOs and other civil society organisations have increasingly contested mining 
problems and unfair income distribution. The involvement
53
 of NGOs in such 
issues has been late compared to other countries. Since the 1990s, following the 
end of communism, Mongolian civil society has grown dramatically. The notion 
of civil society, or ‗citizens society‘ in Mongolian terminology, appears in the 
1992 Constitution. Its preamble states that the supreme objective of Mongolia is 
to build ―a humane, civil, and democratic society in the country‖ (The State Great 
Khural of Mongolia 1992, Article 1).  
Currently, Mongolian civil society covers a wide range of organisations, including 
NGOs, trade unions, chambers of commerce, saving and credit cooperatives, 
                                               
53 Although there were trade unions and associations for women, youth and the elderly during the 
communist era, they were not voluntarily established and not separate from the state. Rather, they 
were a part of the dominant communist party (UNDP, 2006).  
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political parties, religious organisations, apartment owners‘ unions, non-profit 
media, informal self-help and leisure groups, and community groups (UNDP, 
2006, p. 1). Among these, NGOs are the most influential and active. 
The democratic Constitution and the law on NGOs opened up legitimate grounds 
for NGOs. The law defines a NGO as: 
An organisation which is independent from the state, self-governing, not-for-profit 
and established voluntarily by citizens or by legal persons other than State bodies 
(that exercise legislative, executive and judicial powers) on the basis of their 
individual or social interests and opinions (The State Great Khural of Mongolia, 
1997, Article, 4.1). 
Thus, it guarantees the right of Mongolian citizens to freely establish a NGO to 
further their interests and opinions without intervention by the state or other 
parties. The law defines two types of NGOs: public benefit, and mutual benefit. 
Public benefit NGOs are non-member NGOs that operate for the public benefit 
―in the fields of culture, art, education, science, health, sport, nature and 
environment, community development, human rights, protection of the interests of 
specific subsets of the population, charity and other such fields‖ (The State Great 
Khural of Mongolia, 1997, Article 4.2). Mutual benefit NGOs are member-based 
and operate ―primarily to serve the legitimate interests of its members‖ (The State 
Great Khural of Mongolia, 1997, Article 4.3). The law indicates that NGOs may 
be involved in drafting and implementing decisions by state organisations and 
have a right to access information about activities of state organisations unless 
they are classified as state secrets (The State Great Khural of Mongolia, 1997, 
Article, 9.4 - 9.5). 
Since the Law on NGOs (1997), the number of NGOs registered with the Ministry 
of Justice and Home Affairs has boomed, reaching more than 5000 by 2005 (Open 
Society Forum, 2005). However, the Mongolian NGO sector is still in its infancy. 
It faces numerous challenges ranging from the internal problems of NGOs to their 
broader impact on society in their endeavours to pursue democratisation. In spite 
of their relatively large number, only about one-fifth of NGOs operate on a 
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regular basis (UNDP, 2006). The Civil Society Index 2005, developed by the 
International Civil Society Forum for Democracy, indicates that major obstacles 
for the development of NGOs emanate from the weak political, economic and 
social environments of Mongolia, the underdeveloped internal capacities of NGOs 
and their poor external cooperation (UNDP, 2006, p. 3). There is a need for 
powerful umbrella organisations, more active intra- and cross-sector cooperation 
and effective engagement with grass-root organisations and communities (Open 
Society Forum, 2005; UNDP, 2006). 
Almost eighty percent of the registered NGOs are located in the capital city (Open 
Society Forum, 2005) where Mongolian economic, political and social resources 
are located. Urbanisation of NGOs jeopardises their ability both to represent and 
to be accountable to the public, given that NGOs claim to serve the interests of 
ordinary citizens and local communities. Most NGOs are not well-structured and 
staffed, which weaken their strength and reputation in society (UNDP, 2006). 
Financial resources of NGOs come mainly from abroad rather than donations 
from the public
54
 and other organisations. Ninety percent of NGO activities are 
financed by international donor organisations (Asian Development Bank, 2005). 
Consequently, NGOs are at risk of becoming opportunistic and of losing their 
initial social objectives, as well as their independence and internal democracy. 
Environmental concerns expressed by environmental NGOs are becoming more 
frequent and influential as increased economic activity consumes more natural 
resources and worsens global warming. An article in the Environmental Protection 
Law (1995), defining the roles of NGOs, helped to legitimise environmental 
NGOs. It permits them to supervise and inspect the implementation of 
environmental protection legislation, demand rectification of breaches, submit 
matters to authorised organisations for decision, organise ecological training and 
education, and develop proposals, recommendations and methodologies for 
environmental protection and restoration to submit to the relevant organisation for 
a decision (The State Great Khural of Mongolia 1995, Article 32.1).  
                                               
54 Due to low income and social problems, people are often not financially able to support NGOs. 
A lack of donations from the public is also related to the near absence of philanthropy in society. 
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The law also defines the scope of cooperation between the state and 
environmental NGOs. The ministry responsible for the natural environment may 
cooperate with NGOs on a contractual basis to delegate special functions (Article 
32.2). Consequently, the MNET has increasingly cooperated with environmental 
NGOs on environmental protection and on raising public awareness (Gansukh, 
2010). Since 2009, it has organised an annual environmental conference for 
NGOs. The first conference in 2009 established the Citizens Representative 
Committee from representatives of environmental NGOs so as to facilitate 
cooperation between environmental NGOs and the ministry (Bakei, 2010).  
In 2010, 549 environmental NGOs accounted for ten percent of all NGOs 
(Gansukh, 2010). Figure 2 details the number of NGO‘s according to their main 
functions. 
Figure 2. Numbers of Mongolian environmental NGOs by their functions in 2010 
 
Source: Adapted from Bakei, A (2010) ―The status quo of the natural environment: Roles of NGOs‖, UB 
Fifty-nine percent of NGOs work on environmental protection of the main 
ecosystem elements (such as water and soil) and biodiversity, 22.4 percent 
increase public awareness of environmental protection and ecological education, 
10 percent seek to reduce either air or soil pollution, and 5.6 percent act as mining 
watchdogs.  
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In spite of international and domestic enthusiasm for the development of 
Mongolian mining, its potentially adverse impacts on society and the natural 
environment have increasingly attracted the attention of NGOs. Since the early 
2000s, local communities in some regions have organised social movements and 
demonstrations against poor mining practices in their regions. They argue that 
mining has not brought beneficial local economic and social development and has 
left a legacy of disturbed pasture land and dried-up rivers (Snow, 2010).  
Consequently, various NGOs have been established to protect the constitutional 
rights of Mongolians to live in a safe and healthy environment. Figure 2 shows 
that 35.5 percent of environmental NGOs are directly concerned with mining 
issues. NGOs in areas which suffer from water, soil, and environmental pollution 
often focus on poor local mining practices. However, the remaining NGOs and 
other social NGOs have also addressed and participated in public debate on 
related issues, such as the large mining projects of Oyu Tolgoi and Tavan Tolgoi.    
NGOs often complain about poor mining practices in local regions and request 
that the mining companies responsible should consider their social and 
environmental impacts (Munkhbayar, 2005). Local NGOs have pressured local 
and central government to address issues such as environmental degradation, 
contributions to local development, licence trading, and rehabilitation (Snow, 
2010). The most significant contributions of environmental NGOs have been to 
raise societal awareness, mobilise the public, protest against poor mining 
practices, and to act as public representatives in negotiations and mediation 
(Snow, 2010). 
In sum, development of the Mongolian NGO sector is still its infancy. 
Nevertheless, NGOs, particularly environmental NGOs, have played important 
roles in recent years to address social and environmental issues that have arisen 
from Mongolia‘s booming mining sector.  
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4.5 Conclusion 
Being active, influential players of civil society, NGOs have long-standing 
interests and engagement in social and environmental issues that concern 
democracy, participation, environmental protection and mining. However, NGOs 
have diverse perspectives, objectives, adopted societal roles, strategies, 
operations, and national and global influence. They are invariably not ‗good 
actors‘ – opportunistic NGOs exist which seek to exploit increased donor funding 
in their enthusiasm for new societal roles. Thus, the NGO sector is contested and 
variegated. Some parts promote the dominant development agendas, whereas 
others challenge and propose alternative viewpoints. Nevertheless, NGOs are 
crucial for promoting participatory environmental decision-making and 
sustainable mining, particularly in LDCs. Mongolian NGO practices illustrate 
this. Chapter 8 introduces the empirical analysis and will discuss the roles of 
Mongolian NGOs in more detail. 
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Chapter 5: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
5.1 Summary of literature reviews 
Drawing from the literature on mining, discussed earlier in relation to SEA, EIA, 
development studies, and civil society, this chapter develops an analytical 
framework for examining the empirical data in later chapters. First, the principal 
arguments raised by the literature review will be summarised to explain how and 
why the theoretical framework was chosen. 
5.1.1 Importance of environmental concerns 
The rapidly growing world population has increased the exploitation of natural 
resources. Neo-classical economic theories have encouraged mining development 
around the world, particularly in mineral-rich developing countries. This 
enthusiasm for mining assumes that mining sector growth will increase GDP and, 
thereby, development of a country (MMSD, 2001); that mining development will 
reduce unemployment; and that it will increase tax revenue (Ross, 2008). 
However, the mining sector is increasingly being questioned by its broader 
stakeholders because of its environmental, social, and cultural impacts, and 
whether the economic benefits to mineral-rich LDCs actually accrue and how they 
are distributed across different sections of society. 
As the concepts of sustainable development and corporate social responsibility 
(CSR) have developed, the mining sector has increasingly been criticised for its 
negative impacts on the natural environment, society, particularly in LDCs. 
Evidence from mining development in Africa, Latin America, the Asian and 
Pacific regions show that mining has worsened environmental degradation and the 
social divisions, evidenced by the widening gap between rich and poor, corruption, 
increased incidences of local conflict and crime-rates, as opposed to creating 
economic and social prosperity (Diamond, 2005; Slack, 2009; Szablowski, 2007).  
Consequently, mining has come under increased pressure and scrutiny from 
international and local communities, donor organisations, academics, and civil 
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society organisations. If mining is to be compatible with sustainable development 
aims it is expected to meet the societal expectations of being socially and 
environmentally sound while generating economic benefits (CSP
2 
and WRI, 2005; 
MMSD, 2002). Sustainability requires that the mining sector should consider its 
broader stakeholders and include local communities in decisions that may 
significantly affect them (CSP
2 
and WRI, 2005).  
Therefore, sustainable and participatory mining is increasingly advocated by 
international developmental organisations, donors, civil society organisations and 
governments around the world (CSP
2 
and WRI, 2005; MMSD, 2002). Following 
this growing awareness, international communities have established various 
initiatives: international declarations, conventions and agreements among member 
countries of international developmental organisations, and the formation of 
voluntary standards for business, such as the ISO 14000
55
 (International Standards 
Organisation), ‗AccountAbility and the GRI (Global Reporting Initiative) – 
Sustainability Reporting Guide‘ for business entities (Reed, 2002), which address 
environmental issues and sustainable development in practice.  
Social and environmental accounting endorses sustainable development and CSR 
initiatives in business communities and in other disciplines. Accounting that 
primarily serves ‗business interests‘ has increasingly been questioned and its 
potential to re(de)construct realities and values has begun to be recognised 
(Molisa, et al., forthcoming). Alongside calls for democratising accounting, in the 
public interest, a growing number of researchers argue that environmental, social, 
political and cultural issues, which are viewed as externalities or neutral factors in 
the mainstream economic paradigm, should be internalised in managerial 
decisions and accounting practice so as to incorporate sustainable development 
and CSR into practice (Gray, 1992; Mathews, 1997). However, researchers 
approach these challenges differently, depending on their ideologies, perspectives, 
and values.  
                                               
55 The ISO 14000 family addresses various aspects of environmental management and provides ―a 
framework for a holistic, strategic approach to the organisation's environmental policy, plans and 
actions‖ (ISO, 2005). 
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Critical dialogic accounting, which openly acknowledges and engages with 
plurality, provides a promising SEA approach to this. By supporting pluralism, it 
supports the democratisation process in accounting. It argues that participatory 
accounting would encourage dialogue among stakeholders with differing 
ideologies, values, and views on social and environmental issues involving 
business (Bebbington, et al., 2007) and would help counter narrower ―managerial‖ 
approaches to SEA. Given the lack of business concern about social, 
environmental, and intergenerational issues, sustainable development initiatives 
from international communities will require fundamental changes in their 
prevailing economic ideologies, values, and views if such initiatives are to be 
effective (Brown, 2009; Söderbaum, 2007). In this respect, dialogic accounting 
may be useful, as it would outline dialogic processes that could enhance social 
learning and re(de)shape the ideologies and values among various actors, thereby 
promoting social change (Brown, 2009; Söderbaum & Brown, 2010).  
Participatory decision-making on environmental and mining issues has begun to 
be encouraged in public policy and mining research, in the belief that it has the 
potential to improve sustainability and reduce conflict among mining constituents, 
including stakeholders, mining companies, and the state; and that it will increase 
the credibility of decisions among international developmental and donor 
organisations, civil society actors, academics, and local and national governments 
(Akol, 2001; CSP
2 
and WRI, 2005).  
5.1.2 A call for participatory decision-making 
Following calls for participatory environmental decision-making, international 
communities have produced several quasi-legal documents that provide 
frameworks for fostering greater inclusiveness in environmental decision-making 
and for promoting sustainable development. Agenda 21 and the Aarhus 
Convention are notable examples. These influential documents provide legitimacy 
for public participation in environmental and social issues that stem from 
development projects. They encourage countries to guarantee participants access 
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to information and justice, and to grant the public, particularly affected people, the 
right to participate (Toth, 2010). As Zillman et al. (2005) point out:  
Public participation means, at least, that members of the public have a right to gather 
information about major developments from government and from the developer, that 
they have a right to participate in the legislative and administrative and proceedings 
that consider the propriety of the project, and that they have an ―access to justice‖ that 
reflects an ability to bring questions about the project to an independent judiciary 
(Zillman, Lukas, & Pring, 2002, p. 2).   
Consequently, participatory approaches have been widely advocated and applied 
in environmental decision- and policy-making. However, it is important to 
understand how such participation is actually viewed and used. Public 
participation can be used normatively and technically, depending on the premises 
and motivations of policy-makers and proponents of participation. Table 2 
developed in Coenen (2008) summarises these arguments:  
Table 2: Arguments and motives for public participation 
 
Source: adapted from (Akol, 2001, p. 8) 
Normative arguments for participation emphasise the democratisation process in 
environmental decision-making and the empowerment of affected communities. 
In contrast, instrumental arguments suggest that participation makes more data 
available to government organisations and may reduce conflict among participants 
and government organisations. Whether normative or instrumental, participatory 
environmental policy has been promoted globally (Coenen, 2008) and adopted 
widely within environmental frameworks of LDCs under the supervision of 
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international developmental and donor organisations (Kapoor, 2004). Using 
environmental management tools, such as the EIA and strategic impact 
assessment, researchers and policy-makers have encouraged the participation of 
affected people when addressing environmental issues, and have recognised the 
need to take sustainability more seriously (Jay, et al., 2007; Wilkins, 2003).  
Since the 1970s, the EIA – an environmental management decision-making tool – 
has been developed and standardised in legislation. More than 100 countries now 
mandate that the EIA should be conducted before proceeding with development 
projects, such as mining, that may impact the natural environment (Glasson, et al., 
2005). However, researchers have increasingly criticised EIAs for being little 
more than symbolic tools, having only minor consequences on practice (Jay, et al., 
2007; Richardson, 2005; Wilkins, 2003). Critics argue that EIAs have become 
expert-oriented technocratic tools, distant from the social and environmental 
realities they are expected to address (Wood, 2008). Others claim that EIAs have 
failed to achieve the initial goal of being a preventive decision-making tool that 
can mitigate the negative environmental consequences of a given project (Jay, et 
al., 2007).  
Although public participation in an EIA is mandated in most countries (EIA 
Centre, 1995; Mitchell, 2001), there is growing criticism that it is becoming a 
symbolic process that serves principally the interests of elite groups (Diduck, et al., 
2007; Whiteman & Mamen, 2002), rather than helping to facilitate inclusive and 
realistic decisions that consider local knowledge and opinions of affected 
communities (Diduck & Sinclair, 2002; Petts & Brooks, 2006; Rockloff & Lockie, 
2006). Moreover, EIAs are not regarded as tools that encourage social learning 
among stakeholders with differing ideologies and views (Diduck, et al., 2007; 
Söderbaum, 2004; Wilkins, 2003), or necessarily help to prevent conflict among 
mining constituents (Li, 2009; Richardson, 2005). Therefore, some researchers 
argue that for EIAs to address sustainability effectively they need to adopt a more 
―subjective‖ approach to knowledge (Richardson, 2005; Wilkins, 2003) if they are 
to encourage more meaningful participation (Cashmore, 2004; Diduck, et al., 
2007; Sinclair, Diduck, & Fitzpatrick, 2002; Söderbaum, 2004). 
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Nevertheless, the potential of EIAs is still widely recognised among researchers 
and practitioners. They infer that EIAs can: facilitate preventive rather than 
corrective actions; gather considerable information about a project and the area in 
which it will operate; facilitate contracts that detail mitigation measures between 
authorities and project proponents; help prevent or resolve conflicts among 
different constituents; and can promote social learning and increased awareness, 
leading ultimately to changed social values on sustainable development (Biller, 
2003; Cherp, 2001; Jay, et al., 2007; Mitchell, 2001; Nooteboom, 2007; Sinclair, 
et al., 2002). 
In sum, there are many significant calls for sustainable and participatory mining, 
and more democratic and inclusive EIAs. As this study attempts to incorporate 
dialogic accounting principles into an EIA to these ends, it is important at this 
point to introduce dialogic accounting and its underlying concepts.    
5.2 The potential of dialogic accounting 
Dialogic accounting in SEA attempts to respond to calls for public-interest 
oriented accounting that could enable greater participation and help to address 
social and environmental concerns in business and society. Dialogic accounting, 
with its critical roots, recognises power inequalities, the limitations of 
instrumentalist approaches, and the value-laden nature of accounting (Bebbington, 
et al., 2007). Therefore, it challenges the mainstream monologic approach of 
accounting and seeks ―to take pluralism seriously‖ as a way of promoting 
dialogue, participation, and participatory democracy (Brown, 2009; Söderbaum & 
Brown, 2010). Before introducing dialogic accounting in detail, it is important 
first to discuss technocracy in accounting and environmental management, and the 
types of participatory democracies to which dialogic accounting relates.      
5.2.1 Challenges to technocracy 
Dominant neo-classical economic theories are frequently criticised for their 
technocratic rationalities and instrumentalism in creating information and making 
decisions (Brown, 2009; Gray, 2006; Söderbaum & Brown, 2010). Their 
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‗objective‘ technocratic assumptions fail to meaningfully embrace global calls for 
sustainable development, due to their simplification and homogenisation of 
economic actors, and the exclusion of social and environmental factors from 
decisions, labelling them as externalities (Lehman, 2001; Molisa, et al., 
forthcoming).  
Critics challenge the basic premises of neo-classical economics, such as the 
possibility of an economically-rational person, value-free experts, optimal 
solutions, and politically neutral decision-making (Brown, 2009; Gray, 2006; 
Söderbaum & Brown, 2010). They argue that identifying/reducing individuals to 
being merely consumers who make rational decisions within constrained budgets 
is too simplistic and unrealistic (Söderbaum, 2006). People are both economic and 
political individuals, influenced by their social, political, cultural and economic 
contexts (Söderbaum, 2004). It is also difficult to separate the roles of individuals 
because they are not only consumers but also employees, stakeholders, academics, 
citizens, voters, or members of various political and civil society organisations 
(Söderbaum, 1994). Individuals, therefore, are not constrained by simple 
economic, rational choices. Similarly, decision-makers and politicians are not 
value-neutral and apolitical, and they do not make decisions based solely on 
instrumental rationality, as neo-classical economists typically assume (O'Neill, 
1998).   
As well as criticisms of the fundamental values and assumptions of neo-classical 
economics, its analytic methods, including cost benefit analysis, are also 
challenged (Söderbaum, 2006). Cost benefit analysis, which has deeply penetrated 
economics, accounting, and environmental management decision-making is 
accused of being an instrumental and technocratic approach that relies on ―narrow 
forms of expertise‖ (Söderbaum & Brown, 2010, p. 190). The dominant economic 
view portrays experts who conduct research and analyses as value-neutral 
individuals, free from any ideology, values and politics. However, others argue 
that experts are individuals with beliefs and are usually members of professional 
bodies, which would influence their ideologies and perspectives (Brown, 2009; 
Söderbaum, 2004).  
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The dominant positivist philosophy of science, favoured by neo-classical 
practitioners, is privileged with a ―hard scientific approach‖ or economic 
rationalism and its derivative disciplines (Söderbaum, 2004, 2006; Wilkins, 2003). 
One-dimensional monetary, quantitative analysis recognises only economically 
countable or priceable impacts, and claims to identify one optimal solution for an 
issue or decision; but non-monetary impacts, such as social and environmental 
issues are excluded (Molisa, et al., forthcoming).  
Following sustainable development and related initiatives, solely economic, 
rationality-based assumptions and views are challenged for their inability to 
address contested areas, such as environmental management and mining 
(Cashmore, et al., 2010; CSP
2 
and WRI, 2005; Wilkins, 2003). Some argue that 
existing neo-classical economics and positivist paradigms in many disciplines are 
incapable of addressing sustainability, as their basic assumptions leave little room 
for the democratic participation of different stakeholders (Söderbaum, 2006, 2007; 
Wilkins, 2003).  
In environmental economics, a democratic approach is suggested as a potential 
alternative to the technocratic, mainstream economics paradigm. Peter Söderbaum, 
a long-standing academic advocate of pluralism and democracy, argues that a 
democratic approach to decision-making creates space for participation by various 
actors and stakeholders on issues in which they have differing views (Söderbaum, 
2006; Söderbaum & Brown, 2010). Although the importance of experts is 
recognised, they are seen as value-laden and having their own particular 
ideological orientations (Brown, 2009).  
The objective of a pluralist approach is to discuss the complexities of issues with 
an open recognition of the ideological differences among actors, ―rather than 
providing a solution assumed optimal for all actors‖ (McLean & McMillan, 2003, 
p. 191). This approach is echoed in environmental management literature, which 
calls for EIAs to acknowledge the subjectivity of experts (Cashmore, 2004; Petts 
& Brooks, 2006) and to allow greater participation by affected people when 
addressing sustainability (Jay, et al., 2007; Wilkins, 2003).  
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Similarly, others challenge the technocratic nature of conventional accounting and 
call for democracy and pluralism in accounting to address sustainability, 
environmental, and social issues. Technocratic and monologic accounting is 
criticised for its inability to fully illustrate and reflect the complexities of social 
and environmental realities (Power, 1992). A growing number of researchers 
advocate the incorporation of pluralism and democratic norms into accounting and 
for a shift from monologic to dialogic accounting (Bebbington, et al., 2007; 
Brown, 2009; Dillard & Roslender, 2011). As the basic assumptions of dialogic 
accounting are based on participatory democracy and pluralism, different types of 
participatory democracies are considered below.                            
5.2.2 Participatory democracies as a means to participatory 
environmental decision-making 
There are three types of participatory democracies: aggregative, deliberative and 
agonistic. Deliberative and agonistic democracies are increasingly recognised as 
more participatory than the former type (Brown, 2009; Kapoor, 2008). Although 
aggregative democracy is favoured in current politics and neo-classical economics, 
it falls short on the promotion of broader participation (Dillard & Roslender, 
2011). In an aggregative democracy, citizens elect politicians who are recognised 
as legitimate representatives and are expected to make decisions on behalf of 
citizens (Brown, 2009). However, this does not provide an arena for the broader 
participation of stakeholders and affected communities in decisions (Kapoor, 
2008).  
Proponents of both deliberative and agonistic democracies are critical of existing 
liberal democratic institutions as they not only ―fail to adequately deliver on such 
liberal goals as participation and freedom, but sometimes they can even foreclose 
avenues for public contestation and redress‖ (Kapoor, 2008, p. 105). Deliberative 
and agonistic democracies both call for deeper or more extensive democracy that 
can incorporate the participation of marginalised or affected communities (Brown, 
2009). However, each is based on different theoretical perspectives and makes 
differing arguments for participation.      
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Deliberative democracy, influenced by the works of John Rawls and Jürgen 
Habermas, attempts to deliberately create situations that enable participation. It 
employs a normative communicative rationality model, based on the assumption 
that it is ―possible to reach a consensus that would be deeper than a mere 
agreement on procedures, a consensus that could qualify as moral‖ (Mouffe, 
2000). Moreover, deliberative democrats try to position authority and legitimacy 
in public reasoning (Brooke, 1998). Politics is regarded as being associated ―with 
the exchange of arguments among reasonable persons guided by the principle of 
impartiality‖ (Mouffe, 2000, p. 4), according to the ―original position‖ of Rawls 
and ―the ideal speech situation‖ of Habermas (Brown, 2009, p. 320).  
However, deliberative democracy is criticised for its own form of technical 
rationality in seeking to achieve ―a fully inclusive rational consensus‖ (Mouffe, 
2000, p. i). It is argued that such democracy is difficult if not impossible to 
achieve in practice, due to complex realities and participants who are influenced 
by different social, political, and economic contexts, differing ideologies, and 
unequal abilities to express their voices (Kapoor, 2008). Mouffe (2002) describes 
deliberative democracy as ―the dream of a perfect harmony or transparency‖ 
(cited in Brown, 2009, p. 320).  
In contrast, an agonistic approach denies instrumental and what is regarded as 
overly consensual normative rationalities and, instead, favours pluralism. 
Agonistic democracy rejects the possibility of an optimal or fully inclusive 
consensus advocated by deliberative democracy. It argues that there is no sole 
right answer, but only provisional solutions (partially or mostly) that are agreed to 
by most actors through extensive debate and dialogue (Mouffe, 2000). The central 
points of the agonistic approach are the recognition and acceptance of a plurality 
of ideologies and values of different actors, the acknowledgement of the 
complexity of situations, the acceptance that hegemonic political struggles are 
central to democratisation, the recognition of alternatives as legitimate rather than 
hostile, and the need for negotiation and compromise in reaching a ―conflictual 
consensus‖ or a ―temporary respite in an ongoing confrontation‖ (Mouffe, 2000, p. 
16). Some researchers suggest that agonistic democracy has great potential to 
120 
 
promote pluralism and democratisation in economics, accounting, and other areas 
(Dillard & Roslender, 2011; Kapoor, 2008; Söderbaum & Brown, 2010).  
Moreover, agonistic democracy encourages more extensive democracy that is 
operationalised by civil society organisations. Mouffe, an agonistic theorist, 
considers it ―being concretised in the rise of new social movements and their 
politicization of sociocultural spaces heretofore ignored or excluded by 
mainstream democratic regimes‖ (Kapoor, 2008, p. 102). In this respect, civil 
society organisations have the potential to address democratisation and 
participation as they are often established by people who are ignored by or are 
unhappy with the existing dominant systems and institutions (Teegan, et al., 2004).                         
In sum, Mouffe recognises the importance of democratic demands/movements 
that ―grow out of a particular sociohistorical context‖, while Habermas tries 
―artificially engineering participation‖ from the outside (Kapoor, 2008, p. 104). 
Both types of democracy have their advantages and critics. Deliberative 
democracy has the potential to establish democratisation processes in a shorter 
period, but may fail to recognise adequately the complexities, political struggles, 
and characteristics of different participants (Kapoor, 2008). In contrast, agonistic 
democracy provides greater learning opportunities for participants with differing 
ideologies, values, and backgrounds. It also acknowledges the plurality and 
politicisation of issues and respects those with alternative views as legitimate 
actors (Mouffe, 1999). Therefore, it enables broader social learning and promotes 
social change agendas (Brown, 2009). However, agonistic democracy requires 
more resources and time to have meaningful dialogue, as well as the passion and 
commitment of participants to understand pluralism (Kapoor, 2008).  
For both types of democracies, power inequalities and political 
influence/manipulation are great threats. Although participatory democracies, 
particularly deliberative democracy, are romanticised in various disciplines and 
areas relating to development, practice shows that power asymmetries among 
participants and political influences on individuals and groups affect enormously 
the application of participatory proposals and their outcomes (Kapoor, 2002). 
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Therefore, any attempts to import or establish democracies in a certain context 
would need to be wary of power inequalities and political manipulation (Kapoor, 
2008). This is particularly relevant to LDCs, which usually have different socio-
political contexts from ‗Western democratic‘ practices.  
As both theories have been developed and applied mostly in developed country 
contexts, they often fail to address LDCs. Kapoor (2008) argues that both theories 
have paid insufficient attention to ―materiality, [and show] inadequate 
appreciation of the discursive barriers between elite and subaltern, and the lack of 
importance given to the state‖ (p. 113). Differences between LDCs and Western 
developed countries lie in their economic, social, political and cultural aspects. 
For instance, Reed (2002) identifies the following as key factors that make it 
difficult for citizens of LDCs to participate in decision-making: 
(a) less secure guarantees of civil and political rights,  
(b) less practical opportunity to exercise such rights (due to illiteracy, poverty, 
etc.),  
(c) less than fully democratic institutions (for example, endemic corruption in 
administration; slow, ineffective legal systems; electoral systems 
dominated by a single party; influence over the electoral system by the 
military; business; etc.), and  
(d) weaker or less dense civil society organisations (Reed, 2002, p. 194). 
Therefore, any application of participatory democracy in LDCs would need to 
consider such features and complexities. It may need modification, depending on 
a LDC‘s culture, socio-political characteristics and power dynamics (Kapoor, 
2008; Molisa, et al., forthcoming). This study takes up this challenge by 
examining the importance and potential of participatory democracy in LDCs, and 
whether it is currently being applied or could be applied to environmental 
management practices in Mongolia.        
5.2.3 The potential of dialogic accounting 
As noted, dialogic accounting endeavours to take pluralism seriously by 
challenging monologic accounting practices and by promoting democracy, 
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participation, and dialogue. It criticises conventional accounting for being 
instrumental and monologic and too heavily based on dominant neo-classical 
economics (Bebbington, et al., 2007). Although mainstream accountants claim to 
be objective by providing apolitical and value-free accounts (that is, ―taking a 
view from nowhere‘‘ – (Brown, 2009, p. 316), they have arguably been co-opted 
by business and power holders and become trusted ‗gate-keeper[s]‘ of capitalist 
domination (Tinker, et al., 1991). Monologic accounting treats certain issues as 
―off-limits‖ and excludes social and environmental issues from decision-making 
by labelling them as externalities (Brown, 2009). Therefore, it is criticised for its 
inability to act in the public interest, to address sustainability issues seriously, to 
promote democracy and participation, and to make decisions more inclusive and 
socially efficient that can reflect social and environmental realities (Gray, 1992, 
2006). 
In contrast, dialogic accounting in SEA supports a call for pluralistic and 
democratic accounting that can serve public interests. In this respect, accounting 
may be seen as a ―dialogic machine‖ (Lehman, 1999) with the potential to 
facilitate democratisation at organisational and societal levels, as well as to 
improve accountability (Dillard & Roslender, 2011). Dialogic accounting aims to 
provide flexibility and space for stakeholders with differing views to discuss and 
debate issues and to (de)(re)construct their ideologies, values, and views (Brown, 
2009). This would promote greater awareness of social and environmental factors 
and could improve the accountability of participants. 
Based on a social constructionist epistemology, dialogic accounting can 
incorporate agonistic democracy as a potential participatory democratic approach. 
Along with the recognition of things ‗out there‘, social constructionists argue that 
calculations labelled as costs and benefits are an outcome of our constructed 
values and views on what and how to include in accounting (Brown, 2009, p. 325). 
Accounting is value-laden, rather than value-free (Tinker, et al., 1991). Therefore, 
dialogic accounting argues that different ideological orientations can be exercised 
in accounting that would create the potential to (re)construct values of individuals 
and groups in more inclusive and realistic decision-making (Molisa, et al., 
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forthcoming). With its agonistic roots, dialogic accounting supports pluralism and 
recognises the plurality of issues, the conflicting or differing perspectives of 
individuals and groups, and the complexity of power dynamics (Söderbaum & 
Brown, 2010). It suggests dialogue as a potential way to explore and recognise 
plurality and to promote participatory democracy for addressing sustainability 
issues (Dillard & Roslender, 2011).  
However, ―the power dimension of social relations‖ is explicitly acknowledged 
(Brown, 2009, p. 319) and discussed with strong cautions about applying the 
dialogic approach in practice. Dialogic accounting recognises that power 
inequalities among stakeholders affect or restrict some from participating and 
influencing decision-making (Brown, 2009; Kapoor, 2008). It argues that the 
monologic accounting claim of finding a ‗right‘ answer ignores power issues that 
inherently exist among participants, and compresses differing views of 
participants into one ‗optimal‘ solution by excluding alternative views (Dillard & 
Roslender, 2011). Critical dialogic accounting, by contrast, aims for wide-ranging 
debate and dialogue that can ―facilitate genuine and informed citizen participation 
in decision-making processes‖ (Boyce, 2000, p. 55). Through dialogue, 
participants could, potentially, better understand different perspectives, learn from 
each other, and problematise the existing ‗taken for granted‘ knowledge of 
monologic accounting. Importantly, with due care for the voicing of alternative 
perspectives, dialogue also provides ―platforms for normally unheard voices to be 
heard‖ (Bebbington, et al., 2007, p. 366) and helps to ―make power relations more 
transparent‖ (Brown, 2009, p. 318) by presenting the dominant voices in decision-
making. Thus, dialogic accounting is able to challenge the technocracy and 
monologism of existing accounting and can recognise power issues in practice. It 
has the potential to recognise diverse perspectives and to foster participation when 
addressing sustainability and participatory decision-making. It can also 
incorporate the social and environmental impacts of business into accounting 
considerations. Multistakeholder engagement in dialogue could play a crucial role 
in recognising the plurality of different stakeholder perspectives and help to 
re(de)conceptualise social, economic, and environmental realities.     
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5.2.4 The EIA as a tool 
The EIA can be regarded as both a tool and process for operationalising the 
dialogic accounting framework. Some argue that the EIA is not only a well-known 
managerial tool providing environmental information, but also a process that can 
incorporate environmental considerations into decision-making and practice 
(Glasson, et al., 2005; Jay, et al., 2007). In spite of criticisms that the EIA is a 
technocratic tool used to support decision-making about mining projects, many 
have long recognised its potential to be a participatory, preventive tool that would 
promote sustainability (Cashmore, et al., 2010; Jay, et al., 2007; Nooteboom, 
2007). In this respect, public participation could help transform the EIA from 
being monologic to being dialogic.  
As public participation is mandated in most EIA legislation, the EIA contains 
legal space for stakeholder dialogue. The contested political nature of mining and 
environmental issues requires multistakeholder dialogue, if the plurality of 
participants is to be acknowledged. This would entail conflicting values and views 
being openly discussed to define the social and environmental impacts of mining 
and to negotiate mitigation methods. Public participation in the EIA would enable 
communities to make not only better informed and credible decisions but also to 
promote a social learning process among participants with contested views and 
differing knowledge (Diduck & Mitchell, 2003; Sinclair & Diduck, 2001).  
In the absence of other forms of participation, the EIA would become ‗a crucial 
instrument of local democracy‘ (Cherp, 2001, p. 352). By granting space for the 
public to participate, the EIA could also encourage democratisation of 
environmental decision-making (Petts, 2003; Petts & Brooks, 2006; Rockloff & 
Lockie, 2006; Sinclair, et al., 2002; Söderbaum, 2004), as it has the potential to 
make visible the subjective and political nature of environmental decisions and to 
consider plural perspectives and alternative solutions that participants develop and 
recommend (Cashmore, et al., 2010; Wilkins, 2003). Therefore, the EIA should be 
considered as a tool which can provide a ‗space‘ for dialogue among stakeholders 
that have differing views on mining and its social and environmental impacts. 
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5.3 Conceptual framework 
5.3.1 Positioning the study  
Figure 3 summarises the issues raised by calls for participatory environmental 
decision-making, economically sustainable mining, and democratisation in 
accounting that could foster sustainable development.  
Figure 3. The EIA as a tool and process for participatory mining, environmental 
management and accounting 
 
Figure 3 describes criticisms raised in each area of literature (bright brown oval 
shapes), arguments (bright green diamond shapes), and calls (or challenges), 
which are alongside arrows, depending on which disciplines and areas they refer. 
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Four different areas are illustrated in light-blue rectangles in the following order
56
: 
mining, environmental management, SEA, and NGOs.  
Firstly, the mining sector has been criticised for its negative impacts on the natural 
environment and societies, particularly in LDCs. There is mounting social 
pressure on mining companies to be concerned about their impact. Secondly, the 
roles of environmental management tools, particularly the EIA, have become 
more crucial. Figure 3 illustrates that the EIA, order 2, is criticised for having 
become a technocratic tool with an absence of inputs from affected people. 
Researchers therefore argue that public participation in an EIA is important in 
order to address negative mining impacts and concern about sustainability. This is 
illustrated by the arrow that indicates a call for meaningful public participation in 
EIAs. Thirdly, SEA literature also challenges conventional accounting with 
criticisms that accounting favours business interests and fails to consider multi-
stakeholder engagement. With this omission, current accounting practice falls 
short of addressing the challenges of sustainability and CSR. Social and 
environmental accounting calls for more dialogic approaches and public-interest 
oriented accounting. These concurrent arguments of SEA, as well as those of 
mining and environmental management, demonstrate the calls for sustainable and 
participatory mining (or business), and are shown in Figure 3 by red and green 
arrows. Fourthly, civil society actors, particularly NGOs
57
, are recognised as 
potential actors in promoting participatory decision-making that would enable 
democratisation in environmental management and sustainable and participatory 
mining. The engagement of NGOs in these issues is denoted in the figure by grey 
arrows. All these challenges and dynamics of development can be considered as a 
gradual, social-value change process, especially in a LDC context such as 
Mongolia (Molisa, et al., forthcoming).     
This study argues that the EIA can provide a space for dialogue and participation 
in the promotion of sustainable and participatory mining. By challenging the 
                                               
56 Note that the order is not significant, and serves only to organise discussion 
57 Despite potential roles of other constituents, the potentials of NGOs in addressing democracy, 
environmental protection, participatory decision-making and economically sustainable mining are 
discussed in Chapter 4. 
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symbolic participation practices of the EIA, this study regards the EIA as an arena 
where various mining constituents can come together to discuss the potential 
negative and positive impacts of a project. Stakeholders may have conflicting 
values and views on social, environmental, economic, and cultural impacts of 
mining, and they may propose different evaluation methods and alternatives to 
mitigate the impacts.  
Through dialogue, stakeholders can identify their similarities and differences and 
develop a shared understanding of ―sustainable development‖. Or, equally, where 
deep differences exist among people, some may decide not to cooperate in the 
formal dialogic process but prefer to problematise and critique from ―outside‖ (for 
example, as ―challenger‖ NGOs). Whatever decisions are made, dialogic 
participation can enable all stakeholders to be informed about an EIA, to learn to 
talk with each other, and to recognise and engage with different perspectives on 
environmental decisions. Importantly, a dialogic approach may encourage use of 
the EIA as a more inclusive and participatory decision-making tool and process. 
The following section introduces the analytic framework which this study 
employs for its empirical analysis.   
5.3.2 Analytic framework  
This study argues for a dialogic EIA which can promote sustainable and 
participatory mining practices. It takes critical dialogic accounting as its analytic 
framework and focuses on the EIA for illustrative purposes. The critical dialogic 
accounting framework developed by Brown (2009) – previously used to assess 
sustainability assessment models (SAMs)
58
 – will be employed in this respect.  
The EIA is complex and contestable as it incorporates social, environmental, 
economic and cultural concerns regarding developmental projects. The EIA is 
                                               
58  The SAM is an accounting tool designed to assist organisations to perform sustainability 
evaluations by communicating information on the broad impacts of organisational activities. It was 
designed by the BP (UK), in conjunction with the University of Aberdeen and Genesis Oil and Gas 
Consultations and has been applied in several case-studies in the United Kingdom and New 
Zealand (Bebbington, 2007). EIAs were considered more relevant for this study as they are 
currently used in Mongolia and are less reliant on monetisation and neo-classical economic 
valuation methodologies and, thus, arguably less vulnerable to charges of ―monetary reductionism‖ 
(see Brown, 2009, p. 332).  
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normally conducted before a mining project commences. It is a multi-dimensional 
tool that recognises there may be various stakeholders with conflicting views on 
the potential impacts of mining. This study argues that the EIA can be a dialogic 
accounting tool. With guaranteed legislative rights to information and 
participation, the EIA can provide a formal space for dialogue where stakeholders 
with differing views can come together and debate the potential positive and 
negative impacts of a mining project. Through dialogue, participants can 
(de)(re)construct their values and views on the identification, categorisation, and 
evaluation of impacts, and their mitigation methods and processes (Cashmore, et 
al., 2010).  
A more dialogic EIA could promote democracy through participation of local 
communities, civil society groups and other interested parties. In doing so, the 
EIA would encourage non-expert accessibility to environmental management 
decision-making processes, and generate additional quantitative and qualitative 
data and criteria about the social, environmental, economic and cultural impacts of 
a mining project. 
Unlike previous studies which use dialogic accounting in the contexts of 
developed countries (see Bebbington, 2007 for an overview), this study employs 
the framework in a LDC context. Specifically, it applies the key principles of 
critical dialogic accounting to analyse the dialogic potential of EIAs in Mongolia, 
as a newly democratic LDC. Findings and the proposed application of the dialogic 
framework in LDCs may differ from developed countries, given their different 
socio-political-cultural contexts (Belal, 2007; Molisa, et al., forthcoming). Thus, 
this study may advance debate on critical dialogic accounting within LDC 
contexts and thereby contribute to the development of the critical dialogic 
accounting framework.   
The following section discusses the analytical framework for this study. It derives 
from Brown‘s (2009) conceptual framework for critical dialogic accounting, 
which is compatible with pluralism and agonistic democracy. There are eight key 
principles: 
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1. Recognise multiple ideological orientations 
2. Avoid monetary reductionism  
3. Be open about the subjective and contestable nature of calculations  
4. Enable accessibility for non-experts  
5. Ensure effective participatory processes  
6. Be attentive to power relations  
7. Recognise the transformative potential of dialogic accounting 
8. Resist new forms of monologism.  
This study uses these principles to examine EIA practices in Mongolia. The 
empirical data will be analysed according to the extent to which existing EIA 
methods and associated participation practices are monologic or dialogic. The 
framework of Table 2, which illustrates differences between monologic and 
dialogic EIA approaches, will be used. However, it is important to recognise that 
the definition of each type of EIA and its categories are ―ideal types‖, which are 
constructed as a heuristic for analytic purposes, rather than as a checklist for 
providing mutually exclusive and definitive ―yes‖ or ―no‖ answers. Bessire and 
Onnée (2010) adopt a similar approach and note that ―to achieve this aim, we have 
elaborated ideal types of strategy and ideal types of ideology. It must be kept in 
mind that these ideal types are used as analytical tools: reality is obviously more 
complex and strategies of legitimation oscillate along a continuum‖ (Bessire & 
Onnée, 2010, p. 446).  
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Table 2. Monologic and dialogic approaches to EIAs as a tool, and associated 
processes 
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Adapted and modified from (Brown, 2009, pp. 329-333) and (Söderbaum & Brown, 2010,  
pp. 184-191) 
Each principle in Table 2 is explained below:  
1. Recognise multiple ideological orientations 
Dialogic accounting‘s recognition of different perspectives, values and 
assumptions, encourages a broader stakeholder arena where participants, 
including previously marginalised communities, can express their views and 
claims. It is particularly relevant to mining, where social, environmental, 
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economic and cultural factors are often incorporated into ―closed‖ decision-
making that excludes the concerns of affected local communities (CSP
2 
and WRI, 
2005).  
A pluralistic approach challenges technocratic EIA practice, which has 
traditionally ignored socio-political differences among stakeholders and has 
perceived participants as homogeneous (Wilkins, 2003). In a dialogic EIA, 
participants are recognised as having differing perspectives and values; but critical 
dialogics does not ―embrace total pluralism‖ and difference is valued ―only 
insofar as it does not support domination and inequality‖ (Brown, 2009, p. 324).  
2. Avoid monetary reductionism  
The dialogic approach opposes monetary reductionism; rather it encourages the 
production of quantitative and qualitative data to help individuals and groups 
discuss and judge the potentials and trade-offs of monetisation. An attraction of 
the EIA is that it is less epistemologically restrictive than positivistic techniques, 
such as traditional cost benefit analysis, which relies heavily on monetisation and 
neo-classical economic valuation methodologies. A monologic EIA, based solely 
on scientific ―hard‖ data, mathematical calculation, and geographical mapping 
(Cashmore, 2004), would be challenged by a dialogic approach to EIA.  
In contrast, dialogic EIAs would usually use scientific ‗hard‘ data and monetary 
calculations as well as non-monetary data and visual information to help 
stakeholders understand an EIA, or to provide photographic or similar evidence to 
support their arguments (Brown, 2010). This combination is important for an EIA, 
where many environmental, social and cultural impacts are denied consideration, 
or cannot be realistically assessed in monetary forms due to the underdevelopment 
of existing EIA evaluation methods.    
3. Be open about the subjective and contestable nature of calculations  
The monologic EIA is based on positivism and the notion that knowledge and 
calculation is/should be ―objective and value-free‖ to predict the impact of a given 
project (Jay, et al., 2007). Ideologically closed models, such as a cost benefit 
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analysis and scientific calculations with fixed valuation rules, are widely used in 
monologic approaches (Wilkins, 2003).  
However, subjectivity should be seen as a positive aspect of the EIA, 
endeavouring to promote ―more environmentally sustainable assessment decisions‖ 
(Wilkins, 2003, p. 402). Consistent with a social constructionist epistemology, the 
dialogic approach recognises the subjectivity and the uncertainty surrounding 
contested issues (Brown, 2009, p. 325), such as natural-resource use and mining. 
Therefore, the dialogic EIA acknowledges the subjectivity and contestation of 
definitions of impacts and calculations, that is, those identified and included, how 
impacts are measured, how mitigation alternatives are developed and assessed, 
and which decision rules apply in judgements on a selection of mitigation 
methods.  
4. Enable accessibility for non-experts  
The expert-laden monologic EIA is further challenged by the dialogic EIA, as it 
neglects the contested nature of EIAs, and calls for participatory decision-making 
to promote sustainability (Jay, et al., 2007; Nooteboom, 2007). The dialogic EIA 
asks experts not only to be aware of their underpinning values and perspectives, 
but also to be self-reflective and recognise subjectivity and plurality (Wilkins, 
2003); it rejects any attempt to find ―one right answer‖, with its pluralistic roots, 
as this is incompatible with democracy (Mouffe, 2000). In contrast, the dialogic 
approach encourages dialogue and involvement of non-experts. A combination of 
monetary and non-monetary data gives both experts and non-experts access to 
dialogue. NGOs can act as ―border-crossers‖ to facilitate this multi-perspective 
dialogue (Brown, 2009, p. 333) given their capability to raise and address issues 
that surround EIAs (Li, 2009); for example, they are more likely than lay people 
to have access to independent experts.  
Another area of non-expert involvement in the EIA is quality assurance. Whereas 
the quality assurance of monologic EIAs is executed by experts from relevant 
state organisations, the dialogic approach recognises the importance of non-
experts in this process (Bebbington, et al., 2007). The latter may challenge experts 
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by developing their own quality assurance tests, as evidenced in some post-
communist developing countries (Kravchenko, 2002). Both experts and non-
experts can learn from each other from such engagement (Petts, 2007). More 
importantly, the extensive peer quality assurance process would improve the 
quality of EIAs (Petts & Brooks, 2006).   
5. Ensure effective participatory processes  
Although public participation may be mandated by legislation, it can become 
symbolic in monologic EIA practices, for example, by being treated as one 
component of an EIA check-list (Biller, 2003). Symbolic participation often 
excludes the engagement of affected communities and other stakeholders with 
significant concerns about proposed projects (Mitchell, 2001; Rockloff & Lockie, 
2006). A lack of access to information and the ―professionalised language‖ of a 
monologic EIA can contribute to symbolic participation (Petts, 2004). Moreover 
in monologic forms of EIA, public comments are rarely considered in final reports, 
and decisions are made solely by bureaucrats (Jay, et al., 2007; Li, 2009).   
In contrast, the dialogic EIA encourages more effective participation that helps 
people to (re)construct their values and views and to identify issues in their own 
way (Anderson, 1988, p.65 cited in Brown, 2009, p.326). Effective participation 
should have ―legislative rights to information and participation‖, procedural rules 
for ensuring ―a more even playing field‖, and early engagement of stakeholders in 
the process (Söderbaum & Brown, 2010). The dialogic approach requires the EIA 
to be written in an understandable common language, with an executive summary 
that can provide basic information and knowledge to stakeholders. Participants 
have a right to oppose policies if they are perceived as conflicting with their 
interests.  
An inclusive EIA represents an important attribute of effective participation. 
Therefore, a final EIA report should consider public views and comments 
regarding mining projects and should include local knowledge when necessary 
(Diduck, et al., 2007). To ensure further meaningful participation, the EIA report 
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should have a summary, clarifying the main points drawn from participation, and 
publically disseminate them.         
6. Be attentive to power relations  
The monologic and technocratic EIA does not recognise the complexity of power 
relationships surrounding an EIA. In spite of its claim to be objective, powerful 
groups influence EIA preparations and decision-making – thus it is political by 
nature (Cashmore, et al., 2010). This is particularly relevant to LDCs, where close 
linkages between bureaucrats and businesses, and endemic corruption may exist 
(Belal & Owen, 2007; Webler & Tuler, 2006). Capacity building among EIA 
constituents is rarely considered in the monologic approach because the EIA is 
perceived primarily to be an instrumental decision-making tool (Doberstein, 2003).  
The dialogic approach, in contrast, is attentive to the complexity of knowledge, 
expertise, and power (Dillard & Roslender, 2011). It regards the EIA as a learning 
process, whereby the capacity building of all parties is encouraged. Moreover, by 
proposing or enabling a more participatory and inclusive EIA, it would challenge 
power elites.  
Critical dialogic accounting recognises power inequalities that can influence 
decisions and restrict participation of some people and groups. The collective 
actions of NGOs are important because they have the capacity to challenge 
technical scientific discourse (Lehman, 1995), develop counter-reports (Spence, 
2007), and to provide ―resistance from outside established institutional channels‖ 
(Brown, 2009). Hence, critical dialogic accounting would encourage insider and 
outsider engagement (Brown, 2009) of NGOs, which would promote pluralism 
and open the EIAs to contestation.       
7. Recognise the transformative potential of dialogic accounting 
The perception of an EIA as a purely technical and expert-laden tool is further 
challenged by the dialogic approach, which acknowledges the (re)constructive 
potential of discussion and debate. Dialogic accounting promotes horizontal 
dialogue to make social actors more aware of differences and similarities of their 
perspectives (Bebbington, et al., 2007). Hence, it supports ―discussion, debate and 
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dialectic learning in pluralistic environments‖ (Brown, 2009, p. 327). It views an 
EIA as ―a system for producing knowledge, not only as a means to make informed 
planning decisions, but also as a source of directing the development of social 
values‖ (Wilkins, 2003, p. 402). Thus, the dialogic framework may have 
important transformative potential (Dillard & Roslender, 2011), that is, to 
transform monologic EIAs into dialogic ones. The desire to foster a 
transformative dialogue that could promote social learning and sustainable and 
participatory mining is a major reason to adopt a critical dialogic framework.  
8. Resist new forms of monologism  
Dialogic tools are not merely viewed as technical innovations, rather critical 
dialogic accounting views them as a means of revealing conflict and for 
maintaining democratic contestation (Bebbington, et al., 2007). The aim is for all 
participants to appreciate the complexity of issues rather than necessarily 
achieving agreement (Söderbaum & Brown, 2010). Through the dialogic process, 
social change could gradually occur. Social change in dialogic accounting is 
considered to be ―dependent on social interaction and learning – discussing and 
debating one‘s own and other peoples‘ interests and values‖ (Brown, 2009, p. 
327). 
Thus, the dialogic EIA is an on-going learning process that should include 
comments, recommendations, and lessons learned from public participation and 
EIA contestation. This could enable EIA constituents to constantly improve EIAs, 
exercise more democratic and effective participation, undergo social learning, and 
to improve mining practices with respect to sustainable development. Engagement 
outside the formal EIA institutions is welcomed as it may discourage elite-groups 
from co-opting EIA participants who favour their interests, and prevent the EIA 
from reverting to monologism.   
Each constituent plays an important role in the transformation process within the 
dialogic EIA.  
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5.3.3 EIA constituents 
EIA constituents can be classified as experts and non-experts. ‗EIA experts‘ refers 
to officials in state organisations and EIA companies. EIA legislation in most 
countries requires professional assessment companies to use a specific 
methodology and framework, and then submit their EIAs to state organisations, 
which have considerable influence as they finalise EIA approvals (Cashmore, et 
al., 2010). Consequently, experts from both state organisations and EIA 
companies exercise significant power over how to conduct EIAs, whom to include 
as participants, and whether to approve or reject EIA reports.  
Mining companies, affected local communities, international donor organisations, 
and civil society actors, such as NGOs, can be categorised as ‗non-experts‘. 
Mining companies choose the companies which prepare EIAs, pay all EIA related 
costs, implement EIA recommendations when EIA reports are approved by state 
organisations, and establish internal systems to monitor compliance with EIAs. 
Therefore, mining companies are customers of EIA companies that are 
responsible for implementing state regulations for EIAs. In many LDCs, 
international donor organisations are directly and indirectly engaged in EIAs 
through their supervisory and advisory roles to state organisations. In most cases, 
international donor organisations introduce EIA frameworks to LDCs (Cherp, 
2001; Doberstein, 2003).  
The main players in EIA public participation are local communities that are likely 
to be affected or already affected by a mining project. State organisations, mining 
companies, and EIA companies are, or should be, accountable to the public (Li, 
2009; Lockie, Franetovich, Sharma, & Rolfe, 2008). However, local communities 
are often marginalised and excluded from EIA decision-making processes in spite 
of their legal rights to participate (Kakonge, 1998; Rockloff & Lockie, 2006). 
Local and international NGOs have engaged in EIAs to varying degrees, claiming 
to act as representatives of the public and professionals, and as activists for 
environmental protection and human rights. They have actively raised public 
awareness by promoting participation, being participants, developing alternative 
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EIAs, and using formal EIAs to support their arguments against poor mining 
practices (Kravchenko, 2002; Li, 2009). 
In advocating dialogue among EIA constituents and engagement of non-experts in 
EIAs, the dialogic approach emphasises the role of both experts and non-experts. 
Both are crucial to promote the transformation process within the dialogic EIA. 
Various problems for each constituent can arise, due to a lack of public and 
private sector accountability, and weak governance in LDCs. EIA companies can 
prepare EIAs of poor quality, ignore public participation, and favour their 
customers – mining companies (Annandale & Taplin, 2003). State organisations 
can be bureaucratic and corrupt, and often do not provide access to EIAs or make 
inclusive, realistic decisions (Kolhoff, et al., 2009). The citizens of LCDs are 
often unaware of environmental issues and their right to participate, or are 
excluded from participation due to power imbalances, a lack of understanding of 
the professional language and jargon used, inadequate financial resources, and 
time-frames in which to participate (Doberstein, 2003; Kolhoff, et al., 2009; Li, 
2009). 
Thus, it is often argued that NGOs have the greatest potential for encouraging 
dialogue and acting as border-crossers among EIA constituents with differing 
views and interests (Brown, 2009; Söderbaum & Brown, 2010). They may be able 
to challenge the bureaucratic and unaccountable structures of EIA companies and 
exert pressure on mining companies, and state organisations. Figure 4 illustrates 
the relationship of each EIA constituent with engaged an NGO.  
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Figure 4. Relationship of EIA constituents with an engaged NGO 
 
 
LDCs with a poor rule of law, weak public sector accountability, and a lack of 
concern with CSR tend to lack participatory EIAs, and economically sustainable 
mining due to power imbalances among constituents. These countries are also 
more vulnerable to external shocks of global markets, price fluctuations of 
minerals, and environmental destruction caused by poor business practices (Molisa, 
et al., forthcoming; Toth, 2010), such as mining.  
These countries often lack the political will and institutional capacity to foster 
democracy and participation (Kapoor, 2008). Doberstein (2003) argues that 
decisions in LDCS are often manipulated by powerful individuals and that 
environmental decisions are often ‗corrected‘ to reflect the preferred opinion. 
Moreover, corruption and bribery are important factors, and the approval of 
development projects is often influenced ―by political, rather than environmental 
considerations‖ (p. 26). EIA companies and experts are often not supportive of 
more input from the public, claiming that the public lack appropriate training and 
knowledge, and that participation is costly and time-consuming (Annandale & 
Taplin, 2003; Biller, 2003; Jay, et al., 2007). International donor organisations are 
also criticised for a lack of local knowledge and for pursuing ―essentially neo-
colonial development agenda[s]‖ (Cashmore, et al., 2010, p. 374). 
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Given the lack of political will and capacity of other EIA constituents, particularly 
experts, civil society actors, especially NGOs, can play crucial roles in 
transforming this situation. Mining and environmental issues are controversial and 
political, given their impact on broader stakeholders and non-human species, so 
NGOs need to be constantly engaged in these issues and to mobilise interest-
groups and individuals to express their views, if they are to influence decisions 
and policies (Akol, 2001; Schlosberg, 2007; Szablowski, 2007). As Figure 4 
illustrates, an NGO interacts differently with EIA constituents according to the 
arrows labelled (a), and constituents react to the pressures and mobilisation of an 
NGO according to the arrows labelled (b). Through this engagement, the 
accountability of both public and private sectors can improve, and the rule of law 
and public participation in decisions may gradually strengthen.   
Thus, this study argues that local NGOs in LDCs have the potential to mobilise 
and educate local communities, regarding mining and EIAs, and to encourage 
both public and private sectors to be more accountable for their decisions and 
actions. Through such pressure and mobilisation of local communities, the 
mindsets in LDCs can be challenged, and the accountability of state organisations 
and private companies and the rule of law can gradually be improved. Importantly, 
NGOs can help operationalise transformations to dialogic EIAs and thereby 
promote sustainable and participatory mining.     
5.3.4 NGOs as promoters and facilitators of a dialogic tool  
NGOs have considerable potential to promote dialogue and participatory decision-
making. Throughout their history, NGOs have played various roles in society, 
ranging from being activists to partners of state and business in the tri-sector 
approach (Gray, et al., 2006; Howell & Pearce, 2001). With their strong advocacy 
for participatory democracy, human rights, social justice, and environmental 
protection (Howell & Pearce, 2001; Li, 2009; Lockie, et al., 2008; Teegan, et al., 
2004), NGOs have enthusiastically supported and strived for participatory 
decision-making in public policy and environmental management (Akol, 2001; 
Lockie, et al., 2008). Some dialogue practices among mining and EIA constituents 
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illustrate how NGOs can initiate and facilitate multi-stakeholder dialogue in 
mineral-rich LDCs (Cornejo, Kells, Zuniga, Roen, & Thompson, 2010).          
Although the complexity and contested nature of NGOs are widely acknowledged, 
previous studies have not clearly addressed how NGOs are heterogeneous and 
consist of actors with different perspectives, views, and strategies (Howell & 
Pearce, 2001), particularly in mining and environmental decision-making (Li, 
2009; Szablowski, 2007). Instead of being perceived as a homogeneous entity, 
civil society can be perceived as an ‗intellectual space‘ for the development of 
discourses (Lockie, et al., 2008), thus reconciling Western assumptions with 
‗subalterns‘ views and perspectives (Kapoor, 2008). The monologic approach to 
NGOs, which homogenises them as a single-actor group, ought to be challenged, 
particularly in LDCs. NGOs in these countries are diverse in their perspectives, 
strategies, and actions, and experience internal conflict and constant struggle over 
issues, ranging from survival and opportunistic behaviours to counter-hegemonic 
actions against dominant groups and Western capitalism (Feher, et al., 2007; 
McIlwaine, 2009).  
However, this study recognises the plural and contested nature of NGOs in its 
application of critical dialogic accounting. It does not attempt to homogenise 
NGOs as a unitary whole, but rather, recognises that they have legitimate 
differences of viewpoint and, relatedly, adopt different social-change strategies. 
This study views the plurality and the constant struggle within the NGO sector as 
―neither disturbances that unfortunately cannot be eliminated, nor empirical 
impediments that frustrate the realisation of an ‗ideal‘ harmony‖; instead, it 
considers them as ―central to democratisation‖ (Brown, 2009, p. 320).  
Hence, this study explores the different roles, perspectives, and strategies of 
NGOs for promoting dialogic EIAs and greater accountability of EIA constituents. 
NGOs are seen as ‗border-crossers‘ among different stakeholders. Given their 
diversity and potential influence, many prefer to work for social change, either 
from inside or outside mainstream institutions. As Brown (2009) states: 
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Some combination of insider and outsider forms of engagement arguably provides 
the most effective form of praxis for those with social change agendas. This entails 
some social actors working for change from the ―inside‖ (e.g. working with 
business and policymakers to reform institutions from within) and others working 
more combatively from ―outside‖ mainstream institutions (p. 327)59.  
Thus, some NGOs cooperate with business and state, while others prefer to work 
outside mainstream institutions and to challenge them by developing alternative 
perspectives through counter-arguments or counter-reports (Howell & Pearce, 
2001). Particularly in LDCs, socio-political contexts and power dynamics should 
be considered (Kapoor, 2008); neither solely Western democratic concepts 
imported by NGOs nor local activism by a few local NGOs can effectively 
address the complex and contested nature of EIAs and mining issues. 
This study argues that NGOs can promote the key principles of the critical 
dialogic accounting framework. Although they share similar goals, such as 
participation, democracy, and sustainability, the engagement of insider and 
outsider NGOs can be distinguished by their perspectives. Some may prefer 
(implicitly or explicitly) more deliberative approaches to democracy, while others 
may promote a more agonistic stance. Mohan (2002) argues that both strategies of 
NGOs could make a difference in LDCs. Mohan (2002) argues:  
Crucially, greater and more critical engagement with the state is required although 
this is incredibly difficult where states, donors and other aid organisations delimit 
the political space open to civil society. One route for this is more accomodatory 
via the recent emphasis on citizenship and rights which seek to generate greater 
‗synergy‘ between state and society through the promotion of social capital and 
civic engagement. A second route is more radical and involves civil society actors 
opposing the dominant development discourse and challenging local, national and 
global structures (p. 151).  
                                               
59 Some researchers on civil society make a similar argument from the neo-Gramscian perspective. 
They suggest that civil society is ‗simultaneously the arena in which capitalist hegemony is 
secured but also where the subaltern classes forge social alliances and articulate alternative 
hegemonic projects‘ (Howell & Pearce, 2001; Munck, 2006).       
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Whereas Mohan (2002) concentrates on human rights and social capital issues, 
this study argues that a similar combination of NGO strategies could promote 
public participation in EIAs. Based on critical dialogic accounting roots, this 
study explores differing strategies and engagements of NGOs in promoting a 
transformation to dialogic EIAs. Table 3 illustrates the differences between the 
two types of participatory democracy advocated in dialogic accounting research. 
Table 3. NGO strategies and implications for participatory democracy 
 
This table shows that both types of NGO may choose different positions and 
strategies for promoting participatory EIA decision-making and economically 
sustainable mining. Being either a cooperative or challenger NGO has advantages 
and disadvantages. However, both cooperative and challenging strategies can 
encourage pluralistic engagement within formal and informal EIA arenas.  
A cooperative NGO can mobilise EIA participants and facilitate dialogic EIAs in 
a deliberative sense, whereas a challenger NGO can work outside the formal 
dialogic EIA, acting as an independent watchdog or making ‗counter-EIAs‘ that 
challenge formal EIAs, addressing power issues associated with EIAs, and 
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stymieing the formation of new types of monologism. However, this carries the 
danger of cooperative NGOs being co-opted and of challenger NGOs being 
excluded from the EIA arena. Therefore, the co-existence of both types of NGOs 
may be necessary for encouraging dialogic EIAs, and thence agonistic democracy 
and ongoing dialogue. 
The NGO framework, illustrated in Table 3, is used in this study to analyse the 
empirical data and discussion on whether transformation to a dialogic EIA for 
promoting sustainable and participatory mining is feasible. The next chapter will 
describe the research methodology and methods adopted to analyse the Mongolian 
empirical data.   
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Chapter 6: RESEARCH DESIGN 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter introduces the research objectives and design. It bridges the 
conceptual framework and the analysis of empirical data by demonstrating how 
and why the research methodology and methods are suitable for the theoretical 
framework adopted.  
The chapter is organised as follows. The first section introduces the research 
objectives and the research questions, formulated from the literature review and 
the conceptual framework chapter. These guide the analyses and discussion of the 
two empirical chapters. The consistency of research methodology with the 
proposed conceptual framework is then discussed, followed by discussion of the 
appropriateness of the research methods (including case-studies, interviews, 
document analysis and participatory observation) with the research aims and 
research methodology. Details of the data collection follow, including explanation 
of how and which data were collected, and the difficulties encountered. Finally, 
the data analysis of interviews and documents are described, as well as issues that 
arose during the analysis.              
6.2 Research objectives and questions  
This study examines sustainable development in practice, particularly in the 
context of a LDC. Sustainable development for business can be defined as 
economically profitable activities that include consideration of social and 
environmental issues (MMSD, 2002) – the latter being a crucial consideration for 
the mining sector of mineral-rich LDCs. As discussed, researchers across 
disciplines argue that sustainability requires the public participation of affected 
communities in social and environmental decisions. Allied to this, several authors 
promote ideas about the ‗democratisation‘ of decision-making. In recognition of 
these issues, the objectives of this study are three-fold:  
1. to address global and local calls for sustainable and participatory mining;  
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2. to problematise symbolic participation practices of EIAs and investigate 
whether they could foster more inclusive and meaningful EIA practices; 
the study focuses on the EIA as a potential dialogic tool for promoting 
sustainable and participatory mining; it draws on Brown‘s (2009) critical 
dialogic accounting framework to evaluate existing EIA practices and to 
suggest new ones;  
3. to examine environmental and mining-related NGOs in Mongolia and to 
explore their potential for promoting dialogic EIAs. This could 
‗democratise‘ environmental management and improve the performance of 
mining companies regarding sustainable development.  
To address these objectives, the key research question and sub-questions are as 
follows: Can the EIA provide a dialogic accounting tool to promote sustainable 
and participatory mining?; arising from this, are four sub-questions:  
1. Why do we need sustainable and participatory mining?  
2. Are existing EIA practices primarily monologic or dialogic?   
3. Can the EIA be a dialogic accounting tool to promote sustainable and 
participatory mining? 
4. What role(s) might NGOs play in promoting dialogic EIA practices? 
Chapters 2, 3 and 4 have examined these questions, drawing from the relevant 
literature both within and outside the accounting discipline. The next two chapters 
address the questions in the specific context of Mongolia and the empirical 
findings from my fieldwork. 
To address the research questions, a qualitative research methodology and 
methods were used to collect, analyse, and write up the empirical data. The next 
sections discuss the methodology and methods used, the data collected, and how 
they were analysed.   
6.3 Research methodology 
This multi-disciplinary study examines environmental management, SEA, mining, 
and NGOs. Each area provokes distinct, controversial views on sustainability and 
participatory decision-making, but attempts to address all areas simultaneously, 
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making the study a more complex process. Therefore, it is important to trace 
interactions and connection points between areas to focus the study. Although 
some points and areas may be lost during this ‗particularisation‘ process (May, 
2001), a search for intersections helps narrow the research and enables a deeper 
understanding and exploration of specific issues, notably sustainability and 
participatory environmental decision-making – key areas for this research.   
This study uses normative arguments to examine why and if a critical dialogic 
accounting framework in an EIA could positively influence mining practices in 
LDCs, by creating sustainability and empowering affected communities. In this 
respect, the study explores the potential for promoting dialogic and participatory 
environmental decision-making for sustainable and participatory mining in LDCs, 
with a focus on the engagement of NGOs.  
Qualitative research (in an interpretive and critical rather than a ―positivistic‖ 
sense which views it as an open-ended way of discovering new ―variables‖)60 is 
deemed suitable for these ends, as it is compatible with the dialogic accounting 
framework employed. Qualitative research promotes multiple perspectives with 
which to understand research issues better. It is open to subjectivity and does not 
purport to find one ―correct‖ answer, unlike positivist viewpoints (Willis, 2007, p. 
194). Qualitative researchers believe that people have their own interpretations of 
reality, so they choose methods that encompass this worldview (Mason, 2002) . 
Bearing this in mind, dialogic accounting researchers use qualitative research to 
explore the potential of pluralistic approaches in SEA (Bebbington, et al., 2007; 
Dillard & Roslender, 2011).  
Given its multi-disciplinary and exploratory nature, this study draws on 
qualitative social research, which is by its nature ―an interdisciplinary, 
transdisciplinary, and sometimes counterdisciplinary field … and inherently 
political‖ (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005, p. 7). It is open-ended and accommodates 
                                               
60 In the remainder of this chapter, the term ―qualitative research‖ is used in this sense, and the 
literature drawn on comes from writers who adopt interpretive and/or critical stances. For further 
discussion on different approaches to ―qualitative research‖ see Crotty (1998). As explained in 
Chapter 5, dialogic accounting involves both an interpretive dimension (understanding multiple 
perspectives) and a critical dimension (concerned with power relations). 
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many interpretive and critical research viewpoints, and various research methods 
(Patton, 2002).  
Qualitative researchers acknowledge the value-laden nature of inquiry and 
emphasise ―the socially constructed nature of reality‖. Thus they try to understand 
―how social experience is created and given meaning‖ (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005, p. 
10). This is important for this study as public participation in EIA practices is 
viewed as socially constructed, and has different meanings to different EIA 
constituents. This study also focuses on NGOs, but does not attempt to 
homogenise this sector as a unitary whole; rather, NGOs are perceived as 
contested and plural. Differences and similarities emerge for particular issues, and 
the power dimension among different NGOs, and between NGOs and other social 
actors, should be taken into account. 
Qualitative methodology provides flexibility for researchers to investigate 
contested issues while recognising their complexity. It is also attentive to 
subjectivity and power issues (Crotty, 1998), which is appropriate for this study 
because it addresses those issues in relation to mining, EIA practice, and NGOs, 
and examines them in the complex context of a developing country. By 
understanding these issues, it is hoped that the potential for bridging these areas 
and promoting sustainability and participatory democratic change can be 
encouraged.  
Given its critical roots in dialogic accounting, this study recognises power issues, 
particularly those in LDCs. Like other critical researchers, I endeavour to ―expose 
the forces that prevent individuals and groups from shaping the decisions that 
crucially affect their lives‖ (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005, p. 308). Recognition of 
power inequalities among EIA and mining constituents provides not only an 
opportunity to be attentive to the contestation of actors and issues, but also to the 
possibilities and limitations of dialogic accounting in practice.  
Given this study‘s orientation to a dialogic accounting research framework, 
qualitative research methods are deemed more appropriate, not least because they 
―facilitate study of issues in depth and detail‖ (Patton, 2002, p. 14) and help 
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researchers to understand the complexities of social phenomena (Denzin & 
Lincoln, 2005). Hence, the study employs a case-study methodology involving 
interviews, document analysis, and participatory observation. Mongolian EIA 
practices and two NGOs are used as case-studies to explore the nature and 
potential of EIAs and NGOs for promoting sustainable and participatory mining.  
6.4 Research methods 
Studies that promote pluralism are often interdisciplinary because they seek to 
explore differing interpretations of various stakeholders across a range of issues in 
order to understand the complexity of issues (Bebbington, et al., 2007). 
Researchers apply multiple methods to identify stakeholders‘ perspectives and 
views, to explore competing/collaborating relationships among them, to examine 
existing conflicts of interest, and to investigate power relations (Reed, 2002; 
Rockloff & Lockie, 2006).  
A multi-methods approach or methodological triangulation is commonly used in 
qualitative research to gain greater understanding and clarification of meaning 
(Fontana & Frey, 2005, p. 722). Triangulation contributes to the ―validity‖ of 
qualitative research (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005) and ―involves confirmation across 
different data collection methods‖ (Willis, 2007, p. 219). Multiple methods can 
give a ―simultaneous display of multiple, refracted realities‖ (Denzin & Lincoln, 
2005, p. 3). The strengths of one method can compensate for weaknesses of 
another and increase the credibility of findings through cross-checking (Patton, 
2002).  
The case-studies used focuses on Mongolian EIA practices for mining projects 
and NGO involvement in promoting ‗responsible mining‘ initiatives. It uses 
interviews, document analysis, and participatory observation to gather rich data, 
which is then analysed to explore the potential contribution of EIAs and NGOs in 
these regards. My personal experience was also useful. As I am Mongolian, there 
was no language barrier to interviewing people, conducting participatory 
observation, or analysing documents. Furthermore, it was important to be familiar 
with the Mongolian social, political, economic, and cultural contexts, to 
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understand local traditions, and to have witnessed democratisation in Mongolia 
since the 1990 democratic revolution.  
The following section discusses the research methods and explains how they are 
appropriate.      
6.4.1 Case-study 
The advantages of the case-study, which is commonly used in qualitative research, 
are that it allows researchers to collect rich, detailed data; it is more holistic and 
helps to understand issues in specific social contexts; and it can also be done 
without overly predetermined, detailed plans (Willis, 2007, p. 240).    
These features are important, given the exploratory nature of this study. It was 
necessary to gather rich data that were not readily available because of the 
absence of prior studies on environmental management, mining, and NGOs in 
Mongolia. Therefore, I collected all the data personally by interviewing different 
EIA constituents, undertaking participatory observation, and collecting documents. 
Case-studies provided a holistic approach. Six-month‘ fieldwork was conducted in 
Mongolia. The various methods for data gathering, and personal experience of 
Mongolian mining and NGOs helped me to understand more fully EIA practices 
and the engagement of NGOs in mining issues. Rich data and personal 
observation were supported by documents and media coverage of related issues. 
Case-studies enabled me to place issues within their social and political contexts 
and to uncover power dynamics among EIA constituents and NGOs. This is 
important for this study – as dialogic accounting encourages interdisciplinary and 
interpretive study that is open to subjective interpretations of issues (Brown, 2009; 
Söderbaum & Brown, 2010).  
The study did not commence with a clear predetermined plan for conducting the 
research and analysing data. Rather it attempted to explore issues as they unfolded. 
I had ideas about how to collect data, which groups of stakeholders to interview, 
and how to analyse initial data according to the dialogic accounting framework, 
but these were not specified in detail in advance. Accordingly, interviews were 
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mostly unstructured, and participatory observation evolved during the fieldwork 
in Mongolia.           
6.4.2 Interviews 
Interviews were the main resource for data collection. They are widely used in 
qualitative studies as they enable researchers ―to learn about social life through 
the perspective, experience, and language of those living it‖ (Boeije, 2010, p. 62).  
This study attempts to understand different views and interests of various 
stakeholders and to explore the potential of EIAs and NGOs, so it is interested in 
both the ―whats‖ and ―hows‖ of meaning production (Holstein & Gubrium, 2004). 
Interviews helped to explore different stakeholders‘ views on the roles and 
potential of EIAs for sustainable and participatory mining in Mongolia. They 
revealed stakeholders‘ differing understandings of public participation in EIAs.  
The format of interviews differed depending on the research objectives and 
interviewees‘ background. A combination of semi-structured and focused 
interviews was used. This provided flexibility and active engagement between the 
interviewer and interviewees (Fontana & Frey, 2005). Flexibility proved to be a 
major advantage (May, 2001), as it allowed me to ―explore incompletely 
articulated aspects of experience, encouraging respondents to develop topics in 
ways relevant to their own experience‖ (Holstein & Gubrium, 2004). It also 
allowed me to modify interview questions and clarify interviewees‘ meaning by 
using ―reflecting back‖ methods that permitted ―interviewees not only to elaborate, 
but also to correct and/or modify their account‖ (May, 2001, p. 133). 
Semi-structured interviews were used for government officials, EIA specialists, 
mining company managers and project managers of international organisations. 
These helped my understanding of current EIA practices and different EIA 
constituents‘ views on their potential for improving public participation. To use a 
semi-standardised format of topics, such as mining and EIAs in Mongolia, was an 
advantage, as it ensured every interviewee provided answers to the principal 
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questions. It also enabled me ―to have more latitude to probe beyond the answers 
and thus enter into a dialogue with the interviewee‖ (May, 2001, p. 123).   
A focused interview was used for NGO members. Its open-ended character 
provided flexibility, permitted the discovery of meaning, and provided 
―qualitative depth by allowing interviewees to talk about the subject within their 
own frames of reference‖, thereby supplying ―a greater understanding of the 
subject‘s point of view‖ (May, 2001, pp. 124-125). Hence, focused interviews 
helped to establish an understanding of the values and views of selected NGO 
members, regarding mining practices and public participation in EIAs.  
6.4.3 Document analysis 
Various documents were collected during the fieldwork. Document analysis was 
used because it helped me compare my understanding of events and topics with 
those recorded in documents, and it ―situate[d] contemporary accounts within an 
historical context‖ (May, 2001, p. 175).  
As this study covers a wide range of disciplines and issues, I needed various 
documents from different sources. The main documents related to mining and 
environmental issues, EIA processes and reports, and the activities of NGOs on 
mining-related environmental and social matters.  
6.4.4 Participatory observation 
In order to understand interviewees‘ views and gain an understanding of mining, 
EIAs, and NGOs, participatory observation was employed as well as interviews. 
Researchers often use interview and observation methods together as ―observation 
guides us to some of the important questions we want to ask the respondent, and 
interviewing helps us to interpret the significance of what we are observing‖ 
(Whyte, 1984, cited in May, 2001, p. 159). The observations noted ―body 
language and other gestural cues that lend meaning to the words of the persons 
being interviewed‖, and to ―learn things that people would be unwilling to talk 
about‖ during interviews (Patton, 2002, p. 263). Direct observation during 
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interviews helped reveal interviewees‘ intentions, feelings and attitudes towards 
issues of concern.  
Participatory observation also helped to understand the politics and competing 
interests that surround mining and EIAs. Observation is commonly used in social 
research to gain a deeper understanding of social life. Due to time
61
 and funding 
constraints, I could not conduct more in-depth participatory research in certain 
organisations, such as the MNET in the EIA study and the two NGO case-studies. 
Rather, I acted as a participant-as-observer as defined by Gold (1969). This role 
emphasises the researcher‘s ―desire to know and understand more from people 
within the setting‖, rather than attempting to act ―as one of the group studied‖ 
(May, 2001, p. 156). Observations supplemented evidence from interviews and 
documents, especially about the context of issues and relations between EIA 
constituents. 
Fieldnotes were constantly taken during fieldwork. They helped to highlight 
particular events and my reflections on them; provided analytic notes regarding 
rules, roles, and relationships between participants; helped formulate further 
questions and events for further in-depth investigation (May, 2001, pp. 160-161); 
and they were helpful for tracing ―a chronological overview of the decisions made 
and how they guided future actions‖ of the research (Boeije, 2010, p. 70).   
In addition to fieldnotes, research-generated visual data were also gathered. 
‗Visual data‘ refers to ―the recording, analysis and communication of social life 
through photographs, film and video‖ (Harper, 2007). Using such data to promote 
a pluralist dialogic accounting is encouraged by researchers, as visual data provide 
material to develop research arguments (Brown, 2010; Söderbaum & Brown, 
2010).  
Memos on theory and methodology were written during the entire PhD study. 
Theory memos illustrate how findings are derived from the data, and ―form an 
intermediate step between analysing the data – in particular coding – and the 
                                               
61 According to my PhD scholarship terms and conditions, I was allowed to visit to Mongolia only 
once, for up to 6 months, to conduct fieldwork.   
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reporting phase‖ (Boeije, 2010, p. 70). Methodology memos helped me to reflect 
on my methods. They were useful during data analysis and for writing up the 
thesis, as they traced the constant evolvement of the methodological framework 
and my reflections on theory and practice. 
The next section discusses how these methods were used, what was collected and 
from where, and difficulties encountered during the fieldwork. 
6.5 Data collection 
6.5.1 Interviews 
a. How were interviews collected?   
Before going to Mongolia, I made a list of potential interviewees from key 
government institutions, international organisations, mining companies, EIA 
companies and domestic environmental NGOs. The list considered their relevance 
to the research questions and their accessibility. Consent forms, proposed 
interview questions, and an information sheet in English were approved by the 
Human Ethics Committee (HEC) of Victoria University of Wellington. The 
information sheets and consent forms were then translated into Mongolian.    
Once in Mongolia, I met each interviewee twice. During the first meeting, I 
introduced the study, provided an information sheet and consent form, and 
explained my research and how the interview would be conducted. On receiving 
the interviewee‘s approval, an appointment for the second meeting was made. No 
potential interviewee refused to be interviewed, possibly because of their interest
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in the study and the ethical assurances in the information sheet and consent form. 
Interviewees had an option to be anonymous. Most interviewees, except for a few 
local environmental NGOs, preferred this.  
During the second meeting, interviewees were asked to complete and sign the 
consent form. I digitally recorded all interviews. At the end of each interview, 
                                               
62  Issues related to mining, its impacts and environmental NGOs are current ‗hot‘ topics in 
Mongolia.  
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each interviewee was asked for suggestions of other potential interviewees with a 
direct interest in and/or experience of the topics under scrutiny; some made 
recommendations and introduced other interviewees. As a result of this ‗snow-ball‘ 
method, more interviewees from different groups of stakeholders emerged during 
the fieldwork, most of whom were met.  
Although NGO interviewees had unstructured interviews, I initiated conversation 
and gently nudged them towards issues of special interest. During all interviews, I 
endeavoured to be attentive and interactive to gain a more comprehensive 
understanding of the interviewees‘ perspectives, views, and interpretations. As 
Boeije (2010) puts it, ―during the interview it is paramount that the interviewer to 
some degree accommodates the participant‘s need to spend more time on certain 
issues, listens with interest, and does not interrupt the flow‖ (p. 63). During the 
semi-structured interview of experts, mining companies, and international 
organisations, the principal questions approved by the HEC were asked, but with 
sufficient flexibility to allow interviewees to discuss other related issues they 
considered relevant.   
b. What was collected? 
The main determinants of the number of interviews were time, cost, and 
accessibility of interviewees. Initially, 24 interviews were planned, given my 
limited time, availability, and uncertainty of accessibility. Also transcribing, 
translating and analysing interviews are time-consuming and costly processes 
(Holstein & Gubrium, 2004), and gaining consents from interviewees was 
uncertain before the fieldwork began. However, during the fieldwork the number 
of interviews increased to 43, due to more potential interviewees being identified; 
all were willing to give interviews. I actively sought additional interviews in the 
belief that more could provide richer and more informed data.   
In total, 43 interviews were made from seven different groups of EIA constituents: 
EIA companies; government organisations, such as the MNET and the SSIA; 
international organisations or projects with a focus on mining and the natural 
environment; mining companies; local herders; domestic environmental NGOs; 
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and researchers with interests in mining and local development. Following the 
classification in 5.3.3 of Chapter 5, these groups were categorised as experts or 
non-experts.   
Interviews lasted, on average, about 50 minutes. The duration depended on an 
interviewee‘s time, willingness to talk, understanding or experience of the 
research-related issues, and personal characteristics
63
. The following table gives 
demographic details of interviewees. 
Table 4. Demographic details of interviews 
Stakeholder groups Number 
a. Experts 13 
1. EIA companies 6 
2. Government organisations including 7 
Ministry of Nature Environment and Tourism 
(MNET)  
4 
State Specialised Inspection Agency (SSIA) 2 
Ministry of Energy and Minerals 1 
b. Non-experts 30 
3. Mining companies including  3 
Mongolian domestic mining companies 2 
Foreign mining company 1 
4. International organisations and projects 8 
5. Local herders 3 
Local herders 3 
6. NGOs 14 
Local people initiated environmental NGOs 6 
Domestic NGOs (responsible mining, human 
right and other social issues) 
5 
NGO coalitions 2 
Business interest-oriented NGO 1 
7. Researchers 2 
Legal researcher 1 
Australian PhD student in Mongolia 1 
Total number of interviews 43 
Total hours of interviews 34 hours 31 minutes 38 seconds 
Average duration of interview (min) 48 minutes 27 seconds 
Number of interviews lasted up to 35 minutes 13 
Number of interviews lasted more than 35 
minutes 
30 
                                               
63 For example, I noticed that male interviewees of government organisations, mining and EIA 
companies were less talkative and more formal. This might relate to the hierarchical cultural 
tradition and a Mongolian male stereotype of being less talkative.  
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All interviews were digitally recorded and stored in a file format of Windows 
Media Audio.  
c. What difficulties were encountered? 
Although all interviewees were supportive, I was aware of some scepticism and 
suspicion among interviewees, possibly because mining and environmental issues 
are controversial and stakeholders have differing views and interests. Some 
interviewees were careful when giving interviews, and I was concerned that they 
may have viewed me as a ‗spy‘ from mining companies (for NGO interviewees) 
or from NGOs (for interviewees from mining companies). However, this was 
understandable and expected, given the lack of trust among mining constituents 
and the political sensitivity of mining-related environmental issues. I endeavoured 
to overcome such mistrust by being honest about the study and by actively 
engaging in their activities when necessary
64
. 
In five instances this suspicion resulted in delayed interview meetings. In these 
cases, I explained my research interests more fully and issued gentle reminders to 
them. Ultimately, all gave interviews; the longest waiting period was five months.  
Difficulties occurred during interviewing; sometimes interviewees provided too 
much irrelevant information or very brief answers. Some NGO interviewees, 
mostly female, appeared more relaxed about discussing issues and would digress 
to fresh issues
65
; a gentle reminder about the initial question was necessary for 
them return to it. Other interviewees, mostly from government organisations, 
mining companies and EIA companies, tended to answer briefly or give a ‗fuzzy‘ 
answer; they were then asked to provide more precise information and evidence, 
or were asked more questions for clarification, or the question was returned to 
later. Some interviewees may have provided brief answers because mining and 
environmental issues in Mongolia are politically sensitive, and officials tend to be 
careful when expressing views on them.  
                                               
64 See part B of 6.5.3 Participatory observation for an example. 
65 For example, if the question was about mining in local regions, some talked more about city 
issues and the debate about education and mining projects debated in the capital city.    
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6.5.2 Documents 
a. How were documents collected?   
Although some reports and legislation were downloaded from the Internet before 
the fieldwork began, many documents were not available through the Internet as 
e-governance is still in its infancy in Mongolia; however, most government 
organisations have their own websites. To obtain updated information and 
documents, I gained access to the parliamentary library, the Mongolian Central 
Library, the library of the National Legal Institution, the library of the National 
Scientific Park, and the library of the Open Society Forum.  
Visits were also made to the MNET, the Ministry of Energy and Resources, the 
SSIA, and some international NGOs, international projects, and television studios, 
to obtain documents and video materials on mining and environmental issues.  
b. What was collected? 
About 200 documents were collected, including reports from government 
institutions, international donor organisations and various projects; legislative 
documents; publications of NGOs and other institutions; video materials produced 
by television channels in cooperation with international projects and NGOs; and 
organisational documents of the Onggi River Movement NGO. These were 
obtained from libraries, the Internet, the press, NGOs, and personal contacts.   
c. What difficulties were encountered? 
Finding relevant documents and reports was not easy. In some cases, personal 
contacts were necessary to access sources. Bureaucracy of government 
organisations and librarians posed the main difficulties. Also, many documents 
were unavailable because EIAs, mining-related environmental issues, and 
environmental NGOs are relatively new phenomena in Mongolia. 
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Access to the parliamentary library was difficult – I waited three weeks to obtain 
the one-week access permission
66
. The objective was to obtain EIA related 
legislation and archival materials on parliamentary debates during 1998 and 2001, 
when the EIA law and amendments were passed. However, few archival 
documents on parliamentary debates existed. Taking notes and photocopying 
relevant materials was difficult due to limited time
67
, place
68
 and photocopy 
restrictions.         
It was extremely difficult to access EIA reports and related official documents, 
although the law permits access to information (The State Great Khural of 
Mongolia 1995, Section 7). I attempted to see EIA reports and had submitted a 
written request to the Ministry, describing the research interest and desire to view 
these reports. I also attempted to set up an appointment with a government officer 
in charge of EIA reports. A week after the written request was made, the head of 
the EIA related department advised me to meet with an officer in charge of EIAs, 
but she had a strict, bureaucratic approach and denied me the opportunity to view 
the EIA reports.  
In sum, finding useful documents and statistics for this study was difficult due to 
the unavailability of such information, bureaucracy, and the state secrecy mindset 
held by government organisation employees.      
6.5.3 Participatory observation 
a. How was participatory observation conducted? 
Given my limited time-frame and funding, I conducted participatory observation, 
rather than participatory action research in specific organisations. This fieldwork 
had a participatory aspect but was not in-depth. However, I was open to 
                                               
66 I needed another permission for specific archival materials from the parliamentary archive. I 
waited a week for the signature of the Secretary of the Parliament for my written request, 
identifying the documents I wished to see from the archive office.  
67 Mostly, I visited the parliamentary building for only 2-3 hours during workdays of one week. 
An applicant to the parliamentary library is allowed to visit one week only and archival materials 
related to research interests were available only between 2-5pm on weekdays.  
68 Archival materials were only allowed to be viewed in front of the head of archive department, 
who shared his office with another staff member. The workspace was small and inconvenient, due 
to constant interruption by the frequent visits of parliamentary staff to the archive office.     
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participating in any mining-related forum, conference, and event for the purpose 
of meeting mining constituents and to gather information about mining 
development and environmental issues. I also endeavoured to make close contact 
with some NGOs and other organisations so as to learn about their activities and 
understand their views on mining and the environment. 
I participated in various meetings, conferences, and gatherings organised by 
mining constituents, including: two conferences on mining investment and the 
South Gobi mining development, organised by the Mining Association and the 
World Bank respectively; the annual ―Mining and Rehabilitation‖ seminar, 
organised by the ―Mining and the Environment‖ project69; several visits to the 
Onggi River Movement NGO; three attendances at monthly board meetings of the 
United Movements of Mongolian Rivers and Lakes (UMMRL) NGO; some press 
conferences and discussions organised by domestic NGOs on Oyu Tolgoi mining 
project
70
; and a hunger strike
71
 organised by the UMMRL NGO to accelerate 
parliamentary debate on a new law prohibiting mining and exploration at the 
beginning of river resources and forest reservoirs.  
To observe mining practices first-hand, I briefly visited three local areas, each 
lasting one day or more. They included the Erdenet mining company in Orkhon 
aimag, Zaamar soum in Tuv aimag and Uyanga soum in Uvurhangai aimag
72
. 
These two areas are ‗infamous‘ places where unrehabilitated land and dried-up 
large rivers have occurred due to both legal and illegal gold mining operations. I 
interviewed two herders from each soum. The herder families who lived in or near 
mining sites were randomly chosen. During the short interviews with herders, it 
became evident that their families had lived in each soum for about ten years or 
                                               
69 This is a joint project of the Mongolian and German governments. The project focuses on the 
SSIA.  
70 Oyu Tolgoi copper mining project has been one of the ‗hottest‘ topics since 2004. Ivanhoe 
Mining (Canadian gold mining company), which owns the licence, spent five years negotiating a 
stability agreement with the Mongolian government. The agreement was signed in September 
2009. Domestic NGOs often protested against the agreement as they see the agreement and its 
process as contrary to the best interests of the Mongolian public.    
71 I had brief interviews with hunger strikers, including three herders from Khentii aimag – the 
most recent local area to have mining activities and protests against mining.  
72 The Erdenet mining company is located 373km from the capital city. Zaamar and Uyanga soums 
are 230km and 500km from the capital city. 
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more and had experienced the mining boom from its outset. I gained greater 
personal insights from these visits, which helped me to confirm or reject some 
views and arguments circulated by the press and mining constituents, based in the 
capital.       
I had the opportunity to observe the rehabilitation processes of two mining 
companies during the fourth ―Mining and Rehabilitation‖ seminar organised 
among mining constituents, which included domestic and international NGOs 
interested in mining. This was organised by the SSIA and the German 
government-funded project called ―Mining and Environment‖. The seminar was 
semi-formal and held outside the city. During the first two days, senior-ranking 
government officials, academics, mining company managers, and international 
experts made fifteen presentations. These covered a wide range of issues, 
including mining development, implementation of mining laws, and water and 
rehabilitation related issues faced by the Mongolian mining sector. Each 
presentation was followed by an open-microphone session, which allowed the 50 
participants to ask questions and discuss practical issues. On the third day, all 
participants visited Baganuur and Nalaikh coal mining companies and were 
shown the rehabilitation practices on mining sites. During this seminar, I was able 
to discuss informally my research with some academics and mining managers.  
Regular visits to the UMMRL NGO formed a major part of the participatory 
observation. The NGO was chosen because of its interest in recent years in 
mining-related environmental issues, and the plurality of its organisational 
structure. The UMMRL is a coalition NGO of local environmental movements, 
including the Onggi River Movement NGO – a major focus of this study. During 
informal visits to the NGO, I spent days talking with members to familiarise 
myself with their activities and to study their archival materials. Sometimes NGO 
staff contacted me when there was a meeting or activity that might be of interest.   
Besides fieldnotes and memos, I collected some visual data, including mining-
related brochures, posters, NGO newspapers, e-newspapers of the UMMRL NGO, 
and photos. Photographs were taken during the hunger-strike of the UMMRL 
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NGO
73
, fieldtrips to Erdenet, Zaamar and Uyanga soums, and participation in the 
fourth ―Mining and Rehabilitation‖ seminar, as visual evidence for this study.     
b. What difficulties were encountered? 
Although it was not difficult to access the UMMRL NGO, initially there was 
suspicion from its staff and members. This was understandable given the highly 
political and controversial nature of their activities, which focus on negative 
mining-related environmental and social impacts. There had been fear among 
local NGOs since the riot of 1 July 2008. To gain access and build trust, I visited 
the UMMRL NGO weekly or fortnightly, depending on my availability. I had 
informal discussions with NGO staff and members, helped them to translate some 
materials, acted as an interpreter during their meetings with some voluntary 
international researchers and interested parties, took photos during their hunger-
strike for their archival use, and expressed sympathy for occasions such as the 
hunger-strike.    
Fieldtrips to mining regions presented difficulties, such as financing them, finding 
reliable drivers who knew local roads, and safety considerations. Due to my safety 
concerns as a female researcher with limited funding, I visited the three mining 
regions one day for each. Such short visits were insufficient to gain an in-depth 
understanding or for interviewing enough local people, but each visit nonetheless 
provided valuable local insights on mining practices.    
I also managed to overcome difficulties for participating in the three-day fourth 
―Mining and Rehabilitation‖ seminar. Participation proved challenging due to the 
limited number and expensive invitations for participants. However, I helped 
project managers to prepare and organise the seminar, and in return they allowed 
me to participate as an organiser. The seminar provided an excellent opportunity 
                                               
73  Six NGO members declared a hunger-strike on 4 July 2009. Three of the strikers were 
interviewees of this study and one was the leader of the Onggi River Movement NGO. The 
purpose of the strike was to put pressure on parliamentary members to pass the law ‗To prohibit 
mineral exploration and mining operation at headwaters of rivers, protected zones and water 
reservoir and forested areas‘, which was circulated among MPs for one year. The hunger strike 
was supported by a further 20 environmental NGOs and ended on 9 July with success. The law 
was passed on 16 July 2009.   
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to experience mining rehabilitation practices on mining sites, to meet various 
people, such as mining managers, academics, and officials, and to gather up-to-
date information on mining issues.   
6.6 Data analysis 
6.6.1 Interview analysis 
Analysis of interviews occurred in several steps, namely preparing interviews in 
an analysable manner, then organising, coding, and analysing them. First, I 
personally transcribed all interviews, so as to avoid losing the meaning of 
interviewees‘ gestures, expressing their intentions and perspectives, which would 
otherwise have been lost in a verbatim transcription by another person. Five 
interviews were in English, so did not need translation, and were therefore only 
transcribed. Thirty-eight interviewees in Mongolian were transcribed in 
Mongolian, making it easier for me to refer to original transcripts when necessary.  
Second, a three-to-five page summary of each interview was written after careful 
reading of interviews. These endeavoured not to exclude any points and examples 
raised in the original interviews. However, if there were repetitions of ideas, they 
were summarised as one. All interviews also had memos, recalling my reflections 
on each interviewee. These included the main points raised in each interview, and 
gestures and intentions of interviewees noted during direct observation. Third, all 
summaries were translated into English, which was important and helpful for later 
data analysis and writing-up of findings. 
Fourth, a Word document of 197 pages was created combining all summaries.  
This enabled me to examine all summaries without accessing individual summary 
files.  
Fifth, another Word file, titled Coded interview summaries‖, was created to put 
documents in a manageable classification form, as the first step of analysis (Patton, 
2002). This file was one version of the combined file, but all sentences and 
paragraphs were organised and grouped according to codes. I endeavoured to be 
flexible with coding, using two general types of coding. One group consisted of 
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ten codes, according to eight principles of the analytical framework, described in 
Chapter 5. The second group consisted of sixteen general themes, based on those 
most frequently mentioned by interviewees. These free codes were titled as 
follows: Mongolian specific features, cultural framework of Mongolians, mining 
practice (including positive and negative impacts), responsible mining
74
 
(interviewees‘ interpretations of this term), other EIA related issues (main points 
not included in the first group of codes), rehabilitation practice, rehabilitation cost, 
ecological destruction assessment, legislative environment, politicisation, 
corruption, ministerial liaison, NGO sector (including the status quo, and 
appraisal and criticism of NGOs), democracy, foreign influence, and 
accountability. To assist with tracing back to original interviews, each sentence or 
extracted part was associated with the name of interviewees and its time indicated 
in minutes and seconds. 
Sixth, the empirical chapters were prepared from the coded file, memos of 
observations, and documents collected during the fieldwork. To prepare data 
analysis of parts with specific codes in the empirical chapters, I read all pages 
relating to that code. All the main points were then placed in logical order to 
create a story. This was like rearranging the elements of a puzzle to form a picture.   
6.6.2 Document analysis 
A qualitative content analysis enabled me to critically analyse documents and the 
political, social and economic contexts of meaning production (Willis, 2007). All 
documents, including reports, publications, newspaper articles, posters and e-
newspapers were organised into file folders according to their context. This 
analysis provided flexibility and allowed me to consider how meanings were 
constructed, developed, and employed (May, 2001, p. 193).  
Interviews and documents were similarly coded according to the analytical 
framework and free codes. If arguments and views did not match interview codes, 
                                               
74 The term ‗responsible mining‘ started to be widely used in 2006. This term is compatible with 
the term of ‗sustainable and participatory mining‘ in this study, because responsible mining covers 
both sustainable development and participatory decision-making in mining (RMI, 2009)    
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then new codes were created. However, not many extra codes were needed. After 
coding, all the main documents were entered into the EndNote X3 referencing 
programme. This was useful for citations while writing the thesis and helped to 
filter searches for related documents. All useful documents were entered with 
keywords and notes. A research note on each document briefly described its main 
points, indicated useful sentences or evidence for citation, and provided 
suggestions for which chapters and arguments might apply.  
As the notes included page numbers of useful citations and the main arguments, I 
could easily trace them back to documents and use them during the writing 
process. When carrying out the data analysis, documents were mainly used as 
supporting evidence for interview analyses. Documents helped provide evidence 
and statistics not obtainable in interviews.        
6.6.3 Issues in data analysis 
Initially, the NVivo 8 software was used to organise all interviews. After two 
months using the software, I decided it was better to code manually, due to the 
inconvenience of the software. It needed many files for data analysis, making it 
difficult to examine all simultaneously. Also, coding was problematic, as one 
sentence could cover many different areas and codes. I therefore decided it was 
preferable to use a Microsoft Word document to code manually in order to gain a 
fuller picture.     
It was very time-consuming to transcribe all the interviews myself. Consequently, 
transcription took longer than expected. As there were 38 interviews in Mongolian, 
lasting in total 30 hours and 25 minutes, it was not feasible to translate all into 
English. The time restriction of my PhD scholarship allowed only six months for 
transcribing and translating interviews (while also having to attend to other 
aspects of the study).  
6.7 Concluding comments 
This chapter has outlined the research design used. The research objectives and 
questions were developed from the literature review chapters and the conceptual 
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framework. The qualitative case-studies, using interviews, document analysis, and 
participatory observation, has been justified with regards to its relevance and 
usefulness for this study. The results inform the following two empirical chapters 
on EIA practices in Mongolia and the potential of dialogic EIAs and NGOs for 
promoting a dialogic approach to sustainable and participatory mining. 
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Chapter 7: MONGOLIAN EIA PRACTICE 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter analyses the empirical data on Mongolian EIA practice and is 
organised as follows: first, the nature and context of existing EIAs are discussed, 
including the situation prior to the introduction of EIAs, how the EIA process 
operates, and constituent perspectives  on it; second, the empirical data are 
analysed, using the framework developed in Chapter 5 regarding whether EIA 
practices are monologic or dialogic; third, the potential of dialogic EIAs to 
address the deficiencies of monologic EIAs is discussed; fourth, how to make the 
transition from monologic to dialogic EIAs is examined; and lastly, the limitations 
of a dialogic transformation are discussed, as well as the danger of creating a new 
type of monologism and how EIA constituents could benefit from such an EIA 
transformation.      
7.2 EIAs in Mongolia 
7.2.1 The prior situation  
Large-scale mining in Mongolia was not developed until the late 1960s, due to 
Mongolia‘s nomadic culture, its isolation from the rest of the world, its lack of 
mining knowledge and demand for a mining industry, and the absence of 
industrialisation.  
Environmental protection and a sustainable way of living had been core values of 
nomadic life for centuries. Given that the main source of living for nomads is 
herding animals
75
, nomads are dependent on the natural environment. Thus, 
environmental protection has been reflected in Mongolian legislation, tradition, 
culture, religion and social norms. The Secret History of the Mongols
76
 recorded 
                                               
75 Mongolia has five types of herding animals: sheep, goats, cows, horses and two-hump camels in 
the South Gobi.  
76 An unknown author wrote The Secret History of the Mongols in 1228. The book introduced the 
genealogy of Genghis Khan (or Chinggis Khaan in Mongolian) and the rise to prosperity of the 
Mongolian Empire. Although it contains folklore and poetry, it remains the principal historical 
source on Mongolia at that period.   
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in the thirteenth century that Genghis Khan had promulgated rules for 
environmental and animal protection that prohibited Mongolians from polluting 
water resources, digging land, and hunting animals during their reproductive 
periods (Unknown, 1228). Such practices reflected the nomad philosophy of 
―father sky and mother earth‖ and shaman belief in the existence of spirits for 
every natural element, such as rivers, lakes, mountains, steppes, trees and land, 
and to this day Mongolians perform a special ritual to obtain the permission of 
‗mother earth‘ if they wish to dig land for special purposes, such as for buildings 
or for burial. Nomadic life has necessitated that herders be self-sufficient; they 
still minimise the waste of any natural resource. Mongolians claim there is no 
waste from animals: they use the milk for milk products, skin for clothes, bones 
for home utensils, toys and buttons, and faeces are used for fuel, for building 
animal shelters, and natural incense is used to protect herded animals against 
mosquitoes and flies; and all meat and organs are eaten.  That no mining occurred 
in Mongolia until the twentieth-century
77
 was partly because digging land was 
taboo, and the self-sufficient life style, nomadic culture and philosophy of 
Mongolians did not encourage large-scale mining. As well, Mongolia is isolated 
from other countries and sandwiched between Russia and China, neither of which 
became industrialised until the twentieth-century. 
However, the communist period from 1921 brought fundamental social, economic 
and cultural changes. The state promoted industrialisation, especially through 
heavy industries including the mining of coal, copper and building materials to 
accelerate communist development, and provide exports of energy, minerals and 
construction materials to meet the ever increasing demands of the USSR and other 
communist countries (Griffin, 1995). The establishment of state-owned mining 
companies during the 1960s and 1970s brought a growing number of mining-
based cities and towns, such as Erdenet
78
 and Nalaikh. At the time, religion and 
                                               
77 Anecdotal evidence suggests that in the 19th century during the Qing Dynasty domination in 
Mongolia, there were a few small-scale illegal mines operated by Chinese immigrants. Mongolians 
had also conducted some small-scale mining of silver, gold and other precious stones for jewellery 
and home utensils.   
78 Erdenet is the third largest city in Mongolia. Its main income generator and employer is the 
Erdenet copper mining company.  
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nomadic culture was considered old-fashioned and anti-communist, and thus 
strictly prohibited.  
The state encouraged rapid development of agriculture and mining, but 
environmental protection and mining rehabilitation were not carefully considered. 
Mongolians remained silent about their tradition of environmental protection for 
fear of accusation of being labelled enemies of communism and for being old-
fashioned. Thus, people were ―blind‖ to mining-related environmental issues 
during the communist period; at the time, mining companies were state-owned 
and no-one could protest against them (Interview D1)
79
. 
Since the mid-1990s, especially after the government ‗Gold Programme‘ and the 
1997 Mineral Law, mining has boomed in Mongolia. As section 2.2.3 in Chapter 
2 discussed, mining attracted huge international and domestic interest and has 
been regarded as a major determinant of Mongolian economic development, 
resulting in widespread mining exploration and operations in almost every region. 
Figure 5 shows a map of exploration and mining licences issued by the mining 
authority.  
Figure 5. Major operating mines and mineral deposits 
 
Source: Rheinbraun Engineering und Wasser GMBH (2003) ―Review of the Environmental and 
Social Policies and Practices for Mining in Mongolia‖ (World Bank, 2006, p. 8) 
                                               
79 See Appendix on page 343 for an explanation of interviewee codes.  
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However, this Figure is controversial as other sources suggest different numbers 
of licences and mining operations
80
. There are no officially agreed statistics and 
maps regarding mining licences, mineral deposits, and mines: the collection of 
such statistics is an on-going process. 
Environmental protection legislation was passed at the time of mining growth and 
development. Parliament established an environmental management system and 
associated tools, such as the EIA, but it was not until 2006 that the environmental 
and social consequences of mining became widely discussed in society, which 
gradually increased public awareness and public debate. Today, the EIA and its 
associated environmental protection and monitoring plans are the main 
management tools for regulating mineral exploration and operations, and for 
preventing or reducing their negative environmental and social impacts. 
7.2.2 What has worked and what has not 
The Mongolian EIA framework has been gradually developed since 1998, and 
EIAs are today conducted for major development projects concerning 
infrastructure, construction, mining, and tourism. The framework clearly identifies 
EIA constituents as: the Ministry in charge of EIAs, private assessment companies, 
project developers (mining companies for mining projects), local authorities, the 
government inspection organisation, and local communities (see section 3.2.2 of 
Chapter 3 for details of the environmental legislative framework, EIA procedures 
and an overview of the EIA for mining).  
The EIA, as a new environmental management tool in Mongolia, required new 
institutional arrangements and capacity building for training EIA professionals. 
With supervision from the ADB, the EIA was introduced to the MNET in 1994 
and the Ministry then prepared the first EIA (ADB, 2005). Given the booming 
mining industry and other sectors with potential environmental impacts, it became 
evident that the Ministry did not have the financial and human capacity to conduct 
EIAs (Interview B1). The EIA law (1998) separated roles and responsibilities 
                                               
80  For example, maps provided by the government organisations sometimes differ from maps 
produced by NGOs. This is discussed more in Chapter 8.  
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(Interview B2), so as to ensure the independence of an EIA assessor, approver and 
controller. The law states that a legal business entity with an EIA licence should 
conduct EIAs, while the MNET should make the final decision concerning 
approval or rejection (Article 4 and 9). Today, 83 EIA companies conduct EIAs 
for mining and other projects. Mining projects account for 30 percent of total 
EIAs (MNET, 2009a, 2009b). The law was amended in 2001 to incorporate public 
participation
81
 in EIAs (The State Great Khural of Mongolia, 1998).  
The EIA framework has had both successes and challenges. EIA law is 
acknowledged as being is relatively good (Interview A2, B5, F8); most 
interviewees, even NGO interviewees who had not been engaged in EIAs, knew 
about the EIA and when it should be conducted. The EIA has become a well-
known environmental management tool. An EIA expert claimed that the chief 
achievement of the last decade was that everyone understood that EIAs should be 
undertaken before relevant projects and that they ―provided some understanding 
for people on how to protect and use natural resources effectively with 
consideration for the mitigation of negative impacts‖ (Interview A5, 00:17:28-2). 
However, the absence of a clear regulatory mechanism hinders the practical 
application of legislation (Interview D5) which has led to poor implementation of 
the EIA and mining laws (Interview D1).   
Many difficulties are caused by the lack of professional knowledge, expertise, and 
institutions. Study of documents and interviews reveal that the quality and 
implementation of EIAs for mining are problematic. Often considered technical 
issues, such as how they are conducted, what is included, and how they are 
implemented, the quality and inclusiveness of EIAs also reflect conflicting 
perspectives on mining and environmental issues by EIA constituents. Arguably, 
these differences ought to be brought into the open and discussed, as they 
influence ways of thinking, behaving and arguing about EIAs and mining. 
Although different perspectives are invariably not explicit, they were implied 
during interviews and in documents, and were apparent from personal observation.         
                                               
81 Detailed discussion on public participation of EIA practice will be introduced in section 7.3.  
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7.2.3 Different perspectives among constituents  
Four different sets of opinions in this study are relevant to mining development, 
its benefits, mining-related environmental issues, and mining rehabilitation. Each 
is discussed below: 
 Mining development: ‘source of growth’ versus ‘fear of mining’:  
Proponents of mining claim that the chief source of growth for mineral-rich LDCs 
is mining development (World Bank, 2004; World Growth, 2008) as well as a 
favourable mining environment that attracts greater foreign direct investment to 
mining and related sectors such as infrastructure, which will generate increased 
income, tax revenue, and lower unemployment (World Bank, 2007). Given such a 
viewpoint, Mongolia should begin to mine its large mineral deposits, as China – 
one of the world‘s largest mineral consumers – has a huge demand for coal, 
copper and other minerals due to its rapid growth (World Growth, 2008); as well, 
state intervention for a liberal economy should be minimal, with regulation of 
mining development based on the global and national market demand and supply 
for minerals (Fraser Insititute, 2007). Most international organisations, members 
of parliament, government officials, economists, mining companies and EIA 
companies support such mining development. Some interviewees said ―it is 
difficult to see a Mongolian future without mining, and we need to live by using 
our land and its deposits‖ (Interview A6, B7, D1).  
However, some mining constituents, particularly environmental and social NGOs 
and some local communities, oppose mining, believing that it is not ―the right way‖ 
for Mongolian development (Interview F3, 00:11:49-0). An NGO interviewee 
expressed his deep-green view against mining by quoting a Mongolian proverb 
―Gold is dangerous and can take over people‘s lives‖ (Interview F1). Between 
these two extreme viewpoints lies a third view on mining development: four 
interviewees argued that it would be better to mine only a few large deposits and 
not allow the spread of small and medium mining enterprises throughout the 
country, as currently occurs. An NGO interviewee stated that ―we need only a few 
large mining projects to promote the export of final products (processed metals)‖ 
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to add more value to the economy (Interview F11). ―Once we have a few large 
mining companies there would be service and other small industries based in 
mining areas‖ (Interview F8, 00:10:39-5). These views opposing a booming 
mining industry relate not only to the fear of being left without mineral resources 
in the near future, but also to the violation of traditional nomadic, cultural beliefs 
that to dig land is not acceptable (Jachid & Hyer, 1979). 
These conflicting views are evident in public debate in the press and television 
programmes. However, the concept of ―responsible mining‖, developed since 
2007, endeavours to incorporate sustainability and cultural aspects into mining 
practice. Discussion among mining constituents confirms a ―consensus‖ that 
mining is important to Mongolian development and its future (Interview D6, F9). 
Given Mongolia‘s lack of mining tradition and experience, unlike many countries 
in Latin America, the chief question is ―how can we use this non-renewable 
resource to develop sustainably by creating renewable [economic] resources‖ 
(Interview F9, 00:14:43). Arguably, Mongolians are on the cusp of mutiny 
(Interview D6, 00:02:12-08) and must decide how to develop mining in a 
sustainable way. 
 Mining benefits: 
The distribution of mining benefits is a major issue of contention. Supporters of 
mining argue that mining can benefit the economy through increased tax revenue, 
employment, local development and social welfare of local regions (through 
investment to hospitals, local secondary schools etc.). However, opponents argue 
that mining benefits can neither benefit the national economy nor local 
development. They claim instead that mining companies enjoy tax holidays, avoid 
taxes, and because they employ mostly foreign personnel – often Chinese workers 
– few employment benefits flow to local regions and Mongolians in general 
(Interview A2, D5, F1, F3, G1). Moreover, they argue that the benefits of mining 
investment flow mainly abroad. One NGO interviewee claimed that the only 
benefit to the Mongolian economy from mining was from the petrol consumption 
of mining companies (Interview F8). Even if mining companies employ local 
people, they pay the lowest wage and use temporary contracts that allow 
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employees to be dismissed without justification (Interview F7, 00:18:59-4). Thus, 
foreign investors ―take our capital, rather than invest in us‖ (Interview F8, 
00:16:52-2). Another NGO interviewee confirmed this, citing an example from 
her local region where a Chinese mining company had a licence to operate for 27 
years; in the first four years of operation it had not built roads, paid full royalty 
taxes, or provided benefits to local communities as promised in contracts 
(Interview F4, 00:02:11-4 P2).  
However, the lack of economic benefits from mining relates to weak governance 
and legislation that fails to take account of the advantages and disadvantages of 
mining development. Poor governance in mining has precipitated social and 
environmental issues that, although not yet fully apparent or scientifically proven, 
have provoked debate among mining constituents. 
 Environmental issues: 
Due to both legal and illegal mining, the natural environment in many regions has 
deteriorated, and water and soil have been polluted. Until 2006, the environmental 
effects of mining were not visible and hence not addressed by mining constituents. 
An overemphasis on the economic benefits of the 1993 ‗Gold Programme‘ and the 
Mineral Law 1997 contributed to poorly managed mining in Mongolia (Interview 
D5, F7, F8). These regulations failed to consider the environment or to define 
clear mechanisms for reaping mining benefits with less environmental harm 
(Interview F7, F9). Consequently, local communities and the natural environment 
have become ―victims of poor mining‖ (Interview A1, F8). The photos below 
show environmental destruction in two mining regions.    
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These photos were taken in the Zaamar and Uyanga soums: the left photo shows mining tailings 
and water usage; the right photo shows the environmental degradation caused by legal and illegal 
mining. 
In the left photo, a mining company had diverted the river flow to its mining site 
and then discharged processed water back into the river. In the right photo, the 
once beautiful, fertile pasture of Uyanga soum has become a ―borderless‖ site for 
legal and illegal miners. Illegal miners came to live near small and medium 
mining companies, and local residents claimed the area was no longer available 
for local use as pasture land for herders (Interview E2, F6).     
Mining constituents present conflicting views on the causes of environmental 
degradation. Supporters of mining argue that it is not caused by mining, 
operations but is the result of global warming and overgrazing in local regions 
(Interview A6, C1, C2, D2). They identify illegal miners as the guilty party with 
respect to digging, not rehabilitating land, and polluting the water and soil, as they 
use mercury to wash out gold from ore-bearing soil (Interview D1, D5, C2). 
  
The above photos, taken in Uyanga soum, show illegal mining operations. 
Mongolia has more than 100,000 illegal miners, ranging from small children to 70 
year old men. The right-hand photo shows a hole dug by an illegal miner; ore-
bearing soil is excavated from 20 to 40 metre deep holes and fine gold fragments 
are then washed out, using gravity and mercury (World Bank, 2006).  
On the other hand, critics of mining argue that both the poor state of the economy 
and mining companies have created this situation. Most mining companies use 
out-dated equipment to cut their costs, with the result that 30 to 40 percent of 
gold-bearing tailings remains unprocessed in legal mining (Interview A4); this 
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attracts illegal miners who do not rehabilitate the land (Interview B7, C1, D5). 
Gold mining is also heavily criticised for its environmental impacts. As gold 
deposits are mostly located along rivers, mining operations ―pollute water, cut 
trees and dig pasture land‖ and thus ―threaten the essence of local communities‖ 
(Interview F2, 00:07:47-2). Local environmental NGOs such as the Onggi River 
Community claim that water resources in many regions are dried up and polluted 
due to poor mining practices (Snow, 2010). Opponents of these groups, in turn, 
claim that such assertions are not based on scientific proof and therefore lack 
credibility (Interview C2, D6, D1). 
The role(s) of scientists is thus crucial to this debate. Depending on their 
perspectives, most scientists support the argument that global warming and 
overgrazing are important factors in environmental degradation, rather than 
mining (Interview A2, A6, B1, D1). However, some scientists do criticise mining 
for the pollution and degradation of the local environment (Suzuki, 2008) and 
work voluntarily with environmental NGOs on EIA matters (Interview F5). Thus, 
scientists, too, are divided about environmental issues.  
The important aspect of debate for this thesis is that accountability issues are 
raised and blurred, depending on the alleged causes of environmental degradation. 
In the case of global warming, the need for accountability of poor mining and 
governance issues is silenced by the assumption that individual companies and 
countries can do little to change the situation. With ―no one responsible for the 
situation‖, accountability issues are downplayed if not ignored. This is an 
outcome of the current social context which lacks accountability mechanisms at 
all levels of society (Interview F4, D8). However, there are signs of change. 
Environmental and social NGOs have become increasingly active in mining 
debates and provide various arguments and visual evidence. Social awareness of 
environmental matters has improved since 2006 and local communities have 
begun to engage in mining issues (Interview F2, F7, D5, C3). One of the main 
issues raised around mining-related environmental impacts is mining 
rehabilitation.       
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 Rehabilitation: 
Rehabilitation
82
 of mining land is compulsory for all mining companies (The State 
Great Khural of Mongolia 1995, Article 25). In gold mining and some other 
minerals, rehabilitation can be done during operations once gold-bearing ore is 
processed, while for coal and fluorspar mining rehabilitation is only possible after 
mine closure (Interview A4, B1).  
There are differing opinions among EIA constituents regarding rehabilitation 
practices. Interviewees of mining companies, some government officials, EIA 
companies and professional NGOs reported that relatively high quality 
rehabilitation was carried out (Interview A6, B2, C1). They also noted that mining 
companies engaged professional rehabilitation companies, thus providing 
reassurance that the quality of rehabilitation was adequate (Interview C2, B1, B2, 
A6). Mining interviewees noted further that illegal miners would dig rehabilitated 
mining sites after companies had left (Interview C1, C2); un-rehabilitated land 
was not the responsibility of only mining companies (Interview D5).    
By way of contrast, most NGO interviewees and some government organisations 
and EIA companies were concerned at the absence or poor quality of 
rehabilitation. They maintained that mining companies have a window-dressing 
attitude, pretending to comply with legislation (Interview A1, B3, F2, F3). They 
also contested the figures for rehabilitation costs and argued that a deposit of 50 
percent of annual rehabilitation costs was not sufficient when companies 
disappeared without undertaking rehabilitation (Interview F8, F10). Some argued 
that rehabilitation companies themselves were problematic, as they were not 
operated professionally and owned mostly by previous or current public officials 
who had only limited influence in the quality monitoring of rehabilitation projects 
(Interview F3, F6). Other commentators claimed that if mining companies used 
modern equipment and fully processed gold-bearing ores, there would be no 
illegal mining (Interview A4, B3). The following photos show the rehabilitated 
                                               
82 There are two types of rehabilitation: technical and biological. Technical rehabilitation means to 
cover mined areas with soil, whereas ‗biological‘ refers to restoring vegetation with appropriate 
planting (MNET, 2006b).  
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land of a Mongolian mining company which was recognised as one of the best 
practice companies for good rehabilitation. 
  
Photos taken in July 2009, showing land of a Mongolian gold mining company in Zaamar soum, 
which was rehabilitated in 2005 and 2006. 
Although some argued that rehabilitation was properly carried out, it was evident 
when I compared areas with surrounding ones that had no mining, that most 
rehabilitated land was not restored to its original state prior to mining. In spite of 
the ongoing debate about rehabilitation quality, interviewees agreed that 
rehabilitation needs to be substantially improved (Interview D7, F9, B3, C3). 
Some suggested that public monitoring of rehabilitation after mining closure was 
important, as some inspectors were limited in their ability to influence the conduct 
of companies
83
 (Interview A5, B5). 
To summarise, there are different views on mining and its environmental impacts. 
Controversy about mining is also evident in the social issues and political debate 
on the ownership and usage of large strategic deposits. For the purposes of this 
study these views have been briefly outlined to illustrate the contestation of 
mining issues and various perspectives held by mining constituents. As the EIA is 
a legal management tool which can address mining-related environmental impacts, 
differing views on mining and environmental issues are also relevant when 
considering its application. Such views influence the behaviour and understanding 
of mining constituents regarding EIAs and their implementation during the mining 
life cycle. To illustrate this, the analytical framework, developed in Chapter 5, is 
used to analyse interviews, documents and field notes.      
                                               
83 Public participation in the quality assurance of EIAs will be discussed in next section. 
180 
 
7.3 The analytical framework analysis of Mongolian EIA practice 
The principal purpose of this section is to analyse Mongolian EIA practice and to 
examine whether it is monologic or dialogic, based on the principles of the 
framework outlined by Brown (2009). However, the order of principles has been 
changed slightly, and some principles have been merged, depending on their 
relevance to Mongolian practice and data availability
84
.  
1. Avoid monetary reductionism and be open about the subjective and 
contestable nature of calculations: 
Currently, there is neither clear recognition nor avoidance of monetary 
reductionism. In practice, the EIA is a relatively technical environmental 
assessment for determining the impacts on soil, air, and water pollution (MNET, 
2006). EIA assessors, who are mostly environmentalists, must assess these 
impacts according to the EIA legislation and methodology (MNET, 2006; The 
State Great Khural of Mongolia, 1998). Currently, EIA companies use the 2002 
EIA methodology, a few standards on mining and rehabilitation of gold and coal 
mining, and an ecological destruction assessment that was used as a trial during 
2008-09.    
However interviewees, particularly NGOs, criticise the lack of a comprehensive 
methodology and standards that should include assessments of mining impacts on 
biodiversity, local society, culture, and heritage sites. They argue that the EIA 
should consider all components of the ecological system and not be limited to 
only soil, air and water impacts of a given project (Interview A5). As well, 
animals and plants that surround mining affected areas should be considered in 
terms of potential adverse impacts on them and potential mitigation methods 
(Interview D4, F3).  
                                               
84 Some concepts, such as monetary reductionism and dialogic potential, are either not developed 
or recognised, due to the social background and transition phase of Mongolia. As the dialogic 
framework has been formulated, based on the context of a developed country, it ought to be 
modified for the Mongolian context.   
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Currently, no comprehensive guidance and database exist on the animals and 
biodiversity of different regions. Interviewees of EIA companies acknowledged 
that many EIA companies copy and use only general textbooks or research on the 
major geographic regions, rather than conducting actual field studies in the 
proposed mining area for each EIA (Interview A1, A5). This situation relates, 
arguably, to interests of EIA companies, which endeavour to cut costs (Interview 
A3, F2). As there is no clear mechanism for evaluating the impacts on 
biodiversity and for ensuring the quality of an EIA assessment, companies tend to 
comply only minimally with EIA regulations and to avoid expensive field-based 
assessments (Interview A5). To address the lack of a general database, the World 
Bank is cooperating with MNET to develop an online tool that will provide 
information on all animals and vertebrates of each region (Interview D2). It is 
hoped the database will help improve the quality and inclusiveness of EIAs 
(Interview D4).  
Some NGO interviewees complained that environmental experts often ignored the 
social and cultural impacts of a mining project. There is no evaluation method and 
guidance regarding what should be considered social and cultural impacts, how to 
determine them, and what potential mitigation methods are available to avoid or 
minimise these impacts (Interview F7). Interviewees pointed to impacts due to 
mining operations in culturally significant areas that upset local communities 
(Interviews F4, F5, F9). A television programme, ―Detective Derrick‖, alleged 
that some mining companies hide archaeological findings at their sites to avoid 
termination of their licences
85
, and that illegal miners later dug them up, selling 
them to foreigners at very low prices. 
To address these issues, a bill for EIA law amendments was drafted in 2008, using 
input from various EIA constituents, including social and environmental NGOs 
(Interview A5). The bill proposed consideration of the social aspects of mining 
projects and the inclusion of local communities in EIAs (The State Great Khural 
of Mongolia, 2008). The Human Rights and Development Centre and other NGOs 
                                               
85 By law, mining should not occur if a licenced area is archaeologically significant (The State 
Great Khural of Mongolia, 1997). 
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are also evaluating the quality of EIAs and proposing a social impact assessment 
as well as the EIA (Interview F7). However, the need for a social and cultural 
impact assessment will lead to the issue of how to evaluate compensation for 
affected people, which is a very political issue, given the many years of delay to 
pass legislation on compensation in other areas (Interview A5).  
As no clear calculation method on environmental and social impacts currently 
exists, the issue is not about monetary reductionism at present (compared with a 
developed country context, as discussed by Söderbaum, 2004, 2011; Brown, 
2009; Bebbington, et al., 2007 and others). Rather, most EIA constituents are 
eager first to have a comprehensive methodology and calculation.  Perhaps then, 
there can be debate on whether the calculation is sufficiently inclusive and 
accurate, and whether it reduces intangible values to monetary ones. On the other 
hand, the lack of a calculation methodology may provide the opportunity for EIA 
constituents to debate what and how to include and assess the social and cultural 
impacts of mining, by drawing on debate in developing country contexts. They 
might then learn from those who warn of the limitations of trying to ―commodify‖ 
impacts through monetisation (Bebbington et al. 2007, p. 221).  It should also be 
emphasised that the EIA is not as vulnerable to claims of monetary reductionism 
as, for example, the Sustainability Assessment Model, which aims to translate as 
many impacts as possible into monetary terms (Bebbington et al. 2007). 
In terms of the subjectivity of EIAs, what and how to calculate is subjective, 
although this is not widely recognised by EIA constituents. One factor, reflecting 
the cultural and social backgrounds of Mongolians, is that people do not question 
decisions and methodology developed by state organisations; EIA methodology 
and calculations are taken for granted, which is evident in interviewee responses. 
An interviewee of an EIA company said he was unsure of the accuracy of the EIA 
methodology and on what perspective it was based, but he considered that EIA 
companies had to ―merely obey regulations‖ and that the accuracy of the 
methodology was not an ―EIA company matter‖ (Interview A3, 00:22:12-3). 
Interviewees of government organisations also did not question the methodology, 
stating that ―costs are calculated by experts according to the methodology, so it is 
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not possible to say whether it is realistic‖ (Interview B2, 00:02:06-5 P2). 
However, some acknowledged that the methodology was out-dated, as it was 
developed in 2002 (Interview B3, B5).  
In spite of the silence on subjectivity, views on rehabilitation costs demonstrate 
that the subjective nature of calculation is implicitly ‗acknowledged‘. Fifteen 
interviewees agreed that the rehabilitation costs calculated were very low. Some 
interviewees from EIA companies and NGOs were more critical about the 
methodology and the unrealistic calculation of rehabilitation costs. Due to 
conflicts of interest by EIA companies, rehabilitation costs were regarded as being 
―unrealistically‖ determined (Interview F8, 00:36:03-6) and calculated ―roughly‖ 
(Interview A3). Low rehabilitation costs were also produced by ―non-specialised‖ 
experts of EIA companies, who were often ―corrupt‖ (Interview A4, part 7). An 
NGO interviewee provided an example of rehabilitation costs, calculated at 
60,000 tughriks (about 64 NZD
86
) per hector of land (Interview F5, 00:36:33-8). 
However, NGO criticism of poor rehabilitation was often dismissed by other EIA 
constituents, given that NGOs were labelled as ―noise makers‖, providing ―no 
scientific evidence‖ (Interview D1, D6).   
Another concern regarding subjectivity relates to public participation. A public 
official interviewee acknowledged the subjectivity of surveys used as the principal 
tool for collecting public comments on a mining project. He argued that when EIA 
companies prepared and conducted surveys in local areas, there was the 
possibility of a sociologist‘s view biasing the information presented to local 
people. As he explained:  
If he [the sociologist] included mainly positive aspects of a project and praised 
it during his survey, then comments from local people would be in favour of a 
mining project, in the absence of unbiased information. But, it may result in 
further conflict once the project begins (Interview B1, 00:32:30-7).    
In summary, there is no recognition of either monetary reductionism or the 
subjectivity of EIAs. However, interviewees were critical of the calculations of 
                                               
86  By April 2011, the currency exchange rate was 942 Mongolian Tughriks = NZ$1 
http://www.xe.com   
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low rehabilitation costs, and out-dated EIA methodology. To some degree, this 
relates to these two principles of the dialogic accounting framework. Thus, there 
are some aspects that EIA constituents must begin to question and debate.  
2. Enable accessibility of non-experts: 
In terms of the accessibility of non-experts, practice shows that EIAs do not have 
to engage non-EIA expert stakeholders. The following section demonstrates how 
formal EIAs are based heavily on the input of experts and the various associated 
problems that are created for EIAs: first, expertise in EIAs is considered at the 
time of engaging EIA experts and non-experts; second, the processes and 
problems of quality assurance in EIAs are introduced, based on interviews and 
documents.  
a. Expertise 
According to the law, EIAs should be conducted and prepared by licensed, 
professional EIA companies (The State Great Khural of Mongolia, 1998, Article 
5). Experts of EIA companies usually come from various natural and social 
science disciplines, including biology, hydrobiology, geology, hydrogeology, 
mining, environmental studies, engineering, sociology, and others. Interviews 
suggest there is a lack of EIA expertise at both the administrative level – 
ministerial and operational – and at the EIA companies‘ level.   
At the ministerial level, seven specialists are in charge of conducting general 
assessments, and read and comment on EIA reports (MNET, 2009b). However, all 
mainly have biological backgrounds (Interview B3). As an EIA covers a wide 
range of issues relating to the ecological system in general and its components
87
, a 
lack of appropriate expertise has become one of the chief causes of poor quality 
EIAs. As one interviewee described it, ministerial experts do not have ―universal‖ 
understanding (that is, capable of doing anything from any field) (Interview A6). 
Moreover, they are overwhelmed with work, given the continual increase in the 
number of EIA reports prepared each year (Interview B2, D4). Since the mid-
                                               
87 Components of the ecological system are soil, landscape, water and biodiversity (The State 
Great Khural of Mongolia 1995, Article 3.1). 
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2000s, the number dramatically increased, due to the rapid development of 
mining, infrastructure, tourism, and construction (MNET, 2008). The number of 
experts has not increased, but has remained constant or has been decreased due to 
tightened ministerial budgets (Interview B2, B3). Decentralisation policies, 
supported by the IMF and the World Bank, resulted in the government tightening 
ministerial budgets. The Public Sector Management and Finance Law (2002) 
required restructuring of the public sector, and the introduction of contractual-
based financing, which aimed to improve the efficiency of public-sector 
organisations, cut unnecessary costs, and enhance effective public services (The 
State Great Khural of Mongolia, 2002b). However, the law is criticised for 
actually promoting budget centralisation, given that all budgets must be allocated 
through the State Fund (ADB, 2008). Due to a continually tightened budget, the 
MNET has undergone restructuring, budget cuts, and staff reductions (Interview 
B3). Thus, the few experts who are employed are overwhelmed (Johnova, 2004), 
which compromises potentially the quality of EIAs (Interview A5, B2). 
The lack of expertise in EIA companies also contributes to poor quality EIAs. 
Nine interviewees agreed that EIA companies do not have experts who are 
proficient in EIAs and mining (Interview A4). As both EIAs and mining are new 
fields in Mongolia, specialised training is almost absent from degree programmes 
at universities (Interview F8). However, some experienced companies have better 
expertise and can conduct good quality EIAs (Interview A3, A4, A6). Some 
interviewees were critical that new EIA companies often have conflicts of interest 
and are under the ―cover‖ of current/previous ministerial officials (Interview B7, 
F8). Such companies have been established to use the EIA as a money-making 
activity (Interview A2, A6, F10).  
Another expertise related issue, raised by interviewees, is that EIA companies 
‗share‘ a few well-known scientists to satisfy legislative requirements. The law 
requires the use of experts in relevant fields, and a few popular academics are 
simultaneously hired by different EIA companies as permanent or contractual 
experts (Interview A5). By 2009, there were thirteen experts who worked for three 
to seven EIA companies (MNET, 2009a). Combining academic responsibilities 
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with work commitments for many EIA companies by academics raises further 
questions about the quality of some EIA reports. 
Some academics were criticised by NGO interviewees for being corrupt and for 
favouring mining companies. One observed that an EIA report prepared by a well-
known environmental science professor had devastating effects
88
 on the natural 
environment of one soum in Khentii aimag. NGO members met the professor and 
criticised his report. He acknowledged he was wrong and reported that fees 
promised by a mining company had motivated him to prepare a flawed EIA 
(Interview F5). 
In spite of these problems relating to expertise, experts are considered the only 
valid party for EIAs. As EIAs are regarded as a scientific, technical tool and 
process, EIA reports are accepted as finished technical documents, rather than as 
outputs of scientific calculation and of stakeholder engagement. This can be found 
in the views of some interviewees: a public servant stated that ―EIAs are 
conducted by experts of professional companies, so they should be correct‖ 
(Interview B2). Another interviewee stated that a general assessment clarified 
whether the impacts of a mining project were acceptable; if it recommended an 
EIA, it merely followed the recommendation; thus the EIA was correct and 
consistent with the general assessment (Interview B1). Mining companies pay 
experts to conduct EIAs and to follow EIA reports and monitoring plans once 
mining commences (Interview C1, C2). NGOs also assume that EIAs are 
conducted according to the law, and do not pay close attention, as they consider 
EIAs objective because they have been conducted by experts (Interview F8).  
However, EIA constituents have begun to recognise that EIAs are not objective 
and correct. Most interviewees agreed that EIAs are poorly prepared or copied 
from each other and that their implementation and monitoring is not satisfactory. 
In particular, environmental NGOs understand that EIAs are important documents 
that affect mining operations (Interview F2, F5, F8). Thus, there are varying 
                                               
88 The EIA report was prepared for a gold mining project and concluded that there would be no 
negative impact by allowing mining along a river that has supported a surrounding fragile 
ecosystem for thousands of years.  
187 
 
degrees of acceptance that EIA practice is problematic and ought to be 
problematised and closely scrutinised. This leads to the issue of the accessibility 
of non-experts in EIAs.          
Currently, the engagement of non-experts is limited. According to the law, local 
governors and heads of Local Representative Khurals (LRK) should receive EIA 
reports and sign them if they approve (The State Great Khural of Mongolia, 
1998). Some interviewees raised their poor performance, attributing it to the lack 
of expertise by local officials in EIAs. An NGO interviewee said that for local 
governors, EIAs were scientific documents and would be difficult to comprehend 
(Interview F2). They also lack professional support from the central government 
and related government organisations to perform their function well (Interview 
D6). Thus, poor quality EIAs can receive approval by local authorities without 
much scrutiny.  
Interviewees acknowledged that it is important to consider local knowledge in 
EIAs. They argued that local people know their surrounding environment better 
than EIA experts based in the capital city, often substantial distances from local 
areas (Interview F3). Local people are also familiar with nomadic culture and 
knowledge, regarding environmental protection, from oral history traditions 
(Interview A2). Thus, their knowledge could serve as a valuable resource during 
EIA preparation and impact mitigation processes (Interview A5, B5). However, 
local input in EIAs is almost non-existent at present and will be discussed later 
under the fourth principle – public participation practice.  
Most scientists work for EIA companies and make arguments based on a neo-
liberal view of supporting mining. However, there are also scientists, who 
voluntarily engage in NGO activities and help to prepare counter-arguments, 
using scientific research. An NGO interviewee provided an example when he 
made an argument opposing a gold mining company from operating along a river 
in Khentii aimag. The NGO had asked for the assistance of a scientist to explain 
an EIA report. The environmental scientist, a native of that area, agreed to help 
explain the content of the EIA and how its recommendations had been ignored in 
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the actual mining operations. Using the scientist‘s conclusions, the NGO 
requested the Ministry to terminate the company‘s mining licence after the mining 
company had changed the river flow for mining use, resulting in environmental 
degradation and a dry river (Interview F5). Other NGOs also cooperated with a 
Japanese researcher, who concluded that poor mining was the main contributor of 
dry rivers in local regions (Interview F2, F3). Such examples demonstrate that 
there is ad hoc engagement of experts by NGOs in order to support the 
involvement of non-experts in EIAs. Although NGOs have not deliberately 
intended to participate in EIAs, they occasionally use them to make arguments 
opposing mining companies. However, NGOs acknowledged that they had not 
paid close attention or understood the importance of EIAs until 2008. Thus, in 
terms of Brown‘s (2009) framework, NGOs have begun to serve as border-
crossers among EIA constituents, using varying degrees of expertise and 
promoting non-expert engagement.  
b. Quality assurance 
Quality assurance of EIAs is problematic in Mongolia. Interviews and documents 
suggest a confidence that the quality of EIAs is inherently assured by EIA 
procedures and external monitoring by the SSIA. Figure 6 illustrates EIA 
procedures and outlines the quality assurance processes of the existing EIA 
framework.  
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Figure 6. Quality assurance of the EIA 
 
The MNET and SSIA are in charge of the legislative quality assurance 
mechanism. General assessors from the MNET conduct general assessments that 
define the scope of the EIA and provide recommendations for it. The EIA should 
be consistent with the general assessment, and this ensures that ―EIA companies 
are not able to conduct an incorrect assessment‖ (Interview B1, 00:32:30-7). As 
Figure 6 shows, local authorities also engage in quality assurance by receiving 
EIA reports and making comments on them when signing. Once an EIA report is 
received by the MNET, EIA experts from the Ministry make comments on it, and 
then submit them to the EIA committee of the Ministry (MNET, 2006b). After 
this quality assurance process, the committee, consisting of EIA experts, 
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academics and high-ranking ministerial officials makes approval or rejection 
decisions. On approval of EIAs, mining companies can commence their 
operations (The State Great Khural of Mongolia, 1997, Article 37). Environmental 
inspectors of local administrative bodies and inspectors of the SSIA monitor the 
implementation of EIAs (Interview B6). As indicated in Figure 6, mining 
companies are obliged to comply with the approved EIA and accompanied 
environmental plans (The State Great Khural of Mongolia 1995, Article 9). In the 
case of complaints and requests for independent reassessment, a special expert 
group appointed by the Ministry may conduct reassessment of an EIA and 
penalise a guilty EIA company if a report is found to be incorrect, resulting in 
environmental degradation (The State Great Khural of Mongolia, 1998, Article 
12). As a public servant interviewee noted, there have in fact been no cases of 
reassessment or severe penalties for guilty EIA companies (Interview B3).  
Although public officials, EIA companies, and mining interviewees were satisfied 
with this quality assurance mechanism, all interviewees agreed that the quality of 
EIAs is poor for various reasons. One NGO interviewee argued that the current 
environmental degradation is testimony to weak EIAs and their poor 
implementation (Interview F13).  
At the ministerial level, it is possible that overworked EIA specialists approve 
poor quality reports. A public servant interviewee provided an example of the 
conflicts between EIAs and actual mining operations. The 40 mining projects 
along Selenge River
89
 had EIA reports that were conducted by well-known 
researchers of EIA companies. The EIA recommendations of the EIAs stated the 
area should be rehabilitated to the original state before mining. However, no 
rehabilitation has been carried out as stipulated in the EIAs. This was an example 
of how ―some reports are approved even if they were wrong‖ (Interview B6, 
00:15:25-0).  
In terms of the inspection process, inspectors paid scant attention to EIAs until 
2006 (Interview B5). Some interviewees were critical that inspectors did not 
                                               
89 Selenge is one of the three largest rivers in Mongolia. 
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understand EIAs or their importance, and that inspectors were not sufficiently 
knowledgeable or competent at exercising their rights to penalise and close guilty 
EIA and mining companies (Interview A5). The lack of professional inspectors 
was also exacerbated by the constant changes of inspectors in local and central 
inspection organisations (Interview B5). Consequently, non-professional people, 
particularly in local areas, were often employed as inspectors (Interview A5) and 
were prone to corruption, which detracted from the reputation and credibility of 
inspectors (Interview F5).  
The quality of EIAs relates directly to EIA companies. Most interviewees stated 
there are many EIA companies and instances where EIA reports have been copied 
from previous reports or from the reports of other EIA companies. An NGO 
interviewee claimed she saw a photocopied EIA of another mining company that 
still showed the name of the previous mining company (Interview F4). Another 
interviewee related a similar case: 
We discovered an incorrect EIA report of a mining company that operates in the 
Gobi. The EIA was clearly copied as it suggested a rehabilitation plan prepared 
for a forestry area in the north. Of course, the EIA did not fit the circumstances 
of the mining company. It showed that the EIA was simply a copy of the 
previous EIA report conducted for a different mining project (Interview F2).  
These cases indicate that expertise in conducting, approving and monitoring EIAs 
is deficient at all levels (Interview A4).  
Besides EIA companies being non-professional, interviewees also criticised the 
preference of EIA companies for employing temporary or contractual specialists 
in order to reduce expenses. This negatively affected the quality of work. A 
mining interviewee complained that most EIA companies had a director and one 
or two experts (Interview C2). She said ―they [EIA companies] are eager to have 
orders for EIAs and promise nice things to get a contract. But, they do not keep 
their promises regarding timeframe and quality of the EIAs‖ (Interview C2).  
The location of EIA companies also attracted criticism. As all EIA companies are 
based in the capital city, they often do not conduct field-studies to gather evidence 
and local knowledge (Interview F4). An EIA interviewee stated that:  
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To cut costs companies do not send their experts to local areas of proposed 
projects. Instead, they use similar cases or refer to books when preparing EIA 
reports. Therefore, it is not always a valid assessment … and the quality of 
EIAs is poor‘ (Interview A1). 
In terms of implementation, most mining companies were criticised for paying 
only scant attention to EIAs, regarding them, rather, as a document for a project‘s 
approval. Mining companies did not fully implement EIAs and kept them ready 
only for inspection by the SSIA (Interview A5). Some NGO interviewees 
commented that local people and NGOs required mining companies to show their 
EIAs, but were told that EIAs were either held in the capital city office or ―locked 
in the boss‘s desk‖ (Interview F2, F4). According to the law, mining companies 
must keep EIAs on mining sites and implement them during the mining life cycle 
(The State Great Khural of Mongolia, 1998). With increased state inspection since 
2006, mining companies have begun to understand the importance of EIAs 
(Interview C1). 
In summary, the quality of EIAs is poor, and clearly needs improvements to all 
stages. Interviewees suggested it was crucial to have effective mechanisms for 
monitoring and that there was a need for greater penalties and accountability on 
the part of responsible parties (Interview A2, A5, F5). In short, there is a need for 
thorough investigation and improvement in how and by whom EIAs are 
conducted, approved, implemented and monitored.   
3. Recognise multiple ideological orientations: 
Similar to the lack of recognition of subjectivity, the existing EIA framework does 
not recognise the possibility of multiple ideological orientations among EIA 
constituents. Although the EIA is said to be ―an outcome of collaboration‖ by 
ministerial experts, academics, and researchers of EIA companies (Interview B1), 
differences in perspectives are not considered or acknowledged.  
The EIA is viewed as a technical assessment that provides technical or scientific 
―truths‖ of a given project (Interview A5): on one hand, a compulsory tool that 
should be undertaken at the outset of mining operations (Interview A1, A6, B2, 
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B3); on the other hand, a process that must comply with the EIA methodology and 
related standards developed by the Ministry (Interview A1, B2). The underpinning 
ideologies and perspectives of EIA constituents are not recognised or questioned. 
Even if some NGO members criticise EIAs, their critiques are not considered 
valid, as local NGOs are often labelled as noise-makers, lacking scientific 
evidence. Thus, assessments and decisions by experts are considered as objective 
truths. 
This may be a ‗backlash‘ relating to a traditional Mongolian outlook. For 
Mongolians, to recognise different ideological orientations is a ‗strange‘ matter. 
Two hundred years of colonialism under the Qing Dynasty and 70 years of 
communism, closely supervised by the USSR at every level of Mongolian society, 
have promoted a culture of state-worship, characterised by being ―tolerant‖ 
(UNDP & Government of Mongolia, 2006). This passivity has not changed 
radically during the democratic transition, with some interviewees emphasising 
that more time is required, possibly several generations, for change to occur 
(Interview D4, G1).  
One difficulty of such ―tolerance‖ is that it creates a widely held belief that 
difference and/or contestation is not a positive thing (Interview F8). The dominant 
ideology has penetrated every aspect of society and has promoted a technocratic 
approach by government organisations as the ‗only, correct way‘ to deal with 
issues. The quality and subjectivity of EIAs conducted by experts are therefore not 
questioned, and are perceived as correct. This was evident from interviewees‘ 
responses as well as during various public debates in the press and on television 
programmes. Although the introduction of democracy and rapid development of 
information technology has opened people‘s minds and provided unprecedented 
information, people are still wary of new perspectives and views on alternative 
development agenda and proposals. As an NGO interviewee expressed matters: 
―The Mongolian attitude towards new things tends to be slow and negative‖ 
(Interview B1). It is not easy for people to recognise and accept different 
perspectives and views. However, all constituents can ―learn by doing‖ (Interview 
F9).   
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4. Ensure effective participatory processes: 
This section examines public participation in the EIA and investigates whether 
existing participation is effective and meaningful.  Four aspects will be discussed: 
participation practice, accessibility, the understandability of EIAs, and the 
inclusion of public comments.   
a. Effectiveness of public participation 
Due to the lack of previous research and statistics, information concerning public 
participation practice derives principally from interviews. As the EIA law 
amendment in 2001 mandated public participation, all interviewees said that local 
people should participate in the EIA preparation process. At the beginning of EIA 
preparation, an EIA company must introduce a mining project and its benefits to 
local people who live in proximity to the licensed area (Interview A3). Experts 
often use a survey and questionnaire to collect comments from local people 
(Interview A1, A3). A public ‗town hall‘ meeting is also recommended by the 
regulation (MNET, 2006). Depending on the size of mining areas and mineral 
deposits, most EIA companies tend not to organise public meetings as they are 
costly and it is difficult to coordinate bringing local communities together.  
However, since 2008 there have been some initiatives, particularly from 
international donor organisations and large mining companies. As South Gobi 
mining development is hugely important for the development of Mongolia, 
international organisations such as the World Bank have also introduced a 
benchmark impact assessment for the infrastructure strategy and have organised 
public meetings and training for local communities (World Bank, 2009). EIA 
companies conducting assessments for large mining projects, such as Oyu Tolgoi 
and Energy Resources, have organised public meetings among local communities 
of surrounding soums, so as to introduce mining projects and gather public 
comments on mining projects, local social development, cultural heritage 
management and other factors (Energy Resources LLC, 2011; Ivanhoe Mines 
Mongolia Inc., 2006). Thus, the public meeting, as a method of participation, has 
begun to be recognised by EIA companies.      
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Once an EIA report is prepared, the EIA company presents it to the LRK, which 
consists of local representatives of the soum or aimag. Given there are only two 
scheduled meetings of LRK per year, most EIA companies are not able to have 
signatures from LRKs. Thus, EIAs are often introduced to and signed by the 
governor of a soum (Interview A3). The signature indicates a governor has read, 
commented, and approved the EIA (Interview B3). A number of interviewees, 
however, criticised this as being problematic and symbolic. They argued that 
governors are typically not capable of providing reasonable comment on EIA 
reports, given their poor understanding of mining and EIAs (Interview D6). They 
are also prone to being lobbied by mining interests and EIA companies for 
signature approval (Interview F2).  
Interviewees offered different views on participation practice. Some viewed it as 
being relatively good and adequate, while others were critical. Most interviewees 
of government organisations, EIA and mining companies stated that participation 
is satisfactory as it meets the legislation and approval requirements of the EIA 
Committee. In 2006, the MNET established the EIA Committee in charge of the 
approval process for all EIA reports (MNET, 2006). Public participation is seen as 
one prerequisite of EIAs and the Committee requires that all EIAs should provide 
public
90
 meeting notes, signatures of participants, and the governor‘s approval 
signature as evidence (Interview B1). According to the law, mining companies 
have to pay costs of organising the public meeting (The State Great Khural of 
Mongolia, 1998, Article 7.4). An EIA company is also able to organise a public 
meeting to introduce the final EIA (The State Great Khural of Mongolia, 1998, 
Article 5.4.8); however, in practice, only a few reports have been presented to 
local communities, using a public meeting (Interview B3, 00:28:50-0). 
Four interviewees from EIA companies suggested that public participation is 
currently adequate, as local people can comment through surveys and 
questionnaires developed by EIA companies (Interview A3). As an LRK is the 
highest legal representative organisation for a local administrative unit (The State 
                                               
90
 Public refers to citizens who might be affected by the project (The State Great Khural of 
Mongolia, 1998). 
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Great Khural of Mongolia, 1992), its meeting note and approval is regarded as 
satisfactory evidence of public participation (Interview B2, 00:11:51-5). All 
interviewees from mining companies also stated that the law was well 
implemented in terms of public participation. A mining manager said, ―it is up to 
EIA companies on how to get public comments and organise participation‖ 
(Interview C2).  
However, all interviewees of NGOs, international organisations, and researchers 
criticised participation practice as symbolic and almost non-existent in Mongolia. 
NGO interviewees and herders claimed that public comments were collected from 
those who favoured a mining project (Interview F2, 00:36:40-9). An interviewee 
of an NGO argued that there were many cases similar to Khongor soum, where a 
local governor gathered his relatives and then used their signatures as local 
meeting participants (Interview F8). Even the meeting of the LRK can be 
problematic, as some soum representatives are relatives of the governor, elected in 
corrupt local elections (Interview F8). This type of public meeting is not usually 
intended for a gathering of all affected people (Interview E1) that would include 
local NGOs with controversial views on mining (Interview A2, F2, 00:18:42-0).  
Consistent with such an argument, a frequent criticism related to the 
representative power of participants. Many NGOs and herder interviewees argued 
that the people who are really affected are excluded from participation, and that 
those who participate in meetings are often not elected representatives. A herder 
reported that some people, close to the governor, had participated in meetings 
supposedly as representatives of mining affected herders (Interview E1, 00:29:14-
4), and such people were unlikely to understand the situation of affected local 
people as they did not live in mining areas (Interview F13, 00:36:43-9). Such 
participants were not capable of representing the views of affected people, but 
their comments favoured the mining project (Interview F4). Such participation is 
―window-dressing with no benefits‖ or as the Mongolian proverb says: ―Нүглийн 
нүдийг гурилаар хуурах‖ (Interview E1, 00:29:14-4).  
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Even when meetings among affected people are held, they can be problematic, 
given the misinformation and bribery. Some interviewees reported that EIA 
companies often presented only positive facts about a mining project (Interview 
F7, 00:43:31-9); as most local areas had no experience of mining operations, local 
people were not aware of the possible environmental impacts, and they then say: 
‗no objection‘ (Interview D6, 00:26:43-7). In addition, mining companies can 
easily lobby local people, as most projects operate in remote areas, sparsely 
populated by herder families (Interview A4). In the case of a well-known Russian 
gold mining company, vodka and small gifts were given to local herders to gain 
their approval (Interview F10, 00:46:31-2). Such arguments show that even if 
public participation exists, it may only be symbolic (Interview D6).    
Herders interviewed from two different regions affected by mining reported that 
they had not been informed of or invited to participate in EIAs. Mining and EIA 
companies had not informed them of the mining projects that would operate in 
their localities (Interview E2, 00:10:04-6). Herders only came to know about the 
mining after licences had been issued and projects begun (Interview F2). As EIAs 
are conducted ―at the higher level‖, no one had listened to the views of ordinary 
herders (Interview E1, 00:06:38-3). They had no opportunity to see the EIAs 
(Interview E1, 00:04:34-1). Thus, herders are powerless in the face of mining 
companies, and some mining companies said shamelessly that ―herders do not 
matter‖ (Interview E2, 00:02:59-3).   
From the interview analysis, it became evident that various reasons for poor 
public participation exist. In terms of legislation, a number of interviewees 
criticised the lack of a legislative mechanism that would guarantee structured and 
productive public engagement in EIAs (Interview A2, D4). Some suspected this 
lack might reflect a lack of willingness to have public participation, as it might 
attract more controversy regarding projects (Interview F9, 00:33:25). As ―there is 
no incentive or penalty for having or not having participation‖, certain public 
servants and EIA companies can determine whether to allow local communities to 
participate in EIAs (Interview F7, 00:14:53-7).    
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Moreover, the existing EIA framework cannot ensure meaningful participation. 
An interviewee of an international organisation, seemingly ‗amazed‘ at strange 
mining and EIA legislative systems in Mongolia, stated: 
In most countries EIAs are done before the licence is issued. But in Mongolia 
the system is ‗back-to-front‘; mining companies can obtain mining licences 
before being required to carry out EIAs. As licences have already been granted, 
the system is counter-productive and EIA decisions have been pre-empted 
(Interview D1, 00:15:51-7).  
As a consequence, public participation in EIAs is perceived as having no meaning 
or impact on poor mining practice (Interview B3, B5). The current EIA 
framework and system of issuing licences effectively discourage meaningful 
participation.   
In terms of monitoring, no mechanism clearly defines the qualification of 
participation. The EIA approval committee is satisfied with meeting notes and 
signatures (Interview B1). Inspectors have no means or right to monitor it as they 
only do so after mining projects have already begun (Interview B6). Moreover, if 
companies have submitted all documents required by the law, inspectors cannot 
penalise them (Interview B5, 00:17:37-8 P2). Therefore, participation is 
dependent on EIA companies and the approval committee.    
Interviewees mentioned other difficulties of participation, ranging from 
geographic isolation factors of Mongolia through to local people themselves. 
Mongolia has a large land area that is sparsely populated. In most instances, there 
might only be three to five families or no herders in proximity to licensed mining 
areas (Interview A5). Thus, it is easy for mining companies to make minor 
payments to local people, given the poor economic conditions of herders or to 
offer help for herders to move away from mining areas (Interview D5). Besides, 
herders are not usually resistant to mining projects in the steppes, as mining would 
probably occupy only five to ten percent of their pasture land (Interview A4). The 
situation is viewed differently if mining occurs near water resources, as water is 
the essential resource for the livelihood of herders (Interview A4, 00:11:35-1 P2).  
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One of the greatest barriers to participation is local people, themselves. All 
interviewees agreed that local people should be better informed and 
knowledgeable so as to express their views and comments on mining projects and 
the associated social and environmental impacts. An unofficial public survey by 
an international donor NGO, conducted among 700 local people of six different 
soums, revealed that local people were not aware of the impacts of mining 
(Interview D6). Although local people supported public participation as ―a right 
thing to have‖, they did not know ―what participation is or how to participate‖ 
(Interview D6).  
Given poor understanding about mining, local people are mostly either supportive 
or sometimes opposed to mining projects without being able to provide 
convincing arguments. People will often support a project and inquire mainly 
about the mining benefits for them and their local areas, through employment and 
investment in local hospitals and schools (Interview A1). However, local people 
will oppose mining projects if they are likely to affect their pasture, water 
resources and local heritage sites (Interview A4, A6, F4). Given uninformed 
licence issuing, local communities can become annoyed and protest against 
mining companies when they ultimately learn of mining licences after mining 
companies have asked them to leave their areas (Interview E1, F2, F4).  
Poor participation is also related to a sense of powerlessness and lack of hope by 
local people. In many local areas, people are ―powerless in the face of the state, as 
it is mainly outsiders who take local resources such as gold, timber, or whatever‖ 
(Interview D2). This is the consequence of endemic corruption and poor 
implementation of laws (Interview F3). Within the existing vertical decision-
making system, local authorities are also powerless to influence decisions and 
licences made by central government organisations (Interview D2, F2, F3).    
The combination of state-worship culture and selfish behaviour of Mongolians 
(UNDP & Government of Mongolia, 2006) also contributes to poor participation. 
As an interviewee of an international organisation commented, ―people have an 
attitude of being told and then acting‖ (Interview D3). Herders are indifferent 
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about mining even if it occurs in their areas of pasture (Interview A4); they 
assume the local authority will take responsibility for their problems, so they do 
not make their views known (Interview E1). As Mongolians are accustomed to 
living individually, in separate places, they often do not have a chance to meet and 
discuss matters (Interview E1). Even if some herders discuss and oppose mining 
companies, and then seek compensation for the environmental impacts, others will 
suspect their motives if they have worked for or cooperated with local authorities 
to obtain benefits for their own interests (Interview E1). This may also be fuelled 
by a greedy, NIMBY (not in my backyard) attitude of people which ―causes losses 
for all‖ (Interview F8, 00:52:23-5). 
Interviewees of some mining and EIA companies contended that some herders 
resisted mining projects because of individual interests, and required mining 
companies to pay compensation for tuition fees for their children, etc., (Interview 
C2). But mining companies are not philanthropic organisations and cannot listen 
or take care of individual herders with diverse interests (Interview C3). An 
interviewee from a government organisation acknowledged that it was 
understandable ―herders are more concerned with individual interests‖, given that 
most mining revenue and benefits went to the central government budget 
(Interview B7, 00:08:00-5 P5). 
Another important factor in poor participation is the lack of knowledge about 
participation rights by local communities. As one EIA interviewee explained: 
―although public participation is a good thing from the classical democratic 
approach, participation practice is not so good, given our people‘s lack of 
knowledge‖ (Interview A1, 00:21:54-5). Many interviewees agreed that local 
people were not aware of their rights to express their views and participate in 
EIAs. As an interviewee of an international organisation said, ―People don‘t know 
their rights to participate. Even if they know their rights, they don‘t know how to 
execute their rights‖ (Interview D3, 00:30:27-8). Low participation rates are also 
related to the court system. An NGO interviewee was critical that ―according to 
the law, citizens do not have a right to sue guilty companies that conducted flawed 
EIAs; only the governor does‘ (Interview F8, 00:33:59-7). To overcome such 
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problems, a number of interviewees suggested that local people needed to be 
better informed and educated about public participation, and that governance be 
improved (Interview A1, B4, D4, D5). Moreover, locals needed to become 
knowledgeable about mining, its technology, potential impacts and consequences 
(Interview D5, 00:23:31).  
b. Accessible EIA reports 
Accessibility of EIA reports is another major factor contributing to poor 
participation. Although laws on Environmental Protection and EIA have separate 
articles requiring a database, including EIAs (The State Great Khural of Mongolia 
1995, Article 39), access to information is not implemented in practice (Interview 
A4). The Ministry has a project funded by the World Bank to create a website that 
enables the public to see most parts of EIA reports and environmental protection 
plans (Interview B1). The EIA database was launched at the end of 2010. It 
includes 1987 general assessments since July 2005, and 629 detailed EIAs of 
mining projects since 1998. However, it is designed to see only outlines of general 
assessment recommendations and environmental protection and monitoring plans 
(MNET, 2010). One cannot see detailed EIA reports of individual projects.  
Interviewees had conflicting views on the accessibility of EIAs. Some from 
government organisations and EIA companies commented that EIAs were 
available for interested parties (Interview B2, 00:13:14-7), but most NGO 
interviewees argued that EIA reports were not accessible for anyone, especially 
the public (Interview F2, 00:36:19-2).  
One reason for the non-accessibility is the assumption of secrecy at the ministerial 
level and by mining companies. Poor accessibility is fuelled by the state-secrecy 
mindset that remains from the old communist regime, which results in a lack of 
willingness by power-holders to make information available to the public 
(Interview D1, 00:33:35-8). In government organisations, almost every document 
is considered secret, and public servants are not willing to show interested parties 
even although the law stipulates access to information. It is a classic ‗old habits 
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die hard‘ situation in many post-communist countries (Toth, 2010, p.198), and can 
be evidenced in the arguments of various interviewees.  
Government servants and EIA companies see EIAs as secret documents, as they 
contain some business information (Interview A1, B1). Ministerial officials are 
not keen to open up EIAs (Interview B2). One NGO interviewee claimed that 
ordinary people and NGOs could not see reports and might only have the chance 
to see EIAs on receipt of an official written request by a legal entity (Interview 
F2). Another reported they had found the English version of an EIA report and 
attempted to translate it into Mongolian, as they could not find the report in 
Mongolian (Interview F12, 00:12:49-9 P2). A third NGO interviewee argued that 
even some government officials could not see EIAs, as many powerful elites had 
their own mining companies, and therefore had no interest in disclosing 
information (Interview F8). As mentioned in Chapter 6, I personally experienced 
difficulty in accessing EIAs and failed to see them, even when I had followed the 
official procedure.   
Mining companies also contribute to the secrecy of EIAs. They keep reports under 
their desk as secret documents, showing them to inspectors only when required 
(Interview A5). Some local inspectors claimed that even they could not see EIAs, 
as mining companies did not provide reports to them (Interview F7, 00:44:43-7). 
Therefore, it is understandable that it is even more difficult for local people to see 
EIAs.  In fact, local people are rarely interested in EIAs (Interview E1) as they 
have little understanding and no expert knowledge about mining and EIAs 
(Interview A4); they assume that EIAs are only for the use of professional people 
(Interview F3).  
c. Understandable EIA reports         
Interviewees expressed contradictory views on the understandability of EIAs. 
Some interviewees of mining companies and government organisations did not 
assign much importance on this issue. They considered that EIA reports were 
understandable. As an interviewee from the Ministry explained: ―as EIAs are 
written in Mongolian mother language they should be understandable for the 
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public; and they [ministerial staff] approve EIAs because they think EIA reports 
are understandable‖ (Interview B2, 00:13:37-1).  
However, most interviewees of NGOs, international organisations and herders 
agreed that EIAs are neither accessible nor understandable to local people. An 
NGO member shared her experience of finding an EIA report after lobbying a 
higher-ranking Ministry official and secretly viewing the report. She said the EIA 
was ―a thick document full of numbers, and would have been barely 
understandable for ordinary people‖ (Interview F8, 01:01:40-5). Another 
interviewee supported this, commenting that EIAs include a lot of professional 
jargon and ―the language is so professional that ordinary herders are too 
uneducated to understand it‖ (Interview F3, 00:54:28-6).  
d. Consideration of public comments in EIAs 
Interviewees were critical that it is unclear how EIA companies decide on which 
public comments to include in EIAs. Two controversial statements were made: on 
the one hand, interviewees of NGOs, international organisations, researchers, and 
some public servants argued there is neither a mechanism for ensuring inclusive 
EIA reports (Interview F9, 00:35:28), nor are comments necessarily included in 
the final EIAs (Interview F2). On the other hand, some EIA specialists, public 
servants, and mining interviewees said that as the EIA is a professional 
assessment, there was no need to engage people without expertise (Interview C2). 
Another argument opposing the inclusion of non-experts in EIAs concerned local 
people: an interviewee of a mining company claimed that local people sometimes 
provided positive comments (supporting a project), then later made complaints 
(Interview C3), which suggested they either made comments without 
understanding a mining project or they had a conflict of interest once the project 
began (Interview B7, 00:05:58-0 P4).  
In summary, public participation in EIAs is symbolic because of various issues, 
relating not only to EIA constituents, institutional capacity, and legislation, but 
also to constraints on access to information, the language of EIAs, and inclusion 
of public comments in final EIAs. Thus, symbolic participation contributes to 
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poor quality EIAs and mining, resulting sometimes in debates and demonstrations 
by unheard local voices and misinformation.  
5. Be attentive to power relations: 
Power relations and imbalance also contribute to poor public participation. Based 
on interviews, documents, and field notes, Figure 7 illustrates the complexity of 
power relations in the EIA. However, it should be acknowledged that these 
relationships are not as simplistic as depicted; rather, they are deeply interrelated 
among various EIA constituents. 
Figure 7. Power relations and issues among EIA constituents 
 
For local people, public participation is limited due to power imbalances within 
and between local people themselves, local authorities, and EIA and mining 
companies. People with different values, interests and backgrounds behave 
differently when it comes to issues such as mining development and 
environmental issues. They also have varying degrees of ‗political‘ acumen, 
experience, and skills with which to engage in EIAs. For herders who are unaware 
of mining and its associated environmental issues, they have difficulties 
understanding the issues of mining and the need to protect their constitutional 
rights to live in safe and healthy environments (Interview A1, D3).  
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On the one hand, local people are often not sufficiently vocal during meetings so 
as to express their views regarding mining and environmental issues (Interview 
D6); on the other hand, even if some herders particularly affected by mining 
operations express views, they can later encounter problems from their 
communities, local authorities, and mining companies. As noted in discussion of 
the problems of participation, herders are suspected of having conflicts of interest 
and are regarded as opportunists who can accept benefits from mining companies 
(Interview E1). Or they can be punished, like the herder who demonstrated against 
mining and later claimed he was sent to a local jail for 10 days (interview, E1). 
Local authorities and mining companies tend to ignore herders (Interview E1, E2).  
Thus, Figure 7 illustrates that local people are under much pressure. As well as 
problems within local communities, some issues for herders are generated by 
other EIA constituents, ranging from being lobbied by mining and EIA companies 
to being excluded from decisions without being informed and excluded from 
participation and compensation even when decisions impact on their lives. 
Therefore, local people are often powerless in the face of other EIA constituents 
(Interview D2, E1, E3, F2).   
For local authorities, their limited roles in decision-making and the distribution of 
mining benefits may contribute to weak public participation. As Mongolia still has 
a vertical decision-making system, as in the previous regime (Interview F3), all 
licences and EIA related decisions are made by central government organisations 
(Interview F2). For example, Article 19.4 of the Mineral Law allows local 
authorities to comment on the approval or rejection of mining licences. However, 
the legal requirement of 30 days (The State Great Khural of Mongolia, 1997, 
Article 19.4) is not long enough, given poor postal services and transportation in 
local regions, to enable feed-back to the Mineral Authority, which is located in the 
capital city (Interview F2). ―No comment within 30 days‖ is automatically 
considered a sign of approval for mining licences (Interview A5). Moreover, local 
authorities are also legally limited to rejecting mining licences except if they can 
register certain areas for special local use (The State Great Khural of Mongolia, 
1997, Article 17) that is restricted to reserve grass for the winter preparation of 
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herding animals. Thus, local authorities have only limited powers for influencing 
the issue of licences (Suzuki, 2008). 
In spite of a lack of financial and human capacity, local governors are expected to 
perform various functions regarding EIAs. They are often in charge of presenting 
final EIAs, organising public meetings with EIA companies where necessary, and 
providing their comments and signature for approval. As an interviewee stated:  
They [local governors] are also under great pressure from mining companies for 
approval, from their MPs, and from communities for the jobs. But governors need 
to perform as they are supposed to know about mining when there are no local 
experts, information, or educational assistance from the government (Interview 
D6, 00:43:37-1).   
Moreover, low salary, poor economic conditions and the lack of an adequate 
accountability mechanism might influence local governors to choose an easy 
option: to accept ‗offers‘ from mining and EIA companies, and to sign EIAs 
without thorough consideration (Interview A1, D2).     
Budget centralisation is another sign of the lack of power by local authorities. 
According to the Minerals Law, 10 percent of royalties and 25 percent of licence 
fee revenue go to the soum budget, 20 percent of royalties and 25 percent of 
licence fees to the aimag budget, and 70 percent of royalties and 50 percent of 
licence fees goes to the central government budget (The State Great Khural of 
Mongolia, 1997, Article 58). As most tax revenue go to the central government 
budget, local regions receive few economic benefits from mining in their areas 
(Interview B7). This also creates incentives for local communities and governors 
to be vulnerable to bribery and to prefer ‗in kind‘ contributions from mining 
companies (Interview C1). It would be better to give authority to local 
government to use a portion of the tax revenue, so they would have more 
incentive to care for the natural environment (Interview F10, 00:12:38-9). 
However, this argument caused some controversy among interviewees.    
A number of interviewees criticised the representative powers of local governors 
and LRKs, and the possibilities of their being lobbied and of being corrupt. 
Although the EIA law states that local people can express their views through their 
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representatives in EIAs, practice shows it is not always the case, as some local 
administrative bodies are elected through corrupt elections, and they have 
―privatised‖ LRKs and soum governors for their interests (Interview F8, F10). One 
NGO interviewee provided an example of Khongor soum‘s local representatives, 
who were the parents, relatives, and son of the governor (Interview F8, 00:41:44-
4). This kind of evidence is provided to argue that local elections are problematic 
and corrupt (Interview F2).  
As well, local governors have conflicts of interest in mining matters. A mining 
interviewee said that local governors see mining companies as philanthropic 
organisations and require them to donate money for soum anniversaries etc. 
(Interview C3, 00:12:00-3). Another mining interviewee claimed that:  
When governors introduce EIAs and other reports they ask to meet directors of 
the mining companies, saying they need to discuss issues. Directors then lobby or 
bribe them (Interview C1, 00:27:58-7).  
In most cases, it is not clear how much mining companies pay local governors in 
the name of local development, as this kind of information is not disclosed to 
central government, local communities and other mining constituents. Therefore, 
some initiatives, such as the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative, 
encourage mining companies to ―declare what they pay‖ to local authorities and 
government organisations (Consortium of Hart Nurse Ltd and Ulaanbaatar Audit 
Corporations Ltd, 2010).  
In terms of the Ministry in Charge of the Natural Environment, there are various 
issues relating to its main functions and capacity. A number of interviewees were 
critical that the MNET has no monitoring function. An interviewee of a 
government organisation argued that ―unlike some other ministries with a 
producing function, the MNET has a protective function‖ (Interview B2, 
00:09:27-7). Transferring the monitoring function from the Ministry to the SSIA 
has resulted in a lack of ministerial power to monitor environmental matters 
(Interview B1, B2, B5). If the MNET were allowed to monitor EIAs, it could 
improve implementation of the law (Interview B1).  
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Although the intention of separating decision-making and monitoring functions 
might be desirable, the cooperation between MNET and SSIA is lacking 
(Interview D7). In fact, government organisations tend to ―reject‖ each other 
(Interview A1). Poor coordination and cooperation is evident from information 
they provide. An NGO interviewee said that the MNET, the Ministry of Mining 
and Petroleum, and the SSIA provided three different statistics for rehabilitated 
land (Interview F12, 00:19:56-8). If central government organisations had proper 
liaison, there would be no issue concerning ―poor coordination and information 
flows between the central government organisations and local authorities‖ that 
cause misunderstandings, conflict and bureaucracy for mining companies 
(Interview C3).   
Another common problem for all government organisations is that after each 
election there are constant changes to their human resources. As the Mongolian 
corruption assessment reports:  
Unofficial estimates maintain that as many as 60 percent of all government staff, 
including civil service employees, were terminated and replaced after the 
parliamentary elections of 1996 and 2000, when the party in power changed 
(USAID, 2005, p. 12). 
In spite of gradual improvement, the situation still exists in current government 
organisations and this is supported by interviewees. Due to the deep penetration of 
political parties and MPs in executive functions (Interview B7, 00:10:30-5 P4), 
―ministerial staff could not be retained, and were fired/hired after each new 
minister depending on their political parties‖ (Interview A1, 00:11:22-8). 
Moreover, appointments of higher-ranking officials are not based on merit 
(Interview A5) but, rather, on their political contribution or closeness to leading 
political parties and leaders. Politicisation leads to political patronage, political 
appointments and nepotism in the public sector (Interview D1). Thus, the public 
service has become ―a political game‖ (Interview D8, 00:03:43-9 P3).  This 
system leverages ―officials to make symbolic decisions in favour of their own 
interests, rather than leveraging them to make good decisions for the public‖ 
(Interview F9, 00:30:50).  
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Some interviewees claimed that the Ministry has become the ―ministry of 
environmental destruction‖, rather than ―environmental protection‖ (Interview F2). 
Two NGO interviewees argued that Mongolian ―ecology is a victim of politics‖ 
(Interview F4, F8). Even in parliament, MPs, particularly business-MPs whose 
interests are not ―always in the best interests of the public‖ (Interview D1) have a 
lack of political will to form and pass effective legislation and regulations on 
environmental matters, such as the environmental destruction assessment, EIA 
amendments and compensation for mining affected people and regions (Interview 
A5). A project manager interviewee contended that legislation on the ecological 
destruction assessment has taken a decade to be passed by the parliament because 
of this lack of political will (Interview D5). These arguments indicate that 
environmental issues are politically sensitive and that there is ―too much 
politicisation‖ (Interview A5). The Ministry is under great pressure from mining 
companies, business and political power groups, international governments and 
donor organisations. These groups lobby or put pressure on ministerial officials in 
various ways, as evidenced by media coverage, public debates on television and in 
newspapers, parliamentary debates among MPs, and public rumour on the street.  
Moreover, accountability was a critical issue addressed by twelve interviewees. 
Being one of the principal players in environmental issues, the government and its 
organisations should be accountable to society. As an international organisation 
interviewee explained:  
The law is not just about holding somebody else accountable. It is about setting 
a framework which applies to everybody including the government. Until that is 
really understood and implemented, you will continue to see strange decisions 
coming out of these ministries (Interview D1, 00:43:04-8). 
However, at the moment there is no accountability mechanism, particularly for 
higher level officials and politicians. An NGO interviewee was critical that there 
is ―no value is placed on honesty or a mechanism that guarantees accountability‖. 
She considered that ―politicisation, corruption and nepotism… allow officials to 
protect each other from being accountable‖ (Interview F4, 00:26:50-4 P2). Thus, 
no one is responsible in Mongolia (Interview A4, Part 6). Responsibility is passed 
to another, without acknowledging their responsibilities (Interview F2, 00:12:58). 
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One EIA interviewee asserted:  
As a result, the EIA report has become a ‗symbolic document‘, as all parties 
lack accountability and a proper system of penalties. EIA companies do not 
know how to conduct an EIA. Mining companies pay only scant attention to 
implement EIA recommendations. Ministerial staff and inspectors do not know 
how to ensure the quality of EIAs (Interview A5, 00:21:52-3).  
Arguably, accountability for environmental matters is important and everyone 
needs to understand that ―harming the natural environment means harming the 
future of our children‖ (Interview D5, 00:08:11-1).  
The close connection of ministerial officials and EIA companies is a further issue 
that creates power imbalances among EIA constituents. According to the law, an 
EIA company should be an independent business entity (The State Great Khural 
of Mongolia, 1998). However, most interviewees argued that nepotism and 
corruption is widespread among EIA companies due to their close connections 
with ministerial officials (Interview A6, 00:01:22-4 P3). As an interviewee of a 
government organisation commented, the EIA has been regarded as a money-
making activity for ministerial officials, particularly until 2006 (Interview A2, 
00:37:45-3.).  
Public officials and their friends or relatives established many EIA companies – 
83 licensed companies in total (Interview F9, 00:30:50). Some EIA interviewees 
complained that ―in most cases, large EIA reports are conducted by their 
[ministerial officials] own EIA companies and accepted by their own people in the 
MNET‖ (Interview A1, 00:37:53-5). An NGO interviewee supported this and 
argued that ―ministerial EIA experts receive EIAs carried out by their companies. 
So, it is clear that decisions will be made in favour of their interests‖ (Interview 
F9, 00:32:08). Another interviewee gave an example of a case where ―a son has a 
mining company and his father owns an EIA company‖ (Interview F8, 00:36:03-
6).  
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Closeness to the Ministry results in easy approvals, weak monitoring and poor 
accountability for guilty EIA companies (Interview A2). As an EIA interviewee 
noted:  
Some EIA companies produce 157 EIA reports per year. As it usually takes at 
least two months to prepare one report, this example shows that EIAs have been 
low quality or copied from previous reports (Interview A1, 00:06:41-6).  
This situation undermines the reputation of EIA companies as professional, 
independent entities. It also contributes to further conflicts of interest among 
public servants and leverages them to use their positions and networks for 
individual gain.  
In terms of EIA companies, some interviewees of EIA companies complained 
about the lack of ministerial support. The Ministry sees them as business entities 
and claims that ―it is the duty and issue of EIA companies to improve their own 
capacity building, either through their association or in other ways‖ (Interview B2, 
00:07:27-2 P2). Alternatively, an EIA interviewee argued that EIA companies are 
research institutions as well, but do not receive government support in this respect 
(Interview A1, 00:30:13-7). 
Weak EIA companies, in turn, have produced poor quality EIA reports and work 
in favour of their customers – mining companies (Interview B3, 00:20:23-9). Thus, 
professional ethics, reputation and quality of EIA experts are at stake. In this 
environment, it is very difficult for EIA companies to balance being both a 
business entity and a professional research institution (Interview A1) without 
being lobbied (Interview A2, 00:32:54-4). Most interviewees, even ministerial 
staff, acknowledged that many EIA companies tended to favour mining 
companies by promising to approve EIAs (Interview B7, 00:04:25-5 P4). An 
interviewee of a mining company explained: ―as mining companies pay money, 
EIA companies usually conduct EIAs in favour of mining companies‖ (Interview 
C2, 00:06:23-0 P2). And it is an ―understandable logic‖ (Interview C1, 01:01:06-
7). An NGO interviewee gave an example of one mining-biased EIA report that 
did not make mention of endangered plants in the local area where the mining 
project would operate (Interview F7, 00:43:31-9). This type of ―customer-service 
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focus‖ produces poor quality EIAs that have been prepared for monetary gain 
(Interview A4, 00:06 P5).   
Regarding mining companies, there are problems, such as mining becoming a 
political issue, prone to public debate, and that it is becoming difficult to operate 
honestly when government organisations and local governors are corrupt (USAID, 
2005; World Bank, 2007). However, mining companies usually have more power 
compared with other EIA constituents. Large foreign and domestic mining 
companies in particular can influence policies and decisions through business and 
political leaders, their professional interest groups
91
, international governments, 
and donor organisations. Mining companies lobby MPs, the government, and 
ministerial officials, and place pressure on them to have officials make favourable 
decisions. This has often been criticised among NGOs, activists, the public and 
media since the late 1990s.  
Due to endemic corruption, mining companies have become both contributors and 
victims of public-sector corruption. On the one hand, NGO interviewees argued 
that mining companies bribe policy makers and public servants either to gain 
approval or to accelerate approval processes for mining projects (Interview F1, 
F2). On the other hand, mining interviewees claimed it was difficult for mining 
companies to operate in a corrupt country ―as everyone sees mining companies as 
‗rich‘, and therefore wants more‖ either by bribery or philanthropy (Interview C1, 
C3).  
Figure 7.3 also shows that international donor organisations have great influence 
on most EIA constituents. Interviewees, particularly NGO members, were critical 
of large international interests in Mongolian mining and the pressure of 
international organisations on the government and civil society. They asserted that 
the World Bank, IMF, and other international donor organisations forced the 
government to build an infrastructure for transnational companies (Interview F1). 
These organisations usually claimed they were helping LDCs to develop the right 
structure for development, which is generally interpreted as helping to attract 
                                               
91 Such as mining related associations and lobby groups 
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more foreign investment to contribute to economic growth (Interview F10). Large 
international mining companies and governments also have interests in large coal, 
copper, and uranium deposits, and thus place pressure on or endeavour to lobby 
the main political parties, public officials, and the Mongolian government 
(Interview F8, F10). Some also argued that international donor organisations use 
NGOs
92
 to deeply implant their ideas in society (Interview F1).  
Based on interviewees‘ arguments and document analysis, the following figure 
has been developed to illustrate the dangers of social and political issues that 
create increased power imbalances among EIA constituents.  
Figure 8. Mongolian social and political context 
 
Figure 8 shows that poor governance, politicisation, corruption and weak 
public/civil society are both causes and consequences of each other. More 
seriously, they lead to poor accountability and weak democracy that have become 
serious barriers to the Mongolian social and political pursuit of democracy 
(UNDP & Government of Mongolia, 2006).  
Poor governance, ineffective institutions, legislation, and a politicised public 
sector provide a ‗fertile‘ environment for corruption. Endemic corruption in the 
public sector can be seen by the comparison of the average salaries of public 
servants and their personal expenses
93
 (Interview F10). According to the 
corruption assessment, the most corrupt government organisations are customs, 
                                               
92 NGO related arguments will be discussed in Chapter 8 in more detail.   
93  An average salary in the public sector ranges from NZ$300 to NZ$600 per month 
(approximately). But anecdotal evidence suggests many public servants have luxurious apartments, 
cars and expensive personal assets that cost thousands of dollars. 
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tax, and inspection offices (USAID, 2005, p.20), all considered the most desirable 
organisations in which to be employed. An NGO interviewee complained that 
society accepts this situation without much questioning (Interview F10, 00:38:03-
9). Social tolerance of corruption is very dangerous and makes democracy fragile 
―in the face of powerful internal and external challenges and shocks, in particular 
those associated with the current resource boom‖ (Fritz, 2008, p. 786). It also 
worsens power imbalances in society and results in the hopeless situation of EIAs, 
in which local communities feel powerless about decisions that have a profound 
impact on their lives. This was evident from interviews with herders, NGO 
members, and the voices of ordinary people on the street.  
Corruption, politicisation, and poor governance go hand-in-hand, making their 
causes and consequences difficult to distinguish. However, the clear outcomes are 
the absence of accountability, widespread mistrust, opportunism, and nepotism at 
all levels of society. They ultimately affect EIA constituents and prevent 
meaningful participation and effective EIAs.  
6. Recognise the transformative potential of dialogic accounting and resist 
new forms of monologism: 
Based on data analysis outlined in previous principles, it can be asserted that 
existing EIAs are not dialogic. The EIA is a decision-making process carried out 
by the Ministry, EIA companies, and mining companies. It is a vertical decision-
making system without the interaction of all interested parties. Thus, the EIA is 
seen as a compliance process of the environmental protection policy (Interview 
B2). In spite of some degree of participation by local people, EIAs are neither 
open to interested parties nor able to prevent mining-related negative impacts on 
the natural environment and society.  
However, there are some initiatives that encourage dialogue among different 
stakeholders. Multi-stakeholder engagement in mining and environmental issues 
has been increasingly welcomed by policy-makers, from civil society and private 
sectors, with varying degrees of supervision from international donor 
organisations, such as the World Bank, UNDP, and the Asia Foundation.  
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One example of such initiatives is the Asia Foundation (TAF) - a donor 
organisation which aims to address poverty, mining development, and corruption 
in Mongolia (Darling, 2009). It has organised a number of forums and meetings 
among mining constituents to promote dialogue for information-sharing and 
knowledge generation concerning mining. Dialogue among different mining 
constituents with conflicting views can be ―quite adversarial and argumentative‖ 
as ―a lot of aggression and fear‖ is caused by a lack of knowledge and information 
about mining (Interview D6). Through seminars and training in local areas, TAF 
noticed that the old monologue style of meetings has begun to change, as people 
gradually learn to engage in dialogue by talking and listening to each other 
(Interview D6, 00:54:22-5).  
In this process it is challenging to overcome the long-standing mistrust among 
mining constituents and the lack of any tradition of active public engagement in 
decision-making. Through numerous forums and public debates in the press and 
media, all parties have gradually understood the importance and benefit of 
engagement in major developmental projects and environmental issues. This can 
be evidenced by the last five years of social debates and forums on developing 
large mining projects, such as Oyu Tolgoi copper mining and Tavan Tolgoi coal 
mining.  
As current EIAs are not dialogic, the principle of ―resist[ing] new forms of 
monologism‖ is not necessarily relevant at the moment. However, if the EIA 
framework and its progress to date are investigated, this principle can be related to 
the status quo. After its trial introduction by the ADB in 1992, the EIA framework 
became the main environmental management tool after the EIA law (1998). The 
law established a solid basis for the EIA, and its amendments in 2001 promoted 
public participation in EIAs. However, interviewees argued that the EIA law does 
not provide a clear mechanism for public participation (Interview A2, A5, D4, F9). 
As the importance of participation is not recognised, participation in EIAs has 
become a ‗symbolic‘ prerequisite of the EIA Committee for the approval process. 
For the last three years the government has proposed a new amendment bill, 
which has been discussed among EIA constituents, including environmental and 
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human-rights NGOs (Interview F2, F7). The bill attempts to improve existing 
participatory practice by defining a participatory mechanism (Interview A5). It 
proposes two separate articles on informing the public and for receiving public 
comments, and requires the MNET to provide accessible, full EIAs, and to 
consider public comments in final EIAs (The State Great Khural of Mongolia, 
2008).  
In summary, existing EIAs are monologic – they are expert-oriented, technocratic, 
environmental management tools that provide compulsory documents for mining 
project approval. EIAs are heavily dependent on vertical decision-making that 
lacks free information flows and open, fair interactions among EIA constituents.  
7.4 The potential of dialogic EIAs  
7.4.1 Deficiencies of monologic EIAs 
In spite of initial goals for proposing changes in developmental decisions that 
could consider environmental and social consequences, EIAs have not produced 
the necessary ‗revolutionary transition‘ in decision-making. From both the EIA 
literature review in Chapter 3 and Mongolian practice explored above, it is evident 
that EIAs have become a formal assessment process for project approval. As has 
happened in other LDCs, Mongolia uncritically imported its EIA legislation 
(Kolhoff, et al., 2009). There is a lack of awareness and capacity among EIA 
constituents and the lack of a clear implementation mechanism that could ensure 
realisation of the potential benefits of EIAs. Mongolian EIA practice for mining 
projects supports the criticism of Jay et al. (2007) that EIAs have become a 
―decision-aiding tool‖ rather than a ―decision-making tool‖ as initially proposed 
(p. 293).  
A monologic EIA falls short of addressing realities and of being value-neutral and 
apolitical, as proponents claim. As in monologic accounting (Brown, 2009), 
monologic EIAs do not have the ability to reflect and address social and 
environmental realities or the complexities of proposed mining projects. Arguably, 
the EIA needs to confront subjectivity and explicit value judgements if it is to be a 
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management tool that can protect against the adverse environmental impacts of 
development projects (Cashmore, 2004; Jay, et al., 2007). Environmental damage 
respects ―no political boundaries‖, negative impacts may take many years to 
manifest, and such damage is prohibitively expensive to rectify in either economic 
or social terms (Toth, 2010).  
The monologic EIA is technocratic and claims to be value-neutral and apolitical. 
However, advocates of technocracy argue that depoliticisation of decision-making 
can ensure value-neutrality and objective assessment (Wilson, 2006, p. 53). The 
basic assumption is that decision-makers make decisions when pursuing the 
public good, even in the absence of broad based participation (O'Faircheallaigh, 
2010).  
However, Curran and Hollander (2008) argue that the arguments of technocrats 
for value neutrality and the apolitical natures of EIAs are not valid as they ―can be 
dominated by project proponents, consultants on their payroll, government 
agencies that are subject to ‗capture‘ by proponents, and politicians intent on 
promoting short-term economic growth to boost their electoral prospects‖ (Curran 
& Hollander, 2008). This situation is particularly relevant to LDCs with weak 
governance and accountability, a lack of institutional and human capacities, and 
endemic corruption (Cherp, 2001; Kakonge, 1998).  
The analyses of interviews and documents suggest that Mongolian EIAs are 
neither value-neutral nor apolitical. EIAs are political and often favour project 
proponents‘ interests (Interview A4, F2). Moreover, decision-makers act within 
their political arena. They are often under pressure from the government, 
politicians, international donor organisations and international investors 
(Interview A4, A6, B3, D2, D5, F1, F7). They make decisions in the name of 
development, where development projects may ―conflict with environmental and 
public health concerns‖, and ―reward elected politicians for short-term results‖ 
(Toth, 2010, p. 297).  
Technocratic EIAs supported by the existing framework and institutions result in 
expert-oriented reports. These reports provide decision-makers with a ‗protective 
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shell‘ from interested parties, including the more critical voices of NGOs and 
local people. By being privileged with scientifically ‗objective‘ evidence, 
technocracy forces EIA constituents to reduce a wide range of political, economic, 
and social demands and discontent into arguments that can be evaluated based on 
their ―scientific validity‖ (Lockie, et al., 2008). This is supported by Mongolian 
EIA practice and shows that the validity requirements of EIAs monologise 
decision-making, with the exclusion of ‗others‘ as non-valid. This was obvious 
from some interviews with public servants, EIA and mining companies, and donor 
organisations; they were critical of having other voices from environmental NGOs 
and activist locals in EIAs, calling them noise-makers, and criticising them as 
unprofessional and lacking scientific evidence, and also having conflicts of 
interest (Interview A6, C2, D1, D6).  
Thus, the technocratic EIA is non-democratic, given its monologism, excludes 
‗others‘ and is privileged with experts as the dominant group in decision-making. 
There is little room in EIAs for democracy or the pluralism of different 
perspectives with consideration of local knowledge. In terms of providing 
meaningful participation, monologic EIAs are deficient.  
Although public participation is possible in the existing legislative framework 
(Interviewees A1, A5, B2), practice shows that it is symbolic. In practice, affected 
communities are excluded from EIAs due to non-accessible reports written in 
―professional language‖ for only expert use (Interview A5, E1, F3), which 
effectively alienates non-experts from EIAs, and ―keep[s] out any critical voice in 
the decision-making process‖ (Menon & Kohli, 2008, p. 17). Some NGO 
interviewees acknowledged this, arguing that mining and EIA companies exclude 
affected local people and only include people who are in favour of mining projects 
(Interview F1, F2, F4, A4). In addition, these companies misinform local people 
for the purpose of obtaining positive comments or they lobby or threaten 
environmental NGOs and local people so as to silence critical views on mining 
(Interview F4, F8, E1). Thus public participation in Mongolia is primarily 
―symbolic‖ (Interview F8).  
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Contradictory statements on participation confirm that symbolic participation is 
not effective or meaningful. Interviewees from NGOs, international organisations, 
some EIA companies and government organisations acknowledged that current 
participation is inadequate for addressing the ever increasing mining-related 
environmental and social issues in Mongolia. Conducting the EIA after the mining 
licence is issued has resulted in the EIA becoming a ―check-and-tick‖ activity for 
approval of a mining project. Thus the EIA system itself is ―counter-productive‖ 
for promoting participation (Interview D1). This supports Wilson‘s (2006) 
argument that EIA participation is ―co-opted for the purposes of technocratic 
management‖, and ―domesticated away from its radical roots‖ by ―focusing on 
getting the techniques right while avoiding consideration of power and politics as 
divisive and obstructive‖ (Wilson, 2006, pp. 507-508). Mongolian EIA practice 
shows that participation is minimal and has become a bare prerequisite for the 
necessary evidence that is incorporated in EIAs to obtain approval from the EIA 
Committee.   
This symbolic participation has become regarded as a ―useless‖ process for local 
people to influence the outcomes of mining projects (Interview B5). Lack of hope 
can only result in further non-participation in EIAs, as evidenced in countries such 
as Peru, where affected local people began to refuse to participate, as their 
participation served only to ―legitimise‖ the legal process for mining approval (Li, 
2009). However, with minimal public input, the EIA has been ―pushed towards a 
predictive, or technical, paradigm‖ which cannot provide social learning for EIA 
constituents (Lockie, et al., 2008, p. 186).  
To summarise, monologic EIAs are deficient for the purposes of promoting 
sustainable and participatory mining in Mongolia. Their technocracy undermines 
the democratic intention of public participation. Monologic EIAs are incapable of 
addressing sustainable development for mining, as they are closed to alternative 
opinions and perspectives that would identify and assess social and environmental 
impacts and propose mitigation methods.  
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As sustainability is ―a contested concept‖, with various interpretations among 
different actors (Söderbaum, 2011), it is important to promote pluralism to 
recognise different political and ideological orientations of actors and to have 
dialogue about such differences, and to propose or act to revise the EIA 
framework so it can become a meaningful decision-making tool for the promotion 
of sustainable and participatory mining. Pluralism would also enable social 
learning for all EIA constituents absent from current EIA practices. In this respect, 
change towards a dialogic EIA could be promising as a means of overcoming the 
deficiencies of the existing monologic EIAs.  
7.4.2 Potential of dialogic EIAs 
Given its pluralistic roots and capacity for participatory decision-making, the 
dialogic approach is open to subjectivity and is sufficiently flexible for 
contestation. As Molisa et al. (forthcoming) explained:  
A dialogic approach is explicitly concerned with the inclusiveness of all actors 
in accountability processes, identification of unequal power relations, and 
expansion of ethics to include issues previously excluded by identifying 
marginalised voices and including them in exposing social conflicts and tensions 
as ways of beginning to work toward their resolution (p. 17).  
As noted in Chapter 5, one of the goals of the EIA is power re-distribution and 
change in decision-making structures through public participation. 
O‘Faircheallaigh (2010) argues that an EIA can be used as a space for 
marginalised or affected people to ―change the social order, and in so doing alter 
in basic ways the distribution [of] costs and benefits from development‖ (p. 22). 
The dialogic EIA has the potential to address mining-related environmental and 
social impacts by providing an arena where contestation and differences can be 
revealed through dialogue and openly discussed by both experts and non-experts.  
Particularly in the Mongolian context, dialogic EIAs have the potential ―to 
construct more empowering and enabling forms‖ of EIAs ―in ways that are just, 
democratic, sustainable and, most of all, of benefit to their peoples and 
communities‖ (Molisa, et al., forthcoming, p. 17). In recent years, socially 
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beneficial mining has become a crucial issue. This is supported by interviewees‘ 
views and current parliamentary and public debates in Mongolia. A dialogic 
approach could not only contribute to discussion on how to effectively distribute 
the benefits from mining to the public (Interview D3), but could also allow 
engagement of affected people in issues that affect their lives (Interview F2). As 
an interviewee argued, it was important to have everyone‘s involvement in 
environmental issues as ―neither empty criticism, nor ‗blind eyes‘ to problems can 
be helpful for the status quo‖ (Interview D5, 00:10:11-6). 
In spite of the symbolic participation of monologic EIAs, nine interviewees 
emphasised the importance of good participation. In their view, good participation 
could be enabled by well-informed, knowledgeable, and active citizens, whose 
comments are considered in decision-making and who are granted access to the 
jurisdiction system on EIA matters (Interview A5, B3, D5, F3, F7, G1, G2). 
Interviewees believed that participation could make positive contributions to 
existing mining and enable ―information sharing and community development‖ 
that would build trust among EIA constituents and would help reduce future 
conflict (Interview B1, D2, D6). Moreover, early engagement of affected people 
could assist mining companies to discover the major issues before projects 
commence (Interview B1) and could assist in promoting realistic EIAs (Interview 
D2, 00:18:43-5). The quality of EIAs would also be improved as participants 
could be involved in all processes from the impact assessment through to 
monitoring, which would change the attitude of all parties towards mining 
(Interview A1, 00:54:11-1). In this respect, dialogic EIAs could provide 
opportunities for participants to go ―beyond any one individual‘s understanding… 
in dialogue, people become observers of their own thinking‖ (Wilson, 2006, p. 
515), which could have wider consequences for the empowerment of citizens 
(Lockie, et al., 2008; Wilson, 2006).   
7.4.3 EIA as a space/tool/process 
In spite of its symbolism, the Mongolian EIA legislation has promoted 
participation (Interview F8, F9). In the absence of other participatory mechanisms, 
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dialogic EIAs could be an important tool of local democracy as they would 
―encompass [the] empowerment of local people; and enhance the position of … 
disadvantaged or marginalised members of society‖ (O'Faircheallaigh (2010) by 
creating a space ―where local people can frame and articulate their needs, values 
and priorities‖ (Li, 2008). Most interviewees agreed that public participation 
could help to improve the existing poor mining practice (Interview A5, D1, F2, 
B1).  Unlike monologic EIAs, dialogic EIAs would include affected local people 
and allow them to have dialogue with other EIA constituents. With dialogic 
engagement, EIA decisions would be better informed and have a ―multi-
directional feedback mechanism‖ among the government, private sector, public 
and civil society organisations (Toth, 2010).  
Dialogic EIAs could also open ―a learning space‖ that recognises differences 
between experts and non-experts (Sinclair, et al., 2008). However, it is ―a unique 
space where learning cannot be prescribed‖ and is: 
… neither strategic learning for ‗normalisation‘ nor learning for transformation. 
Nor are different kinds mutually exclusive; one can have elements of both 
strategic and transformatory learning within the same space and one might move 
from one to the other and back again over time (Wilson, 2006, p. 512).  
This learning process could enable the ―transformative potential‖ of EIAs to direct 
EIA constituents towards social-value change that would be inspired by 
sustainable development (Söderbaum, 2004; Wilkins, 2003). As Sinclair et al. 
(2008) explained, through dialogue, participation could also lead to ―the 
perspective transformation necessary for changing unsustainable resource use 
patterns‖, and address the need for ―a change in response to the sustainability 
imperative‖ (pp. 416-425).  
As a dialogic learning tool, the EIA could also contribute to democratisation in 
newly democratic countries such as Mongolia. As discussed in Chapter 3, the 
Aarhus Convention (1998) legitimised and accelerated this process, as most 
governments have voluntarily signed to enforce it. It could also challenge the 
state-secrecy culture in post-communist countries and ―… represent a compromise 
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or intermediate step to broader actions toward transparency‖ by allowing 
accessibility of environmental information (Toth, 2010, p. 328).  
The Mongolian government has voluntarily adopted the Aarhus Convention since 
the early 2000s (MNET, 2009b). Although current monologic EIAs do not apply 
to many recommendations of the convention, dialogic EIAs would better suit the 
ethos of the Aarhus framework of participatory environmental decision-making. 
The transformation to dialogic EIAs, with the promotion of pluralism and 
dialogue, could be regarded as a democratisation process in the environmental 
decision-making framework and EIA related institutions.  
As EIA and participation processes create ―an image of consensus, cooperation 
with local communities and state avowal‖ (Li, 2009, p. 232), the benefits of the 
dialogic approach in EIAs could be enormous. Through pluralist dialogue, EIA 
constituents with conflicting views on mining may better understand their 
differences and commonalities; be enabled to make more inclusive decisions; and 
learn from each other as no one party would be explicitly ‗privileged‘. Some 
interviewees expressed their agreement with this, based on their past experience 
of multi-stakeholder dialogue in which multi-stakeholders with conflicting views 
and knowledge had been able to share information with each other and discuss 
common goals for mining development (Interview D6, F9).  
Arguably, ―shared responsibility‖ set by the existing EIA framework (Szablowski, 
2007) could lead EIA constituents to pay more attention to mining and 
environmental issues as participants become part of a proposed project and 
become beneficiaries of mining-related benefits and costs. Perhaps this 
engagement of shared responsibility could change the NIMBY attitude of some 
people, referred to by some NGO and herder interviewees. 
To summarise, the dialogic EIA, as a legitimate space for participation and 
dialogue, could serve as a dialogic tool and process that would enable EIA 
constituents to achieve shared common goals, such as sustainable and 
participatory mining.         
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7.5 How to transition from monologic to dialogic 
To enable transformation from monologic to dialogic EIAs, a number of issues 
must be addressed, which can be framed by the following three questions: 
1. What must be changed to facilitate this transformation? 
2. Who can carry out the necessary changes? 
3. How can this change happen?  
The following sections will discuss these in detail. 
7.5.1 What to change, and by whom? 
It is important to understand that the monologic EIA is both a tool and process. 
Thus, any transformation must address the ‗dual nature‘ of monologic EIAs. In 
this respect, EIA related institutions and constituents would need to take various 
actions: forming a participatory mechanism/framework that would enable 
meaningful dialogue and social learning; organising dialogue among EIA 
constituents to discuss the opportunities and challenges of the transformation 
process; ensuring information accessibility; and having broader participation that 
would include affected local communities. However, it might prove challenging 
for LDCs such as Mongolia, which as a young democracy has weak governance 
and endemic corruption.   
Regarding the second question as to who can carry out the necessary changes, all 
EIA constituents would need to contribute to the change towards dialogic EIAs. A 
number of interviewees acknowledged the importance of mutual understanding 
among EIA constituents. They suggested that all parties, including government 
officials, inspectors, EIA specialists, mining companies and local people, would 
need to be trained and be cooperative, to enable better participation (Interview A1, 
00:50:13-3) and provide opportunities for each other to participate in EIAs 
(Interview B7, 00:10:31-5 P5). An interviewee of an EIA company emphasised 
the importance of engagement by the most active people – NGO leaders or other 
interest groups – to facilitate this process through the education and mobilisation 
of affected local communities (Interview A5, 00:35:05-1). The potential 
engagement of NGOs will be discussed in the next chapter.    
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For mining companies, more participatory dialogic EIAs would also be beneficial. 
As mining projects operate for decades, public perception of mining is crucial for 
mining companies (Interview C3, D2). Poor engagement and misunderstanding 
increases the risks for mining companies, which can be evidenced by numerous 
demonstrations, debates and hunger strikes against mining companies in Mongolia 
(Interview D2, F2, F4). As one interviewee described it, public participation 
should be seen ―as in their [mining companies] self-interests to have engagement 
of communities around mine sites‖ (Interview D2, 00:20:20-5). Participation 
could improve public perception and trust among mining constituents and could 
help reduce future conflict (Interview B1, D6). In addition, increased participation 
would contribute to economically sustainable mining development (Interview D3, 
00:13:33-6). 
In terms of when to participate, some interviewees suggested that affected 
communities ought to participate from the outset of the planning process of an 
EIA (Interview D5, 00:23:31) and be able to ―express their views, determine how 
the project will affect them and their surrounding natural environment, and 
discuss whether these impacts are acceptable or not‖ (Interview F13, 00:35:05-6). 
While others proposed that participation should begin from the issue of the mining 
licence, as this could enable more meaningful participation for those who will be 
impacted by poor mining (Interview D1, D8, B5). However, it is better to have an 
effective mechanism and economic incentives to ensure that affected local 
communities can engage in EIAs and receive benefits from mining operations, 
rather than have empty slogans and only minor penalties for companies after 
adverse environmental impacts occur (Interview D5, 00:10:11-6).  
Public participation that is limited to ad hoc questionnaires and surveys would 
need to be changed to multi-stakeholder dialogue that could enable dialogic EIAs 
that foster sustainable and participatory mining.  
7.5.2 How to transition from monologism towards dialogic EIAs? 
There could be two forms of dialogic EIAs: formal and informal. Although their 
boundaries may become blurred, both forms would contribute to the 
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transformation process. Formal EIAs would be deliberative, in terms of having a 
legislative framework for public participation and having organised dialogue 
among EIA constituents. Alternatively, informal EIAs would provide a more 
agonistic type of participatory democracy. Participation in informal EIAs would 
be flexible and temporary. Participants could have their own pro- and counter- 
EIA assessments, arguments and perspectives on EIA related issues. This will be 
discussed further in Chapter 8, with consideration of the potential engagement of 
NGOs for promoting dialogic EIAs.  
In terms of dialogue, the Western style town-hall meeting for public participation 
in EIAs may not be appropriate and effective in the Mongolian context, given 
sparsely populated herders and their nomadic life style. Some interviewees 
suggested the need for a different ‗model‘ of participation that would recognise 
the specific characteristics of the nomadic culture of herders (Interview D4). In 
this respect an interviewee of an international organisation suggested that: 
You've got to think about a new model for doing it. You cannot use European, 
North American or South-East Asian models. I'm not sure where you would 
find a model because it requires participation at an individual 'ger'
94
 level - I 
don't see how you can avoid that. You need to understand the movement of 
people. Because in the area where most of the mining happens, it‘s the herding 
environment where people move throughout the year and over the years. So, 
you are going to have to find a model that is appropriate for Mongolia 
(Interview D2, 00:15:47-8).    
Thus it is important to carefully consider time, space and structural issues when 
proposing the development of dialogic EIAs. There may need to be at least two 
levels of dialogic participation in formal EIAs: one at the herder family level and 
another at the EIA constituent level. The reason for having different levels of 
dialogue is to have greater input from all affected local communities and to enable 
broader social learning among EIA constituents. Given geographical distances, 
time differences for the workloads of each EIA constituent and the costs involved 
                                               
94 ‗Ger‘ or ‗yurt‘ is a traditional Mongolian living place or tent. It is a portable, felt-covered, wood 
lattice-framed dwelling structure traditionally used by Turkic and Mongolian nomads in the 
steppes of Central Asia. A ‗ger‘ is more home-like than a tent in shape and build, with thicker 
walls (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yurt). 
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in organising and participating in dialogue, not all affected people may be able to 
participate in formal multi-stakeholder dialogue. Thus, it would be better to have 
two different levels of dialogue, each having different benefits and inputs to 
dialogic EIAs.  
The herder family level dialogue would enable discussion among herder families 
and EIA experts about a mining project and its potential impacts on local society, 
the economy, and natural environment. Herders would not only be information 
receivers, but also act as discussants and information providers for EIA experts. 
Their inputs to an EIA could be concerned with the impacts the mining project 
might have, how to define, measure, and mitigate such impacts, the local 
knowledge herders may have to address these issues, and how they could engage 
during the preparation, implementation and monitoring of an EIA report. From 
this process, both herders and experts would gain understanding and local 
knowledge. This could provide a social learning process for herders on how to 
express their views and knowledge, how to present arguments and engage in 
dialogue. In turn, EIA experts could learn to appreciate non-experts, become 
familiar with local knowledge, and become accustomed to preparing more 
inclusive EIAs.  
Through the herder family level of dialogue, herders could discuss their formal 
engagement in EIA processes and the best way to execute their engagement. Due 
to family commitments and limited time availability, herders might agree to 
become an organised, identifiable group for further EIA participation, or could 
select herders to represent their interests at the next level of multi-stakeholder 
dialogue. 
Regarding timing and distance factors, this type of dialogue would be better 
organised during summer and autumn, as the workload of herders and travelling to 
each other would be easier than in spring and winter. This dialogue could be 
organised on either the ‗bag‘ level or ‗khot ail‘ level, depending on distances and 
population density.  
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The second level of dialogue would be the EIA constituent dialogue or multi-
stakeholder dialogue. This could be organised during the preparation and after the 
issue of final EIA reports. To be inclusive and have effective impact on mining, it 
would better to stage such dialogue both during and after EIAs. Multi-stakeholder 
dialogue would provide an arena for all EIA constituents, including affected 
communities (or their representatives if it is organised far from the mining area), 
EIA and mining companies, local authority, experts from relevant government 
organisations, and interested environmental/other NGOs and academics.  
The dialogue would, in deliberative terms, initiate discussion and monitor the 
timing of meetings. However, it should maintain a flexible structure and 
procedures that would ensure a pluralistic, dialogic approach. This would mean 
dialogue must encourage the contestation of different actors, expressing their 
views of affected communities, and avoidance of trying to find immediately any 
single consensus. Thus, this dialogue would be more akin to the expression of 
views and methods, rather than seeking a ‗right‘ decision. 
The benefits of having such dialogue during the EIA preparation period would be 
to open up different views of EIA constituents on defining, measuring, 
determining social, economic and environmental impacts of a mining project and 
their mitigation methods. Through discussion, these views may be proposed, 
argued, accepted or rejected by constituents. EIA experts would appreciate a 
broader picture of their impact assessments, be able to find methods that best suit 
certain local areas, and learn from non-experts. All participants would also benefit 
from dialogue as they began to recognise the differences and similarities of each 
other, acknowledge subjectivity of EIAs, open up their ideological differences, 
learn to have dialogue, express views and gain more understanding of mining, 
social development, and EIAs. Organising multi-stakeholder dialogue after the 
final EIA report would also benefit multi-stakeholder engagement in the 
implementation of EIA recommendations in a project life cycle and monitoring 
that process.                   
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In terms of having an effective dialogue, an international organisation interviewee 
said that it was important to be ―focused on what is important‖ for all constituents 
and that ―they need to have goals which they are working towards‖ even if ―not 
everybody necessarily agrees on those goals‖ (Interview D1). He continued that 
once the government became part of the dialogue and agreed with common goals, 
it would be very difficult for the government to turn around and say ―no, we are 
not going to do it‖ (Interview D1, 00:36:43-8).  
Moreover, information and knowledge sharing is crucial for encouraging effective 
multi-stakeholder engagement. As an interviewee said, ―aggression and fear 
comes from a lack of knowledge‖, so the more informed and knowledgeable 
stakeholders can be, the more likely they will be to engage productively in 
dialogue (Interview D6). Thus, it is important that affected local communities be 
informed before a mining project and has time to comment on EIAs (Interview 
D2, 00:16:59-3). The amendment bill of the EIA law proposed 30 days to provide 
public comments on an EIA (The State Great Khural of Mongolia, 2008). 
 
In terms of the accessibility of EIA reports, some interviewees suggested it was 
crucial to have accessible EIAs for the public and to have public engagement both 
before and after final reports (Interview D5, F9). If access to EIAs were granted 
and became available to interested parties, this could promote more effective 
participation. In addition, EIAs would need to be open to the public at least one to 
three months before final reports are issued in order to provide the necessary time 
to gather public comments and include them in final EIAs (Interview F9, 
00:41:37). As understandable EIAs are another prerequisite for meaningful 
participation, EIA companies should provide at least an executive summary of an 
EIA to local people (Interview F7, 00:44:43-7), so they can more easily 
understand reports.       
As well as dialogue, participation in monitoring the implementation of the EIA is 
important, and was raised by twelve interviewees. Participation in the monitoring 
process, particularly during and after rehabilitation, is essential. As an NGO 
interviewee said, even up to five years after rehabilitation has been undertaken, 
local communities should monitor whether the natural environment has returned 
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to the original condition prior to mining, as recommended in the EIA (Interview 
F2, 00:30:16-9).  
Under the Environmental Protection Law, environmental inspectors at local and 
central government levels are responsible for environmental monitoring (The 
State Great Khural of Mongolia 1995, Section 3). However, this area of 
management is problematic due to limited human and financial capacities 
(Interview B3, 00:33:55-1). Regular monitoring by local people could be more 
effective than the ‗sole‘ monitoring undertaken by a few inspectors (Interview B5, 
00:03:05-3 P4). Because local herders have more time, capacity and knowledge 
about their surrounding natural environment and biodiversity, they could be more 
effective environmental guardians for checking mining operations and later 
rehabilitation programmes (Interview B3, 00:33:55-1). Herders naturally perform 
a monitoring role of their surrounding environments (Interview C3, 00:25:07-3) as 
their nomadic life requires close observation of their environmental surroundings. 
An interviewee suggested, given that monitoring plans have their basis in EIAs, 
that environmental protection and the monitoring of plans were potential areas of 
involvement for local people, (Interview D5). She also argued it would be more 
beneficial if local people were allowed to participate from the planning process 
stage onwards (Interview D5).  
In practice, there are already initiatives that promote the participation of local 
people in monitoring. Some large and medium mining companies have a 
representative group of local people, consisting of three herders who are paid to 
monitor mining activities according to the environmental protection and local 
social development plans proposed by companies (Interview B1, 00:42:14-8). 
Environmental law also has a separate article on partnership with local people or 
‗nukhurlul‘, which encourages local people to organise local environmental 
partnerships to protect the natural environment, implement environmental 
protection projects, and to perform public monitoring (The State Great Khural of 
Mongolia 1995, Article 31). Although such partnership practice is in its infancy, it 
has the potential to promote public engagement in environmental protection and 
EIAs.   
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7.6 Limitations of dialogic EIAs and barriers to transformation  
7.6.1 Barriers for EIA constituents  
To enable dialogic EIAs, each EIA constituent, including EIA companies, 
decision-makers, mining companies, affected communities and NGOs, needs to 
accept the concept of dialogic EIAs and make an effort, individually and 
collectively.  
Through legislation, experts of EIA companies would act as facilitators of public 
participation (The State Great Khural of Mongolia, 1998). However, they could 
also be technocrats with a lack of awareness and appreciation for effective 
dialogue among EIA constituents. Thus, a legislative framework for participation 
at the initial stage of the EIA process would be necessary to provide guidelines on 
methods and processes for organising multi-stakeholder engagement, and how to 
ensure effective dialogue among EIA constituents. In such a deliberative process, 
the role of government organisations and initiatives by international donors and 
professional NGOs, such as the EIA association, would be substantial. For 
instance, government organisations would need to ensure that EIA companies 
comply with high quality regulations, whereas donors and professional 
associations could apply international best practices and benchmarks in mining 
and EIAs, and develop professional training programmes and codes of conduct for 
regulating the professional ethics of EIA experts.           
For decision-makers, a range of difficulties would exist in institutions for the 
development of dialogic EIAs. The tension of decision-makers in participation 
would be problematic, as they often have participation ―within tiny circumscribed 
limits‖ so as to maintain ―centralised control‖ (Lawrence, 2003). However, 
increased international initiatives, following an appraisal of participatory decision-
making (Toth, 2010) and ―pressure‖ from international quasi-legal institutions and 
national NGOs, has forced national governments to manage the dilemma between 
―their propensity towards centralised control‖ and the ―decentralising tendencies 
of public involvement‖ (Lawrence, 2003, p. 273). Finding the political will to 
open EIAs to public participation would be challenging, particularly in those 
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LDCs with a politicised, corrupt public service. Some interviewees, including 
public servants, considered that Mongolia lacked the political will to have more 
participatory EIAs (Interview B3, F8). 
Opportunistic behaviour of public officials would pose another threat for the 
promotion of dialogic EIAs. Due to the highly politicised public service and the 
four-year election period in Mongolia, public officials tend to make decisions that 
favour their individual interests. This phenomenon supports Wilkins‘ (2003) 
argument that decision-makers ―overemphasise short-term individualism over the 
long-term community goals‖ (p. 410). This could worsen, given that the EIA 
committee is ―often headed by the current and ex-bureaucrats‖ (Menon & Kohli, 
2008), who may be un-aware or unwilling to recognise the benefits of a dialogic 
approach and therefore be unavailable to foster change towards dialogic EIAs. 
Thus, it would be necessary to have independent watchdogs over state 
organisations to hold them accountable and to act in accordance with public 
expectations (Interview D2). This function is already partially performed by 
current NGOs in Mongolia and will be examined in Chapter 8 in the case of 
environmental and mining NGOs. 
For mining companies, most interviewees, including those from mining pointed 
out the importance of state involvement in setting regulations and mechanisms 
that would ensure mining companies have more effective compliance with EIAs 
and also be self-monitoring (Interview C3, F9, D5). Again, professional NGOs 
such as the Mining Association could facilitate this process by introducing 
benchmarks, organising training and multi-stakeholder dialogue, and establishing 
self-monitoring systems, such as codes of conduct that would ensure better EIA 
enforcement and community engagement of mining companies. As mining 
companies tend to comply with only minimum standards (Interview F1, F3, A4), 
the public and NGOs would need to actively express their views on mining, 
cooperate with mining companies to promote social development, and act as 
watchdogs to ensure that mining operates in socially and environmentally friendly 
ways.  
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For affected local communities, earlier discussion in section 7.3 on public 
participation demonstrates the issues and impediments for local communities to 
engage in EIAs. The principal problems relate to a lack of power and knowledge 
to participate effectively in an EIA, and its monitoring. Arguably, the ability to 
express views, protect Constitutional rights and to have time, have the financial 
capacity and willingness to engage in EIAs are the chief barriers that would 
restrict the participation of affected communities. Thus, environmental and social 
NGOs, which aim to protect human rights and the natural environment, could help 
local communities to increase their awareness of mining, EIAs, and participation, 
and encourage them to exercise their legislative rights. Such potential roles of 
NGOs will be discussed in Chapter 8.  
In summary, Mongolian socio-political issues, such as corruption, weak 
governance, power imbalances and poor accountability in both public and private 
sectors could limit EIA constituents from developing dialogic EIAs and having 
meaningful participation. Moreover, the promotion of dialogic EIAs, without 
consideration of the possible manipulation by experts and power-holders, may 
risk the creation of a new type of monologism. 
7.6.2 Dangers of a new type of monologism  
Dialogic EIAs are promising, as they could create more inclusive, qualified and 
effective EIAs without marginalising affected local communities and local 
knowledge. However, there would be barriers and possible risks of manipulation 
(similar to those recognised in the ―tyranny of participation‖ literature – see 
Cooke and Kothari, 2001).  
An overemphasis on cooperative participation could create a new form of 
monologism. Critics argue that such an emphasis could in fact restrict ―public 
critique and disqualify opposition to mining activity‖ (Li, 2009, p. 224). Li (2009) 
claims that EIA participation could be used by project proponents to ‗map‘ the 
relations of various individuals and groups vis-à-vis the corporation: their 
attendance at meetings, concerns, and willingness to cooperate, as a basis for 
surveillance and establishing ―friendly alliances‖ (p.231).  By making pro- and 
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anti-mining ―alliances visible‖, corporate could reinforce the polarisation between 
―constructive‖ stakeholders and ―trouble-makers‖ (ibid.). In the process, ―the role 
of corporations and the state fades to the background‖ while local people ―take it 
upon themselves to monitor the activities of their fellow citizens and discipline 
them accordingly‖ (ibid.). 
In addition, the public and NGOs that refuse to engage in EIAs could argue that 
the formal EIA participation was symbolic and contrary to democracy, as their 
attendance in EIAs already would legitimate public hearings that were biased in 
favour of project proponents (Li, 2009, pp. 230-231). In spite of enthusiasm for 
participation on the basis that it may empower citizens by including marginalised 
or affected people, EIA participation does not always allow such engagement. 
O'Faircheallaigh (2010), for example, observes that disempowered groups are less 
likely to participate in EIAs, given their lack of resources and possible 
intimidation. Within the existing system of symbolic participation, EIAs are not 
distributing power among the public as hoped initially (Wilkins, 2003). Rather, 
EIAs are being used ―to reinforce marginalisation or marginalise social groups 
even further‖ (O'Faircheallaigh, 2010, p. 23). This has given rise to a loss of 
credibility for the idea of EIA participation (Jay, et al., 2007; Wilkins, 2003). Too 
often participation in EIAs has been used by technocrats in ways that create new 
forms of monologism.  
Accordingly, researchers and practitioners argue for the need to foster a ―dynamic 
and political environment‖, where participation occurs, based on a flexible 
framework of participation rather than on ―hard-and-fast rules‖ (O'Faircheallaigh, 
2010, p. 25). Practitioners would also need to recognise the dangers of power 
manipulation – closing down debate, ignoring uncertainties and excluding 
human/nonhuman actors (Chilvers, 2008). At the same time it is recognised that 
even monologic EIA processes could provide some small ―opportunity for public 
control of decisions‖, and ―for acquisition of skills, such as communication 
strategies and methods of social mobilisation‖ (Diduck & Mitchell, 2003, 358-
359). 
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Power inequalities among participants and political influences are serious issues 
which need to be addressed in developing participatory democracy and the 
practice of dialogue. Power inequality exists not only among EIA constituents, but 
also between LDC governments and international donor organisations. 
International donor organisations are criticised for favouring the governments of 
developed countries and multinational corporations at the expense of LDCs 
(Cooke & Kothari, 2001). Some NGO interviewees argued that an initiative for 
responsible mining would amount to the importation of a new form of Western 
capitalism (Interview F1, F8). They alleged that international donors use such 
initiatives to embed their infrastructure and to promote the interests of large 
multinational mining companies (Interview F8, F12).  
Dialogue has the potential to empower citizens through both formal deliberation 
and informal discussion. Especially in newly democratic countries, a democracy 
built on participation and dialogue helps to address ―a fundamental disconnection 
between the public and their governments‖ (Toth, 2010). Dialogue also helps to 
build a relationship between experts and non-experts and provides opportunities 
for mutual learning (Wilson, 2006). In this respect, this thesis argues that a 
transformation to dialogic EIAs, through participation and dialogue, has the 
potential to enable democratisation in environmental decision-making. However, 
time and resources would be required for the development of meaningful dialogue, 
and a number of obstacles would need to be addressed, some specific to LDC 
contexts. 
Dialogue in Mongolia could possibly continue to marginalise some local people, 
as the current system has effectively already excluded them. Kapoor (2008) 
argues that the assumption of deliberative democracy that marginalised people can 
be heard by elites is not often realised, as the system ―filter[s] out, den[ies], or 
suppress[es] subaltern voices‖ (Kapoor, 2008, p. 115). Such power imbalances 
may generate obstacles for dialogic EIAs to develop an accountability process and 
to institutionalise a democratic approach. Kapoor (2008) further highlights that in 
LDCs with extreme socio-economic inequalities it is easy for elites to divert 
resources to their own ends, and the risks that they will ―manipulate and impose 
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consensus are heavier and more difficult to minimise‖ (Molisa, et al., forthcoming, 
p. 19). Furthermore, there are discursive barriers between elites (Kapoor, 2008, p. 
113) and ordinary people, and experts and non-experts that are not easily 
overcome. Some interviewees were critical of the monologue style of discussion 
by local people and their lack of ability to express their views, and recognised that 
they would be major barriers for effective, inclusive dialogue (Interview D6, F2).     
Interviewees also reported the lack of trust among EIA constituents as a further 
constraint. Distrust among the public persists from the communist period, while 
cynicism about mining stems from a lack of understanding about mining and the 
poor social and environmental performance of mining companies (Interview D4, 
F9). Distrust and cynicism about mining would work against honest and open 
discussion among EIA constituents (Interview D1, D6, F2). As trust is ―a basis for 
genuine dialogue‖ its absence means people are ―less prepared to expose 
themselves and explore differences‖, thus inhibiting ―transformatory dialogue‖ 
(Wilson, 2006). Any consensus that could be drawn from this kind of dialogue 
would be arguably ―little more than ideological fantasy‖ (Kapoor, 2008, p. 115).  
To conclude, efforts to have meaningful participation and dialogue among EIA 
constituents could be obstructed and manipulated by power-holders who conduct 
EIAs, dominate dialogue, make EIA decisions, and monitor their implementation. 
This could diminish hope in, and the credibility of, dialogic EIAs and waste the 
efforts made by active participants. With a danger of co-option or manipulation by 
EIA companies, government organisations, and mining companies, overemphasis 
on participation could also create a new form of monologism. Thus, it is crucial to 
consider power issues carefully and to improve the awareness and capacity of all 
constituents, rather than to proceed with a naive faith in the ‗transformative 
possibilities‘ of dialogic EIAs. 
7.6.3 Benefits of transformation  
Notwithstanding important caveats that dialogic EIAs could be manipulated or 
result in a new form of monologism, there would be many potential benefits. 
Dialogic EIAs could be both a tool and process for environmental decision-
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making and public participation and dialogue among EIA constituents, potentially 
affecting each participant and institution in numerous ways.  
Even with a ‗minimal‘ dialogic approach, the most important benefit would be 
social learning for all EIA constituents. As the dialogic approach would encourage 
―dialectic learning in pluralistic environments‖ (Brown, 2009, p. 327), 
transformation to dialogic EIAs could provide opportunities ―to expose oneself 
before others, push the boundaries of what one knows, explore radical ideas 
together, and embrace disagreement where necessary‖ (Wilson, 2006, p. 518). The 
learning process could help actors go beyond ―the purpose of reinforcing and 
tweaking existing practice … towards transformation of ideas, knowledge and 
practice‖ (Wilson, 2006, pp. 518-519). Thus, it is crucial for Mongolians to 
address new challenges, such as enabling participatory environmental decision-
making and promoting sustainable and participatory mining. 
Even if dialogue among constituents does not occur as expected, the public – 
particularly affected local communities – could gradually learn about participatory 
rights and ways to engage in dialogue. Some interviewees claimed that dialogue 
was a passive form of engagement in environmental issues that would not have 
straightforward, direct outcomes that could be created by radical activism, such as 
hunger strike and protests (Interview F1, F10). In spite of its unnoticeable short-
term effects, dialogue could have long-term positive effects through the 
transformation of perspectives held by EIA constituents, increases in the quality 
of EIAs, and the development of EIA institutionalisation.  
Arguably, dialogic EIAs would free up information on the EIA, mining, and other 
issues and would challenge the long-standing state-secrecy culture of the public 
sector. EIA decisions would probably become more accessible to the public, 
which would enable improved accountability in both public and private sectors. 
Dialogic EIAs would also provide an opportunity to incorporate both scientific 
and local knowledge into EIAs, which is an important aspect for Mongolia, as the 
local knowledge of nomadic culture could benefit existing scientific knowledge of 
the EIA, which has been imported from Western countries. Thus dialogic EIAs 
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would have the potential to incorporate local knowledge in the scientific 
understanding of experts and to create a country-specific EIA framework and 
learning process.  
With more open engagement and information, EIA constituents would be more 
likely to identify and address environmental and social impacts ―before a crisis 
point is reached‖ (Toth, 2010, p. 297). This is crucial for Mongolia, where global 
warming and desertification has already begun to threaten people‘s lives and the 
biodiversity. As well, dialogic EIAs would have the potential to promote the 
engagement of local people and NGOs in environmental monitoring, which is 
currently poorly performed due to a lack of financial and human capacity of 
government organisations and a lack of political will (Interview A5, B3, F13).  
In summary, the pluralist environment provided by dialogic EIAs would 
encourage the dynamic engagement of EIA constituents in identifying impacts, 
discussion of mitigation methods, and mutual learning among experts and non-
experts. Moreover, it would enable much broader social learning of 
democratisation in environmental management by opening up the differences of 
EIA constituents and by initiating dialogue on an agenda for social change 
towards sustainable and participatory mining.  
7.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has argued that existing EIAs in Mongolia are monologic with only 
symbolic public participation. It is important to challenge monologic EIAs to 
address effectively the current poor mining practices and to foster sustainable 
development. Transformation from monologic EIAs to dialogic EIAs could be 
executed using two forms of dialogue; formal dialogue of EIAs would be 
deliberative, whereas informal dialogue would be more likely to be agonistic so as 
to include actors with conflicting views, different voices and perspectives. 
However, the boundaries between EIA forms would not be clearly divided, 
making them more pluralistic and inclusive, so as to enable dialogic EIAs. 
Although not everyone would choose to engage in deliberative dialogue of formal 
EIAs, dialogic EIAs would provide a space for informal/outside engagement.  
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The next chapter will discuss the potential engagement of NGOs for promoting 
dialogic EIAs, and will outline the different roles and strategies for NGOs to 
participate in both formal and informal forms of dialogic EIAs. 
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Chapter 8: MONGOLIAN ENVIRONMENTAL NGOs 
8.1 Introduction 
This chapter introduces the empirical findings from two studies of environmental 
and mining related NGOs. As noted in Chapter 7, NGOs have the potential, as 
constituents of the formal EIA process, to promote dialogic EIAs. Compared with 
other constituents, NGOs could have greater impact in terms of the transformation 
process if they were to consider engaging in environmental and mining issues in 
various ways. Accordingly, this chapter discusses the roles and participation of 
NGOs in mining and EIA matters and explores their potential engagement in 
dialogic EIAs. The chapter is structured as follows: first, the roles of NGOs are 
discussed, based on interviews and document analysis; second, case-studies of 
two NGOs are introduced to illustrate the diverse ways NGOs in Mongolia are 
engaging in mining and environmental issues; third, critiques of NGOs are 
discussed to provide insight into the challenges Mongolian NGOs face and the 
constraints on their activities; and finally, the current involvement of NGOs in 
EIAs is briefly discussed, followed by discussion of the potential for NGOs to 
promote dialogic EIAs.     
8.2 Mongolian NGO practice  
8.2.1 Roles of environmental NGOs 
Because of booming mining development in Mongolia, the negative impacts of 
mining on the local society and environment are becoming more obvious. 
Growing numbers of NGOs have been established by local communities and 
citizens who are concerned about human rights and environmental protection. As 
noted in Chapter 4 there are currently approximately 550 environmental NGOs 
that focus on environmental protection, environmental education, and mining 
issues (Gansukh, 2010). However, these NGOs account for only ten percent of 
total registered NGOs, some of which also address human rights and social issues 
arising from poor mining practices.  
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Similar to NGOs in other countries, Mongolian environmental NGOs have played 
important roles in increasing social awareness of mining-related environmental 
and social issues (Interview F8). In response, mining constituents have begun to 
acknowledge the rights of people to live in safe and healthy environments 
(Interview F7), and environmental issues have become one of the hottest topics in 
public debates. The roles of Mongolian NGOs can be categorised as follows: 
Provide critical voices: NGOs provide critical voices in society when the 
government cannot (or will not) act in the public interest (Interview F8). Some 
mining interviewees acknowledged that ―there is a need for NGOs to address 
environmental protection‖ (Interview C1, C3). For example, interviewees felt 
NGOs should watch over the government to ensure public monitoring (Interview 
D6) and to investigate the wrongdoings of government and the public (Interview 
F3). NGOs are regarded as important as they can monitor and exert pressure on 
the government ―to improve the quality of things done in the country‖ (Interview 
D1, 00:27:52-1).  
Provide information: NGOs are also seen as important contributors in that they are 
able to inform the government about developments in local areas, as the 
government appears unable to manage everything without assistance (Interview 
B3). Environmental NGOs have played an important role by informing local 
authorities and MPs about poor mining practices in local areas (Interview F4).  
Engage in monitoring functions: Some interviewees argued that NGOs should 
exist in society to perform some government functions, such as monitoring and 
providing professional consultation (Interview A5, F5). Environmental NGOs 
were seen as having the potential to enable public monitoring in mining affected 
areas, given that the government is unable to reach all areas (Interview B3, D6). 
Professional NGOs, such as the EIA Association, could for example encourage 
cooperation between EIA companies and government organisations, develop EIA 
methodologies, and organise training for EIA companies on how to use EIA 
methodologies (Interview A6).  
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Public educators: Environmental NGOs were also seen as educators, informing 
the public, increasing awareness of mining and environmental issues, improving 
knowledge of legal rights and responsibilities, and educating people about 
environmental protection (Interview B7, F3, F4).  
Influence decision-making: NGOs undertake various activities to lobby and 
influence decision-making and policy-making (Interview F7). One NGO 
interviewee reported: 
Because of the vertical decision-making system, local environmental NGOs 
realised it was useless acting in local areas already affected by decisions that 
had been made in the capital city. Rather, it was better to have an office and 
representative in the capital city and … cooperate with other NGOs with similar 
goals to influence government policies (Interview F2). 
NGOs have chosen both peaceful, cooperative strategies and more activist types 
of engagement to influence public debate and government policies. As NGOs 
began to realise ‗the power of numbers‘, they sought cooperation with similar 
NGOs to influence government policies and improve the legislative environment 
in terms of environmental protection (Interview F2, F3, F78 F10).  
Activism: NGOS have more contentiously organised petitions, demonstrations, 
protests and hunger strikes to exert pressure on the parliament and government to 
urgently address mining-related social and environmental issues (Shinebayar, 
2011; Snow, 2010). Such NGO activism attracts both criticisms and support.  
Some interviewees complained that NGOs politicise issues and criticise mining 
companies without credible evidence to support their claims (Interview B7). 
Instead of addressing issues in advance to prevent them, NGOs criticise after the 
event, which has ―little effect‖ (Interview D5). Some interviewees labelled 
environmental activist NGOs as ―grandstanders‖ or ―noise-makers‖ (Interview D1, 
F8).  
Other interviewees argued that NGOs have contributed to increasing public 
awareness of mining-related issues. They might not always be ―right‖, but NGOs 
such as the Onggi River Movement make a lot of noise (Interview D2) and in 
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doing so attract attention to issues, about which people had previously been 
unaware (Interview F12). Interviewees provided examples of several successes 
resulting from NGO activism, including opposition to the government ‗Gold 
Programme‘ (Interview F10) and cyanide contamination in Khongor soum 
(Interview F8), where NGO activism, together with media releases, raised social 
awareness and public anger against poor mining practices.  
The various roles outlined above are not mutually exclusive; NGOs may perform 
various roles individually and collectively. Some choose different strategies to 
address issues they care most about. To illustrate differences in approach, the 
following section introduces case-studies of two NGOs: the Onggi River 
Movement and the Responsible Mining Initiative. These particular NGOs have 
been chosen because of their popularity in Mongolia, the relevance of their 
activities to the promotion of sustainable and participatory mining, and the 
frequency with which they were mentioned by interviewees.  
8.2.2 Two case-studies of environmental and mining NGOs 
8.2.2.1 A challenger NGO – Onggi River Movement  
Onggi River Movement (ORM)
95
 is an example of a local NGO. It is a well-
known pioneering environmental NGO whose activities have been widely 
publicised.  
The primary reason for the formation of this NGO was the drying up of the Onggi 
River and Lake Ulaan, which sustained the lives of many people in the central and 
southern regions of Mongolia. Since the government ‗Gold Programme‘ in 1993, 
economic interests in gold mining have prevailed, exploiting gold deposits at river 
heads. The Onggi River flows for 430 kilometres through mountains, steppes and 
the Gobi region, and discharges its water into Lake Ulaan, which covers an area of 
175 kilometres
2
. Historically, the river has sustained the lives of more than 
100,000 people and more than one million livestock (UMMRL, 2009). Currently, 
                                               
95 Nine interviewees mentioned this NGO when addressing environmental NGOs and their roles in 
society. 
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it flows only 100 kilometres, and Lake Ulaan
96
, one of the ten largest lakes in 
Mongolia, has been dry
97
 since the late 1990s. As Mongolia depends largely on 
surface water, which comprises 70 percent of its water reserves, depletion of this 
river system has serious implications for local communities (Lovgren, 2008). 
Land degradation around the Onggi River basin is serious, due to poor mining 
practices that include diverting river water flow for mining use, and because 
appropriate technical and biological rehabilitation has not been undertaken 
(Tsolmon, Tungalag, Miller, & Sloan, 2009; UMMRL, 2009).  
This visible decline in water resources and pasture land spurred local communities 
to act. The ORM NGO was founded in 2001. The chair of the soum‘s LRK at that 
time, Mr Munkhbayar, was the main driving force. He brought together residents 
of eight soums from three neighbouring aimags, through which the Onggi River 
flows, and established the NGO with a stated mission to reverse the drying up of 
the Onggi River system and to restore Lake Ulaan (UMMRL, 2009). The local 
residents recognised the importance of an organised NGO to protect their vital 
community interests in a more influential way (Munkhbayar, 2005). 
The NGO has 1200 regional members and a Leadership Council of nine members 
who are representatives of soums, a Supervising Council of three members, and a 
sub-council in each soum. Since its formation, Mr Munkhbayar has been 
continuously elected as chair. The NGO has three other paid staff positions: an 
executive director, legal adviser, and a driver. It also has an office in the capital 
city, Ulaanbaatar (UMMRL, 2009).  
The NGO has undertaken various activities to accomplish its objectives, which are 
to raise public awareness of mining impacts in local areas, to educate local people 
about environmental protection, to prevent desertification along the river, and to 
demonstrate against poor mining and the lack of accountability by government. 
                                               
96 Lake Ulaan used to reach 40 kilometres in diameter during wet periods, playing an important 
part in balancing the climate of Mongolian Gobi Desert.   
97 According to the report of the Independent Review Group (formed by the MNET), the Onggi 
River and Lake Ulaan dried up due to the direct impacts of exploitation of gold deposits at the 
river catchment areas. Furthermore, the study released that 28 rivers in the eight aimags were in 
danger of drying up (Independent Review Working Group, 2002). 
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The NGO has organised meetings with local authorities, local communities, and 
mining companies to raise awareness of local environmental issues and to seek 
possible solutions. It has also organised training for local communities to inform 
them of their legal rights and environmental issues, and to gather their opinions. 
With the cooperation of local school teachers, the ORM has also prepared and 
published textbooks on environmental protection for primary and secondary 
schools. Some local schools have introduced new subjects into their curriculum in 
order to increase student awareness of the region‘s natural environment (UMMRL, 
2009).      
In 2004, the ORM began a long-term reforestation project, planting sea-
buckthorn
98
 trees on the banks of the Onggi River. The plan was to replant the 
entire river banks over several years, for the purposes of preventing soil erosion 
and to mitigate desertification. Sea-buckthorns are indigenous to Mongolia. Their 
extensive root systems have a positive impact on water balance and help to 
prevent erosion and desertification. Fruit can be harvested after three years and are 
rich in vitamins. The NGO has collected donations from the public and has been 
awarded international projects for tree planting. It has also organised numerous 
workshops and training for local communities, showing them how to plant and 
benefit from their trees (Global Nature, 2011).   
Between 2002 and 2003, the ORM NGO appealed to all 76 members of 
parliament, the Prime Minister, and the President to take immediate action to avert 
an ecological disaster in the region which seriously threatened to violate the 
constitutional rights
99
 of citizens. In spite of repeated requests to the state, no 
radical measures were introduced. Another strategy used by the ORM for raising 
the awareness and support of public officials and citizens was a 478 kilometre 
‗Ecology protest march‘, organised between May and June 2004. The march 
traced the entire span of the river with over 2000 participants, including 
                                               
98 Sea-buckthorns are planted for soil and water conservation purposes. They are tolerant of salt in 
the air and soil, and grow typically in dry and sandy areas (Wikipedia).  
99 Article 16 states that Mongolian citizens shall have the rights to live in a healthy and safe 
environment, and be protected against environmental pollution and ecological imbalance (The 
State Great Khural of Mongolia, 1992).    
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representatives from eight soums, some MPs, other NGOs, and journalists 
(Munkhbayar, 2005). Since then the NGO has organised and taken part in a 
number of demonstrations opposing poor mining. It has used media coverage and 
other options to publicise activities and to raise public awareness of the 
misconduct of mining companies and government organisations. The NGO has 
worked closely with newspapers and television channels, set up its own website, 
and produced documentaries in collaboration other environmental NGOs in a 
television programme, ―Calls from the Rivers‖ (Interview F3, 00:04:42-0). 
The positive outcomes from these demonstrations include: increased public 
awareness of mining impacts and the stimulus given to environmental NGOs to 
consider different strategies and activities for addressing poor mining practices; 
government research that confirmed the NGO‘s claims concerning the adverse 
impacts of mining activities; and joint physical inspection of the river basin with 
the Mineral Resource and Petroleum Authority that led to agreement on the need 
to conduct a scientific study (UMMRL, 2009).  
Financial and technical support was crucial for development of projects and 
training by the NGO, as such social activism was new for rural Mongolians for 
both socio-political and cultural reasons. The NGO has received a variety of 
funding and support from international donor organisations, given its limited local 
resources and the impoverishment of rural regions (Snow, 2010; UMMRL, 2009).    
To achieve its goals, the ORM has cooperated with other NGOs, and is ―learning 
by doing‖. Between 2006 and 2008 it was a member of the Mongolian Nature 
Protection Civil Movement Coalition (MNPCMC) that was established and 
supported by an international donor NGO. As a donor organisation the ORM 
realised the importance of ―power of numbers‖ in addressing environmental issues 
effectively, and changed its strategy by encouraging greater cooperation among 
NGOs (Interview D6). As an interviewee said:  
Rather than giving out a lot of small grants, [we] have larger grants to the 
coalition, who could then use part of them for core funding, professional 
development, capacity building, and for coming a force and presence in 
Ulaanbaatar and throughout the country (Interview D6).  
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The idea was not only to promote the cooperative skills of NGOs, but also to 
sustain their operations by improving their institutional and human capacities 
(Interview F9). The ORM actively engaged in activities of the coalition along with 
thirteen local environmental NGOs. However, the donor NGO announced it 
would end its cooperation when the ORM issued a media release expressing its 
willingness to organise violent protest, if necessary, against poor mining in some 
local regions (Interview D6). The ORM, for its part, refused to work with the 
donor NGO and coalition as it wished to maintain its independence and be free 
from international influences. As the ORM leader described:  
The cooperation with NGOs enabled us to make progress only on matters that 
were wanted by the donor NGO. If the donor did not want them, then matters 
could not be carried out by NGOs. Therefore, cooperation was limited by the 
preferences of the donor. … When NGOs made a contract of cooperation, they 
were told not to criticise government policies, and not to protest against mining 
companies. It appeared the donor‘s main goal was to silence NGOs and 
condone mining practices, as that was the main income and growth generator 
(Interview F1, 00:14:43).  
Following ORM, some other coalition member NGOs also refused to cooperate, 
and the coalition disbanded. After the donor‘s refusal to cooperate, the ORM had 
been excluded as a board member of the Responsible Mining Initiative NGO, 
which was supported by the same donor (Interview F1, 00:12:46).  
ORM then began new cooperative initiatives with some local environmental 
NGOs, forming a new NGO coalition called ‗United Movements of Mongolian 
Rivers and Lakes‘ (UMMRL). The coalition consists of six local environmental 
movements, representing five different regions that have significant mining 
development. These NGOs are the ORM, Salhin Sandag, Huder Gol, Toson 
Zaamar, Anggir Nuden Munduuhei, and the Local Environmental Protection 
Movement. All are registered environmental NGOs.  
The common goal is to protect rivers and lakes from environmentally and socially 
harmful legal and illegal mining. Through various activities, principally protests 
in their local areas, the NGOs realised their weakness as ‗solo‘ players at the local 
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level because of little impacts that individual NGOs can have to influence mining 
related government decisions (Interview F3). Local NGOs recognised the need for 
cooperation to become more influential and realised the importance of having 
representatives based in the capital city to influence decision-making. 
Accordingly, in early 2009 they united and established the UMMRL NGO 
(Interview F12).  
An interesting feature of the UMMRL is its management principles. All member 
NGOs have equal rights in decision-making processes and equal opportunities to 
manage, in turn, the UMMRL (Interview F12). Leaders of member NGOs meet 
once a month
100
 in the city and select a leader as the monthly head. The selected 
leader will introduce his/her plan for the month, ensuring it is consistent with 
activities of previous months. At the end of the managing period, the head will 
report to other NGOs about his/her achievements, the financial situation (monthly 
member fees, donations or project monies, and costs), and matters for action in the 
next month. Two permanent staff of the UMMRL are in charge of administrative 
activities and assist the monthly head. Among other NGOs, the ORM NGO plays 
an inspiring, ‗informal‘ leadership role, as it has more experience and knowledge 
of organising various activities and addressing mining-related social and 
environmental issues
101
. 
In spite of united activities in the city, each NGO retains autonomy in its own 
region (Interview F6); each NGO has its own activities and voice. This was clear 
at monthly meetings as members presented different views and proposed their 
own solutions. At the same time, NGOs had a united view on certain strategic 
issues, such as when undertaking a wide range of activities to accelerate the 
formation and implementation of a new law. 
                                               
100 To update, NGOs now select a head on a quarterly basis, due to the cost of travel, and to allow 
the leader more time to work independently and achieve desired outcomes. 
101 The leader of ORM was elected as chair of the board of the Citizens Representative Committee 
during the first NGO conference held in November 2008. However, after a few months, he 
resigned from the position. 
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The first goal of the UMMRL was to form a new law prohibiting the exploration 
and mining at river headwaters and in forest reservations
102
. Since 2006, six 
NGOs have cooperated and undertaken various activities, such as organising local 
meetings, lobbying and sending letters to MPs written by 6000 local people from 
five regions, collecting signatures of support in petitions in the city, cooperating 
with other environmental NGOs to organise protests near the parliament building, 
and declaring a hunger strike in front of the parliament building to pressure MPs 
into passing the law.  
The following photographs were taken during the hunger strike when five NGO 
leaders went without food for four days, and three local people sat with them in 
peaceful protest. 
 
The left photograph shows the hunger strikers, and the middle photograph, a 
doctor from the government hospital, checking the health of the strikers to 
confirm whether they were well enough to participate. The blood pressure of the 
oldest striker (approximately 65 years old) was high, and the doctor advised him 
not to continue participating. The coalition replaced him with a younger man that 
afternoon. In the right photograph, the NGO leaders, including the UMMRL, were 
giving television and newspaper interviews. The poster reads ‗No need for the 
Naadam
103
 if we have no rivers and forests‘.  
                                               
102 Mongolia is a landlocked country with scarce water and forestry resources. Forestry counts for 
only 7% (Dorjgotov & Purevsuren, 2006). As the country is located in one of the world‘s arid and 
semi-arid regions, there is more likelihood of water scarcity (UN, 2007, p. 4).   
103 The Naadam Festival is the biggest three-day national holiday in Mongolia between 11-13 July. 
It is also called ―The three games of men‖, and has existed for centuries. The games are wrestling, 
horse racing and archery. The hunger strike began on 3rd July - close to the Naadam Festival and 
just before the official closure of the spring session of the Mongolian Parliament.  
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The above photographs show the proximity of the hunger strike to the parliament 
building. In the right photo, the posters read ‗Onggi River‘ and ‗there is no gold 
more precious than water, and no legal authority is more important than the 
interests of our country‘.  
 
The poster in the left photo reads ‗We, Khuduu Aral NGO, support the new law to 
protect our environment‘. Three local residents of Khentii aimag are taking part in 
a sitting protest, calling for an immediate end to the mining operations of ‗Geo-
Erel‘ (a mining company in Murun soum of Khentii aimag). The middle 
photograph shows two sitting protesters holding posters, stating ‗If Mongolia is an 
independent country, we should be owners of our territory‘, and ‗We can live 
without gold but not without water‘. The right photograph shows a citizen signing 
a petition to express his support for the new law.   
Besides the six NGOs of the UMMRL, 25 other local environmental NGOs 
cooperated in this protest. As a result of their efforts, the law was passed on 9 July 
2009. This law illustrated a new phenomenon in Mongolia – it was the outcome of 
local environmental NGO pressure and lobbying of some MPs. It has 
subsequently led to numerous public and parliamentary debates on how to define 
the borders of river basins and forestry reservations, which mining operations 
should cease, who will implement and monitor procedures for closing and 
prohibiting mining, the environmental measurements that need to be taken, and 
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the compensation that ought to be paid by mining companies. The UMMRL, 
including the ORM NGO, has worked to help enforce the law, and has been part 
of the Committee that defined the borders of river basins and forestry areas. The 
law clearly requires government organisations to be accountable, and has affected 
1700 mining licences, which are now under review (Shenbayar, 2010). This 
consequence has created huge controversy among MPs, government organisations, 
mining companies and NGOs. Although the government passed a regulation to 
terminate 254 mining licences, based on the new law (Shenbayar, 2010), the 
companies are still operating, and the regulation has not yet been enforced due to 
political and economic factors and the lack of effective accountability 
mechanisms.     
Interviewees mentioned the ORM NGO as an exemplar of both an active NGO for 
environmental protection, and as an NGO that had been silenced by power 
influences. Four interviewees noted that the ORM has acted as a leading NGO 
that consistently focused on environmental protection and poor mining practices 
(Interview A4, C1, D4, F12). However, some argued the NGO was in danger of 
losing its independence and of being ―absorbed by the government‖, given that the 
government provides funding and an office: 
Although the ORM is an activist NGO with its own voice, and has been listened 
to, even if its claims were not always right, that is okay; but the NGO has been 
more like an advocacy NGO in Mongolia. However, it is now silent, having lost 
its independence, which is probably a shame (Interview D2, 00:09:47-2). 
Another interviewee complained that the ORM was lobbied by foreigners when 
the international donor organisation nominated its leader for a prestigious 
international award
104
 (Interview A4). In spite of these differing views, the ORM 
is acknowledged as a legitimate well-known environmental NGO in Mongolia. 
This is evidenced by interviewees‘ arguments and various domestic and 
international publications. 
                                               
104 Mr Munkhbayar, the leader of the ORM, was awarded one of six 2007 Goldman Environmental 
Prizes. This prize is awarded annually to grassroots environmental activists, one from each of the 
world's six geographic regions (Nijhuis, 2007).    
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In October 2010, the ORM and UMMRL NGOs appealed to the Court against the 
government of Mongolia‘s mismanagement of the mining sector, alleging that it 
had caused environmental degradation and water scarcity in many local regions. 
The NGOs also sued the government for its ―alleged failure to enforce the law 
prohibiting mineral resource exploration and exploitation in river and forest 
basins‖ (Niislel Times, 2011). However, the Sukhbaatar District Court rejected the 
lawsuit in March 2011 on the grounds that ―there is no law stating that the 
government should be responsible for damage to environment caused by mining 
companies and to compensate local communities for such damage‖ (Shinebayar, 
2011).  
 
In early September 2010, a small group of citizens, including the ORM leader and 
members of the UMMRL, ―armed with hunting rifles, opened fire on gold mining 
equipment owned by two foreign mining firms operating illegally in northern 
Mongolia‖ (Snow, 2010). This action raised numerous criticisms in both domestic 
and international media, but once again focused social attention on poor mining 
practices. In company with other environmental and social NGOs, the leader of 
the ORM became a co-founder of the Gal Undesten Movement, regarded as a 
strong activist NGO aiming to forcefully address environmental and mining issues. 
The leader of the ORM co-organised demonstrations against mining companies 
and the government, but was arrested.  
On 19 June 2011, forty activists of the Gal Undesten Movement were threatened 
and shot twice at the gold mining equipment of the Ermuun Bosgo Company in 
Uvurkhangai province. Before the shots, activists had sent a written request to the 
director of the company to stop mining operations in the prohibited area 
(Lkhagjav, 2011). However, the company did not reply, and the movement 
organised demonstrations followed by the shootings. Seven activists were arrested 
and investigated, according to the criminal code of Mongolia, under the article of 
offences against property (Oyundari, 2011). 
In summary, ORM has challenged mining constituents to address poor mining 
practices, and has improved the accountability of both the government and mining 
companies. It has adopted various activist strategies both individually and 
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collectively with other environmental NGOs. As well as demonstrations, ORM 
has undertaken a diverse range of activities to protect the environment and to 
educate local communities. Notwithstanding criticisms of its activities, ORM has 
become a widely acknowledged exemplar NGO.    
8.2.2.2 A cooperative NGO – the Responsible Mining Initiative  
Another influential NGO, which has sought to raise awareness and influence 
political and policy discourses to develop socially and environmentally 
responsible mining, is the Responsible Mining Initiative for Sustainable 
Development (RMI). The RMI was registered as an NGO in December 2007, and 
was the initiative of several multi-stakeholder forums, set up to address 
responsible mining. As a non-membership public NGO, it operates primarily in 
the capital city. The RMI seeks to promote responsible mining by aligning itself 
with the concept of sustainable development. The aim of the NGO, as outlined in 
its mission statement, is:  
To build a common framework of understanding of responsible mining in 
Mongolia among the public, government, industry, and investors; to provide 
open and transparent information; and to secure equal participation of the multi-
stakeholders in these activities (RMI, 2009). 
The emergence of the RMI reflects the diversity of Mongolian civil society. The 
first ‗Multi-stakeholder Forum‘ was held in 2006, facilitated by an international 
donor NGO, the Asia Foundation (TAF); it attracted a wide range of interest, 
including from the government, civil society, mining industry and academia. 
Participants developed a definition of responsible mining and its eight guiding 
principles. As Molisa et al. (forthcoming) argued, the way the RMI defined 
mining, however, ―was clearly normative in the sense that it said more about how 
mining ought to be rather than about how it currently is‖ (p. 6). Its definition of 
responsible mining is: 
A comprehensive and transparent minerals activity respecting the rights of 
all stakeholders, especially of local people, environmentally friendly and free of 
human health impacts, embracing the best international practices and upholding 
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rule of law while generating a sustainable stream of benefits for Mongolia (RMI, 
2007).
105
 
Thus, the idea of responsible mining was fully ‗imported‘ from the best mining 
practice of developed countries.  
The second forum was organised in April 2007, where participants agreed to 
establish the RMI NGO. They developed and signed a ‗Declaration on 
Responsible Mining‘, which was signed by different mining constituents. Later 
that year, the RMI was registered as an NGO. The declaration set out fundamental 
principles to guide the NGO: which assisted in defining its purpose, providing 
general guidance for its activities, and identifying principles of cooperation for its 
constituents. The declaration acknowledges the harmful impacts of existing 
mining on the environment, society and economy, and recognises the importance 
of responsible mining that ―will benefit all Mongolians now and in the future‖ 
(Darling, 2009). Multi-stakeholder engagement, based on mutual respect and 
information sharing, is recognised as a key principle of the NGO, and its members 
have equal rights and responsibilities to participate in making collective decisions 
(RMI, 2007). Approximately 60 organisations have signed the declaration to date, 
agreeing to develop responsible mining and follow its guiding principles (RMI, 
2009).  
Since 2008, the RMI has undertaken various activities: engagement in policy and 
standard development, knowledge building and information sharing, and 
development of performance indicators. The NGO successfully cooperated with 
MPs to include responsible mining-related clauses in the mining and 
environmental policy sections of ‗The 2008 - 2012 Government of Mongolia 
Action Plan‘. The NGO also co-organised thirteen multi-stakeholder forums with 
TAF and organised a series of panel discussions at the National University to 
                                               
105 The eight guiding principles are as follows: 
 Secure multi-stakeholder participation 
 Transparent and open 
 Law-abiding and enforcing 
 Responsible for environment and human security 
 Investing in the future 
 Efficient 
 Humane and ethical 
 Technologically advanced (RMI, 2009). 
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build knowledge and share information with the public and other stakeholders 
(RMI, 2009). Facilitated and funded by the MNET, the RMI participated in the 
development of standards aimed at regulating mining rehabilitation. The NGO has 
also begun to develop criteria for mining companies to measure their compliance 
with principles, and to inform the public about successes (Interview F9). 
The RMI represents an interesting case in the Mongolian NGO sector as it 
illustrates the new phenomenon of a tri-sector partnership approach. For the last 
two decades, mining has attracted huge interest and controversy. As discussed in 
Chapter 7, there are differing views and debates about mining development, and 
its role and contribution to Mongolia‘s development. Mining constituents have 
worked separately and not listened to each other. Through these engagements, 
stakeholders have begun to recognise a need for listening and cooperating with 
each other in an endeavour to address mining issues and to change the mining 
sector so it can be ―beneficial to Mongolia‖ (Interview D3).  
The 2006 and 2007 forums, facilitated by TAF, have provided the opportunity for 
mining constituents to come together and collectively discuss mining issues; they 
had agreed on the need for more regular and consistent engagement to address 
issues they all care about (Interview D1). Although constituents have different 
backgrounds, understanding and views, they realised they need a place or 
organisation that can facilitate potential interaction and cooperation among 
different constituents (Interview D6).   
For forum participants, NGOs have been recognised as a space for participation, 
dialogue and collective action for promoting responsible mining initiatives. As an 
interviewee said:  
Participants of the forum chose to establish a non-political, non-governmental 
and non-profit organisation that could enable stakeholders with contested 
interests to come together, and talk and act with equal rights: no one stakeholder 
has more privilege than another, and all have equal rights and responsibilities to 
express their voices, to provide information, and to participate in activities 
(Interview F9).  
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To enable this interaction, dialogue among stakeholders has been promoted as the 
foundation of RMI operations, and the principal form of activity (RMI, 2007). To 
have effective dialogue is challenging for Mongolians as they have little 
experience of the concept of dialogue. In practice they often have ―monologue 
type meetings, where one talks and others listen without much interaction‖ 
(Interview D6). However, they are gradually learning to talk, listen, and debate 
with each other by participating in various meetings and public debates supported 
by NGOs, international organisations and the media. Thus, the RMI is becoming a 
‗space‘ where mining constituents try to listen, talk, share their views, and reach 
mutual understanding and decisions for the promotion of responsible mining 
principles. 
The RMI‘s organisational structure comprises board members, supervisory board 
members, and staff. The board is composed of fifteen different organisations, 
including: 
 two MPs from the most powerful opposition political parties, which have led 
the parliament and government interchangeably since 1990 
 the deputy director of the Water Agency of the MNET 
 two academics, including a former MP and the vice president of the 
University of Agriculture; and a lecturer and head of Young Researcher 
Innovation of the University of Science and Technology 
 the vice president of the Corporate Affairs and Social Responsibility Division 
of Ivanhoe Mines Inc.
106
  
 an expert of an EIA company  
 a leader of a local environmental NGO 
 representatives of two social NGOs, including the national social 
responsibility NGO and the human rights NGO 
 representatives of five other civil society organisations including: the Mining 
Association, the Mining Sector Youth Confederation, the Mongolian Labour 
                                               
106 Ivanhoe Mines is a Canadian mining company that has signed a stability agreement with the 
government in September 2009 to begin its operation of the Oyu Tolgoi copper deposit in the Gobi. 
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Union, the ecology department of the National Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry, and the Incubation Centre of Business Development (RMI, 2009).     
The director of TAF serves as a supervisory board member. The RMI has two 
permanent staff, including a senior advisor and project manager.  
Each board member of the RMI has contributed in different ways. TAF has played 
an important role in operationalising the RMI through its support during the 
establishment phase. It facilitated multi-stakeholder forums, and mediated 
between mining constituents with contested viewpoints. TAF helped different 
constituents come together and interact with each other. Once the RMI was 
established, TAF began to fund operational costs, such as the office rent and staff 
salaries (Interview F9).  
Although the advantages of having support from the donor organisation have been 
many, difficulties can also be created, such as the donor influence on the RMI‘s 
policies, decision-making processes and the board structure
107
. One NGO 
interviewee, who criticised the relationship between RMI and the donor NGO, 
observed: 
The RMI was at the mercy of the donor‘s orders. On first appearances the RMI 
looks a good initiative that enables tri-sector partnership, and generates dialogue. 
In reality, however, the RMI is the opposite of the public‘s intentions. It 
pretends to be multi-stakeholder oriented but is heavily dependent on the donor 
NGO. The donor NGO dictates what and how to carry out matters. If you do not 
listen to it, then it will not work with you. Through various discussions and 
forums, only those who are willing to accept the donor‘s requirements and who 
have same interests remain (Interview F1, 00:12:46).  
In terms of state representatives of the RMI, there are two members of parliament 
from the two major opposition parties. This could be viewed as a good beginning, 
as these MPs will become aware of multi-stakeholder comments and views, and 
                                               
107 The donor could influence who should or should not be a board member. For example, ORM 
resigned from the board of the RMI. According to the ORM leader, this was related to the fact that 
the donor NGO called the ORM a ‗terrorist‘, and ceased cooperation after the ORM declared its 
willingness to participate in activism against mining companies to stop irresponsible mining 
operations.    
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can consider those views in relevant legislation and policies, thus hopefully 
legislation can be more inclusive and effective. Similarly, a government agency 
representative could inform the RMI members about government policies and 
decisions, and be persuaded to improve policies by recognising the views of other 
RMI members.  
In terms of NGOs, the RMI has a relatively good mix representing environmental, 
social, and mining specialised NGOs, comprising eight out of fifteen board 
members. Two board members are from the Mining Association and the Mining 
Youth Association, while another three are from business-related organisations. 
Nevertheless, including more NGOs is an achievement as it suggests that NGOs 
are beginning to be regarded as ‗legitimate‘ actors, and their views and comments 
are being heard among mining constituents.  
The RMI provides an opportunity for domestic NGOs to engage in discussion and 
to influence the decisions and actions of other mining constituents. This 
cooperation among NGOs offers a way to address criticisms that NGOs are 
simply critics and activists, rather than being part of any ―practical solution‖. 
Some interviewees supported this argument and expressed their views that NGOs 
needed to engage in activities that can have real benefits for mining issues 
(Interview B7, D5).  
However, NGOs in the RMI structure could also be criticised on the basis of their 
representation. The environmental NGO is a member of an NGO coalition 
established by the same donor NGO, and some social and business-oriented 
NGOs are new to this field. It is not clear whether these NGOs can ideally 
represent the NGO sector, given that some influential NGOs in mining and 
environmental issues are not included in the RMI. This might be either because 
more activist NGOs do not wish to cooperate with other mining constituents 
(namely, mining companies and the state), or that they are excluded from the RMI 
as it does not wish to include more controversial and critical voices, which might 
make it difficult for RMI members to cooperate and reach shared understandings. 
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The Canadian mining company occupies a prominent place on the RMI board as a 
mining representative. Compared to other mining companies, it refers more often 
to CSR and sustainable development (Ivanhoe Mines Mongolia LLC, 2008). It 
has been one of the most high-profile companies in the media due to its deposits 
and stability agreement negotiations with the government
108
. Having this company 
as part of the RMI board provides other members with access and influence 
during the process of persuading mining companies to adopt best mining practices. 
However, there is considerable concern that Ivanhoe Mines might merely engage 
with the RMI to improve its public image through favourable publicity, or more 
disturbingly for some, to influence the RMI and its polices for its own benefit. 
The RMI case-study illustrates that an NGO can focuses on cooperation and 
dialogue to promote sustainable and participatory mining. Through the tri-sector 
partnership, controversy among mining constituents has begun to be openly 
discussed and problematised, and more importantly, conflicting parties are 
learning to collectively engage in decision-making. However, this cooperation 
might also create a degree of compromise, exclusion, manipulation and politics 
due to the power dynamics among constituents.  
8.2.3 Challenges for Mongolian NGOs  
In spite of their achievements, environmental NGOs face various challenges that 
prevent them from achieving their common goals – environmental protection and 
the well-being of Mongolians. Based on interviews and document analysis, it can 
be argued that the NGO sector is still in its infancy, at a fragile stage of 
development ―where it could easily change in any direction‖ (Interview D3). 
Some interviewees were critical and described such a developmental stage as a 
―wrong formation‖, given that most NGOs have been established to improve the 
personal reputation and careers of their leaders, and to make money from 
environmental funding (Interview F1). This opportunistic behaviour can be 
                                               
108 The company discovered world class copper/gold deposits in the Gobi, and has spent five years 
since 2004 negotiating a stability agreement with the Mongolian government. The agreement was 
the hottest topic of public debate, and the company organised various meetings, training sessions, 
and press conferences to stimulate dialogue on this subject. 
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evidenced in statistics that indicate that approximately only 20 out of 500 
environmental NGOs are active (Interview F8, F12), with 80 percent located in 
the capital city (Open Society Forum, 2005). On the other hand, this could also 
relate to the fact that Mongolian NGOs have not had enough time to develop their 
core skills and capacities (Interview C2, D6).  
Table 5 lists the principal challenges for NGOs, which can be categorised as 
internal and external, although these are deeply interrelated.  
Table 5. Challenges of Mongolian NGOs 
 
a. Internal issues: 
1. Financial capacity: NGOs, particularly local NGOs, struggle with their 
financial and basic operating capacities (UNDP, 2006). Most NGOs are 
financially dependent on foreign projects (Interview D3, D4), which creates a 
difficult dilemma for NGOs. As an NGO interviewee observed, the situation is so 
mixed that it is difficult to distinguish whether NGOs are ―finding funding for 
funding‖ or ―finding funding for an operation‖ (Interview F9).  
Although other financial resources exist, such as a share of income tax revenue 
and donations from organisations and the public, these resources are not 
fundamental resources as in other countries (The National Network of Mongolian 
Women‘s NGO, 2004). The legal environment does not encourage NGO 
development, as only one percent of personal tax income is used for NGO funding, 
and provisions that previously allowed tax exemption for organisational donations 
to NGOs have been discontinued (Interview F1). Due to poor economic 
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conditions, people are not able to support NGOs, thus public donations are not ―a 
reliable financing method‖ (Interview F13).  
2. Human resources: Working in NGOs is often a voluntary job. NGO staff face 
difficulties balancing personal life with NGO work (Interview F8). Even for paid 
positions, it is a challenge to find people who are willing to work hard and 
passionately for only modest salary (Interview F7). The lack of human resources 
restricts the ability of NGOs to engage continuously in activities (Interview D3).  
NGOs were criticised for their lack of knowledge and specialisation. Some argued 
that the public and NGOs still do not fully understand ―what is an NGO?‖ 
(Interview F9). An interviewee claimed that 70 to 80 percent of NGOs do not 
understand their roles and ―what they can and cannot do‖ (Interview A2). 
Sometimes, NGOs sought to conduct EIAs, which according to the EIA law 
should be only carried out by licensed professional experts (Interview A2, A6). 
Mining interviewees argued that NGOs merely criticised mining in a poorly 
informed manner (Interview C2, C3); and NGOs were blamed for being critics of 
environmental destruction and pollution after the event, and for causing public 
discontent and needless demonstrations (Interview F13). Rather than developing 
strategies and methods on how to engage in decision-making (Interview D5), 
misinformed NGOs were seen as making great deal of noise, but without scientific 
evidence to support claims (Interview D1, D6). This detracts from the credibility 
and reputation of NGOs in society, and creates social misunderstanding about 
NGOs as ―activists‖ (Interview D5).  
Due to their different stages of development, some NGOs are more skilled, 
conduct research, and have input into a law drafting process, whereas others 
merely struggle to begin their operations (Interview F13). Although many NGOs 
are funded by international donor organisations, they have weaknesses in the areas 
of language and communication skills, and need more interaction with donors 
(Interview D6). They also lack the capacity to use scientific evidence (Interview 
D1, F9). NGO interviewees, themselves, acknowledged such criticisms, and 
agreed that NGOs shied away from engaging in environmental decision-making 
and monitoring because of a lack of knowledge, experience, and ability to engage 
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(Interview F3, F7). Thus, interviewees suggested that NGOs needed to be better 
informed and educated, and to improve their capacity building in order to gain 
public trust (Interview D1, F12).  
3. Consistency: NGOs were also criticised for competing for financial resources 
without attending to the environmental issues they were supposed to address 
(Interview F3). An NGO interviewee argued that ―NGOs have an ‗opposite logic‘ 
– of fighting for government provided projects – rather than providing voices 
when the government does not act in the public interest‖ (Interview F8). They are 
deficient in terms of their vision and of acting consistently in relation to goals, and 
tend to ―jump from project to project‖ (Interview D3, F9). Such arguments are 
supported by reports that criticise NGOs for acting inconsistently with respect to 
their goals (Open Society Forum, 2005; UNDP, 2006). This creates public 
scepticism of NGOs, and affects their credibility.      
4. Conflict of interest: Many interviewees raised the issue of conflict of interest 
among NGOs, which can be identified at an individual or organisational level, 
such as personal ambition, and the ‗money-making‘ sector.  
NGOs were regarded as operating with an overly short-term view or as being 
unduly influenced by individual interests, such as a desire to improve their 
organisation‘s reputation, or to gain a personal career improvement (Interview F1, 
F14). Moreover, claims were made that some NGOs favoured particular 
individuals or groups, and focused on foreign mining companies to enhance their 
political careers (Interview C3). Such criticism is interesting as it supports 
arguments that environmental and mining issues are political, thus NGOs have 
become politicised. 
On an organisational level, most NGOs viewed civil society as the ‗money-
making arena‘ (Interview F8). Many opportunistic NGOs have been formed to 
receive donor funding. An interviewee described: ―I have met people who conduct 
three different businesses, funded by three different NGOs, but they are all 
operated by the same person. That is unfortunate‖ (Interview D6, 00:24:50-9).  
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The increased donor funding for environmental protection has led to opportunism 
and corruption. There are approximately 15 to 20 million dollars (US) of funding 
for environmental projects annually (Interview F1). As the Ministry distributes 
funding, government officials establish their own NGOs under the names of 
relatives and friends, and receive project money (Interview F12). Anecdotal 
evidence suggests that the mother of a previous president has eleven NGOs (not 
all environmental), and an ex-minister of the MNET has many NGOs (Interview 
F8).  
Because of this opportunism, there is a lack of interest in reporting on the use of 
foreign funding. Statistics of environmental funding for the last two decades do 
not exist due to the lack of political will to report (Interview D5). An interviewee 
stated that when he personally asked the current minister
109
 to show a report on 
the Environmental Protection Fund, ―he [the minister] shamelessly told me ‗you 
guys don‘t need to see [the report of Environmental Fund], I‘ll tell you when I‘m 
not afraid to see it‘‖ (Interview F1, 00:39:51). These arguments illustrate that 
foreign funding for environmental protection is poorly managed, and contributes 
to conflicts of interest among government organisations and NGOs.  
Another criticism of opportunistic NGOs came from interviewees of mining 
companies. They argued that some local NGOs were more like ‗ninja-miners‘, and 
asked mining companies to allow them or local people mining in their licensed 
areas to contribute to local development (Interview C1, C2). Another mining 
interviewee claimed that some people and NGOs have realised an opportunity to 
make money by threatening mining companies, and use NGOs to pursue their 
own interests (Interview C3). A ministry official also experienced a similar case, 
where a local NGO negotiated with the Ministry to rehabilitate an abandoned 
mining area, but later found that the NGO was washing gold from gold-bearing 
ore tailings (Interview B1). Thus, interviewees complained that claims of NGOs 
and their actual interests are often contradictory (Interview C2), and require 
thorough investigation.  
                                               
109 During that time, he had been in the position for a year. 
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5. Leadership: Leadership is another valid issue. NGO success is very dependent 
on the leader‘s personality, his/her passion, discipline, bravery and hard work 
(Interview A4). Many NGO leaders have conflicts of interest, thus the consistency 
and sustained activity of an NGO is often related directly to the leader (Interview 
F9). Although there are approximately 500 environmental NGOs, there is a lack 
of leadership (Interview D2). This gives rise to passive NGOs that struggle for 
funding to survive. Most leaders work on an intuitive basis and passion, rather 
than formal education and management, to address and influence effectively poor 
mining practices.   
6. Representativeness: Most NGOs cannot act as public voices and 
representatives (Interview F8). There are two kinds of NGOs: the first is formed at 
the local level in response to poor mining practices, whereas the second type is 
established in the capital city mostly by middle-class, educated people (Interview 
A4). Thus many NGOs cannot actually represent the affected local people, as 
NGOs are mostly organised and managed by city people who are often not aware 
of the actual situation of local people (Interview B3). However, a counter 
argument was that some NGOs do not need to represent specific people, as NGOs 
can be social and member-oriented. Social-oriented NGOs work for the general 
well-being of people, thus do not need to directly represent local communities 
(Interview F13). This raises the question of NGO accountability to members and 
society at large. The accountability of NGOs is poor (Open Society Forum, 2005; 
UNDP & Government of Mongolia, 2006), yet none of the interviewees raised or 
addressed this issue.  
b. External issues: 
1. Cooperation: Cooperation of environmental NGOs has gradually developed. 
The main advantage of cooperation is ―power of numbers‖ (Interview D2). 
Through cooperation, NGOs can collectively impact decision- and policy-making 
in ways that cannot be achieved by individual NGOs (Interview F1). However, the 
unity of NGOs is weak for a number of reasons.  
Failures to cooperate are usually caused by conflicts of interest, individual 
ambition, aims of NGOs and their leaders (Interview F1, F5). Once cooperation or 
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coalition shows signs of success, members wish to form their own NGO so as to 
have independent leadership. This results in the formation of more NGOs that 
need ―grants to survive‖ (Interview D2). Similarly, the distribution of limited 
financial resources among coalition member NGOs causes problems (Interview 
F1) as members compete to receive bigger portions for their NGOs. Thus, 
cooperation fails due to selfish and opportunistic NGO leaders.  
Regarding the development of cooperation, an interviewee shared her experience. 
During efforts to form a coalition of NGOs, an international donor NGO 
recognised that they needed to develop trust and cooperative skills as in civil 
society organisations of developed countries (Interview D6). These skills are 
lacking in Mongolia at the moment, but NGOs are gradually learning from their 
mistakes (Interview F9, F13).  
2. Political pressure: Although NGOs are supposed to be non-governmental and 
apolitical, practice shows they are often political. However, there are differences: 
some NGOs use NGOs for political purposes, while others became silent because 
of political pressures.  
On the one hand the NGO sector is criticised for being a ‗joke‘, consisting of 
‗unreal‘ NGOs. An interviewee argued that political leaders and government 
officials established their own NGOs so Mongolia could be ―looked on as a 
democratic country‖ (Interview F8), or to use environmental funding for 
themselves (Interview F1). Other interviewees were critical that NGOs are mixed, 
and that some are influenced by political interests (Interview D6) or under 
pressure from political groups (Interview A4). Politicisation of NGOs becomes 
more evident nearer to elections (Interview C1, C2), as some NGOs ―serve their 
political networks‖ (Interview F8).  
‗Political‘ NGOs not only threaten the credibility of the NGO sector in society, 
but also cause trouble for mining companies. A mining interviewee related his 
company‘s attempt to mine gold along the Taaz River. The company faced 
arguments, demonstrations, and physical conflict from local people and NGOs, in 
spite of the fact it had the necessary licences and documents required by law. It 
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attempted to negotiate with demonstrators, but had no success and eventually left 
the area (Interview C1). Another mining interviewee shared a similar story, 
complaining that politicisation of NGOs had resulted in a large loss for the 
company, as it had already invested and moved equipment to that area (Interview 
C2). 
On the other hand, there are also many NGOs that become silent, due to political 
pressures. As raising mining issues usually involves taking ―a stand against 
someone‖, NGOs often engage in activism in the capital city rather than working 
in local regions (Interview F1, F7). Once NGO members and local people become 
intimidated by power groups and mining companies, some become careful and 
prefer not to complain so often (Interview D2, F12). Two women interviewees of 
NGOs shared their experiences of the dangers of lobbying rich and powerful 
people and companies. One was threatened during the Khongor soum cyanide 
contamination case; her car was shot at as she drove alone, returning to the city 
after organising a demonstration in Khongor soum (Interview F8); but the police 
refused, with no explanation, to register her case (Interview F8). More generally, 
various threats from government, political groups, and companies can cause 
NGOs to stop operating, even after many years of activism (Interview A4).  
3. Government support and bureaucracy: Another issue raised by interviewees, 
not only by NGOs, was the lack of government support. Government support for 
training and informing NGOs is critical (Interview A5). Unfortunately, NGOs 
have little power to operate as the government provides only a limited budget 
(Interview D4, F13).  
Poor governance and bureaucracy of the public sector is a widely criticised 
problem in Mongolia, and also causes problems for many NGOs (UNDP, 2006; 
World Bank, 2007a). Due to centralised governance, all decisions are made in the 
city (Interview F3). Thus NGOs need to have representatives and offices in the 
city, and this leads to financial and human resource difficulties (Interview F2, F8).  
NGOs also find it difficult to express their voices because of bureaucracy and 
politicisation. When they try to organise marches or demonstrations in the main 
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squares, the Police Department can reject or introduce bureaucratic procedures 
that obstruct the permission process
110
 (Interview F1, F10). Such barriers from 
government organisations limit the activities of NGOs.    
4. Corruption: Corruption affects NGOs in a number of ways. On the one hand, 
corruption limits and can result in failures of NGOs. NGO members complained 
they were powerless to stop mining operations, claiming that even if mining 
licences were revoked they could easily be renewed by corrupt senior officials 
(Interview F3). An interviewee said that she and other cooperating NGOs sent 
requests to government organisations, collected hundreds of protest letters from 
local people, organised demonstrations, and finally had government authorities 
stop irresponsible mining operations in their region. But within 24 hours, mining 
companies had obtained approvals from senior officials, even from the Prime 
Minister (Interview F2). Even relatively active NGOs can become silent when the 
impossibility of operating in a corrupt society is recognised (Interview A4), or 
when threatened by corrupt bureaucrats (Interview F8).       
On the other hand, corruption among NGOs attracted criticism. Interviewees 
argued that corrupt NGOs threatened the reputation of all NGOs (Interview A1, 
F3). An interviewee argued:  
There is a lot of corruption among NGOs, which is unfortunate. Without 
funding, they cannot do what they aim to do. So they are paid by mining 
companies to be silent… It is very difficult for these NGOs to be transparent 
and to operate … in corruption-free ways (Interview D6, 00:24:50-9).  
Corruption not only limits and silences NGOs, but also attracts opportunistic 
people to use NGOs for pursuing their individual interests. Thus, it is very 
difficult for NGOs to operate in a society with endemic corruption.   
5. Pressure on NGOs: There are various pressures on environmental NGOs, and 
these can be classified as expectations of NGOs and government ‗pressure‘ on 
NGOs.  
                                               
110 According to regulations, organisers need to obtain permission from the related district Police 
Department to organise public events in the main squares of the capital city (The State Great 
Khural of Mongolia, 1994). 
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In spite of a great many expectations of NGOs, the public do not actively engage 
and support NGOs (Interview D6). Although people may personally support the 
goals and activities of NGOs, they do not know how to influence, organise and 
support them (Interview F8). This is related to the lack of awareness and 
knowledge about the roles and characteristics of NGOs (Interview F9). In the 
absence of a philanthropic mindset, as in Western countries (Interview D6), there 
is little financial support for NGOs (Interview F13).  
Similarly, donor organisations expect much from Mongolian NGOs without 
recognising they are not as developed or as institutionalised as in Western 
countries (Interview D2, D6). Corruption among NGOs and their misuse of 
environmental funding causes donor cynicism of NGOs (Interview, D5). This 
results in an ―uncomfortable relationship‖ among donors and NGOs, and donors 
focus on short-term projects rather having long-term positive influences on the 
sustainability of NGOs (Interview D6). 
There are criticisms of donors as well. Some NGO members were critical of the 
influence and intentions of donors. The ORM leader related his experience of 
cooperation with a donor organisation, criticising donors for having silencing 
tactics, and for using NGOs to plant their capitalist ideas in Mongolia (Interview 
F1). Another NGO interviewee argued that through funding, some international 
NGOs and power groups had joined the boards of NGOs, and then silenced or 
divided strong NGOs from within (Interview F10). A third interviewee 
complained that international donor organisations had played crucial roles in 
importing their capitalist infrastructures, and had used some NGOs as informants 
(Interview F8).  
As well as expectations from the public and donor organisations, there is a tension 
among government organisations to ‗filter‘ NGOs into ‗good‘ and ‗bad‘. Many 
government officials and EIA interviewees saw NGOs as a substitute for 
government functions, such as monitoring (Interview A5, B1, B2, B5, D5). They 
saw activist NGOs as ―noise-makers‖ and destructive, while NGOs that 
cooperated with the government and implemented its projects were seen as ―good‖ 
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(Interview F14). This attitude was evident from the statements of some 
interviewees, such as ―the government needs to clean up this situation‖ that is 
having activists and other types of NGOs (Interview B1), ―the SSIA tries to work 
with the right ones [right NGOs refer to non-activist cooperative NGOs]‖ 
(Interview D6), and ―it might need to have an organisation that distinguishes the 
good NGOs from the bad‖ (Interview B7). It is argued that the government 
needed a filtering mechanism to rid civil society of ―bad‖ or activist NGOs.  
Pressures through expectations and classification of ―good‖ and ―bad‖ NGOs 
affect the formation and development of NGOs. They not only restrict the 
activities of NGOs, but also influence what type of NGOs form. This is arguably 
dangerous as this situation could damage the diversity of NGOs and democratic 
processes.  
Given the internal and external problems facing NGOs, the current NGO sector 
can be summarised as struggling to gain credibility and authority in existing social 
and political spaces. Although various issues make it difficult for them to have 
influential and active engagement in mining and environmental issues, NGOs still 
arguably have the potential to promote dialogic EIAs and economically 
sustainable mining.    
8.3 The potential of NGOs to promote dialogic EIAs 
8.3.1 Current NGO engagement in EIAs 
Currently, environmental and social NGOs do not participate in EIAs. This is 
mainly related to the monologism and technocracy of existing EIAs as discussed 
in  
Chapter 7.  
From the NGO perspective, they were not aware of EIAs until 2007, and lacked 
understanding of them (Interview F3, F12). There have since been some ‗ad hoc‘ 
NGO engagements in monitoring the enforcement of EIAs. As found in the debate 
in literature on EIAs, in LDCs, some NGOs have attempted to use EIAs to make 
‗scientifically valid‘ counter-arguments to oppose poor mining practices. As EIAs 
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are conducted by experts and based on scientific assessments, NGOs occasionally 
point to EIAs and claim that either mining companies have not complied with EIA 
recommendations or that EIAs have been incorrectly carried out. For example the 
―Khuduu Aral‖ NGO of Khentii aimag sent an official written request to the 
MNET, claiming that a mining company had not complied with an EIA and had 
polluted the river. The MNET agreed to send a re-assessment expert group to the 
mining site for investigation. Interviewees shared other cases where they 
undertook similar tactics of using the EIAs to bolster their arguments and to call 
for mining companies to cease operations (Interview F3, F7).  
The principal difficulty for NGOs to use EIAs as a basis for their activism is the 
lack of access to EIAs. All NGO interviewees complained that EIAs are not 
accessible in terms of either the information itself or the language used. To 
monitor environmental compliance, the ORM NGO leader requested on several 
occasions that the MNET keep him informed of EIAs and monitoring plans. 
Notwithstanding the legal requirement for access to EIAs, he noted such requests 
are almost impossible as:  
Ministry officials prevaricated on these requests, and in some cases gave 
implausible excuses for not releasing the documents. Some claimed the 
documents were confidential, while in a few incidents ORM leaders were 
prevented from seeing the appropriate ministry officials. For the ORM, this 
reinforced the urgent need for a freedom of information law that would 
guarantee access to such information, require officials to respond, thus 
rendering the government to be more transparent and accountable‘ (UMMRL, 
2009).    
Interviewees stated that they made various efforts to find EIAs: for example, they 
sent official requests to the MNET, used their personal connections with senior 
officials to see EIAs, and found an English version of an EIA through their 
international networks (Interview F1, F3, F7, F8, F12). These statements also 
supported claims of the inaccessibility of EIAs as discussed in Chapter 7.  
In spite of the lack of awareness, experience, and access to EIAs, NGOs reported 
that they have become more aware of the importance of EIAs, public participation, 
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and enforcement of EIAs. An interviewee of the Centre for Human Rights and 
Development reported the experience of working on an environmental case, 
caused by poor mining practices; after two years of hard work, the NGO lost the 
case due to the lack of an assessment methodology on environmental damage. The 
Court rejected the case because there was no scientific assessment of 
environmental damage and compensation. The NGO informed the MNET about 
the lack of an assessment methodology on ecological destruction; it later 
developed and proposed a methodology, which was trialled between 2008 and 
2009 (Interview F7).  
With increased pressure by NGOs, the media, and local communities, the situation 
is gradually improving. Previously, mining companies held their EIAs as 
confidential documents, but some mining companies, particularly high-profile 
ones, are now voluntarily placing EIAs on their websites, and NGOs have been 
able to request companies to make their EIAs available (Interview A1, A3, C3). 
Although there is a lack of NGO engagement in the public participation of EIAs, 
NGOs have begun to recognise the roles they could play in promoting such 
participation.  
Some NGOs have worked with the drafting team on the EIA law amendment Bill, 
and have proposed separate law articles on participation by collecting comments 
from various environmental and social NGOs (Interview A5, F2, F3, F7). Most 
interviewees agree that the roles of NGOs for promoting participatory EIAs are 
crucial, and that NGOs have the ability to act as informers, educators, organisers, 
and participants.  
In summary, there is a lack of effective NGO engagement at the moment. 
However, through years of activities and demonstrations, some NGOs have 
‗discovered‘ the importance of EIAs in addressing poor mining practices. They 
have come to understand that they have the potential to play important roles in 
promoting public participation in EIAs, and some are actively working to realise 
this potential.  
272 
 
8.3.2 Potential roles of NGOs among EIA constituents 
Chapters 4 and 5 discussed the potential of NGOs to promote participatory 
dialogic EIAs, which is further supported by the analysis of Mongolian EIA 
practice in Chapter 7. Given the ability of NGOs to bring lawsuits directly, to 
lobby MPs to draft legislation, Toth (2010) argues that NGOs could act as the 
―fifth estate‖, as their relationship to power is ―often more direct than that of the 
press‖ (Toth, 2010, p. 163). Mongolian NGOs can demonstrate that they have 
actively addressed mining issues, along with the press, and are gradually learning 
how to influence and lobby decision-makers.  
The role of the ORM and UMMRL NGOs in the development of the new law, and 
the formation of the RMI NGO, illustrates there have been varying degrees of 
success. Such cases also show that the development of NGOs and their 
relationship with other mining constituents have stepped up to the next level, 
where NGOs can have more strategic influence. Discussions on mining have 
moved from pure criticism, aimed at stopping or revoking mining licences, to 
developing responsible mining with the cooperation of all mining constituents, 
and to drafting law with the support of MPs to prevent mining at river headwaters 
and in forestry reserves.  
In spite of various internal and external challenges, the roles of NGOs in 
addressing politically sensitive issues of mining and its impacts are essential. As 
stated in Chapter 7, poor mining, weak governance and a lack of awareness of 
mining-related issues are closely interrelated to the Mongolian socio-political 
context. Although NGOs contribute to politicisation of the mining sector, this 
helps to open up mining issues in society. These can otherwise be neglected by 
powerful mining constituents, and the public can often remain unaware and 
incapable of tackling mining-related social and environmental issues. Besides 
their occasional engagements, NGOs have the potential to strengthen EIAs 
through improved public participation and non-expert involvement.    
In the absence of effective public and private sector accountability, NGOs can 
help to activate ‗sleeping‘, ‗ignorant‘ EIA constituents; ‗sleeping‘ refers to the 
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public, particularly affected local communities, whereas ‗ignorant‘ refers to EIA 
experts and mining companies that often exclude local communities from 
preparation, enforcement, and monitoring of EIAs. Figure 9 illustrates how 
relationships among EIA constituents, and the related power dynamics, can be 
improved through the engagement of NGOs.   
Figure 9. Engagement of NGOs with other EIA constituents 
 
Through the red dotted-lines, NGOs interact with each constituent differently 
depending on the roles and responsibilities of EIA constituents. NGOs mobilise 
and educate affected communities showing them how to participate in the 
preparation, enforcement, and monitoring of EIAs. Some NGOs put pressure on 
the government and its officials, EIA companies, and mining to act in responsible 
ways. Other NGOs cooperate with these constituents to improve the quality of 
EIAs, develop professional ethics, and engage with government organisations to 
monitor EIAs. The potential benefits of these differing engagements include 
improvements in EIA quality and inclusiveness, enhancement of accountability of 
constituents, and enabled social learning for all.  
As argued in Chapters 4 and 5, the diversity of NGOs should be recognised, and 
the NGO sector should not be regarded as a unitary whole. The issue then 
becomes how NGOs, given their plurality, can promote dialogic EIAs.  
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8.3.3 Plurality of NGOs and promotion of the dialogic EIA 
As discussed in Chapter 7, existing EIA practice in Mongolia, as elsewhere, is 
monologic and public participation is only symbolic. However, this can be 
challenged because ―even quite closed and technocratic processes can be broken 
open if the public becomes aware of the project and begins to mobilise against it‖ 
(Devlin & Yap, 2008, p. 19). In this respect, it is argued that NGOs have the 
potential to mobilise the public for the purposes of promoting dialogic EIAs.  
The power of NGOs lies in their potential to be ‗border-crossers‘ among EIA 
constituents. Depending on their own perspectives and values, NGOs are diverse 
in their interests and flexible in their strategies. For example, the EIA Association, 
as a professional NGO, could work with EIA companies, and local and central 
government organisations to form and facilitate a dialogic EIA framework; while, 
the Mining Association, as a mining interest group NGO, might facilitate and 
introduce a benchmark for dialogic multi-stakeholder engagement among mining 
companies; and local environmental NGOs could mobilise affected local 
communities to participate in dialogic EIAs.  
NGOs could engage in the promotion of dialogic EIAs from different perspectives 
and with different strategies. The two case-studies of the ORM and RMI NGOs 
illustrated the complexity for NGOs in addressing mining issues. The ORM has 
chosen to act as a challenger NGO, aiming to increase social awareness through 
activism, and to urge the government and mining companies to be accountable for 
their actions. However, the RMI prefers to cooperate with mining constituents to 
raise social awareness of responsible mining, and to embed its principles in 
mining practice. This cooperative strategy also relates to its formation, associated 
with multi-stakeholder and tri-sector partnership initiatives. 
Throughout their development these two NGOs have had similar but different 
challenges to achieve their goals. Both have faced financial and human capacity 
issues. The ORM has addressed its problems through international funding and 
donations from supporters. Diversification of its activities, such as developing a 
secondary school environmental teaching curriculum, planting sea-buckthorn trees, 
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organising local seminars to raise public awareness of mining-related 
environmental issues, has provided the ORM with the opportunity to apply for 
international donor funding and to receive public donations. It has also shown 
consistent leadership among NGOs by mobilising people and similar NGOs to 
demonstrate against poor mining practices and water pollution. With its strong 
voice since 2000, environmental and social consequences of poor gold mining 
practices in local regions have been widely publicised. This has led to social 
dissatisfaction with mining, which were previously praised without question as 
the key to economic development. In spite of criticism levied against the ORM, 
today its name is synonymous with the mining-related environmental impacts on 
the Onggi river system, and its actions opposing poor mining practices. 
The RMI has resolved its financial difficulties with the help of an international 
donor NGO. It is a donor ‗nurtured‘ NGO, as the donor NGO has supervised 
every stage of development and financed all administrative costs. Board members 
of the RMI are representatives from the mining constituents. The inclusion of 
powerful groups allows the RMI to cooperate with and lobby large mining players 
and decision-makers. Dialogue among RMI members is encouraged, making the 
RMI a unique exemplar, which seeks to overcome distrust and to create mutual 
understanding and cooperation among Mongolian mining constituents with 
conflicting views. 
In spite of their lack of engagement in EIAs, the strategies of challenger and 
cooperative NGOs demonstrate that the plurality of NGOs have the potential to 
promote participatory dialogic EIAs. In Chapter 7, the case was made for having 
two forms to develop fully dialogic EIAs that could promote economically 
sustainable mining, and enable meaningful participation, democratisation, and 
social learning for EIA constituents. Based on the plurality of NGO strategies, the 
following table (a modified version of Table 3 in Chapter 5) proposes the potential 
engagement of NGOs in the promotion of dialogic EIAs.      
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Table 6. Participatory democracies and the potential of NGOs to promote and 
facilitate dialogic EIAs 
 
As discussed in Chapter 5, both deliberative and agonistic democracies have the 
potential to address the shortcomings of monologic EIAs. NGOs with cooperative 
strategies can initiate and facilitate dialogue among EIAs constituents in a 
deliberative sense. They would be more capable of engaging in the formal form of 
dialogic EIAs proposed in Chapter 7. Their relations and legitimate positions 
among EIA constituents may provide advantages for cooperative NGOs. Through 
cooperation/collaboration from inside the mainstream institutions, these NGOs 
might bring the stronger voices of challenger NGOs into discussions with EIA 
experts, decision-makers and mining companies. They could also educate 
participants on how to effectively engage in dialogue, raise awareness of mining, 
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facilitate dialogue in a way that constituents could respect and listen to each other, 
and ensure inclusive EIAs. However, cooperative NGOs bring the risks of co-
option to powerful EIA constituents, and the favouring of mining interests. Thus, 
the promotion of dialogic EIAs needs NGOs that can also challenge cooperative 
NGOs and powerful EIA constituents to act in the best interests of the public. 
Challenger NGOs, such as the ORM, could act from outside mainstream 
institutions, given their preference for being watchdogs over the government and 
mining companies. Based on agonistic participatory democracy, challenger NGOs 
may act differently, depending on their own perspectives and chosen strategies. 
Some may cooperate with other EIA constituents and cooperative NGOs to 
initiate and facilitate the formal dialogic EIAs, and to ensure participation of local 
affected communities. Others may prefer to remain outside the formal process and 
to propose counter-EIAs and arguments, if they consider formal dialogic EIAs 
cannot satisfactorily address mining challenges. They may criticise cooperative 
NGOs they consider have been co-opted by powerful groups. Although not all 
EIA constituents may be comfortable with activism and criticism, challenger 
NGOs would preserve the contestation of dialogic EIAs, and help prevent any 
new type of monologism.  
In spite of their different strategies, both cooperative and challenger NGOs would 
aim to have meaningful public participation in EIAs for the promotion of dialogic 
EIAs. Their co-existence would enable mutual learning, contribute to 
transformation of EIA democratisation, and would promote sustainable and 
participatory mining. Perhaps this combination could assist in identifying and 
―unpack[ing] tensions between such issues as consensus and difference, pluralism 
and justice, or universalism and particularity‖ (Kapoor, 2008, p. 111) that lie at 
the core of agonistic democracy.           
8.4 Conclusion  
This chapter has introduced the roles of Mongolian environmental NGOs in 
addressing poor mining practices. Through case-studies of two NGOs, it has 
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illustrated how NGOs act differently to promote more socially and 
environmentally responsible mining. The chapter has also discussed NGO 
engagements in existing EIAs, and proposed ways for NGOs to develop dialogic 
EIAs. The role of NGOs, as ‗border-crossers‘ among constituents, highlights the 
potential for NGOs to initiate and facilitate dialogic EIAs. Contrary to those who 
promote a singular approach, the plurality of NGOs is not viewed as a 
disadvantage. Rather, it means NGOs could encourage both deliberative and 
agonistic engagements in dialogic EIAs; some would seek to build cooperative 
relationships, while others would act as challenger NGOs. In short, the contention 
is that the co-existence of both challenger and cooperative NGOs could help to 
transform monologic EIAs to dialogic ones, and ultimately promote sustainable 
and participatory mining practices. 
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Chapter 9: CONCLUSIONS 
9.1 Research overview 
This study examines sustainable development in practice, particularly in the 
context of mining and environmental management in an LDC. Sustainable 
development for mining can be defined as economically profitable activities that 
include consideration of social and environmental issues (MMSD, 2002). The 
mining sector has been enthusiastically supported in mineral-rich LDCs, in the 
belief that mining can alleviate poverty and lead to economic prosperity because 
of increased employment and GDP growth (MMSD, 2001; Ross, 2008). However, 
mining is under increasing scrutiny because of its social and environmental 
impacts. Less developed countries are particularly vulnerable to social and 
environmental issues due, inter alia, to their weak governance and poor economic 
circumstances (Molisa, et al., forthcoming).  
It is increasingly argued that the participation of affected communities in social 
and environmental decisions regarding mining projects is crucial if sustainability 
concepts are to be embedded and conflict managed (Hilson, 2000; Toth, 2010). 
The EIA, an environmental management tool, provides a mechanism whereby 
mining constituents can assess and discuss ways of mitigating the social and 
environmental impacts of mining. It is a well-institutionalised tool used around 
the world, for which public participation is mandated in most countries (Glasson, 
et al., 2005).  
This study aims to address global and local calls for sustainable and participatory 
mining. It problematises the symbolic participation practices associated with 
existing EIAs, and investigates whether more inclusive and meaningful EIAs are 
possible. To this end, Brown‘s (2009) critical dialogic accounting framework is 
applied to evaluate existing EIA practices and to suggest the possibilities for 
reform. The EIA is explored as a potential dialogic tool for promoting sustainable 
mining practices. This study also explores the potential roles of NGOs to promote 
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dialogic EIAs in an attempt to ‗democratise‘ environmental management and 
foster more socially responsible mining practices. 
Chapters 2, 3 and 4 introduced key literature on mining, SEA, EIA, and NGOs. 
Drawing on this literature, research questions and analytical frameworks were 
formulated in Chapters 5 and 6. The key research question was: Can the EIA 
provide a dialogic accounting tool to promote sustainable and participatory 
mining. Chapters 7 and 8 addressed this question by examining the EIA and 
Mongolian mining practices, and the roles of NGOs in contesting certain practices.  
Mongolians have begun to question existing mining practices because of 
mismanagement, and the negative social and environmental impacts. On the one 
hand, mining proponents point to the potential to bring economic prosperity to 2.6 
million Mongolians (World Bank, 2004; World Growth, 2008). On the other hand, 
environmental and social NGOs and others are cynical about mining, and are 
concerned that the country will be left with polluted land and water resources and 
depleted mineral deposits for future generations (Munkhbayar, 2005). With 
increased public awareness and scrutiny, there is a trend among mining 
constituents to promote the idea of sustainable and participatory mining through 
various initiatives: large mining companies have made their annual reports and 
EIAs publicly available and developed CSR agendas; mining NGOs have 
introduced best practice guidelines and codes of conduct for mining; and donors 
and the government have begun to encourage multi-stakeholder engagement. 
Environmental protection laws have authorised the EIA as a legitimate 
environmental management tool. However, practice shows that EIAs have been 
implemented in a monologic fashion. EIAs are approached as a technical tool for 
experts to apply before a mining project begins. Public participation is minimal 
and symbolic. NGOs have not yet been actively engaged in EIA processes. With 
growing conflict among mining constituents and demonstrations against poor 
mining, EIA constituents have begun to question the quality of existing EIAs, 
while at the same time acknowledging the importance of EIAs for developing 
sustainable and participatory mining. Some experts and NGOs have developed an 
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Amendment Bill for parliamentary debate on the need to establish more 
participatory procedures in EIAs.  
NGOs have played crucial roles in raising social awareness of poor mining and 
environmental issues. As discussed in Chapter 8, Mongolian NGOs are still in 
their infancy and have experienced a number of internal and external challenges. 
Some NGOs have addressed operational and other challenges, while others have 
been silenced or have disappeared. Two case-studies of environmental and mining 
related NGOs illustrate this struggle for development, but also demonstrate how 
NGOs have challenged existing mining practices by different strategies of 
engagement.  Both NGOs aim to address poor mining practices, and to promote 
sustainable and participatory mining. However, the ORM has acted as a 
challenger NGO with a strong critical voice and activism, whereas the RMI has 
focused on cooperation and dialogue among mining constituents. Through 
exploration of their similarities and differences, it is clear that NGOs cannot be 
regarded as a unitary whole. Rather, they need to be examined in all their socio-
political complexity, including their power relations vis-à-vis other mining 
constituents. 
Based on my findings, this thesis argues that the promotion of inclusive and 
dialogic EIAs is important if sustainable and participatory mining practices are to 
be developed. However, this requires careful consideration of how to change and 
the role(s) that can be played by different EIA constituencies. Along with other 
players, this thesis argues that NGOs would have important roles to play in any 
transformation process. The combination of both challenger and cooperative 
strategies could enable development of more democratic, participatory, and 
meaningful EIAs that could challenge existing poor mining practices, non-
participatory decision-making, and the lack of accountability among government 
organisations, EIA companies, and mining companies.                      
9.2 Implications for theory 
This thesis contributes to literature on SEA, particularly dialogic accounting and 
environmental management. As discussed in Chapters 3 and 5, dialogic 
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accounting is an emerging field in SEA that proposes dialogic engagement and 
pluralism could foster sustainability and accountability. This study applies 
Brown‘s (2009) dialogic accounting framework to explore and evaluate existing 
environmental management practices. By taking Mongolian EIA practice for 
illustrative purposes, it seeks to contribute to the debate in EIA and SEA literature, 
and to support calls for more participatory EIAs that can be embedded in the 
practice of sustainable development.  
9.2.1 Dialogic accounting          
This study contributes to the emergent body of literature on dialogic accounting. 
Given its relatively short history, much work remains to be done on both the 
theoretical and empirical fronts (Brown, 2009). Much of the prior research has 
focused on the development and application of a sustainability assessment model 
developed in the United Kingdom and New Zealand (Bebbington, Brown, Frame, 
et al., 2007; Brown, 2009; Frame & Brown, 2008). As in SEA more generally, 
little attention has yet been paid to LDCs (Molisa, et al., forthcoming).  
This study contributes to dialogic accounting literature by exploring it in an LDC 
context and linking dialogic accounting with the literature of other disciplines. It 
draws ideas from literature on environmental management, mining, and civil 
society to help flesh out discussion in an LDC context. It also examines 
Mongolian EIA practices relating to mining projects for illustrative purposes, 
arguing that the EIA is a potential tool for the application of dialogic accounting.  
Given the wider economic, social, and environmental impacts of mining, it is not 
surprising that mining development in Mongolia has proved controversial. This 
study argues that there are initial signs of dialogic engagement in discussion of 
mining development and of encouraging economically sustainable and 
participatory approaches; it claims these approaches can be extended to the EIA as 
a tool to address the sustainability challenges of mining (Jay, et al., 2007; 
Nooteboom, 2007). However, existing monologic EIAs need to be transformed to 
dialogic EIAs if this potential can be realised. As public participation in EIA is 
mandated, the social and environmental impacts of mining projects should be 
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openly discussed among constituents with differing views. This dialogic process 
should be seen as a social learning process where ―engager and engaged mutually 
learn‖ (Bebbington, Brown, Frame, et al., 2007), and reflections from dialogue are 
subject to further discussion and contestation among EIA constituents. 
This thesis brings NGOs into the transformation process. The accountability of 
business can be addressed not only from the ―shareholders‘ side‖ (Mathews, 1997; 
Milne & Gray, 2007). Stakeholders, including local communities and NGOs, have 
the potential to promote dialogic EIAs from different perspectives. This study 
supports the idea of insider and outsider engagements of civil society actors 
(Bebbington, Brown, Frame, et al., 2007; Brown, 2009), and argues that 
transformation to dialogic EIAs could be activated and facilitated by a 
combination of different NGOs. Two case-studies of NGO engagements, 
concerning responsible mining in Mongolia, suggest that both cooperative and 
challenger strategies of NGOs can encourage pluralistic engagements within 
formal and informal arenas of the EIA.  A cooperative NGO could mobilise EIA 
participants and facilitate dialogic EIAs in a deliberative sense. Whereas a 
challenger NGO could work from outside formal dialogic EIAs by acting as an 
independent watchdog, making ‗counter-EIAs‘ that could challenge formal EIAs, 
highlighting power imbalances among EIA constituents, and preventing the 
formation of new types of monologism. Although cooperative NGOs face risks of 
being co-opted, and challenger NGOs of being excluded from the EIA arena, the 
co-existence of these NGOs could be beneficial. While each group might be 
sceptical of the other‘s approach, a combined approach would allow dual 
strategies and the potential for NGOs to learn from each other. 
9.2.2 Environmental impact assessment 
It is also hoped this thesis can contribute to current debate in EIA literature. The 
EIA is criticised as a technocratic, expert-oriented, ‗decision-aiding‘ tool which 
overemphasises the instrumentality of natural science, and falls short of providing 
meaningful public participation (Jay, et al., 2007; Sinclair, et al., 2008). Such a 
monologic EIA must be censured for its inability to foster sustainability. It is 
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argued that existing EIAs do not consider ideological differences and power 
dynamics among constituents, are incapable of acknowledging the subjective and 
political nature of EIAs, and do not foster social learning (Cashmore, et al., 2010; 
Sinclair, et al., 2008; Söderbaum, 2004; Wilkins, 2003).  
Based on my data analysis, this study supports the above-mentioned critiques of 
the EIA. It applies the dialogic accounting framework to assess whether existing 
Mongolian EIA practices are monologic or dialogic, arguing that they are 
monologic and incapable of addressing the sustainability challenges of mining 
raised by local communities and environmental NGOs. At the same time, it is 
proposed that application of ideas from dialogic accounting might assist in 
transforming monologic EIAs into sustainability-oriented participatory EIAs.  
To this end, the thesis suggests there could be formal and informal EIA arenas to 
allow greater multi-stakeholder engagement and social learning. Based on EIA 
legislation, the formal arena would be well-institutionalised and facilitated by 
experts. In contrast, informal EIAs could provide flexibility and space for EIA 
constituents, particularly local communities and NGOs, to have informal 
gatherings, discussion and dialogue to open up the contested nature of EIAs and 
mining projects. Moreover, formal dialogic EIAs could provide a legal space for 
stakeholders to engage in dialogue, whereas informal EIAs could offer more room 
for challenger NGOs and others to produce counter-EIAs and arguments, and to 
act as watchdogs. Through this plurality and contestation, EIA constituents could 
recognise their similarities and differences, become attentive to issues of social 
power dynamics, including the impacts on EIA practices (Cashmore, 2004; 
Cashmore, et al., 2010), and learn from each other (Saarikoski, 2000; Sinclair, et 
al., 2008). Moreover, EIA quality and accountability should improve as more 
participants would have ‗a close watch‘ on EIAs and, with enhanced public 
participation, practice would become more inclusive. Both formal and informal 
arenas would be equally important. 
In terms of public participation, two stages of engagement may be useful to ensure 
effective participation of affected communities, and to provide meaningful social 
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learning for all EIA constituents. Given sparsely populated local areas and the 
lack of awareness by some local communities about EIAs, these two stages could 
be particularly important for a country such as Mongolia. The initial stage would 
involve local communities, NGOs, mining companies, EIA companies, and local 
authorities sharing information about a proposed mining project and the EIA, and 
to begin dialogic engagement among the constituents. As this stage would need to 
fit in with the nomadic lifestyle of local communities and their engagement 
preferences, this participation would most likely be informal, and its venues, times 
and style would be suitable for herders so as to ensure maximum participation of 
all affected people. Comments and views of local herders regarding a mining 
project and its potential negative impacts could be heard, and their local 
knowledge could be acknowledged by experts. This process could also provide an 
opportunity for experts to learn from local communities.  
The second stage of participation could be a formal dialogic process among EIA 
constituents, including local communities or their representatives if meeting 
venues and times are inconvenient for affected communities to participate directly. 
During dialogue, EIA constituents could discuss the mining project and EIA in 
more detail, including consideration of comments and local knowledge obtained 
from the initial participation.  
These different stages of participation could help address critiques in EIA 
literature regarding existing approaches to public participation. They might foster 
changes in practice, so that formality and the exclusion of affected communities is 
minimised (O'Faircheallaigh, 2010), wider social learning on mining and EIAs 
among EIA constituents is enabled (Sinclair, et al., 2008), and that ideas about 
sustainable and participatory mining are actually applied. Organising multi-
stakeholder dialogue after the final EIA report would also allow discussion of the 
stakeholders‘ engagement in implementing EIA recommendations. This could be 
built into the life cycle of a mining project, including defining stakeholder roles in 
ongoing monitoring processes.                     
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In short, this study seeks to contribute to mining related debate on the 
transformation process to sustainable and participatory mining. It argues that such 
mining could be realised through the greater participation and dialogic 
engagement of mining constituents from the beginning of mining projects 
(MMSD, 2002; O'Faircheallaigh, 2010). The EIA could be used in LDCs as a 
potential transformatory tool that could embed sustainability and participatory 
concepts into the DNA of mining projects. EIAs and related environmental plans 
could help transform the current poor mining practices in Mongolia.    
9.3 Implications for Mongolian EIA practice 
In addition to its contributions to academic discussion, this study has suggested 
practical recommendations on how to improve the Mongolian EIA framework, 
and has identified roles for different EIA constituents in this process. Due to the 
relatively short history of the EIA framework, mining, and NGOs, there is a lack 
of comprehensive research in Mongolia that examines the use of the EIA in 
mining development and its potential to address mining challenges. Furthermore, 
no prior research has been conducted to investigate the roles of NGOs in 
addressing issues of mining and environmental management. This study provides 
schools of thought and discussion by which EIA constituents could foster 
sustainable and participatory mining, and develop public participation in EIAs. 
Suggestions for each EIA constituent are discussed below.  
9.3.1 Government organisations 
As the EIA can be regarded as a tool and process of environmental decision-
making, policy and decision makers of government organisations would need to 
consider several issues in order to develop dialogic EIAs.  
It would be crucial to establish comprehensive legislation or amendments to 
existing EIA law and regulations. Most interviewees agreed that the current law 
needs to be improved to facilitate better public participation. Policy-makers would 
need to set the ‗rules of the game‘ to clarify what mechanisms and processes are 
required to enable meaningful dialogic engagement of all EIA constituents, 
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particularly affected communities. Amendments in legislation should be attentive 
to power imbalances among EIA constituents, recognise the subjective and 
contestable nature of EIAs, aim to minimise bureaucracy, and attend to the 
potential conflicts of interest of public officials. They would also need to ensure 
the inclusion of both monetary and non-monetary data in EIAs, and give 
consideration to the social and environmental impacts of a proposed mining 
project.  
The implementation and monitoring of this legislation would be equally important 
for the promotion of dialogic EIAs. Information should be accessible to all 
interested parties, and EIA reports would need to be discussed among EIA 
constituents both before and after finalisation. Dialogue before final EIAs would 
be crucial to ensure all constituents could include their concerns, views and local 
knowledge. Discussion after final EIAs would allow them to express their views 
on, and share responsibilities for, enforcing EIA recommendations over the life 
cycle of mining projects (for example, discussing who and how to monitor this 
enforcement).  
Government organisations would need to view the EIA as a dialogic process that 
requires the active engagement of all constituents, acknowledges inputs from non-
experts, and openly and reflectively discusses alternatives. The EIA would need to 
be perceived not only as a decision-making process, but also as a social learning 
process for all EIA constituents. Through dialogic EIAs, participants would obtain 
knowledge about the EIA, its importance, inclusion, exclusion and its potential to 
prevent adverse impacts (Sinclair, et al., 2008). They could also discuss their 
different roles and potential for improving existing EIA processes and for 
addressing local mining challenges.  
This whole process would endeavour to strive for continuous improvement in the 
quality of EIAs through the inclusion of comments, gathered from a two-stage 
dialogue among EIA participants. Reflections and lessons from dialogue could 
also assist the preparation of further EIAs. With inclusion of local knowledge, this 
process as a whole could localise the Western imported formal EIA, and help 
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policy-makers to create a country-specific EIA framework and style of 
participation.  
9.3.2 EIA companies 
EIA companies would play an important role in promoting dialogic EIAs. Unlike 
existing monologic EIAs, where EIA companies are the main actors, experts in 
dialogic EIAs would act as organisers and facilitators of dialogue among EIA 
constituents, and as experts in preparing and finalising EIAs. They would need to 
recognise their status in EIA processes as being an equal member of EIA 
participation, rather than as privileged experts of monologic EIAs. Although such 
change might be regarded by EIA companies as a loss of their privilege, dialogic 
EIAs could help them to establish legitimacy in society and, more importantly, to 
improve the quality of EIAs.  
In this transformation, EIA companies would need to recognise the engagement of 
non-experts as being equally important for the development of EIAs. Comments, 
views and alternatives proposed by non-experts, during a two-stage dialogue in 
formal and informal EIA arenas, would need to be considered in final EIAs to 
obtain the full benefit of dialogic engagements. Thus, experts of EIA companies 
would need to be attentive to local knowledge and alternative proposals raised by 
non-experts.  
Most importantly, EIA companies would need to ensure the engagement of 
affected communities in the EIA preparation process, and to have internal 
mechanisms for enabling the inclusion of affected communities and related NGOs 
in the implementation and monitoring of EIAs. By doing so, the existing 
disengagement of EIA companies in EIA enforcement could be corrected.  
9.3.3 Mining companies 
Mining companies would need to recognise their responsibility to incorporate EIA 
recommendations in their mining operations, and to have participatory mining in 
order to keep their ―social licence to operate‖. Improved public awareness on 
mining and EIAs has the potential to benefit mining companies themselves – 
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engagement with local communities can foster a two-way understanding of 
mining issues as well as discussion of ways of fostering sustainable mining 
practices.  
Rather than making ad hoc monetary ‗contributions‘ to local authorities, it would 
be preferable for mining companies to establish a comprehensive framework and 
plan for contributing to local social and economic development. In such a process, 
mining companies would need to ensure that local communities participate fully 
in planning, discussion, and monitoring of their strategies and plans.   
9.3.4 Environmental NGOs 
The roles of NGOs are crucial in developing dialogic EIAs. Given their plurality 
of perspectives and strategies, different kinds of NGOs could adopt different 
approaches. Cooperative NGOs, such as professional associations and NGOs, 
could take the initiative in organising dialogue among EIA constituents to discuss 
ideas about improving EIA quality, engagement of non-experts in EIAs, 
development of social and environmental assessment methodologies and methods, 
and enforcement mechanisms. More importantly, these NGOs could act as 
facilitators of the two-stage dialogue in the formal EIA arena because they are part 
of a tri-sector partnership and are regarded as professional NGOs among the 
public and EIA companies. They could also be educators and mediators among 
EIA constituents, given their reputation and cooperative status. 
Challenger NGOs, such as environmental and human rights activists, could also 
contribute to the transformation to dialogic EIAs. Their roles in organising and 
educating affected communities to participate in two-stage dialogue would be 
crucial. As these NGOs, particularly local ones, are often formed by local people 
themselves, they are closer to local communities, and have greater local 
knowledge on how to organise and involve local communities in dialogue. Thus, 
they could be facilitators of the first stage of dialogue, organised at the local 
community level. Moreover, through initial dialogue local people might develop 
strategies to participate in the second stage of formal dialogue to express their 
views and influence final EIA reports. Challenger NGOs might prefer to 
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cooperate with local communities in executing their strategies, increasing their 
awareness of legal rights and responsibilities, and giving advice on how to 
participate effectively in multi-stakeholder dialogue.  
Challenger NGOs could also participate in formal dialogic EIAs, acting on behalf 
of the general public, given their long-standing activism in relation to 
environmental protection and participatory decision-making. Environmental 
challenger NGOs may become the strongest counter-voice among EIA 
constituents. Compared with individuals in local communities, these NGOs have 
more capacity and skills to develop strong arguments and propose alternative 
assessments and mitigation methods for potential social and environmental 
negative impacts. They could produce their own counter-EIAs and arguments, and 
warn other EIA constituents to be attentive to issues of subjectivity and power 
dynamics in relation to EIAs. Such NGOs might even refuse to participate in 
formal EIAs, and form their own informal dialogic EIAs, and undertake activities 
to challenge formal EIAs.  
9.3.5 Affected communities 
Although local communities would be essential players in the promotion of 
dialogic EIAs, they would need to become more active members of society to 
perform this role. Instead of having the current NIMBY attitude, they would need 
to behave as co-owners of local areas, engaging actively in EIAs, and sharing their 
views and local knowledge with other EIA constituents. Local communities 
should have an understanding of their legal rights and responsibilities, and know 
when and how to execute their rights and take responsibility. Environmental 
NGOs could facilitate this. 
As dialogic EIAs put more emphasis on affected communities and their 
engagement in different stages of dialogue, local communities could benefit 
greatly from participation in dialogue and the monitoring of EIA enforcement: 
they could learn how to engage in dialogue, how to express their views in a 
credible manner, how to organise effectively to influence final decisions, and how 
to ensure effective monitoring of EIA enforcement. All these processes might 
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challenge existing power dynamics among EIA constituents, and lead to public 
empowerment (Brown, 2009; Dillard & Roslender, 2011).  
9.3.6 International donor organisations 
Although there would be no direct engagement of international donor 
organisations in dialogic EIAs, these organisations might have indirect impacts on 
the formation of and transformation to dialogic EIAs. Given their active 
involvement in supervision to improve the capacity building of environmental 
governance and responsible mining, international donor organisations could act as 
supervisors and mentors for such a transformation. They could introduce 
international best practices and in successful cases, where they have overcome 
poor participation and irresponsible mining, they could help government 
organisations and EIA companies to implement effective participatory 
mechanisms in EIA legislation and methodology, and help provide financial 
support to improve their capacity building. However, they would need to be 
attentive to their roles as mentors, and not put pressure on EIA constituents to 
import uncritically Western democracy, capitalism and associated infrastructures.  
9.4 Challenges of implementing dialogic EIAs 
There are issues that would need careful consideration to enable a transformation 
from monologic to dialogic EIAs. As greater public participation would lead to a 
redistribution of power from experts to the public (Arnstein, 1969), experts and 
government officials might fear heightened stakeholder demand and control 
(Brown, 2009), and they might be reluctant to fully support and facilitate dialogic 
EIAs. Depending on their educational background and perspectives, they might 
approach public participation instrumentally as one of the EIA requirements 
(Doberstein, 2003). Thus, experts and decision-making government officials 
might not appreciate different stages of dialogue, and could regard it as too time-
consuming and costly (Biller, 2003; Brown, 2009). Some activist NGOs 
interviewees might also complain that dialogic engagement would not produce 
immediate outcomes that could solve mining-related environmental issues 
(Interview F1, F10).      
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The proposed forms of dialogic EIAs and dialogue in different stages could not be 
developed without appropriate legislation, regulatory mechanisms and institutions. 
However, given the lack of political will among Mongolian politicians and their 
close connections with business, they could delay passing the Amendment Bill of 
the EIA law. Mining companies could also obstruct dialogic EIA related 
legislation, and attempt to keep dialogue as only a voluntary initiative 
(Fitzpatricka, et al., 2011; Scottish Executive, 2006). Not all affected local people 
might be willing to participate due to their lack of knowledge, limited ability to 
express themselves, and lack of power to influence EIAs. As in other LDCs, the 
majority of Mongolians, particularly women, are traditionally shy, and expressing 
their views in front of older people and authority and opposing them is regarded 
as inappropriate. Although people are learning to participate in dialogue and to 
voice concerns to government, this cultural aspect could take time and effort to 
change.   
In short, the promotion of dialogic EIAs in LDCs could encounter a lack of 
willingness from EIA constituents. Given this background it is difficult to rely 
fully on experts and decision-makers in the belief that they will initiate and 
develop dialogic EIAs; because they have more power to influence other EIA 
constituents, they might effectively exclude ―subaltern voices‖ (Kapoor, 2008), 
and this could influence the preparation, engagement and results of dialogic 
engagement. Some of their power needs to be intentionally redistributed to the 
public and NGOs through EIA legislation and the participatory framework of 
dialogic EIAs.  
In spite of its oppressive negative side, power also has a positive side, being ―the 
basis of all forms of behaviour in which people resist, struggle and fight for their 
image of a better world‖ (Freire, 1985). Therefore, power might have both 
positive and negative impacts on dialogic EIAs. As discussed in Chapter 7, power 
imbalances among EIA constituents could restrict effective dialogue and limit 
potential outcomes. However, attempts at dialogic engagement among participants 
might also lead to more contestation that could promote discontent and a desire to 
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fight for public empowerment and to challenge existing taken-for-granted 
monologic EIAs.  
Approaches to dialogic accounting, based on agonistic democracy, acknowledge 
the impossibility of eliminating power (Bebbington, Brown, Frame, et al., 2007; 
Brown, 2009). Rather, the main challenge is ―how to constitute forms of power 
which are compatible with democratic values‖ (Mouffe, 1995, p. 1536). Therefore, 
the dialogic approach recognises a need for counter-narratives or ―oppositional‖ 
forms of talk to have dialogue with the powerful (Brown, 2009, p. 370). This 
might be intentionally and unintentionally promoted by various NGOs, affected 
local people, and even by some experts, as experts could become the strongest 
legitimate actor cooperating with NGOs in developing NGO counter arguments 
(Li, 2009; Suzuki, 2008).   
Considering the lack of political will and appreciation of the need for more 
dialogic engagement, participation, and facilitation of NGOs could be a potential 
way to foster power issues in the promotion of dialogic EIAs, and to help people 
―to see themselves as active constructors of reality‖ (Brown, 2009, p. 368). As 
discussed in Chapter 8, this could be realised through different NGO engagement 
strategies. However, it should be emphasised that NGOs are not yet fully 
advantaged players in terms of power. Some, challenger NGOs in particular, are 
considered ―noise-makers‖. This indicates a tendency among all EIA constituents 
to exclude NGOs, if they have a more critical voice, from important discussion 
and policy making. This also relates to the contested nature of NGOs and existing 
politics and opportunism among them. Thus, the NGO sector has also experienced 
great power struggles among NGOs to establish their legitimacy in Mongolian 
society.  
All these situations cannot be easily overturned within a short period. Rather, 
there is a need for cooperation among EIA constituents for their common good – 
sustainable and participatory mining. In spite of the above-mentioned difficulties, 
all constituents have begun to recognise that there is growing social pressure from 
the general public, media, NGOs and international communities to change 
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existing bureaucracy, mining mismanagement and the lack of participation. This 
study argues that different types of NGOs might challenge power issues, in spite 
of power imbalances among participants, and the current limited ability of 
affected people to participate in dialogue. Thus, the contestation and coexistence 
of various NGOs could positively influence the transformation to dialogic EIAs.     
9.5 Limitations of the study 
This study has limitations, given its exploratory nature and the availability of data 
sources. The study focuses on Mongolian EIA practices, and its findings and 
lessons might not apply to other LDCs. Because it is multi-disciplinary and 
focuses on Mongolia, comprehensive literature and previous research that 
combines all relevant issues do not exist. For this reason, a longitudinal study 
could not be conducted.  
Due to time and funding restrictions, the fieldwork was carried out over a limited 
period, and it was not possible to observe events unfolding that a longer case-
study would have allowed. These limitations also influenced the choice of the two 
NGO case-studies. Thus the findings and discussion on NGOs might not provide a 
full picture of the Mongolian NGO sector. In spite of these difficulties, I tried to 
obtain as much information on Mongolian EIAs, NGOs, and public participation 
as possible by interviewing existing and potential stakeholder groups of EIA and 
mining. Interviewees were selected, given their direct work experience in mining 
and EIAs, and their interest in mining and environmental protection.  
Various data resources and research methods were used in data collection. 
Contacts with interviewees and data resources were made by telephone calls and 
personal meetings. After interviews, some interviewees were contacted when 
clarification of particular points was needed. The ethical issues arising from the 
research were handled according to the Human Ethics Committee requirements of 
VUW, and by my careful conduct. The identity of most interviewees was kept 
anonymous except for some interviewees and organisations that expressed their 
willingness to be identified.   
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In terms of data analysis and the writing-up, common themes in the interviews 
were extracted, and related to those in existing literature. Interview data was 
triangulated against document analysis and personal observation, where possible. 
Where there were inconsistencies, clarifications from interviewees were sought. 
Given the controversial nature of mining and its impacts, however, it is not 
surprising that interviewees sometimes contradicted each other. In those cases, 
divergent views were discussed.  
Data was checked through triangulation of data sources, where possible. My 
application of the dialogic accounting framework for Mongolian EIA and NGO 
cases was an exploration, and in many instances I have provided interpretations 
and discussion from my own standpoint.  Other researchers or respondent groups 
may have different interpretations depending on their perspectives.  
9.6 Future research 
This study opens up various avenues for future research on dialogic accounting 
and SEA, particularly in LDC contexts.  
My thesis addresses calls in SEA for more empirical studies and interdisciplinary 
research, linking SEA with other social and natural science disciplines 
(Bebbington, Brown, Frame, et al., 2007).  It attempts to foster greater 
accountability by the mining sector from the ―stakeholders‘ side‖, and brings EIA 
into SEA discussion. More detailed SEA research is needed to explore the 
dialogic potential of the EIA as an environmental management tool that can 
explicitly address the environmental and social impacts of development projects.  
The study contributes to dialogic accounting literature by exploring its application 
in an LDC context. This field of SEA calls for pluralistic and democratic 
accounting to promote sustainable development (Bebbington, Brown, Frame, et 
al., 2007; Gray, 2006a; Unerman, et al., 2007). Future researchers could extend 
research findings and reflections in this study to continue discussion on how to 
develop and apply dialogic accounting, particularly in LDCs where Western style 
democracies and dialogic engagement might be emerging, or to develop more 
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LDC-specific alternatives. There is a need for more research examining dialogic 
engagement among stakeholders, evaluating its effectiveness, and exploring the 
potential and challenges of this new approach to accounting.              
This study brought NGOs into the dialogic accounting discussion and argued that 
they could be potential promoters and facilitators of the dialogic process. 
However, future in-depth research is needed to explore their roles and engagement 
strategies in different contexts. Moreover, the roles of other stakeholders, 
particularly local communities, could be investigated through a participatory 
action research study that would need a longer research period.  
This study raises accountability issues of NGOs, particularly in the LDC context. 
Although not explored in detail, my findings support the argument of Gray et al. 
(2006) that the accountability of NGOs in LDCs requires more attention from 
SEA researchers. Further research into NGO accountability is necessary, as NGOs 
might have different accountability challenges, depending on their account-
holders, such as donor organisations, NGO members, and beneficiaries. The latter 
account-holder is often excluded from NGO accountability (Bebbington, 2005; 
McIlwaine, 2009) due to lack of awareness of their rights, responsibilities, and 
power to hold NGOs accountable. 
In sum, researchers could extend the findings of this study and further investigate 
synergies between the EIA and SEA. The EIA provides a potential way to foster 
sustainability, accountability, and accounting in environmental management and 
SEA, and to address calls for operationalising SEA ideas in practice. In addition, 
the potential and challenges of critical dialogic accounting could be further 
explored, discussed, and addressed among researchers and practitioners from 
various disciplines.        
9.7 Concluding comments 
This study explores the potential application of the dialogic accounting framework 
in the mining and environmental management of an LDC. It seeks to contribute to 
the ongoing development of SEA theory and practice, and to foster responsible 
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mining practices in Mongolia and elsewhere. Instead of proposing the ―correct‖ 
solution for Mongolian mining practice, I have endeavoured to open up avenues 
for various EIA constituents, and SEA researchers to begin/continue discussion of 
the potential of dialogic accounting, and of ways to change current practices that 
could address the challenges of sustainable development. 
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Appendix: 
Coding of interviewees 
 EIA constituent groups Code 
 
a. Experts  
 1. EIA companies 
A 
1 EIA company A 
A1 
2 EIA company B 
A2 
3 EIA company C 
A3 
4 EIA company D 
A4 
5 EIA company E 
A5 
6 EIA company F 
A6 
 2. Government organisations  
B 
7 Government organisation A – senior official 1 B1 
8 Government organisation A – senior official 2 B2 
9 Government organisation A – senior specialist B3 
10 Government organisation A – officer B4 
11 Government organisation B – senior inspector 1 B5 
12 Government organisation B – senior inspector 2 B6 
13 Government organisation C – officer B7 
 
b. Non-experts  
 3. Mining companies  
C 
14 Mongolian mining company A C1 
15 Mongolian mining company B C2 
16 Foreign mining company A C3 
 4. International organisations and projects 
D 
17 International donor organisation A – consultant 1 
D1 
18 International donor organisation A – consultant 2 
D2 
19 International donor organisation A - officer 
D3 
20 International donor organisation B - consultant 
D4 
21 International project A - manager  
D5 
22 Donor NGO – manager 
D6 
23 International project B - manager 
D7 
24 Government project - manager 
D8 
 5. Local herders 
E 
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25 A herder of Zaamar soum, Tuv aimag E1 
26 A Herder of Uyanga soum, Uvurkhangai aimag  E2 
27 A herder of Khentii aimag E3 
 6. NGOs 
F 
 a. Local people initiated environmental NGOs  
28 Local environmental NGO A F1 
29 Local environmental NGO B F2 
30 Local environmental NGO C F3 
31 Local environmental NGO D F4 
32 Local environmental NGO E F5 
33 Local environmental NGO F F6 
 b. Domestic NGOs (responsible mining, human right and other 
social issues) 
 
34 Domestic NGO A F7 
35 Domestic NGO B F8 
36 Domestic NGO C F9 
37 Domestic NGO D F10 
38 Domestic NGO F F11 
 c. NGO coalitions  
39 NGO coalition A F12 
40 NGO coalition B F13 
 d. Business interest-oriented NGO  
41 Professional NGO A F14 
 7. Researchers 
G 
42 Researcher A G1 
43 Researcher B G2 
 Total number of interviews 43 
 
 
